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THE LIFE  
OF  
JOHN CALDWELL CALHOUN


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COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES  
VOLUME I





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*J. C. Calhoun*

JOHN C. CALHOUN AS A YOUNG MAN

*Frontispiece, Vol. I*

# THE LIFE OF JOHN CALDWELL CALHOUN


BY  
WILLIAM M. MEIGS

Author of "The Life of Thomas Hart Benton,"  
"The Life of Charles Jared Ingersoll," "The  
Growth of the Constitution," and Other Works

COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES  
VOLUME I



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It had pleased Providence, said Mr. Calhoun, to cast his lot in the slaveholding States. There were his hopes and all that was near and dear to him. His first duty was to them, and he held every other, even his obligations to this Government and the Union, as sacred as he regarded them, subordinate to their safety. He knew he would be assailed, both here and elsewhere, for this avowal; but he had long been accustomed to such assaults. They had no terror for him.—“Works,” Vol. III. p. 178.





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## PREFACE

The following "Life of Calhoun" was undertaken a number of years ago and has, by the labor it has entailed, shown most convincingly to the writer the vast field that Calhoun covered. During nearly forty years of our earlier existence, there were few subjects of public importance on which he did not take a leading part. Many of these concerned the system of slavery and the protection of the then civilization of our South, but the world of his countrymen would make a great mistake to suppose, as many do, that his work was confined to this one point. In his later years that subject was of controlling importance to him, as to all Americans; but the case was far otherwise during much of his public life.

The fact, however, that he was the leader in the losing struggle of the South has centred public attention on this one phase of his life's work, and his fame,—so great in his day,—has suffered a marked eclipse. Modern man, with slavery as much gone as is the civilization of ancient Egypt, or Assyria, can hardly conceive how vital were the questions presented to the South by the growth of abolition sentiment and the evident likelihood that in no long course of years the slaves would be emancipated. To the Southerner this result was ever a nightmare, promising a terrible upheaval, the loss of his existing civilization, and even a reversion to some state of half-barbarism. These predictions of his have not been fully realized, but we must remember that the generation that lived during Abolition did go through a period not so different. Most of us probably realize to-day that the fundamental difficulties in a popular government of the existence side by side of the two races are still unsolved and are perhaps no nearer solution than they were fifty years ago. Calhoun said that the negroes, instead of being the slaves of the individual, would become the slaves of the community, and the tendency is, beyond doubt, away from actual equality and toward some other form of absolute control by the white race.

All this adds to the difficulty of writing a Life of Calhoun; and perhaps we have here the reason why the task has not before

been attempted. The student of modern times studies with infinite patience the inscriptions on bricks buried some thousands of years ago, and the cultivated public are interested in the results; but the struggles from which has emerged our American civilization of to-day appeal to but few of our people. There is no adequate Life of Calhoun. Jenkins's "Life" (published soon after Calhoun died, and which is perhaps the one referred to by Crallé in his Note to the Oregon Negotiation<sup>1</sup> as "now being prepared for the press") is the most extensive, and there is no other even purporting to be full. There are several short ones, among which by far the best is that by Mr. Gaillard Hunt, admirable so far as it goes, but only intended to be a sketch.

Von Holst's "Life" must also not be forgotten,—a work much lauded by a certain class of our historians, whose chief purpose seems to be to write down everything concerning the South and resolutely to refuse to present or to realize the *milieu* in which the Southerner lived prior to 1861. Von Holst almost says in his early pages that he cannot imagine himself walking and talking with Calhoun and, when he comes to present the State Rights view held by the subject of his book, he shows a lack of comprehension of fundamental points which is quite inexcusable in one who had undertaken to write the Life. He had either never read Calhoun's arguments, or had not tried to understand them, for he could easily have done so; and it looks as if he had merely gulped down the partisan answers of Webster and others.

To assert, as Von Holst does,<sup>2</sup> that Calhoun held that our Constitution was an agreement made between the States on the one part and the United States on the other is to misstate most grossly what the State Rights School maintained as to the nature of our Government. Nor was it necessary to wait until Calhoun's day to ascertain what that school did maintain on this point. The very history of the origin of our Government showed plainly that the several States were the only parties to the Constitution, and that the United States was the resultant or derivative or agent for certain purposes of the States, much as a partnership results from the agreement of its members among themselves. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99 stated the matter most

<sup>1</sup> Calhoun's "Works," Vol. V, pp. 414-15.

<sup>2</sup> "Life," pp. 139-40.



plainly,—“that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party,—its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party.”<sup>3</sup>

The origin of Von Holst's error is apparently Webster's final speech in the great debate with Hayne. The latter had stated the matter accurately, that “the Federal Constitution, therefore, is . . . a compact by which each State, acting in its own sovereign capacity, has entered into an agreement with the other States, by which they have consented that certain designated powers shall be exercised by the United States”<sup>4</sup> but a little further on he made the slip of saying “when it is insisted by the gentleman that one of the parties [the Federal Government] ‘has the power of deciding ultimately,’” etc., etc. And he later repeats this error, which his opponent, the great orator and skillful advocate, fixed upon with the grip of death and held up to crushing ridicule in the last short speech, which closed the debate. The blunder is far more ridiculous in Von Holst's mouth, and has not the excuse of inadvertence in a largely extempore discussion.

The State Rights theories, whether right or not, were guilty of no such shortcomings as this. They were scientifically very accurate. All the elements fitted together and made a perfect whole, conclusion following from premise in a way that is fascinating to many minds. To the present writer, who was carried to them by mental conviction in impressionable youth after the Civil War, they still seem absolutely unanswerable, if we approach the subject and discuss it in the way that our public men did down to 1861-65. In my opinion, neither Webster nor any one else ever approached an answer to Calhoun,—I still mean on the basis on which they discussed the problem. The facts were plain, and the conclusion seemed to follow as day follows night.

But was their method of approach the true one? Are vast subjects, involving the welfare of millions upon millions, living and to be born, to be decided by the syllogism and the methods of the forum? Can faulty human logic be allowed to conclude questions of such infinite magnitude? It has rarely done so in the long run, though the method is always used for make-weight and has doubtless controlled in some cases, but man has in vital

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Calhoun's “Discourse on the Constitution,” etc., in “Works,” Vol. I, p. 355, and see also the same in the “Massachusetts Remonstrance,” Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 350-351 and in many other authoritative statements of that day and later.

<sup>4</sup> “Congressional Debates,” Vol. VI, Part 1, 1829-30, p. 86.

matters thrown to the winds so frail a crutch as it affords. The "perils of the logical short-cut" in complex circumstances have been appreciated by some public men, even some who were logicians in a high degree.<sup>5</sup>

Instances might be cited by the score in which the results of theory and the syllogism have not been and could not be adhered to in practical affairs. The Roman Catholic Church in Italy itself recognizes Uniat Priests and their wives. St. Augustine balked at the inevitable logic that demonstrates that the Deity predestined for millions that they would be damned. Calvin was of a different mettle and almost revelled in this result, but modern days have seen his followers eat away the essence of this article of their creed,—yet at the same time still claim to be Calvinists. The Catholics and the Christian Churches in general no longer follow out or want to follow out what is certainly the logical result of their beliefs, that they must destroy or at least silence such men as Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall and others, whose teachings have undoubtedly undermined the faith of centuries. And in the same general direction it may be mentioned that the most successful governments have been the most highly unphilosophical in history. Few laws have been passed in England or other countries governed by the parliamentary system, which have not been a hodge-podge of compromise.

In the arguments which have been advanced in history and in some great law cases, we find again the like incompatibility between the conclusion of the syllogism and the result necessarily carried into effect in practice. The Attorney-General of England argued in 1624, on a *quo warranto* upon the charter of the Virginia Company, that the power conferred to carry the king's subjects to Virginia, if exercised without limitation, might result in the transfer across the seas of the whole population, and thus leave England a howling wilderness: whence he concluded that the power was too great to be bestowed on a private company and therefore the charter ought to be revoked.<sup>6</sup> Most lawyers have heard arguments made in court not so dissimilar from this, based on some world-shaking cataclysm, which is, however, absolutely certain never to be realized in actual affairs.

Nor were such arguments, or rather such absurdities, confined to one or two countries. The pages of the following Life show

<sup>5</sup> Morley's "Gladstone," Vol. I, p. 309.

<sup>6</sup> Fiske's "Old Virginia and Her Neighbors," p. 219.



a rich instance in an attempted demonstration,—scorned by Calhoun,—that Texas was still a part of our Union in 1843, for the reason that the Federal Government had had no power *to convey it away* by the Treaty of 1819. So, in 1609, when it was desired in the German Empire to make the monarchical power stronger, a young jurist, whose mind was perhaps obsessed by the idea of The Holy Roman Empire, advanced the thesis that the monarchy was, in accordance with the terms of the never-repealed *lex regia* of ancient Rome, an absolute one, and others had to demonstrate the unsoundness of this argument based on a law forgotten under the dust of centuries and belonging to the history of an entirely different people.<sup>7</sup>

Probably the following extract from Macaulay's review of Mill's "Essay on Government" sums up the truth as to such mental extravaganzas as have been noticed:

The fact is, that, when men, in treating of things which cannot be circumscribed by precise definitions, adopt this mode of reasoning, when once they begin to talk of power, happiness, misery, pain, pleasure, motives, objects of desire, as they talk of lines and numbers, there is no end to the contradictions and absurdities into which they fall. There is no proposition so monstrously untrue in morals or politics that we will not undertake to prove it, by something which shall sound like a logical demonstration, from admitted principles.

Perhaps then, after all, Webster used the best weapons that could be used to bring about the birth of a nation. He could not meet the facts and the crystal clear deductions of Calhoun's logic from them, so he indulged at times in most barefaced assertions and appealed in splendid oratory to the pride and glory of our past and the promise of our future, moving his earlier opponent Hayne to an open acknowledgment of this feature of the wonderful orations of 1830.

Nor could Webster then speak of what students since the Civil War, groping for an answer to the State Rights view, have called the historical growth of our nationalism. Such a process was then not recognized, was but in embryo, and any one who advanced it would certainly have been met by the cry of usurpation and wrong. As a matter of fact, we can see to-day that, not only since 1789, but almost since our colonies were founded, the seeds of an American Nation were in existence. Slowly and

<sup>7</sup> "Deutsche Geschichte" von Karl Lamprecht. Zweite Abtheilung. Erster Band. Zweite Haelfte, s. 486.

insensibly they grew and spread, adding in time even new meaning to the written words of the Constitution, and not infrequently (it must be admitted) in the teeth of them, until by 1860 many mystic cords bound us together, while the material bonds of the vast and ever increasing network of iron rails and the constant intercourse between the parts added other nationalistic elements of vast power.

This whole subject was well presented by Lamar in his oration in Charleston in 1887 on the unveiling of the Monument erected by the Ladies' Calhoun Monument Association, and the orator intimated very plainly to his Southern audience the opinion that Calhoun had entirely neglected to take into view essential matters in our history, which were entitled to great weight against his theories. It was a bold and manly view for a man of the South to present to so highly Southern a community, but it seems to have been well received. Charles Francis Adams and others have since presented much the same view, and it is a curious fact that Calhoun himself recognized the like historical growth in England.<sup>8</sup> It is an interstitial process, very gradual and advancing by insensible steps, and perhaps offers the best mode of escape from the irresistible logic of Calhoun and the State Rights School.

What were these views,—now so nearly forgotten? They are nowhere consecutively stated as a whole by Calhoun, but the reader interested in the subject will find much of them in the early portions of his "Discourse on the Constitution"<sup>9</sup> and in his "Letter to Governor Hamilton."<sup>10</sup> In the former he bears weight on the fact,—which was in 1789 undoubtedly in general recognized,—that our States were originally nations, small and of little power, it is true, but larger than some in Europe, and at the same time without any union at all among themselves. They created the Congress of the Revolution, voted as units in it, and gave their agency so little power that the Congress was obliged even to appeal to the States to pass laws which it had no power to pass. The name of the central body moreover was then and ever has been Congress, a word meaning a meeting together of nations.

The next central power,—the Confederation,—was palpal

<sup>8</sup> "Discourse on the Constitution," etc., in "Works," Vol. I, p. 394.

<sup>9</sup> "Works," Vol. I, p. III, *et seq.*

<sup>10</sup> "Works," Vol. VI, pp. 144-193.

a mere union of States, and each State expressly reserved its sovereignty. Nor was the present constitution adopted for the whole country by a vote of the majority of its people, as it would of course have been, if we had been one nation. No one seriously proposed such a plan. Each State adopted for itself alone and as to the people of any State the instrument was void and of no effect, until that State should ratify. North Carolina and Rhode Island remained out of the Union for eight and fourteen months respectively, after it was put into operation and there was no serious contention that they had not the right so to do or were willy-nilly a part of the United States. On the other hand, an opposing minority in any State, as for instance in the upper country of South Carolina, was at once swept into the Union against its will as a part of the State by the affirmative action of that particular State.

Some writers have sought to draw far-reaching conclusions from the language of certain of the commissions issued to delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They forget that these commissions conferred no power but to mould a draft, as committees are appointed to suggest a form of contract or settlement. The form of Constitution proposed in May, 1787, was a mere sketch like an unsigned deed or contract, and was of no force or effect whatsoever, until the breath of life was breathed into it. And this vital spark was only derived from the later action of nine States, approving quite separately and each for itself alone.

Under this new Constitution, as well as by the terms of the Confederation, there was no merger of the States. Each remained an existing sovereignty. Rights and powers were reserved to them, and their continued maintenance was essential to the very existence of the government established. "We, the people," on which frail phrase the nationalistic school sought to build so much, was plainly of no real weight. Not only did the preamble, until nearly the end of the Convention, go on and list the thirteen States *nominatim*, but palpably the change was made for the simple reason that it was impossible to know in advance which of the thirteen would ratify. And more than this, a later clause of the instrument already provided that ratification by any nine States should be sufficient to establish the constitution among the States so ratifying. How could the preamble be left to read that we, the people of thirteen enumerated States ordain a constitution, the ratification of which by any nine States (the same

instrument went on) was to be sufficient to establish it among the nine only?

The Union formed in 1789 was then still a Union of States, and no consolidation. It was a more perfect union than the Articles of Confederation, and the new government was to act directly on individuals; but the States did not act whatsoever from which a surrender or merger of their sovereignty (their very existence) could be inferred, and some of the ratifications contained assertions plainly negating such an idea. To-day, when the subject has lost its importance, I think the student will generally admit all this, and that the overwhelming sentiment in 1789 and for a number of years afterward admitted and insisted on the continuing existence of the sovereignty of the States. Had those jealous little entities dreamed in 1787 and 1788 that it would be asserted that they were to cease to exist and to become merged into one nation, few of them would have ratified the instrument. Massachusetts did not want to sink her existence and merge with South Carolina and the rest of her little known sisters, any more than did South Carolina. They were quite too far apart and too diverse to have consented knowingly to such a course.

To meet this difficulty, the nationalistic school took up the idea of divided sovereignty. The States were, it said, sovereign in some departments, but the United States equally so in others. It is quite true that the function to carry out certain powers was delegated to the United States and that relating to others reserved to the States, but this was merely a question of the *exercise* of these powers and did not touch sovereignty. The latter is by its very nature as incapable of division as is life or personality, and must rest as a whole somewhere. It had rested with the States at the time of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, no act or series of acts of theirs can be shown by which they gave it up, and therefore it still remained to them.

With the Union then a union between sovereign States, what was to be done, if the agencies of the Union should assume powers not granted and oppress one or more States? When some members of a partnership violate the articles, the suffering member goes to court for redress; but a sovereign State cannot do this. What is then its remedy? It was contended by the Nationalists that, under certain clauses of the Constitution, the federal judiciary was to decide this problem. That is to say, one mere department of the agency which the States had created, was



to pass judgment on questions as to the authorities that the creators had conferred on the central Government, even when one or many of the creating States denied the existence of the power. A vast function, indeed, and unlimited,—the like of which was surely never before conferred upon one department of an agency or derivative government! Nor had the judiciary ever in history been meant to decide questions of national power, of sovereignty, and to conclude the whole world. Their function is to decide,—and of course finally decide,—suits between parties; but this does not extend to deciding Who is the King, or what the ultimate nature of the United States Government, or any other question of a political nature.

So it is infinitely unlikely that this idea, so foreign to the highly educated publicists of the Convention, was in their minds; and their language is absolutely satisfied by supposing it to mean simply that the judiciary was to settle and conclude suits between parties. To these decisions would be attached the weight that belonged to precedents in Anglo-Saxon countries, but this had not extended to concluding Parliament or the Commons on a question of power. There is little reason to suppose that our founders meant to give far greater influence to the judiciary they were creating, and authorize them to settle finally what was the extent of the powers conferred by the States on the Central Government and in so doing to conclude not only the rights of the parties to the suit but the rights of the creating States.

The question then recurs: How were disputes as to the existence or non-existence of a power to be settled? The States, it has been already said, were different from the members of a partnership. The latter had a superior over them, could appeal in an orderly way to a civil court and thus obtain and easily enforce a decision. But the States, with their proud attribute of sovereignty knew no superior, and had only the remedies incident to sovereignty. It was here that Nullification or State Interposition was brought in, first threatened and barely sketched in the rough in 1798–99 and its details worked out to completeness under Calhoun's inspiration in 1828–33. The claim was that any one of our States had,—as a nation voluntarily united in a league with others,—the right to decide for itself as to the extent of the powers it had conferred on the central agency, and to prevent the enforcement within its limits of any Congressional statute which it held was unauthorized. This is what South

Carolina did in 1832, and this the basis of reasoning on which was rested her action.

To-day it seems absurd to almost every American, but at its date there was a large sprinkling throughout the country of men of brilliant intellect and of the highest character, to whom every step in the argument,—and the conclusion as well,—was as plain as Holy Writ; while in our earlier history under the present Constitution, hosts of our public men would hardly have had a doubt upon the question.

But the results of Nullification, as applied in practice, were most extraordinary. Let us consider the one concrete instance. Tariff laws, partly intended for protection, were nullified under the claim that the power to pass such laws was *palpably* not conferred, yet in the first session of the First Congress under our present Constitution, protection was discussed to no little extent, and the very second law on the statute books recited as one reason for its passage the necessity for “the encouragement and protection of manufacturers that duties be laid on goods.” Calhoun, too, who was the chief advocate of the Nullification in 1832, had voted for the Act of 1816 and numbers of his utterances are quoted in this Life, which show that he was to no little extent inspired in his earlier public life with the desire to have Congress pass laws for protection. And, besides this, he and numbers of the leaders standing shoulder to shoulder with him in the contest of 1828–33 had only too recently been strong nationalists, spurning the State Rights views of Cooper and others.

In the face of this record, it was a mere paper limitation that Calhoun built when he wrote in his “Discourse”,<sup>11</sup> that nullification was only to be exercised in case of “a clear and palpable infraction of the instrument” [the Constitution]. The instance is one more example of how in such arguments each party ever assumes that its side will act in an orderly way and not go an inch beyond the perpendicular. In reality it always is and was in this case too plain for discussion that the asserted right was almost certain to be exercised for getting rid of any course of legislation a particular State might seriously dislike, no matter how slight the injury or how little the unconstitutionality might be palpable. And it furnished an almost certain device to undo the law; for the claim of the theory was that, when *one* State interposed its sovereign voice against a particular statute, that

<sup>11</sup> “Works,” Vol. I, p. 280.

statute was at once to cease to be of effect within its limits, and the power it was based on was to be finally decided not to exist at all, unless, by a process similar to that of amendment, *three quarters* of the States should affirmatively decide that the power did exist. An easy way indeed for a very small minority to control a very large majority and to re-write the terms of the constitution!

Perhaps, there is some evidence that Calhoun felt these difficulties of the impracticability of "the high prerogative remedy," and hence conceded the necessity of a justification for nullifying, as well as elaborated the idea that, after nullification by one State, the others should call upon the amending process, and to this added that the nullifying State must then submit to the result, and should the power be affirmed to exist, must either cease its objection or withdraw from the Union.<sup>12</sup> Clearly needed though some such corollary was to the decent administration of affairs, I, at least, can see nothing in the theories of sovereignty that leads to or even permits the corollary and the control of the States' sovereignty by such an outside influence. Sovereignty never has been controlled by such means, did not need a justification, and it looks like an addition devised in order to make the central theory workable and avoid a confusion worse confounded. It was probably the like feeling that led Calhoun to object to the term Nullification and long to use instead that of State Interposition, which pointed to this corollary devised by him.

Such was Nullification. And even in those early days, when Nationalism was a new-born babe or an embryo, so striking were the incongruities sure to flow from nullification that as sturdy a State-Rights man as Nathaniel Macon refused to accept it, at the same time that he asserted to the full the right of any State to secede at will from the Union.<sup>13</sup> ✓

The right of secession concerns us less intimately here, but would have received pretty general,—or at least very frequent,—recognition in 1789 and for numbers of years later. It was an ever-present dread of our earlier statesmen, as may be seen from a thousand of their utterances. As a recent author has summed the matter up:<sup>14</sup> "Both [North and South] alike, when independence was declared, and even when the Constitution was

<sup>12</sup> Letter to Governor Hamilton, Jenkins' "Life," pp. 214, 222.

<sup>13</sup> Wm. E. Dodd's "Nathaniel Macon," p. 385.

<sup>14</sup> Garrison's "Westward Extension," p. 12.

adopted, regarded the Union as a confederacy from which any State might withdraw if it desired to do so." And other recent writers could be referred to who have reached very similar conclusions,<sup>15</sup> while such could be plainly shown to have been the belief of hosts of our earlier men.<sup>16</sup> They often spoke in that day of their State as their country.

But even here, so doubtful are such abstract questions as the rights of a sovereignty, so much are they perhaps bound up with the reciprocal rights of the others with whom a league or union has been formed, that possibly, after all, a justification is necessary for one or more members doing an act that the others regard as injurious to them. Plighted faith can hardly be denied all weight in the matter. It was evidently with this in mind that Gladstone, though at heart against the North, wrote to Cyrus Field in 1862:

Your frightful conflict may be regarded from many points of view. The competency of the Southern States to secede: the rightfulness of their conduct in seceding (two matters wholly distinct and a great deal too much confounded),

And again:

There is last and (relatively to this subject-matter) best of all the strong instinct of national life, and the abhorrence of nature itself towards the severance of an organized body.<sup>17</sup>

It is impossible here to go at length into the question whether or not South Carolina had a sufficient justification in 1832, or the South in 1861. In the latter case laws by the score had been passed in the North in violation of plain promises contained in the Constitution, but they were defended under the claim of a "higher law." And then still another question arises whether the existence of this higher law can be recognized. The question thus becomes nearly infinite in its ramifications.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Claude H. Van Tyne's "Sovereignty in the American Revolution" in Vol. XII, "American Historical Review," pp. 529-45, or his later "The American Revolution."

<sup>16</sup> See Wm. E. Dodd's "Life of Nathaniel Macon," p. 11, and same author's "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 207; Pendleton's "Stephens," pp. 108, 117-120, 186 *et seq.*; R. T. Bennett's "Address at Raleigh, N. C. on May 22, 1894," in "Southern History Society Papers," Vol. XXII, p. 83.

<sup>17</sup> Morley's "Gladstone," Vol. II, pp. 71, 72.



In what way the heart was slowly and insensibly eaten out of the earlier view as to the powers and rights of the States could not possibly be traced. It never was abandoned in the South until after the Civil War; and numbers of leading men in the North asserted ultra State Rights views down to as late as 1861, whenever the interests of their section were severely pinched. The abolitionists, of course, ever railed at the Union, but far sounder minds did the same thing. The opposition in the North to the annexation of Texas squinted dreadfully toward Nullification, and John Quincy Adams urged resolutions that "any attempt to annex the Republic of Texas to this Union would be a violation of the Constitution, null and void, and to which the free States of the Union, and their people, ought not to submit."<sup>18</sup> Any number of like opinions could be cited from others, and Seward's "higher law" was but Nullification viewed from another angle.

But, despite these occasional instances, probably the North had come by 1861 to look upon our country as a Nation. The historical growth of our Nationalism was there recognized by that time. But the difficulty still remains that the other large and contiguous area of our country,—the South,—did not recognize it, but adhered consistently to the beliefs of 1789 and later. And how then the problem is to be settled and a satisfactory explanation to be formulated why one party was wrong in its constitutional contentions in 1861-65, and which party was the wrong one, must be for other pens.

Our feelings, our universal present views as to the absolute necessity of the result attained, lead us rapidly and instantly to a conclusion, but the pale cast of thought is far from an aid. To view the obverse of this coin is but to bring in difficulties,—perhaps not doubts,—and, as with Milton's angels discussing "fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute," the mind is soon "in wandering mazes lost."

Probably a recent writer, quoted immediately above, has well put some truths in regard to the real essence of the matter. Control, power, the virile desire to rule and even to exploit, lay back of much of the history. Mr. Garrison goes on,—directly after what has been quoted from him shortly above:

<sup>18</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. XI, p. 330.

And this view the South continued to hold afterwards—even to the extreme of secession and Civil War; but the North, seeing the advantage of the national machinery provided by the Constitution for the support of its policy and the promotion of its interests, was gradually led to use its growing strength through that machinery and to adopt the nationalistic attitude. Under such circumstances, it was but natural for the weaker South, even if there had been far less historical justification for its attitude, to fall back on the defensive theory of State Rights.

Here the problem must rest, so far as the present writer is concerned. Perhaps some day a mind with the analytical power that Calhoun possessed will grapple with the subject and point out to us the true conclusion of reason. And, when this is done, probably no great share of blame in a human sense will after all adhere to either of the great contestants in the monumental and inevitable struggle of 1861-65.

My thanks are due to a great many persons. Without the aid of the "Calhoun Correspondence," brought together by Professor Jameson, my task could not have been accomplished. Some few other collections of letters in manuscript and in print have come to my knowledge, and every assistance in going over those in manuscript has been rendered me by their owners, whose names are all mentioned in the text. To Mr. Gaillard Hunt, of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, I am particularly indebted for calling my attention to highly important letters in the Library and for aid in going over them and in solving some of the mysteries they present. From Miss FitzSimons, Librarian of the Charleston Library Society, I have received frequent aid in consulting the Society's very large collection of newspapers, and in efforts to unfathom various matters. Mr. Theodore D. Jervey, author of the "Life of Hayne," has most kindly aided me in many instances with his knowledge of the South Carolina law system, as well as in regard to matters of local history and of geography, which I was unable to understand. Mr. Salley, head of the South Carolina Historical Commission, has aided me in an examination of some of the early legislative proceedings of South Carolina, still in manuscript, and has also kindly allowed me to reproduce certain illustrations contained in his article on the Calhoun family mentioned early in my text. Mr. Edwin Calhoun of Abbeville, Mr. and Mrs. A. P. Calhoun of Atlanta, the authorities of Clemson College, and Mr. W. A. Clark, President of the Carolina National Bank in Columbia, have all allowed me to have photographs made of various portraits owned either

by them or their institution, and there are numbers of others who have aided me in different ways. Many of these are mentioned in the text, and my sincerest thanks are due and rendered to all.

In regard to the illustrations contained in these volumes sufficient information is generally contained in the legends, but in some instances this is not the case. The frontispiece to the first volume is thought to be from the portrait owned by Mr. Patrick Calhoun and to have been painted at the time when Calhoun was Secretary of War. It was not possible to secure a copy of the original painting in time.

The Reeve Law School Building was erected by Reeve in 1782 on the same lot on South Street on which his dwelling-house stood. It was later removed and used as a part of a dwelling, but was carefully restored by Dwight C. Kilbourn, and in 1911 was removed to its present site on the grounds of the Litchfield Historical Society. The Gould Building was erected by Gould in 1795 on the lot on North Street, where his residence stood, but was, after the giving up of the Law School, removed a mile west of the village, was there occupied for a time by a family of negroes, and was finally destroyed.<sup>19</sup>

The portrait by Rembrandt Peale, forming the frontispiece to the second volume, was painted for Mrs. Armistead Burt, Calhoun's niece. It is marked as having been painted in 1834, but it has had some serious vicissitudes, and in a letter to Armistead Burt, dated November 17, 1838, Calhoun writes: <sup>20</sup>

My factor in Charleston writes me that he has received the Portrait from Mr. Peile [*sic*] and that the cost including the difference of exchange is \$103 25/100, which you will please pay my brother William on my account. I hope you will be pleased with it.

The present owner is Mrs. Thomas Frost of Charleston, whose mother was brought up by Mr. and Mrs. Burt and often stayed also at Fort Hill, when going to school. Mrs. Frost has frequently heard her mother say that Calhoun thought this portrait the best ever painted of him.

The War Department portrait reproduced at page 38 of Volume II is said to have been found about 1870 by Secretary Belknap in an attic at West Point and to have been removed by him to the Department in Washington.

<sup>19</sup> Dwight C. Kilbourn's "Bench and Bar of Litchfield County, Conn.," pp. 191, 195. Pamphlet "Presentation Exercises. The Litchfield Law School, 1911."

<sup>20</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 416-17.

The full-length portrait at page 374 of Volume II is from a painting at Clemson College which has on it a plate reading: "Details of likeness from Brady's Celebrated Daguerreotype. Painted by T. Hicks. Engraved by A. H. Ritchie. Published by R. A. Bachia, 12 Dey Street." Another copy hangs in the Carolina National Bank at Columbia and an engraving of the same is owned by Mr. Edwin Calhoun of Abbeville. The portrait seems to be the original from which has been made, with several minor variations, the head and shoulders of Calhoun reproduced in Davis's "Rise and Fall," Stephens's "War between the States," and many other works. These reproductions are often spoken of as "the DeBloch" portrait, but are in reality quite different. Mrs. A. P. Calhoun, the granddaughter of Mrs. Clemson, has kindly loaned me a copy of De Bloch's portrait, three copies of which were made in Belgium from a miniature in a bracelet, but which was not liked (so Mrs. Calhoun informs me) by the family. It differs in many respects from the ordinary cut. Capt. John C. Calhoun of New York owns a second copy of the De Bloch portrait.

WILLIAM M. MEIGS.

PHILADELPHIA.

# THE LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

## CHAPTER I

### PRELIMINARY

#### The Upper Country of South Carolina — Ancestry of John C. Calhoun.

THE settlement of America has been full of romance. The resistless power of the colonists pushing on across the continent and forever subduing new regions to their control resembles the action of one of the forces of nature in its intensity and persistent pressure. Halted and dammed up here and there for a time, the wave of humanity has always ere long broken over the barrier and kept on upon its course, until finally the shores of the Western Ocean itself were reached. Men, the petty pawns of the social forces, have been worn out and sacrificed by the thousand on the crest of this torrent-like surge of humanity; but a vast destiny has thereby been opened up to our branch of the human race. The frontier, that outward edge of civilization beyond which lay only wild nature, has been pushed steadily on, and now for some years we have had no frontier-town in the American sense. From ocean to ocean, the whole of our territory has been harnessed to civilization.

The history of few regions concerned in this growth offers so much of stirring interest as does that of the foot-hills and easternmost valleys of the long Appalachian chain of mountains. It is true that the first comers to Virginia and Massachusetts found terrible difficulties to overcome, but in general the settlers in what are now our Middle and upper Southern States had a comparatively easy task in filling the coastal plains and the fertile river valleys. They and their immediate suc-



cessors spread rapidly over the rich country to the westward, and in a remarkably short course of years created a series of separate colonies lying along the shores of the Atlantic and reaching inward nearly to the mountains, each colony with its own customs and with systems of law materially different the one from the other.

But the great Appalachian chain of mountains once reached, the story was very different. Those towering hills were not to be passed by ordinary men. The mere barrier of nature was almost insuperable under the then conditions and would alone have long delayed settlement; but, besides this, entrance upon the frowning mountain region meant also bloody conflict with the French, the powerful rivals of the English in America. Many years elapsed before these hindrances began to be solved, and a new race had to enter upon the scene in order to overcome the obstruction. Neither the Quaker of Pennsylvania, the Dutch of New York, the Catholic of Maryland, nor the Cavalier of Virginia was alone competent to the task.

The Scotch-Irish was the race that in the main accomplished this labor of Hercules. That strange people, made up of qualities so diverse, with a large dash of evil and so much good in its character, and of such unlimited pluck and endurance, forced its way almost inch by inch over the rough foot-hills and lesser spurs of the mountains and ere long found itself in a rich region of smiling and fertile valleys. And these valleys did not run inland as did those of the coastal plains, toward the interior of the continent, but extended in a southwesterly direction, roughly parallel to the shores of the ocean as well as to the great chain of mountains.

Down along the course of these valleys these Scotch-Irish and their descendants swept on, with numbers augmented by adventurous spirits from many other sources, until they had reduced to possession a long strip of territory lying inland from the older settlements and stretching from Western Pennsylvania southwestwardly down the troughs of the mountain valleys to Tennessee and the Carolinas, where the mountains give out and end in a rich and rolling country. Constituting

the "backwoodsmen" of Pennsylvania, they were generally known in Virginia as the "dwellers in the back country," while in the region we have to do with their section was usually called "the upper country."

In all this long tongue of territory occupied by them and lying to the west of the coastal plains they had a fairly uniform civilization of their own and were not greatly influenced either by the Quakers of Pennsylvania or by any of the other races with which they came in contact. And despite the long course of years now elapsed since they came into the region, one may still see to-day in many of the inhabitants the bolt upright hair and other lineaments of the old type, as pure as it was in the days of Calhoun, of Jackson, or of their ancestors.

This is not the place to record the ceaseless struggle that this virile people had with nature and with that terrible enemy, the American Indian. Some instances, indeed, of these features will come out later in the lives of early Calhouns, but no extended sketch of that branch of history belongs here. Suffice it merely to call the reader's attention to this element in that people's life, and to remind him that by virtue of their position the settlers in the Appalachian valleys and in the upper country of South Carolina were the pickets and outlying forces to ward off Indian attack. They were thus almost certain to be scattered and ruined before the dwellers in the more settled regions would even know that the savages were on the war-path.

To this Scotch-Irish race of such strange contrasts of character belonged, on both his father's side and his mother's, the ancestors of John Caldwell Calhoun. In personal appearance he bore clearly enough the marks of his ancestry; but I, at least, am unable to see the prevalence of the type in his mental make-up. The human mind is too subtle to allow us to trace with any clearness the origin of its peculiarities, and possibly we must be contented to suppose that the mind of this great American statesman was somewhat in the nature of what the thought of modern times calls a *sport*, or perhaps that his race was in the uncertain equilibrium of the *mutants* of some thinkers. In his father we shall find some of his qualities, but,

so far as we know, none of that cold and relentless reasoning, clear as the waters of the Gulf Stream and as crushing and resistless as fate, which so distinguished the son. And surely in the probable history of the families in their old home, we cannot imagine much that might go to develop a profound thinker and overwhelming logician.

As we go backward in history, toward the beginnings of things, it is not usually long before a period of mist and uncertainty is reached, where one gropes in darkness, able to do little better than guess from supposed probabilities. So it is in a marked degree with the origin of families; and I do not think the case is different with the clan of Calhoun. One member of the family, however, writes that its history "has been distinctly traced back to the reign of Gregory the Great, and connected with the Earl of Lexon in Dumbartonshire, Scotland, and one of the younger sons of King Conock of Ireland, who came to the same region at that period. The name of Conock soon became corrupted into Colquohoun, Colquhoun, Colchoun and finally Calhoun. The first ancestor who obtained the barony of Colquhoun in Dumbartonshire was Umphredies, who lived in the time of Alexander the Second."<sup>1</sup>

Another writer<sup>2</sup> undertakes to fix the date of ancient oc-

<sup>1</sup> "The National Register of the Society Sons of the American Revolution," *sub* "Capt. John Caldwell Calhoun" (a grandson of the Senator), pp. 721-723. Captain Calhoun gives no authorities. The curious may turn, too, to the sketch of the Calhoun family given in Charles Croslegh's "Descent and Alliances of Croslegh, &c.," (of which there is a copy in the Library of the University of South Carolina, at Columbia). This begins with Umfridis (b. 1190), and has a Rev. Alexander (b. 1662), the eighteenth in descent from him, whose son James married Catherine Montgomery and came out to America, with his brothers, Ezekiel and Patrick. Mr. Croslegh doubts the accuracy of this account, which had been sent him.

<sup>2</sup> Col. W. Pinkney Starke in his "Account of Calhoun's Early Life," as abridged in "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun," edited by Prof. J. Franklin Jameson (published in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1899), pp. 65-89. Col. Starke's account has been severely criticised, and certainly with justice in many particulars, in the "South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine" Vol. II (1901), pp. 158-163; 248, 249; but there are many statements in his sketch for which he cites either local knowledge or reminiscences given him by nearly related members of the family. The difficulty is, of course, to determine what statements do and what do not rest on such authority.



currences with a minuteness that unavoidably leads one to doubt his accuracy. He tells us that "among the emigrants from Scotland to North Ireland who crossed the channel early in the eighteenth century was a family of Colquhouns and another of Caldwells [the family name of Calhoun's mother]. The Gaelic clan Colquhoun is said to have been very respectable in numbers. The Caldwells were Lowlanders from the Frith of Solway." He continues that owing to bad crops in the north of Ireland in 1727-28-29, the Calhouns, who had settled in county Donegal, concluded to remove to America. Three brothers Calhoun, he goes on, emigrated in 1733 and arrived in New York, but soon removed to the western part of Pennsylvania and later to Virginia. One of these three brothers was James, who with Catherine, his wife, and four sons, James, William, Patrick and Ezekiel, thus ventured to take their chances in the New World.

Many of these statements are borne out by an authority,<sup>3</sup> which may be fully relied upon as reproducing at least what Calhoun himself believed in regard to the origin of his family. And whether the Caldwells were Lowlanders, or the Colquhouns left Scotland for Ireland at about the date asserted by Col. Starke or not, it is at least clear from all the authorities that Calhoun's mother, Martha Caldwell, as well as his father,

<sup>3</sup> "Life of John C. Calhoun," printed anonymously in 1843 as a campaign biography. This publication was always attributed to Robert M. T. Hunter, until Mr. Gaillard Hunt found in the Crallé papers a letter of R. B. Rhett to Crallé, dated in 1854, in which Rhett says that it was almost entirely written by Calhoun himself. Rhett was asked at the time to let it be published under his name, but refused to appear as the author of what he had not written. Hunter was then selected, and Rhett and Hunter read it over at Rhett's house. Rhett says that Hunter "inserted about a page and a half and became the putative author." See Mr. Hunt's Article in "American Historical Review," Vol. XIII, p. 311, and *résumé* in his "Life of Calhoun," pp. 250-251. Calhoun wrote of the publication at the time to his daughter, saying merely that Hunter had "re-written most of the [sketch] so much so as to be fairly entitled to the authorship," while a letter to his brother-in-law speaks of transmitting by mail "a sketch of my life, prepared by some of my friends here," "Correspondence," pp. 524-525. Still more indicative of the real authorship is, perhaps, a letter dated October 25, 1842, to Calhoun from Joseph A. Scoville, later his clerk and a political supporter. Scoville writes: "As soon as possible, I would advise your sending me the proposed life, etc. I have seen the publishers, and they will wait very willingly. I will select some one here to edit it." "Correspondence," pp. 855, 856.

Patrick Calhoun, was Irish. There seems to be no clear proof as to exactly where the family landed in America, but Calhoun says in his "Autobiography" that they were first in Pennsylvania, "where they remained some years," and then moved to the western part of Virginia.

Further, as Patrick Calhoun died on February 15, 1796,<sup>4</sup> in the sixty-ninth year of his age, and as the family is positively found in Virginia in 1746, after having been some years in Pennsylvania, we may assume that Col. Starke's fixing of 1733 as the date of their emigration is not far wrong. At least, it cannot have been more than a few years later. It is equally clear that Patrick Calhoun must have been brought out as a child, or at most a youth.

I know of no evidence from public records that the family lived in Pennsylvania, and the statement to that effect in the "Autobiography" is probably based on information derived by Calhoun from his father. But from this time on we stand on firmer ground.<sup>5</sup> About the middle of the XVIII century, there are authentic records of the presence of four brothers Calhoun,—James, Ezekiel, William, and Patrick,—in the western parts of Virginia. And they were there as settlers, taking up land and remaining some ten years. Their mother,<sup>6</sup> too, Catherine by name, was with them later, if not then, and a sister, Mary Noble, either the wife or the widow<sup>7</sup> of John Noble. At least three other members of the Calhoun family are also mentioned: one George, who lived in the Reed

<sup>4</sup> This positively fixes the year of his birth as 1727 or early in 1728, and not 1723, as stated by Col. Starke.


<sup>5</sup> An admirable sketch of "The Calhoun Family in America" by A. S. Salley, Jr., is to be found in the "South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. VII (1906), pp. 81-98; 153-169. It is based on public records, newspaper notices, and other such evidence of unquestionable character. I have used it largely, and with entire reliance. The facts following in the text in regard to the early history of the family are based on it, unless other authority is given.

<sup>6</sup> There is no doubt at all as to the presence in America of this one member of the generation preceding that of the four brothers, but I know of no evidence tending to bear out Col. Starke's statement that her husband's name was James and that James emigrated, accompanied by two brothers, as well as by his own immediate family.

<sup>7</sup> Mr. Salley makes her out a widow, while a letter of Calhoun, printed in the "Gulf States Historical Magazine," Vol. I, pp. 439-441, speaks of her husband as having removed with the Calhoun family to South Carolina.

Creek region in 1746, while Hugh Calhoun lived in 1777 in South Carolina, near the other members of the family, and described himself in his will, executed in 1792, as formerly of "Fawney Co. Tyrone," and one John is described in a death notice as formerly of "Bushfield, L. Derry."<sup>8</sup>

✓ Patrick Calhoun, the one of the four brothers who is of special interest to us as the father of John Caldwell Calhoun, was born in County Donegal, Ireland, in the year 1727, or in 1728, as has just been shown. ✓ He was the youngest of the four brothers and was undoubtedly a minor and probably a child at the time of the emigration. Col. Starke writes that, "owing to an injury in childhood," he had had only six months at school in Ireland, and that he never had received

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Patrick Calhoun". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, ornate initial "P" and a decorative flourish at the end.

*Reproduced by permission from Mr. A. S. Salley, Jr.'s, article on the Calhoun family mentioned in the text.*

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Salley is my authority for George Calhoun, "The Calhoun Family," *ut supra*, Vol. VII, p. 81. The facts as to Hugh and John are derived from the notice of Jameson's "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun" in the "South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. I, pp. 45, 134, 135, 160, 186, 187. Fawney is in Ireland, but I have been unable to learn where Bushfield was.

any more school education in this country, and the statement is very likely true, though it does not seem to have been made by any other writer. ✓ He and his three brothers were in Virginia in November, 1746, from which date their names often appear in the public records. Thus Patrick and several others were at that date appointed to lay out a road; and grants of land on Reed Creek near Wytheville, in what is now Wythe County, Virginia, were made to various members of the family. On March 5, 1749, a tract of one hundred and fifty-nine acres on the waters of Reed Creek,<sup>9</sup> "near to where he lives," was surveyed for Patrick Calhoun. This was close to the time of his majority.

There is evidence that the members of the family were not devoid of that pugnacity and dogged tendency to insist upon the rights they claimed, even when of little actual value, which is thought by some to characterize their race. In 1746 the four brothers Calhoun were charged by one James Patton with being "divulgers of false news," and were ordered to answer at the next court. This contest seems to have been easily composed; but only a few years later, in 1752, James Patton became involved in a bitter controversy with James Calhoun. This suit dragged on for a year and a half, and was apparently heard more than once by the same jury, despite their wish to be discharged. There was at least one mandamus obtained in the matter from the General Court, and finally the case seems to have been submitted to arbitration. The action was for slander, the plaintiff asserting that Calhoun "had said in 1750 that Patton made over all his estate to his children to defraud his creditors, and that he had no title to the lands he offered for sale on Roanoke and New Rivers."

Either in this suit or another one between the same persons an abstruse legal point bitterly contested was as to which party should pay a certain fee to the governor. Patton had contracted to deliver to Calhoun two patents for land at a

<sup>9</sup> Calhoun visited this region in 1846 and saw the identical place where his father had lived nearly a century earlier, "Correspondence," pp. 706, 707.



time when no fee was payable to the governor on issuing patents, but since then a law had been enacted requiring a fee. Who should pay this new charge? The point was evidently one of bitter controversy and was finally settled, possibly with less of law than of horse-sense calculated to appease the contestants by an order that each should pay the fee for one patent. In another case in 1752, it is to be presumed that this same James Calhoun, who was the oldest of the four brothers, had boldly taken the law into his own hands, for the records tell us that on November 20 of that year he was "bound to keep the peace towards James McCall."

While these petty contests were going on in the then wilds of what is now Wytthe County, Virginia, events of far greater moment were enacting on a wider stage. The early moves in the final contest between France and England for the mastery of the New World were made at this time. And, as has happened more than once in the world's history, the power whose comparative democracy was destined to succeed in the end was at the outstart overwhelmed with disaster by its rival. Braddock met with his crushing defeat near Fort Duquesne on July 9, 1755.

This was an event of awful import to the settlers on the borders of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. They were at once exposed to the inroads of the French and Indians, and many soon turned their thoughts to removal further South. In this same year, too, Governor Glenn of South Carolina made a treaty with the Indians by which much of the upper part of that State was ceded to the King of Great Britain. Here was a strong inducement to settle in the new region, and the Calhouns were among those to make this move. All the four brothers,—James, Ezekiel, William, and Patrick,—and their sister Mary Noble and mother Catherine Calhoun made the long and difficult journey. There is evidence that in their migration to Carolina they passed by the Waxhaws, where the family of Andrew Jackson had lived, and one writer <sup>10</sup> says that they were induced to fix upon the

<sup>10</sup> John H. Logan's "History of the Upper Country of South Carolina," Vol. I, p. 150. See also Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 66.

site they actually selected for their home in South Carolina by the description of its loveliness and fertility that they had heard from a band of hunters at the Waxhaws.

Long Cane Creek was the region that they selected, and in a few years it came to be known as "The Long Canes Settlement." Situated in what was originally Granville County and later the district of Ninety-six, it is now included in Abbeville County, some eight miles from the town of Abbeville. The settlement was very new, having been begun only in 1750, and early in 1756 the whole number of settlers scarcely exceeded twenty.<sup>11</sup> John C. Calhoun wrote<sup>12</sup> nearly a century later that the family arrived in February, 1756, and settled in a group in what came to be known as Calhoun's Settlement, at the fork of two streams of that name, not far from where their waters empty into Little River. Patrick Calhoun selected either at the time of settlement or later a tract of slightly rising ground on the north side of the South Fork of Calhoun Creek, not far from its union with the North Fork. Long Cane Creek, from which the settlement took its name, lay a few miles to the eastward.<sup>13</sup>

It is doubtless hardly an exaggeration, when Col. Starke writes that, as the Calhouns neared this new home, "they worked their way along wagon-roads and foot-trails until the compass was perhaps their only guide." The following from Calhoun's just-quoted letter is also worthy of reproduction:—"The region composing the District was in a virgin state, new and beautiful, without underwood and all the fertile portion covered by a dense cane-brake, and hence the name of Long Cane. It had been recently got from the Cherokees, and the settlement was more than sixteen or seventeen miles from the boundary between them and the whites. The re-

<sup>11</sup> Ramsay's "History of South Carolina," Vol. I, p. 209. Calhoun's letter next cited says there were only two settlers, one at White Hall and one at Cambridge, then called Ninety-six. See *infra*.

<sup>12</sup> Letter to Charles H. Allen, dated at Fort Hill, November 21, 1847, printed in "Gulf States Historical Magazine," Vol. I (1902-03), pp. 439-41.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 68. A map of the region is to be found in Mills's Atlas, 1820, 1825, of which there is a copy in the Charleston Library Society.



gion was full of game, and among them, the buffalo." To this Ramsay adds <sup>14</sup> that in 1750 buffalo, deer, bear, and wild turkeys were there in great numbers, as well as beaver, otter, musk-rat, wolves, panthers, and wild cats.

For a few years the new settlement grew fast, for it was not actually involved in the French and Indian war, which harried the borders further to the north. But the reduction of Fort Duquesne by the British in 1758, which brought peace to the North, entailed in turn upon South Carolina the misery of a war with the Cherokees and stunted the growth of the Abbeville region.

The horrors of Indian warfare lie so far back of us that it is to-day hard to realize them. Often as they have been described on paper, the reality no doubt beggared all attempts at reproduction. They were by no means unknown in the upper country of Carolina, and the older generation of Calhouns had their part in them. The early biographer <sup>15</sup> of Calhoun, indeed, writes that they had been driven from Virginia by attacks of the Indians and that "in the hostile encounters that took place previous to their removal, Patrick was old enough to take a prominent part." It was, probably, however, in South Carolina that the instance occurred, of which the "Autobiography," as well as the record of other writers, tells us in which an Indian distinguished for prowess as a chief and for skill with the rifle, selected Patrick Calhoun as an opponent, possibly in some small skirmish. The savage took to a tree, while the white man hid behind a log, and then fire-arms came into play. Calhoun succeeded four times in drawing his opponent's fire by raising his hat on a stick a little above the edge of the log, and finally the Indian exposed part of his person in an effort to see the effect of a shot. Here was a capital error, for Calhoun at once shot him in the shoulder and he was forced to fly. The accuracy of aim of the Indian was shown by four bullet holes to be afterwards seen in Calhoun's hat.

One instance of far more serious import occurred. In 1760

<sup>14</sup> "History of South Carolina," Vol. II, p. 598 (Appendix No. IX).

<sup>15</sup> John S. Jenkins's "Life of John C. Calhoun," p. 20.

during the Cherokee war which broke out after the reduction of Fort Duquesne, the borders must have been seriously threatened, for the settlers at Long-Canes decided to remove all women and children for safety to Augusta, Georgia. The story of their surprise by the Indians can best be told in the words of Patrick Calhoun as printed in the *South Carolina Gazette* of February 23, 1760.<sup>16</sup>

Mr. *Patrick Calhoun*, one of the unfortunate Settlers at *Long-Canes*, who were attacked by the Cherokees on the 1st Instant, as they were removing their Wives, Children, and best Effects, to *Augusta* in *Georgia* for Safety, is just come to Town and informs us, 'That the whole of those Settlers might be about 250 souls, 55 or 60 of them fighting Men; that their Loss in that Affair amounted to 50<sup>17</sup> Persons, Chiefly Women and Children, with 13 loaded Waggon and Carts; that he had since been at the Place where the Action happened, in order to bury the Dead, and found only 20 of their Bodies, most inhumanly butchered; that the Indians had burnt the Woods all around, but had left the Waggon and Carts there empty and unhurt, and that he believes all the fighting men would return and fortify the Long-Cane Settlement, were part of the Rangers so stationed as to give them some Assistance and Protection.'

According to the same newspaper of an earlier date, "the whole of the Long Cane settlers to the number of one hundred and fifty souls" were thus flying from their homes and were attacked by about one hundred Cherokees on horseback, at a time when the fugitives were getting their wagons out of a boggy place. They had forty gunmen, but unfortunately their guns were in the wagons. A few recovered their arms and fought the Indians for half an hour, but were then obliged

<sup>16</sup> I quote from Mr. Salley's "The Calhoun Family," *ut supra*, p. 85, 86, where the account of the newspaper (published in Charleston) is reproduced. See also *ibid.*, p. 85, an extract from the same newspaper of February 9, 1760, from which portions of my account are derived.

<sup>17</sup> This number does not seem to agree with that mentioned on the stone afterwards erected (see *infra*) by Patrick Calhoun to the memory of those killed, which makes the number out to have been twenty-three. The numbers were likely to be exaggerated so soon after the event, owing to the fact that the savages had carried some into captivity and that others had hidden and had not yet been able to return; or possibly the figures given on the stone may refer only to those killed and buried at that particular place, while others were killed later on in flight.



STONE ERECTED BY PATRICK CALHOUN TO THE  
MEMORY OF HIS MOTHER



to fly. The bulk of the fugitives reached Augusta in safety.

Among the slain were James Calhoun,<sup>18</sup> the eldest of the four brothers who had emigrated from Ireland, and Catherine Calhoun, their mother. She was at the time seventy-six years of age. Her son Patrick later erected in memory of her and of the others killed a stone that still exists, on which is an inscription that reads:

“ Patk Calhoun Esq.  
In Memory of  
Mrs. Cathrine Calhoun  
Aged 76 Years

who With 22 Others was Here Murdered by The Indians The  
First Day of Feby. 1760.”

The stone marks, of course, accurately the spot of the ambush and is in a little valley about two hundred and fifty yards to the right of the road leading from Abbeville to Troy. It is about twelve miles from Abbeville and two and a half from Troy, three quarters of a mile beyond Patterson's Bridge over Long Cane Creek.<sup>19</sup>

Another writer<sup>20</sup> I have often quoted adds certain details, but unfortunately without giving any authority. The facts are, however, likely enough. After the massacre, he tells us, many children were found wandering in the woods, and one man alone discovered nine. It is well established that two, if not three, very young daughters of William Calhoun were carried off by the Indians. One of these was held in captivity fourteen years, but then somehow got back to civilization and married a white man. The other was never heard of. Another niece of Patrick's, Rebecca, who had hidden in the cane-brake, was discovered by the uncle when he returned to bury the dead. She afterward became the wife of General Andrew Pickens.

The settlers probably soon returned to their homes but were

<sup>18</sup> Letter of John C. Calhoun, dated Fort Hill, November 21, 1847, printed in "Gulf States Historical Magazine," Vol. I (1902-03), pp. 439-41.

<sup>19</sup> My authority here, as elsewhere in regard to the early years of the Calhouns, is the article by A. S. Salley, Jr., referred to above.

<sup>20</sup> Col. W. Pinkney Starke, as already cited. Mr. Salley is my authority as to the daughters of William Calhoun.



not yet quite free from Indian alarms. As late as June, 1764, more than a year after the treaty of peace that closed the French and Indian war, the Assembly voted pay for a company of "rangers" for six months to protect the Long Canes settlement against the Indians. It consisted of a commission officer, a sergeant, and twenty men. Patrick Calhoun, who was to serve without pay, was appointed the captain.

This period ended, it seems, all serious difficulties with Indians; but the savages were not the only trouble of the South Carolina frontier. There was a lamentable absence of governmental authority in the upper country during all its early years, and no court existed nearer than Charles Town. It was hence well-nigh impossible to try offenders by legal process. For years the settlers on the border sought in vain for relief. In 1768 a petition, in which members of the Calhoun family joined, prayed for the rights of British subjects and for the establishment of courts. They complained, moreover, that they were two hundred miles from the parish church, and that when they travelled all this distance in order to vote they were refused except in Prince William's Parish. "There were people on the frontier," said their petition, "that had never seen a school or heard a sermon."

Recommendations were made in the legislature, in answer to the petition, that the back country be laid out in parishes; but nothing came of these suggestions, and affairs grew to be intolerable. During their long border wars, the manners of the people had become much corrupted, and stealing,—especially horse-stealing, that favorite form of border-land robbery,—had grown to be sadly frequent. When a thief was caught, moreover, there was no method for a legal trial, except by going down to Charles Town, some two hundred miles away. Many of the justices of the peace even,—the only legal authority in the region,—are said to have been scoundrels and to have sided with the thieves.

All efforts by petition and other legal means to obtain relief from this state of affairs having failed, the inhabitants did what has so often been done in new countries among a people having the instinct of self-government: they estab-



lished a governmental system entirely apart from that which bore the sanction of law. Some of the best inhabitants united to create what was called the "Regulation." In plain words, they introduced a form of lynch law, and in proper cases sentenced thieves to receive a number of stripes on their back, coupling this often with a well-understood advice to leave. The thieves, on their part, quickly made common cause and offered resistance. Soon the majority of inhabitants took sides with one or the other of these parties, the Regulators alleging as their justification absolute necessity and the substantial justice of their proceedings, while the others stood upon the right of a British subject to be regularly tried by jury.

The contest grew so serious that the Governor appointed one Scovil to settle it under a commission that conferred high authority upon him. He seems to have been quite unfit for his office, for he soon called the Regulators to answer for their conduct and sent two of them to Charles Town for trial. The two parties were for some time drawn up against each other almost in hostile array, but entered into an agreement, or treaty, by which both left their rights to the Governor for settlement. This finally resulted in the Circuit Court Act of 1769, under which various parts of the State, and Ninety-six among others, secured courts of justice within their limits, and numerous thieves were brought to trial. The district of Ninety-six, where the Calhouns lived, was established in 1768, possibly as a result of this contest.

The State then enjoyed peace for a few years, but the animosities that had been engendered continued to rankle, and the parties in the back country were thenceforth known as Regulators and Scovillites. These names, indeed, continued down to the Revolution, when the Regulators became Whigs and the Scovillites Tories.

One very serious trouble of the situation then and later was the heterogeneous population impregnated with the strong antipathies brought over from the old country. The Scotch are said to have been generally loyal, while the pure Irish were no more fond of English rule in Carolina than they had been in their ancient home. There were Quakers, too, with their

peculiar beliefs and a method of life so different from that of ordinary men that they lived largely to themselves; while a sprinkling of French, Germans, and Swiss served still further to complicate the situation.

It was a most dangerous population in which to light the flames of civil war, and probably the Revolution bore more heavily upon the up-country of Carolina than upon any other part of what was soon to be known as the United States. It would be difficult to conceive of a more terrible internecine war. Ramsay wrote that "The single district of Ninety-six has been computed by well-informed persons residing therein to contain within its limits fourteen hundred widows and orphans made by the war."<sup>21</sup>

Harrowing tales were told of bloody murders committed by the Tories, and it cannot be doubted that the Whigs were in many instances open to the like charge. One Whig family of interest to us, and a daughter of which was destined to be the mother of John Caldwell Calhoun, may serve to typify the stormy days of the Revolution in upper South Carolina. Martha Caldwell had four brothers at the outbreak of the war. Of these, one fell at the battle of the Cowpens, it is said, with thirty sabre wounds upon his body; another was taken prisoner by the English and confined in a dungeon at St. Augustine for nine months; and a third, Major John Caldwell, was murdered in cold blood by the Tories in his own yard, after they had destroyed his house by fire.<sup>22</sup>

The war touched Ninety-six in a larger way, too. At the

<sup>21</sup> Ramsay's "History of South Carolina" (published in 1808, and apparently written in 1798 and later), Vol. I, p. 452. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-217; 423-429. II, 126, 127; Simms's "South Carolina," pp. 120-124, 142-147, 225, 326-30, 351; "Sketch of Judiciary in South Carolina," contained in J. B. O'Neill's "Bench and Bar of South Carolina," Vol. I, pp. x, xi; upon which authorities my statements for this whole period are based. See also "Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina" by William A. Schafer, contained in "Annual Report of the American Historical Association" for 1900, Vol. I, pp. 335-337.

<sup>22</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography," "The Annals of Newberry," by J. B. O'Neill, pp. 244, 245. The statement as to the brother confined at St. Augustine has been doubted in Gustavus M. Pinckney's "Life of Calhoun," p. 13; but seems to be fairly well established by an article in the "South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. V (1904), pp. 261, 262.

time of the effort to capture Charlestown in 1776, by the combined army and navy of the British, the Tories and Indians had arranged for an attack upon the western settlements, but the defeat of the effort upon the capital put an end to this plan, and for four years the West enjoyed quiet. But when Charlestown fell in 1780, the circumstances were reversed, and the "king's friends," as the Tories called themselves, had the upper hand. The British, indeed, maintained a post in Ninety-six for thirteen months, and during this period, according to Ramsay, the country "was filled with rapine, violence, and murder." In 1781, Greene marched with his main army to reduce this station and had nearly succeeded, when a relief party arrived and forced him to abandon the effort.

There is no evidence, so far as I know, that Patrick Calhoun had any direct share in these movements of the War of the Revolution, though other members of the family served for long periods in the army. There will be occasion later to refer to a nephew of Patrick, John Ewing Calhoun,<sup>23</sup> who went to Charlestown early in the war to study law, but enlisted instead,—in August, 1776,—as a private in Colonel Charles Drayton's Volunteer Company, and was not admitted to the bar until 1783. He was later United States Senator from South Carolina and was the father of a daughter who proved of immense importance in the life of John Caldwell Calhoun.

With the treaty of 1793, which closed the Revolution, came at last real peace to Ninety-six. The troubles of its earlier days are summed up as follows by Ramsay :

From the first settlement of the upper country till the peace of 1783, a succession of disasters had stunted its growth. The years 1756, 1757 and 1758 were attended with no uncommon calamity. The same may be said of the years 1770 and 1775, but with these exceptions, the upper country was for nearly twenty years of the first thirty of its existence kept in a constant state of disturbance either by the Indians or Tories and

<sup>23</sup> "South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. I, pp. 134, 135, 186, 187. O'Neill's "Bench and Bar of South Carolina," Vol. II, p. 599.

the contentions between Regulators and Scovillites. Under all these disadvantages, it grew astonishingly.

Patrick Calhoun must have shared in all its ups and downs, and it will be seen later that his bold and determined character bore deep traces of the life of trial he had long lived.

— It is evident that he became prosperous in a worldly sense. Six conveyances of land to him are on record <sup>24</sup> between 1763 and 1768, three of them on Long Cane Creek and at least one on Calhoun Creek, and the United States Census of 1790 <sup>25</sup> tells us that he had thirty-one slaves, a number exceeded by only three and approached by but few settlers in the same far-off outlying district. He was a surveyor by occupation, and is said <sup>26</sup> to have been an eminent one. His brother William kept a store at which were sold corn, rye, wheat, flour, pork, and liquors, and Patrick's name appears quite occasionally in this brother's journal <sup>27</sup> as a purchaser of fairly liberal quantities of these latter beverages as well as of other more necessary solid provisions.

On September 10, 1766, he had the misfortune to lose his wife. Her maiden name was Jane Craighead, and she was the daughter of Rev. Alexander Craighead of Rocky River, North Carolina. It is said <sup>28</sup> that they were already betrothed at the time of the Indian ambush in February, 1760. Nothing further is known about her except what the *South Carolina Gazette* of Monday, October 13, 1766, records that on September 10, on a miscarriage of twins there died at Long Canes "in the twenty-fourth <sup>29</sup> year of her age one of the most pious

<sup>24</sup> Review of "Calhoun's Correspondence" by Jameson, in the "South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. II, pp. 158-163.

<sup>25</sup> "Heads of Families at the First Census of the United States taken in the year 1790, South Carolina." Published by the U. S. Government in 1908.

<sup>26</sup> O'Neill's "Bench and Bar of South Carolina," Vol. II, p. 283; also Starke's "Sketch," pp. 66, 72.

<sup>27</sup> Published by Mr. A. S. Salley, Jr., in "Publications Southern History Association," Vol. VIII (1904), pp. 179-195.

<sup>28</sup> "History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina," by George Howe, Vol. I, p. 331.

<sup>29</sup> This age renders it impossible that Patrick's first marriage should have occurred, as Col. Starke ("Sketch," p. 66) says it did, during the residence of the Calhouns in Virginia. They had left there in 1756, if not



and accomplished young women in these parts, in the person of Mrs. Calhoun, the wife of Patrick Calhoun, Esq. and daughter of Rev. Alexander Craighead." It is evident that the twins did not survive. At a subsequent date, which has not been fixed, Patrick Calhoun married<sup>30</sup> Martha Caldwell, who was born in Charlotte County, Virginia, but was a resident of what is now Newberry County, South Carolina. The Caldwells are said<sup>31</sup> to have been Huguenots and to have fled from France, some to Ireland and some to Scotland, at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The branch to which Mrs. Calhoun belonged was undoubtedly Irish.<sup>32</sup> She and Patrick Calhoun had the following five children: James, Catherine, William, John Caldwell, and Patrick.

Patrick Calhoun was by this time not only a man of some property but of prominence as well. He was elected in 1769 to the Commons' House of Assembly of South Carolina from Prince William's Parish at a time when no representative from the Up-Country had yet sat in the legislative body of the State. He was, moreover, again elected in 1775, in the early days of the Revolutionary movement, to the First Provincial Congress as well as to the Second. This body adopted a constitution for the State of South Carolina and resolved itself into a General Assembly. He then continued to serve in almost every General Assembly until his death in 1796 and was a member of the Senate at the last session preceding that date. He was also a Justice of the Peace for Granville County and later for

1755. The quotation in the text is from the already cited review of Jameson's "Calhoun Correspondence" in the "South Carolina Historical &c. Magazine," pp. 248, 249.

<sup>30</sup> There is possibly some evidence that Patrick Calhoun was married three times, and that Martha Caldwell was the third wife. The already mentioned diary kept by William Calhoun, brother of Patrick ("Publications of the Southern History Association," Vol. VIII (1904), pp. 174-195), records (p. 193) the marriage of Patrick Calhoun and Sarah McKinly on February 26, 1767. I do not see what other Patrick this can well have been. Ezekiel the immigrant had a second son, Patrick, but he was necessarily very young in 1767, as his elder brother, John Ewing, is stated to have been born "about 1750."

<sup>31</sup> J. B. O'Neill's "Annals of Newberry," p. 242. The family name certainly bears no evidence of its alleged French extraction.

<sup>32</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography." Starke writes that the Caldwells were Lowlanders from the Frith of Solway.

Ninety-six District, and was elected judge of the County Court for Abbeville County, Ninety-six District, in 1791.<sup>33</sup>

His environment (to use the pet word of modern days) was one likely to develop character in a man who had any of the raw material thereof in his make-up and we need not wonder at being told that the effect of his mode of life "upon a mind naturally strong and inquisitive was to create a certain degree of contempt for the forms of civilized life, and for all that was merely conventional in society." He claimed all the rights which nature and reason seemed to establish, and he acknowledged no obligation which was not supported by the like sanctions. It was under this conviction that, upon one occasion, he and his neighbors went down within twenty-three miles of Charlestown, armed with rifles, to exercise a right of suffrage which had been disputed: a contest which ended in electing him to the Legislature of the State, in which body he served for thirty years. Relying upon virtue, reason, and courage as all that constituted the true moral strength of man, he attached too little importance to mere information, and never feared to encounter an adversary who, in that respect, had the advantage over him: a confidence which many of the events of his life seemed to justify. Indeed, he once appeared as his own advocate in a case in Virginia, in which he recovered a tract of land in despite of the regularly-trained disputants who sought to embarrass and defeat him. He opposed the Federal Constitution, because, as he said, it permitted other people than those of South Carolina to tax the people of South Carolina, and thus allowed taxation without representation, which was a violation of the fundamental principle of the Revolutionary struggle.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> I follow Mr. Salley. The "Autobiography" differs slightly. The writer of the review of Jameson's "Calhoun Correspondence," *ut supra*, p. 160, says that from the time of his first election in 1769 he was "constantly in the House, and the proceedings of the House show he was one of the ablest men in that body. He was a ready debater, and his words were well chosen and strong."

<sup>34</sup> "Autobiography," p. 4. In 1786, he opposed the bill to authorize Congress to regulate the trade of the United States and moved an amendment to require the consent of eleven States (instead of nine, as was proposed) to any such law, but the amendment was at once lost and nine carried almost unanimously. The Charleston "Morning Post and Daily Advertiser," February 9, 1786.



One other story should be told here as to Patrick Calhoun, which may serve to illustrate his dislike of lawyers and possibly thus explain why he undertook the conduct of his own case. O'Neill writes<sup>35</sup> that once in the Legislature of the colony during a debate upon some law to give a reward of so many shillings for a wolf's scalp, Patrick Calhoun said that he would much rather "gie a poond for a lawyer's scalp." He died on February 15, 1796, as is learned from *The City Gazette or the Daily Advertiser* of Charleston of March 7, 1796.<sup>36</sup> It contains the following details:

Died at his seat in Abbeville county the hon. Patrick Calhoun esq. in the 69th year of his age. He had served as a member of the Legislature in this State for many years; was the first person who ever acted in that capacity from that part of the State in which he resided; and was a member of the Senate at its last session. During the past summer he was seized with a lingering fever, which much enfeebled his constitution. On his return from Columbia he was seized with a bleeding at the nose, which exhausted him gradually until his life came to a close. He was a friend to virtue and piety; and a foe to vice in every form.

Col. Starke is doubtless fully justified in speaking of him as "the pioneer and patriarch of Abbeville."

<sup>35</sup> J. B. O'Neill's "Annals of Newberry," p. 249. I do not understand why so broad a Scotch accent is attributed to Patrick Calhoun.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Mr. Salley's article, *ut ante*, Vol. VII, p. 90.

## CHAPTER II

### EARLY YEARS

Boyhood — Schooling — Youthful Pursuits and Influences — Conditions, Social and Political, in South Carolina — Slavery.

✓ JOHN CALDWELL CALHOUN, the third son and fourth child of Patrick Calhoun and Martha Caldwell, was born at the Long Canes settlement, in what was then the District of Ninety-six, on March 17, 1782, and was, therefore, at the date of his father's death on February 15, 1796, within a few days of thirteen years and eleven months of age. ✓ He was hence quite old enough to retain many memories of his father and to have had his character to a considerable extent moulded by him. ✓ Indeed, he himself wrote that among his earliest recollections was one of a conversation when he was nine years of age, in which his father maintained that government to be best which "allowed the largest amount of individual liberty, compatible with social order and tranquillity, and insisted that the improvements in political science would be found to consist in throwing off many of the restraints then imposed by law and deemed to be necessary to an organized society." <sup>1</sup> ✓ The boy had been but about six years of age at the time when the adoption of the federal constitution was opposed by his father and the general opinion throughout their part of South Carolina and, so far as we know, had not even any recollection of the event.

His boyhood was probably like that of millions of other boys, and no hint reaches us of marked precocity. Indeed, with the one exception just mentioned of his own recollection of his early years, nothing of any moment has survived with

<sup>1</sup> "Autobiography," p. 5.

certainly other than a rather abortive attempt at schooling when he was in his fourteenth year.

The earliest glimpse we have of young Calhoun is in 1794, when the settlers in the region were apparently seeking a Presbyterian minister. One Moses Waddel, then a young divine and later widely known as the most successful of Southern schoolmasters, was at that time probably an applicant for the place and stayed in the Calhoun house. He described in later years "that evening's hospitable entertainment around the wide, old-fashioned chimney, the sire in one corner, the fair old matron in the other, and beside her an interesting daughter." And goes on to say:

After some time a door was opened, and a youthful head, with very disheveled locks and strong features, peeped in, but was instantly withdrawn. That strong-featured lad of twelve years with disheveled head, was John C. Calhoun.<sup>2</sup>

In about a year, Waddel married the "interesting daughter" in question, Catherine Calhoun, and it will be seen shortly that he came some years later to be an important element in the training of his young brother-in-law.

Schools had hardly any regular existence in upper South Carolina at that date and even when present were doubtless most primitive. The "Autobiography" tells us that there was not an "academy" in the section, and the nearest one was kept by Mr. Waddel in Columbia County, Georgia, some fifty miles away. Starke adds to this that occasionally an "old Field school,"—meaning perhaps simply a school opened for a time in some shanty erected in one of those abandoned clearings which seem often to be known as "old fields" in a new country,—was opened for a few months by some itinerant teacher capable of instructing children in the rudiments. He was himself old enough to remember one of these in the Calhoun neighborhood, consisting of a log hut with rude appliances. "In the year 1794," the same writer goes on, there was a school-house "at Brewer's, half way between Mr. Cal-

<sup>2</sup> "History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina," by George Howe, Vol. I, p. 331. See also Starke's "Life," p. 71.

houn's and Little River, and a tradition existed that John Caldwell went to school there for a few months when quite young."

This tradition is possibly borne out by the "Autobiography," which speaks of Calhoun's early tuition as having been "very imperfect, and confined to reading, writing, and arithmetic in an ordinary country school." With this exception the first regular instruction he had was during a short period at the above-mentioned academy of his brother-in-law, Moses Waddel, probably from about the end of 1795 to early in 1796, when he was nearing fourteen. But destiny seemed determined to close to him the avenue of education, for his father died in February, 1796, and shortly after that his sister, Mrs. Waddel, died, and the academy was for the time being discontinued. Young Calhoun remained for a time with his brother-in-law — he passed there in all about fourteen weeks — but with what object is not very clear. Waddel was away from home most of the time upon his clerical duties, and the boy was apparently much alone and without any white companion.

Inborn tendencies, however, had their way. Waddel maintained in his home some sort of circulating library, and this attracted young Calhoun's attention. History in particular became his delight, and so deeply was he interested in this his first draught upon the stored knowledge of the past that, to quote the authoritative "Autobiography":

. . . In a short time he read the whole of the small stock of historical works contained in the library, consisting of Rollin's Ancient History, Robertson's Charles V., his South America, and Voltaire's Charles XII. After despatching these with eagerness, he turned with like eagerness to Cook's voyages (the large edition), a small volume of essays by Brown, and Locke on the Understanding, which he read as far as the chapter on Infinity. All this was the work of but fourteen weeks.

So closely did he apply himself that his eyes began to fail and his health to give way. Soon his mother, informed of this by Waddel, sent for her son to come home, and there the open air and exercise repaired the boy's plastic frame.

The home region was doubtless still full of game, and he acquired a fondness for hunting, fishing, and other country sports. Four years were passed away in these pursuits and in attending to the farm, during his brothers' absence, to the entire neglect of education as such. But the exercise and rural sports helped to endow him with some of the vigor he was destined to need in his great career, and he soon acquired a fondness for agriculture,—a love that never left him.<sup>3</sup>

During these four years at home, young Calhoun was rapidly drifting into the position of director of the family farm. The two older brothers, William and James,—probably at the instigation of “the managing mother, a canny Scotchwoman,” as Col. Starke writes,—were “sent off,” the one to Charleston and the other to Augusta, where they obtained employment as clerks, and the direction of the farm fell by degrees into the hands of John Caldwell. Col. Starke tells us, too, in part on the authority of a relative, James Edward Calhoun,<sup>4</sup> that he proved a very successful manager, making good crops whenever it was possible. The evidence does not exist that would enable one to go far into this point, so it will possibly be best simply to assume that he was careful and diligent, attaining success when it could be attained.

Leaving him, then, at his agricultural work, before coming to the turning point of his early life, some effort must be made to describe the home life and influences under which he lived until past eighteen years of age. These were the sources from which he received the bulk of the training that constituted almost his only education in the world down to that time.

The Calhoun settlement lay in that part of South Carolina which is to-day known as the Piedmont region and constitutes

<sup>3</sup> The “Autobiography” is my authority for all statements relating to this period of Calhoun's life, except when some other is given.

<sup>4</sup> James Edward Calhoun was a son of Calhoun's first cousin, John Ewing Calhoun, and grandson of Ezekiel, a brother of Patrick. He was hence a brother of Calhoun's wife. He lived to “not far from a hundred years of age,” and was well known to Col. Starke. I have in the text softened the latter's statements, which *verbatim* are that “when he (John C. Calhoun) took charge of his brother's property, he made the largest crop ever made and saved him from bankruptcy,” and he quotes James Edward Calhoun as stating that “under whatever overseer, he always made fine crops.”



the foot-hills of the Appalachian chain of mountains. Distant about two hundred miles northwestwardly from Charleston, it has an elevation of roughly five hundred feet above sea-level. The country was, for the greater part, prairie, but gently undulating; the soil a rich black loam, and the whole district well watered by streams that find their way by the Savannah River to the Atlantic Ocean. The gentle, soft beauty of the landscape was then, as now, most pleasing to the eye, and the region admirably adapted to agriculture. Further to the north lay the southern limit of the Appalachian chain of mountains, whose lofty summits here at last, after their long continental course, come down gradually to the level of the flat coastal plains.

The whole district was most primitive at about the end of the eighteenth century, and settlers must have been but scattering, and the whole life full of the rudeness of the frontier. The houses were probably nearly all built of logs. Col. Starke, who knew the Calhoun one well from having repeatedly slept there in early childhood, writes that it was "the first framed house in the neighborhood." It was situated on slightly rising ground on the northern side of the creek, called after the Calhoun family, and was so well built, he adds, as to last nearly a century. It had only been destroyed by fire a few years before he wrote, and two chimneys still remained standing at that time. The house consisted of two stories, with a sitting-room to the left on entering, and four rooms in all on each floor. The scant furniture and decorations inside must be left to imagination.

It is probable that the Calhoun house, though far from luxurious, was one of the most comfortable and,—at least in some ways,—best appointed in the neighborhood. There was a high degree of respect paid to the father by the neighbors, and he is very commonly referred to as "Mr.," or "Esquire." It has already been said, moreover, that he appears to have been in comfortable circumstances and was the owner of thirty-one slaves. When these latter were brought to the district is not known, but Col. Starke is authority for the statement that Patrick Calhoun, returning upon one occasion



from his legislative duties <sup>5</sup> in Charles Town, "brought home on horseback behind him a young African, freshly imported in some English or New England vessel. The children in the neighborhood, and perhaps many of the adults, had never before seen a black man. Mr. Calhoun gave him the name of Adam, and in good time got a wife for him. At the time of John Caldwell's birth, Adam had a family coming on, one of whom, named Sawney, was a playmate for Mr. Calhoun's boys."

During the term of more than eighteen years that Calhoun passed on the family plantation it has been seen that his school education was very scant, and it is likely that he had not much opportunity for self-education. Books were costly, and doubtless rare at that time in the backwoods. But the father had to go to Charleston to attend meetings of the Legislature, and it may be that, as suggested by Col. Starke, he would occasionally bring back with him in his leather saddle-bags (the journey was probably made on horse-back) "a book for his children, especially for John, who took to reading from early boyhood." I know, however, of no actual evidence of the boy's showing any fondness for reading, until his already narrated stay at Waddel's school, when between thirteen and fourteen years of age.

But after that date the story is possibly different, though our knowledge in regard to the subject is scant enough. A copy of the *South Carolina Gazette* for May 10, 1798, was preserved among the Calhoun papers,<sup>6</sup> and bears in many parts the pencil-marks of the then sixteen year old John Caldwell. Here we have the earliest actual evidence of the youth's interest in public affairs. It is, moreover, far from bald guessing to assume that a boy, who had at fourteen so greedily devoured

<sup>5</sup> Patrick Calhoun's first service in the Legislature was in 1760, *ante*.

<sup>6</sup> Col. Starke is authority for this statement and for that as to the handwriting. He is apparently endorsed also by Prof. Jameson, who tells us (Foot-note to Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 76) that among the contents of the newspaper in question were "accounts of proceedings in Congress on April 11 and 13, including a party debate on relations with France; memorials from Pennsylvania and Baltimore on the same subject; President Adams's reply, April 21, to an address of the citizens of York, Pa., and the proceedings of a public meeting at Charleston on May 4. Most of these are pencil-marked."

the books in his brother-in-law's library, did not at any time afterward entirely lose that taste and would find some means to gratify it.

The chief element in his training, however, down to the date in his life at which we have now arrived, was undoubtedly the influence of his father and, still more, of his mother. The father died when young Calhoun was but fourteen, but left an impress on the boy, which he seems never to have forgotten, and he always expressed himself <sup>7</sup> as deeply sensible of the influence of his parents. The father seems to have been a man of exemplary virtue, and of very strong character, with many of the traits of his Scotch-Irish ancestry. And the mother, too, was a woman of mark. Tall and stately, according to Col. Starke, she left to her descendants the memory of many virtues. And to this he adds, on the authority of the already mentioned James Edward Calhoun, who had seen her in his early years, that "she was a great manager. She taught her son John how to administer the affairs of a plantation." In still another place the same writer adds <sup>8</sup> that "he was taught to regard the Bible as a sacred book, to reverence God, to obey his parents, to do justice to all. He was a profoundly devout man without being religious, and often expressed himself as having 'unshaken confidence in the providence of God.'" We shall find all this fully borne out by his history in the years now but a little way ahead of us, however much the rather Calvinistic creed he once accepted may have been shaken in later life. Both his parents were Presbyterians,<sup>9</sup> and probably strict ones.

A chief purpose of biography is to enable us to understand the mental make-up and growth of the opinions of its subject, so let us stop here and try to realize the influence that Calhoun's early surroundings may be supposed to have had upon him. He grew up in an outlying district, far from the busy haunts of men, where government was not a conspicuous quantity. The federal power, so little to be seen in any part

<sup>7</sup> Senator Butler in eulogium upon Calhoun.

<sup>8</sup> "Sketch," p. 77.

<sup>9</sup> Biographical sketch reprinted from the "U. S. Telegraph" in the "Charleston Mercury," May 10, 1831.

of the country at that time, was of course practically non-existent in upper South Carolina until Calhoun's youth, or manhood, and the affairs of the State were managed in such a way as to give those living on the frontier a thorough dread of being controlled by any government at a distance, which they did not themselves select.

+ South Carolina was governed by an aristocracy composed of the large planters in the lowlands and of leading men in their one city of importance,<sup>10</sup> and of course these managed public affairs generally in their own interest. Gerrymandering the State in order to continue their power,—long before that word was invented,—they entirely controlled its destinies; and those living in the upper parts, toward the frontier, found it impossible to secure such legislation as they needed. They came thus to be a people by themselves, and it has been said<sup>11</sup> with truth that between the two great divisions of the State in these early days, "there were no ties of consanguinity, no identity of history, traditions or experience, no religious affinities, no personal acquaintance, no commercial relation." The uplanders felt strongly the injustice of the state of affairs forced upon them by the far-off lowlanders, under a government nominally for the benefit of all, but from which in reality the first-named could secure but little of what they wanted.

One other fact must be emphasized. South Carolina was a community rather apart from the rest of the United States.

<sup>10</sup> James H. Hammond, for many years so prominent in South Carolina, wrote in his "Diary" on December 27, 1850: "The Government of So. Car. is that of an aristocracy. When a Colony many families arose in the Low Country who became very rich and were highly educated. They were real noblemen & ruled the Colony and the State—the latter entirely until about thirty years ago & to a very great extent to the present moment. Our legislature has all power. The Executive has none. The people have none beyond electing members of the Legislature—a power very negligently exercised from time immemorial. The Legislature governs and the old families ruled the Legislature. The abolition of primogeniture in 1790 was a severe blow to them. Extravagant, bad managers & degenerating fast, they have been tottering with the death of every one who was in active life or at least had his character formed in the last century or the first fifteen years of this." Hammond Papers in Library of Congress.

<sup>11</sup> "Transportation in South Carolina," by W. L. Trenholm in "Hand-Book of South Carolina," p. 616, quoted in Hammond's "The Cotton Industry in the United States," p. 114.

To the growth of this feeling, many causes contributed, among which may be mentioned its great distance from the more northern parts of the country and its lack of easy communication with that region. The centralization of the functions of government, too, in the powerful classes in and near Charleston contributed largely to the growth of "a remarkable sentiment of compactness and self-reliance." The division between the settlers in the hill-country and those on the coastal plains was very marked; but, none the less, the people of the State in general came in time,—and indeed early,—to feel that South Carolina was their home, their country, the nation to which they owed allegiance. This feeling was widespread throughout the whole United States in our early days, and probably letters of nearly all the leading men in every one of the thirteen original States could be cited, in which they write of their State as their "country."

The people of South Carolina were, however, by no means a unit on the question of the adoption of the proposed Federal Constitution in 1788. The two great divisions stood here once more in direct opposition to each other. The governing classes strongly favored the instrument, and the delegation from Charleston voted unanimously to call a convention with power to ratify. But far different was the feeling of the up-country people. These "outlanders" felt that they knew already the ill effects of a government at less than two hundred miles distance, in which their delegation was but a minority; and they dreaded with a deep dread the thought of establishing over themselves another government at a far greater distance, in which their voice might be still more completely smothered.

The opposition to the United States Constitution in South Carolina came, therefore, almost entirely from the people of the back-country and was among them very general. Patrick Calhoun, it has been seen, opposed the instrument on the ground that "it permitted other people than those of South Carolina to tax the people of South Carolina and thus allowed taxation without representation, which was a violation of the fundamental principle of the Revolutionary struggle."



In this instance, again, however, when the vote came to be taken, Patrick Calhoun and his neighbors of the up-country found themselves defeated by the faraway lowlanders.<sup>12</sup>

All this happened, of course, at a time when John Caldwell Calhoun was not yet seven years old and can have made little impression upon him; but its echo must have reached his ears later and had its effect as he came to more mature age. Much knowledge and many beliefs are imbibed at the paternal table, and Calhoun doubtless heard from his father facts and opinions tending to emphasize the importance of the State and to argue its sovereign rights as a nation. The surrounding circumstances and his father's action in regard to the Constitution would most naturally have led to discussion as to what would have been the condition of South Carolina had she refused to ratify; and who would then have questioned but that she would have been a sovereign and independent community?

The young Calhoun grew up close enough to that day to realize thoroughly that the federal government had been dependent for its very existence upon the voluntary ratification of the requisite number of separate States, and to know, too, with what breathless anxiety the advocates of the plan had awaited the assent of one State after another. In his early years the States were, beyond doubt, the primordial, essential, governmental agency, and the newly-created federal government merely their derivative,—a creation they might well have refused to call into being. We live so far from that day, and the stupendous events of half a century ago have resulted in such a growth of federal activity, that we have forgotten all these facts and the then current beliefs upon the subject; but the student of history knows them and is apparently coming to recognize the great strength they afford to the arguments of the States' Rights school of our public men. This view cannot be argued here, and my only purpose is to call attention to

<sup>12</sup> On the condition of affairs in South Carolina about the time of the adoption of the constitution, see article on "The South Carolina Federalists," by Ulrich B. Phillips, in the "American Historical Review," Vol. XIV (April, 1909), pp. 529-543. As to Patrick Calhoun's action, see Calhoun's "Autobiography."



how strongly the facts mentioned probably influenced the mind of Calhoun in his early days. Impressions made at that time doubtless aided to guide his pen many years later when drafting some of his resolutions as to the nature of the State and federal governments.

Another one of the circumstances surrounding his early years must be mentioned. When Calhoun's mind began to develop,—even, indeed, when his eyes first opened in the world, ~~+~~ he found himself in a slave community. A very inferior race was held in bondage by that race to which he belonged. The subject people had but few rights, were forced to work at the command of their white owners, were punished by their masters, and were kept strictly under the control of the white people. Nothing could be more striking than the essential superiority of those masterful whites to the absolutely ignorant and almost barbarous blacks. In his own home, presided over by his father and mother, he found this system at the earliest date he could possibly remember, and he could hardly think very ill of it, without first ceasing to accord to his parents' opinion the respect that almost all children render.

This was the case throughout the whole South down to 1865; but it was perhaps even more striking in these early days. Among the slaves on the Calhoun place, we are told that at least one (Adam) was a native of Africa and had been imported thence to this country. Of course, this had been done in gross violence and wrong, but there was another point to be considered here; and the Southern view is absolutely sound: that by his seizure and the bringing of him to America that poor black had been rescued from a cruel and savage barbarism,—and possibly slavery,—beyond measure harder to endure than any ill of the slavery he could meet in this country. He was in truth vastly bettered by the wrong done him, and those who think upon the subject are coming to recognize as true the view always maintained by the South,—that the black race owes a heavy debt to the Southern people for “the immense amount of help rendered the Negro during the period he was a slave.” <sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Booker T. Washington in “Tuskegee Normal Institute Annual Re-

All these ideas and many more of the same general character must have been trite among Southerners at that date, as they were to later generations; and doubtless John Caldwell Calhoun both heard discussions in which such views were brought out and unconsciously imbibed those views from the logic of the surrounding circumstances. And, as he grew older, he could not have failed to be deeply impressed with the inherent and probably ineradicable incapacity of the blacks. Their inferiority was and is so painfully evident as not to require emphasis here, and its ineradicable nature is strongly argued by the absolute blank that the history of the negro race presents. The white people and others have repeatedly evolved a civilization within themselves. Why has the negro never done so, nor even been able,—when separated from the superior race,—to hold the veneering that had been acquired by dint of long contact with a capable people?

Calhoun's lifelong views cannot but have been profoundly influenced by all these thoughts.—His early years fell, too, in a time when slavery had acquired little, if any, of the harshness that marked it in some instances later; nor were the ill effects of the system upon the white people then conspicuous. Dwelling in a border-land, the idea of the whites not working does not seem yet to have arisen, and despite the rather large possessions of Patrick Calhoun, it is clear that hard work was the rule on his farm. Col. Starke writes that no idea whatsoever of the degradation of manual labor (in his opinion one of the worst of the later ill effects of slavery upon the whites) had grown up in Patrick Calhoun's family, and he had himself often seen the grandsons following the plough. He tells us, too, that Sawney,—the son of Adam and the playmate of the Calhoun boys,—used to delight in his old age to tell all inquirers at great length what he knew of John Caldwell Calhoun. They had hunted and fished together, it seems, and Sawney would add: "We worked in the field, and many's the times in the br'ilin' sun me and Mars John has plowed together." <sup>14</sup>

port," 1901, quoted in Alfred Holt Stone's "Studies in the American Race Problem," p. 89.

<sup>14</sup> Calhoun told John Quincy Adams in 1820 that both he and his father

All this was long before the general introduction of the overseer, to whose advent and the consequent *quasi* absentee landlordism may probably be attributed many of the harsh conditions of the slavery of later times. The system at that early day was a very different institution, as to which I shall quote the words of the oft-cited Col. Starke, a native of the Calhoun region in South Carolina, who tells us here what he saw with his own eyes in this very region, and what we know from other sources to be a true picture. He writes:

The institution of slavery, the old plantation life, is gone. Soon all recollection of it will be lost. In order to enable the reader to understand something of that life, we shall give a brief account of what fell under our notice. We shall present no imaginary picture.

Not far from the Calhoun settlement lived a man who had ridden with Sumter in the old war for liberty. During a long and active life he managed the business of the plantation himself. Towards the close of his life he consented to try an overseer, but in every case some difficulty soon arose between the middleman and the negroes, in which the old planter invariably took sides with the latter, and rid himself of the proxy. On rainy days the negro women spun raw cotton into yarn, which was woven by his own weaver into summer goods, to be cut out by a seamstress, and made by the other women, assisted by her, into clothing for the "people." The sheep were shorn, and the wool treated in the same fashion for winter clothing. The hides of cattle eaten on the place were tanned into leather and made into shoes by his own shoemaker. He had his own carpenters, wheelwright, and blacksmiths, and besides cattle and sheep the old planter raised his own stock of horses and mules. He grew his own wheat for flour, besides raising other small grain, corn and cotton. He distilled his own brandy from peaches and sweetened it with honey manufactured by his own bees. His negroes

had often held the plough; but, according to Adams, then went on to draw a distinction in regard to labor, such as is very hard for us to-day to understand. See *post*, pp. 259, 260. John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, p. 10. Macon, too, worked regularly with his slaves, Benton's "Thirty Years' View," Vol. I, p. 117, William E. Dodd's "Nathaniel Macon," pp. 89, 90; and Jefferson Davis, when he started his Mississippi plantation, "worked with his own hands and directed personally and through his trusty foreman . . . the labor of the fields," William E. Dodd's "Jefferson Davis," p. 43.

were well fed and clothed, carefully attended to in sickness, virtually free in old age, and supported in comfort till their death. The moral law against adultery was sternly enforced upon the place, and no divorce allowed. His people were encouraged to enjoy themselves in all reasonable ways. They went to a Methodist Church in the neighborhood on Sunday, and had besides a preacher of their own, raised on the place. The young were supplied with necessary fiddling and dancing. I was present when he died, and heard him say to his son that he would leave him a property honestly made and not burdened with a dollar of indebtedness. His family and friends were gathered about his bedside when the time had come for him to go. Having taken leave of his friends, he ordered his negro laborers to be summoned from the field to take farewell of him. When they arrived he was speechless and motionless, but sensible of all that was occurring, as could be seen from his look of intelligence. One by one the negroes entered the apartment, and filing by him in succession took each in turn the limp hand of their dying master, and affectionately pressing it for a moment, thanked him for his goodness, commended him to God, and bade him farewell.

Finally, in regard to these early years of Calhoun, attention must be called to one other fact, which is borne upon by Col. Starke, is the usual Southern view about life on a plantation, and which beyond doubt has a great deal of truth in it. This author says:

The faithful discharge of the duties of the proprietor of a plantation in former times demanded administrative as well as moral qualities of a high order. There never was a better school for the education of statesmen than the administration of a Southern plantation under the former régime. A well-governed plantation was a well-ordered little independent state. Surrounded with such environments, Calhoun grew up at this school.

If the future Senator and greatest of Southern leaders lacked early tuition, he had at least from an early age that better instructor, ceaseless responsibility, and was persistently called upon to exercise watchfulness as to the thousand details of the difficult microcosm under his care.



## CHAPTER III

### EDUCATION

#### The Turning Point — Waddel's School — College Life at Yale — Impressions.

THE great change in Calhoun's life,— which resulted in giving him to public affairs for which so few are well fitted, instead of wasting his remarkable capacities in agriculture to which thousands of others are as well suited as he was,— came about during the early part of his nineteenth year. Of course, even otherwise he might have entered public life in some way; but, so far as we can see, the incident referred to was the sole cause that led to his great career. It is said by Col. Starke on the authority of James Edward Calhoun that, as he grew toward maturity, "a feeling manifested itself among the people in remarks that John C. Calhoun ought to be educated." But this statement is not borne out by the "Autobiography," and it is impossible to know whether the neighbors really had any part in bringing about the change.

The only reliable information on this point is the following from Calhoun's own account:

. . . About this time, an incident occurred which turned his after life. His second brother, James, who had been placed at a counting-house in Charleston, returned to spend the summer of 1800 at home. John had determined to become a planter; but James, objecting to this, strongly urged him to acquire a good education and pursue one of the learned professions. He replied that he was not averse to the course advised, but there were two difficulties in the way: one was to obtain the assent of his mother, without which he could not think of leaving her, and the other was the want of means. He said his property was small and his resolution fixed: he would rather be a planter than a half-informed physician or lawyer. With this determination, he



could not bring his mind to select either without ample preparation; but if the consent of his mother should be freely given, and he (James) thought he could so manage his property as to keep him in funds for seven years of study preparatory to entering his profession, he would leave home and commence his education the next week. His mother and brother agreeing to his condition, he accordingly left home the next week for Dr. Waddel's, who had married again and resumed his academy in Columbia county, Georgia.

It was in June of 1800 that this event happened, and from that time on until his death, half a century later, Calhoun's career was brilliant at every stage. The devotion of the mother thus willing to part with her son for his good, and the unselfishness of the brothers, who doubtless made considerable pecuniary sacrifices for his benefit, need to be mentioned in passing. At one time during his years of study, in 1806, it seems that James Calhoun found the burden heavy to carry and wanted him to come home. On April 13th of that year, Calhoun wrote from Litchfield that his brother James would be there in the latter part of June and "is desirous of my returning with him; but I have not yet gave<sup>1</sup> him an answer. However, as the course of lectures will not conclude till the fall, I do not think it probable I shall." There can be little doubt that lack of money was the cause for this wish on the part of the brother, and it was only about three months later that the law-student is to be found asking a loan.<sup>2</sup>

Returning thus for a second time to Dr. Waddel's school, it may be assumed that Calhoun applied himself assiduously to work, or he could never have made the rapid progress he did make. He himself writes that he may be said to have commenced his education at this time, while Starke adds

<sup>1</sup> I transcribe from Prof. Jameson's "Calhoun Correspondence" precisely as the letters are there printed, down to and including those ending on p. 98 *post*. After that time I have omitted mere errors of spelling. A good many of these, and some of grammar, occur in the printed "Correspondence," but probably not a few are owing to the difficulty of reading Calhoun's handwriting, and he had some strange indifference in the matter. Within a few lines the same word will be found correctly and again incorrectly spelled. Misspelling and pet errors of grammar are faults common enough to-day as well as in Calhoun's time.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Mrs. Colhoun, dated July 3, 1806.

that he then "opened for the first time a Latin grammar." We shall soon see where he stood two years later.

Not very much has survived in regard to the famous Waddel school of the South. At the time of Calhoun's short stay as a boy in 1795, it was situated near the small town of Appling, in the present Columbia County, Georgia, not far from the Savannah River, and at the date of his second attendance, in 1800, Calhoun himself has just been quoted to the effect that it was still in Columbia County, Georgia. In 1804 it was removed to Willington in Abbeville County, South Carolina, and was there maintained for many years by Mr. Waddel, the father, and later by his sons.<sup>3</sup> It lived long in the memory of Southern men as "the Willington Academy." At this, its last and most enduring situation, the school was upon a high and healthy ridge between the Savannah and Little Rivers, not far from the region where the members of the Calhoun family had settled. John C. Calhoun also lived near by during some years of his early manhood. The latter long afterward wrote as follows of Dr. Waddel as a teacher.<sup>4</sup>

In that character, he stands almost unrivaled. He may be justly considered as the father of classical education in the upper country of South Carolina and Georgia. His excellence in that character depended not so much on extensive or profound learning as a felicitous combination of qualities for the government of boys and communicating to them what he knew. He was particularly successful in exciting emulation amongst them, and in obtaining the good will of all except the worthless. The best evidence of his high qualities as a teacher is his success. Among his pupils are to be found a large part of the eminent men in this State and Georgia. In this State it is sufficient to

<sup>3</sup> I have depended in the main for details as to Waddel's school on Colyer Meriwether's "History of Higher Education in South Carolina" (Bureau of Education. Circular of Information, No. 3, 1888), pp. 38, 39. This writer says that the school was in 1800 at "Vienna," apparently meaning in Georgia, and this seems to be borne out by Calhoun's statement quoted in my text. Vienna was, however, in a region very little settled at that date, and there was another Vienna in Abbeville County, South Carolina, close to Willington. As to the mode of life at the school, see also W. J. Grayson's "Memoirs of James Louis Petigru," pp. 34, 35.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Col. Starke's "Sketch," pp. 78, 79, from Sprague's "Annals of the American Pulpit," Vol. IV, p. 67. See also Meriwether's "Higher Education in South Carolina."

name McDuffie, Legaré, Petigru, and my colleague Butler. To these many others of distinction might be added. His pupils in Georgia who have distinguished themselves are numerous. In the list are to be found the names of William H. Crawford, Longstreet, etc. It is in his character of a teacher especially, that he will long be remembered as a benefactor of the country.

There seems to be no record left of the school as it was in Calhoun's day at its earlier homes, but even at Willington it was plain indeed. Log-houses took the place of the luxurious dormitories of modern times. These shanties varied in size from six to sixteen feet square, and fronted on a sort of street shaded by majestic oaks, while at the head of the street stood a larger log-house divided into two rooms, one of which was intended for the smaller boys, while the other was used for recitation, for prayers, and for all general purposes. It was without seats, and was large enough to hold one hundred and fifty boys standing erect. "Under the wide-spreading branches in summer," we are told, "and in their huts in winter, the students diligently studied, changing their occupation at the sound of the horn, and repairing to the house for recitation when called for by the name of 'the Virgil class, the Homer class,' or by the name of the author they were studying. . . . Such was the spirit (of study) among them that drones were hardly tolerated at all. Their life was simple and industrious, and their food was Spartan in its plainness — corn-bread and bacon. Instead of gas and students' lamps, they pored over the lessons by the aid of pine torches. At the sound of the horn, they retired to bed. . . . They rose at dawn, and resumed their studies."

To this may be added from other sources a few words bearing more directly on Calhoun's own life at the school. Thus, one authority<sup>5</sup> writes: "It is related of him by his school-mates, that while at Waddel's Academy, he had an impediment or hesitancy in his speech, which, added to his unusual diffidence, rendered his prospects of eminence as a speaker

<sup>5</sup> "Measures not Men: Illustrated by some remarks upon the public conduct and character of John C. Calhoun," by a Citizen of New York. New York, 1823. The pamphlet being anonymous, its statements must of course be received with caution.

quite unflattering." And Col. Starke,<sup>6</sup> who writes that he himself was, of course at a later date, "long an inmate of Moses Waddel's family and a pupil at the Willington Academy," gives an account of the old Willington school as the boys of his day had received it from tradition. His account agrees in the main with what has been already said of the school in general, but adds certain information as to a particular point that is interesting in view of Calhoun's later life. After telling us that it was a classical school and quite devoid of the modern multiplicity of studies, he writes that "the debating club on Friday afternoons was an important institution and regarded by the teacher as a very necessary part of his scholastic system, for to converse and speak in public were esteemed necessary accomplishments to Southern youths." A valuable training, indeed, for one whose then unknown destiny it was to debate in later years with Clay and Webster and the other giants of his time!

In the short space of two years at this school the raw country boy, who started in 1800 with almost none of the foundations of learning but had zeal and inborn abilities of a most unusual order, entered in 1802 the Junior class at Yale, then as now one of the leading institutions of learning in the country. He had begun his education at Waddel's school and first opened a Latin grammar only some two or three months in advance of the time when his Yale classmates of 1802 were entering upon their college life as freshmen, after possibly ten or twelve years of preparatory work.

He seems early in college life to have found himself quite the equal of his classmates. Asked once in later years when the thought first came into his mind of his superiority to ordinary men, he smiled and then answered as follows:

"I went on to Yale College, fresh from the backwoods. My opportunities for learning had been very limited. I had a high opinion of the New England system of education. My first recitation was in mathematics, and we had been told to fetch our slates into the class-room. On taking our seats the professor proceeded to propound certain arithmetical ques-

<sup>6</sup> "Sketch," pp. 79, 80.



tions to us. I found no difficulty in working out the first, and on looking about me was surprised to find the others busy with their slates. The professor noticing my movement asked me if I had got the answer, and I handed him my slate. The answer proved to be correct. The same thing occurred every time. On returning to my apartment I felt gratified. This is, perhaps, sir, the best answer I can give to your question."<sup>7</sup>

Calhoun tells us in the "Autobiography" that he was highly esteemed by Dr. Dwight, the then president of the college, despite their wide differences in politics. Calhoun came up from the South, a Republican, like most of his home neighbors, and full of all the theories of popular rights supported by them and the Jeffersonians in general. To Dwight, on the other hand, Jefferson and all his beliefs were a horrid nightmare. Dwight was indeed among the most ultra of the New England Federalists of that day, when party feeling ran so high that in Connecticut ostracism was the probable result of espousing the Republican cause. More than one person suffered from the bitterness of this feeling, and otherwise harmless professors had found the confines of Yale College far too warm for them to live in.

But Calhoun came from afar and was barely entering manhood, so his views were possibly less harmful, and the President seems even to have drawn him out. The "Autobiography" has the following story upon this point:

The doctor [Dwight] was an ardent Federalist, and Mr. Calhoun was one of a very few, in a class of more than seventy, who had the firmness openly to avow and maintain the opinions of the Republican party, and, among others, that the people were the only legitimate source of political power. Dr. Dwight entertained a different opinion. In a recitation during the senior year, on the Chapter on Politics in Paley's Moral Philosophy, the doctor, with the intention of eliciting his opinion, propounded to Mr. Calhoun the question, as to the legitimate source

<sup>7</sup> Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 80. I at first supposed that this superiority of Calhoun was in reality owing in great part to his age (22 years at graduation), but inquiry developed the fact that of the 60 members of his class, whose ages are known (of 6 there are no details on this point), as many as 24 were 22 or older. I am indebted to Mr. Edwin Rogers Embree, Alumni Registrar of Yale, for these facts.



of power. He did not decline an open and direct avowal of his opinion. A discussion ensued between them, which exhausted the time allotted for the recitation, and in which the pupil maintained his opinions with such vigor of argument and success as to elicit from his distinguished teacher the declaration,<sup>8</sup> in speaking of him to a friend, that "the young man had talent enough to be President of the United States," which he accompanied by a prediction that he would one day attain that station.

Calhoun graduated with distinction on September 12, 1804, but little more than four years after the date at which he had really begun his education. Among his classmates were John M. Felder and Micah Sterling from South Carolina, with both of whom we shall find him associated in after years; as well as the following, who all came in time to occupy positions of prominence in some department of life: Christopher E. Gadsden was Bishop of South Carolina; John Gadsden, Attorney General of South Carolina; John P. Hampton, Judge of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and Bennett Tyler, President of Dartmouth College and later President of the Theological Seminary at East Windsor Hill.

In the latter part of August, 1804, Calhoun had a serious illness which "well-nigh put an end" to his life. He hoped in the end of the month to be well enough by commencement "to realize the enjoyments and participate in the labor of that Day,"<sup>9</sup> but such was not the case, and he was not even able to be present. He had been assigned to deliver an Eng-

<sup>8</sup> This opinion of Dwight is mentioned by numerous other authors. The writing of earliest date to which I have been able to trace it is the pamphlet of 1823 cited shortly above and called "Measures not Men," &c., &c. Perhaps another version of this story should be mentioned here, but it seems to be based on nothing but a loose newspaper-clipping. According to this, Dwight's words were, "Young man, your talents are of a high order and might justify you for any station, but I deeply regret that you do not love sound principles better than sophistry—you seem to possess a most unfortunate bias towards error." "Letter of Petigru to Legaré," dated December 17, 1836, and enclosing such a newspaper-cutting. "The Life and Times of James L. Petigru," by Joseph Blyth Allston in the "Charleston Sunday News," January 21 to June 17, 1900: see issue of June 17. The story ought to be reproduced here, I feel, but is probably apocryphal.

<sup>9</sup> Letter to Mrs. Floride Calhoun of August 29, 1804, and to Alexander Noble of Oct. 15, 1804. See also the "Autobiography."

lish oration and had selected as his thesis "The qualifications necessary to constitute a perfect statesman," but this paper, interesting as it would be to-day in the light of his subsequent career, has never seen the light of day.

Thus graduated, and with the degree of bachelor of arts in his pocket written in a language of which but four years earlier he had not known the first rudiments, the brilliant young South Carolinian was now a man of twenty-two and a half years. Before he leaves New England to go home again, a word must be said of a family with the members of which he became intimately acquainted about the close of his years at Yale. They had never met before,<sup>10</sup> despite the fact that they were closely related. He went South with them on this occasion, and the only daughter of the family, at this time a child of twelve, became his wife in course of time.

Among the brothers of Patrick Calhoun to come over from Ireland was one Ezekiel, who married a Miss Ewing and left behind him among other children a son, John Ewing Calhoun, or, as he spelled the name, Colhoun. John Ewing Colhoun has already been mentioned in these pages as having gone to Charlestown from the upper country about 1776 with the intention of studying law. Instead of this, however, he enlisted as a private in Colonel Charles Drayton's Volunteer Company and was not admitted to the bar until 1783. On October 8, 1786, he married Floride Bonneau, who was, according to Col. Starke's "Sketch," "a low-country heiress of French extraction [and whose family] lived at Bonneau's Ferry on Cooper River, about twenty miles above Charleston." The same authority tells us that she was the owner of a rice-plantation and of lands in the upper country; and according to a newspaper marriage-notice<sup>11</sup> of the time she was "an

<sup>10</sup> Letter to Mrs. Floride Colhoun, dated June 12, 1810.

<sup>11</sup> The Charleston "Morning Post and Daily Advertiser" of Monday, October 9, 1786, quoted in Mr. Salley's "The Calhoun Family of South Carolina," printed in "The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. VII (1906), p. 154, speaks of the marriage as having occurred on October 8, and again "yesterday." This fixes it on a Sunday. The facts in the text in regard to the family of John Ewing Colhoun and his career in general are taken from Mr. Salley's article, pp. 153, 154, and from other publications in the same magazine, Vol. I, pp. 134, 135, 162, 186, 187. See also, *ante*, p. 43.

agreeable young lady, with every accomplishment to make the married state happy." Whatever we, who live in the last degree of newspaper gossip as to private life, may think of the taste of this sort of announcement by public prints it was in the particular case probably an accurate judgment, and we shall find Mrs. Colhoun kind and attentive in the highest degree to her husband's cousin in his sickness at Yale as well as during all her later years.

John Ewing Colhoun was a man of note in his day, served in the Legislature and Privy Council of South Carolina, and was United States Senator from that State from March 4, 1801, until his death on October 26, 1802. He had been elected to the Senate as a Republican over the prior incumbent, Jacob Read, by the close vote of 75 to 73. After his death, his widow, a woman of means, was in the habit of at least often spending the summers,—the unhealthy season at her home,—in Newport, Rhode Island, and she passed also at least two winters (those of 1805–1806 and of 1806–1807) in that favorite northern resort of Southerners.<sup>12</sup> It may possibly be that this was partly for the advancement of the education of her children. She had two sons, James Edward (so often quoted by Col. Starke) and John Ewing, and one daughter, Floride Bonneau Colhoun, who was born<sup>13</sup> February 15, 1792, and was thus ten years younger than her future husband.

It seems that Mrs. Colhoun, being at Newport in the summer of 1804 and hearing in some way of the illness of her husband's first cousin, John Caldwell, wrote in the latter part of August inviting him to come and stay with her in Newport. Indeed, she had at some prior date sent a like verbal invitation by a kinsman named Noble, but Calhoun did not then know where she was. To her letter he replied on August 29th, saying that he would gladly visit her after commencement, which was to be on September 12. In the end of September,—probably after he had sufficiently recovered from his illness,—he accordingly went to Newport and stayed with Mrs. Col-

<sup>12</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," Letters to Mrs. Floride Colhoun, *passim*, 93–123.

<sup>13</sup> Mr. Salley's article, *ut ante*, p. 154.

houn until the latter part of October or very possibly until the middle of November, when he and the Colhoun family sailed South on the same vessel.

Some of Calhoun's impressions of the time are interesting. As he wrote to Alexander Noble from that place on October 15, 1804:

Newport is quite a pleasant place, but it has rather an old appearance which gives it a somewhat melancholy aspect. I have found no part of New England more agreeable than the island of Rhode Island. Agreeably situated, well cultivated and possessed of a good soil and delightful climate, it seems to possess all that can contribute to the pleasure of man. But as to the civil situation of this State and its manners, customs, moral and religious character, it seems much inferior, as far as my information extends, to every other part of New England. To-morrow I set off in company with your aunt<sup>14</sup> for Boston. We expect to make a short stay, not more perhaps than a week. I expect to return to Carolina by water, and in the same vessel with your Aunt and family. We do not expect to sail before the 10th or 12th of next month, as we apprehend from accounts received from Charleston, that it would be dangerous to be there before the middle of November.

<sup>14</sup> Mrs. Colhoun was certainly not strictly Alexander Noble's aunt, and the word must have been employed in the loose sense in which it often was used. I presume Noble was a descendant of Sarah Calhoun, daughter to John C. Calhoun's uncle William. She married one E. P. Noble of Texas (Col. Starke's "Sketch," foot-note to p. 78). But it is possible he was a descendant of the immigrant Patrick's sister, Mary, who married one John Noble (Mr. Salley's "Calhoun Family," *ut ante*, p. 83). In either case, he and Mrs. Colhoun's husband were cousins in some degree.

## CHAPTER IV

### FURTHER TRAINING

#### Studies Law — The Litchfield Law School — Growth of Opinion.

ARRIVING, doubtless, in Charleston, it may be surmised that Calhoun soon went up to the neighborhood of Abbeville to live and to make further progress in his education. A little more than four years of the term of seven he had appointed were gone, and a course of study in law still lay ahead of him. His mother had died about the time he went to Yale in 1802<sup>1</sup> and it seems that the management of his private affairs was in the hands of his brother James.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, I presume it is likely that the family estate was still managed as a whole. He spent the ensuing winter of 1805 in Abbeville, studying law with George Bowie, "an eminent and leading lawyer on the Western Circuit," who is said to have been the first member of his profession to reside in Abbeville.<sup>3</sup>

Calhoun had evidently made up his mind from the start to secure the best education, and he came to the conclusion to take a course at the then famous law school maintained at Litchfield, Connecticut, by Judge Tapping Reeve, of the Connecticut Superior Court, and James Gould. This school was known far and wide and was the first institution in the United States at which law was taught to established classes by a system of lectures. It was attended by students from various parts of the country and resorted to by Southerners to no little

<sup>1</sup> This is the time of her death distinctly asserted by Col. Starke ("Sketch," p. 80). Curiously enough, Calhoun himself once wrote that his mother died when he was sixteen years old (i.e., in 1798). Letter to John Rodgers printed in "Virginia Magazine of History and Biography," Vol. VII (1901), p. 328.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Mrs. Floride Calhoun of July 3, 1806.

<sup>3</sup> J. B. O'Neill's "Bench and Bar," &c., Vol. II, p. 207.



extent. Calhoun found some of his home acquaintance already there upon his arrival.

The journey North was made by him under most favorable auspices. Mrs. Floride Colhoun, whose acquaintance, it has been shown, he had made at New Haven the preceding autumn, was this year going North by land in her own carriage, and I think it may be safely assumed that she had been greatly attracted by the young student or she would hardly have asked him, as she did, to go with her on this long journey, upon which she took her three children and we can only guess how many servants and slaves as well. Travel of this kind in one's own carriage was common enough in that day for those who had the fortune to render it possible, and it must have been an admirable education as to everything appertaining to the country traversed. Col. Starke is our chief informant as to this event in Calhoun's career, and he in turn derived his information from James Edward Colhoun, one of the hostess' sons, who still remembered the trip in very advanced life. Col. Starke writes:

The wealthy widow must have made a stir in the little village [Abbeville] <sup>4</sup> as she passed through it in her family coach, drawn by four splendid gray horses, with the reins held by an English coachman in full livery. The widow took with her Floride, then in her thirteenth year, and her sons John and James. At the request of John Caldwell, for whom she had learned to feel a warm motherly regard mixed with admiration, the widow consented to make a detour and stop a day or two at Charlottesville, in Virginia. The young Carolina Republican was anxious to see Mr. Jefferson, then on a visit (he was President at the time) to Monticello.

"Cousin John," said my informant, "went out to Monticello to call upon Mr. Jefferson, who must have been pleased with him, as he detained him until the following morning. The conversation between the two men is said to have lasted until midnight, which was an unusual occurrence with Mr. Jefferson. I remember hearing that Mr. Jefferson, coming into town next day, spoke

<sup>4</sup> "Sketch," pp. 83, 84. Some doubt is possibly raised as to the fact of their passing through Abbeville, by a letter of Calhoun's to Mrs. Colhoun, dated July 3, 1806, in which he compares the then state of vegetation with what it was "when we left Charleston last year."

about John C. Calhoun in a manner quite gratifying to my mother."

Not much more remains to tell us of the route by which they travelled. They did not go through Wilmington, as seems to have been their original intention, and afterward rather congratulated themselves for having arrived at this conclusion,—possibly sickness developed there during the summer. The young man wrote Mrs. Colhoun on August 12, 1805, that here was another argument in favor of her conviction that "all is for the best." They passed through Princeton, N. J., and Calhoun wrote <sup>5</sup> Mr. DeSaussure, his law instructor of a few years hence and the future great Chancellor of South Carolina, an account of the latter's son at the college, with which the far distant father was greatly pleased.

Calhoun went on with his cousin's family to Newport; and in July proceeded to Litchfield, returning first to New London, and then going on by stage by way of Norwich and Hartford. On the last ride of his journey he was fortunate in having as a fellow-passenger his instructor to be, Judge Reeve, to whom he presented a letter of introduction and "found him on the passage open and agreeable." He arrived at his destination shortly before July 22, on which day he wrote to his late hostess giving her an account of his journey and telling her that "for two or three days after I left New Port, I felt much of that lonesome Sensation, which I believe every one experiences, after departing from those with whom he has been long intimate. However by mingling and conversation with others, I have felt it much diminished; and by a few days application to studies, which to me are highly interesting, I have no doubt it will be entirely removed." And in an earlier part of the same letter he wrote: "I have every prospect of rendering my residence here very agreeable; and I return, I assure you, with much pleasure to the cultivation of Blackstone's acquaintance."

It seems doubtful, however, whether the law ever had any real attraction for him, unless in these early days of its acqui-

<sup>5</sup> Letter to Mrs. Floride Colhoun, Sept. 26, 1805.

sition, and, it may possibly be supposed, in some of its great underlying principles. He wrote to Mrs. Colhoun on August 12, 1805:

I feel myself much absorbed by the pursuit of legal knowledge at present. In fact, to take the course of law lectures, not as they usually are, but as they ought to be, I find I must devote almost the whole of my time to that purpose. I find Mr. Felder<sup>o</sup> a faithful and cheering companion in the dry and solitary journey through the exterior fields of law. We both console ourselves, that in a few years we shall acquire a pretty thorough knowledge of our profession; and then our time shall be more at our own disposals. Perhaps this is but a pleasant dream; as every succeeding year comes loaded with its own peculiar cares and business.

To his cousin, Andrew Pickens, also, he wrote on November 24 of the same year:

You do me an injustice in supposing your letters intrude on my studious disposition; I am not so much in love with law as to feel indifferent to my friends. Many things I study for the love of study but not so with law. I can never consider it, but as a task which my situation forces on me. I therefore, often lay it aside for the more delicious theme of the muses, or interesting pages of history; and always throw it away with joy to hear from my Carolina correspondents. But, I confess, from my aversion to law, I draw a motive to industry. It must be done, and the sooner the better is often my logick.

Litchfield was a small town situated in the western part of Connecticut, north of the central line of the State and not far from a range of hills that approached to the dignity of mountains. It was far enough from the sea and at a sufficient elevation to afford in its northern latitude a complete change of climate to those who came up from the far South, and Calhoun not infrequently refers to this element in his new surroundings as well as to the "very high open situation" of

<sup>o</sup> His room-mate, John M. Felder, who had graduated with him at Yale in 1804, and who became in later years a prominent politician in South Carolina. Letter to Mrs. Colhoun of July 22, 1805. O'Neill's "Bench and Bar of South Carolina," Vol. II, pp. 325-336.

the district. With wide streets lined by the spacious mansions usual in those days, the village was situated on some of the great lines of traffic, and good roads, travelled regularly by stage-lines, passed through it.

Some historic interest attached to Litchfield. Governor Wolcott, famous even among the men of Connecticut for his intense federalism, was a resident, and opposite his home stood that of Judge Reeve, the senior member of the firm maintaining the law school. The latter's wife was the only sister of the meteoric Aaron Burr, who had for a time studied law there, but who left this peaceful pursuit to join Arnold's romantic expedition against Quebec. Washington had passed through the village more than once during the Revolution, and Lafayette and Rochambeau are said to have been entertained in the Reeve house. It is curious, too, that Harriet Beecher Stowe and her brother were born in Litchfield; while a short walk would have brought the young Southerner to the spot where John Brown first saw the light of day in the adjoining town.

The students of the law-school met for lecture and recitation in a small building adjoining Mr. Gould's home. It was situate on North Street, and the "legends of the village" are said to centre about this building and one other—"the square-built aggressive-looking structure, which was the seat of Miss Sarah Pierce's no less famous Young Ladies' Seminary."<sup>7</sup> The two schools were very close together, and there was some social intercourse between them, but I find no mention of the girls' school in Calhoun's writings.



Calhoun spent more than a year at Litchfield, and it is evident that he devoted himself assiduously to study. He arrived there about July 22, 1805, and his diploma, dated July 29, 1806, certifies<sup>8</sup> that "during that period he has applied himself to no other regular business, and has attended diligently and faithfully to the study of the law." But he evidently<sup>9</sup> con-

<sup>7</sup> "Sketch of James Gould," by Simeon E. Baldwin, in Wm. Draper Lewis's "Great American Lawyers," Vol. II, pp. 455-87. Charles Burr Todd's "In Olde Connecticut," pp. 188-190. Article by Charles C. Moore reprinted from "Law Notes," in Dwight C. Kilbourn's "Bench and Bar of Litchfield Co., Conn.," pp. 181-183.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 84.


<sup>9</sup> Letter to Mrs. Floride Colhoun, dated July 3, 1806.





THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOLS





tinued his studies and attended lectures after this date until August 20, at which time the school had a vacation of three weeks. This vacation he spent with Mrs. Colhoun at Newport, but was back again at Litchfield by September 11 and attended that fall further lectures, to which he referred as being a "part of the course."<sup>10</sup> He wrote Mrs. Colhoun on that date that the lectures had commenced again, and he should not be able to get down to the Yale commencement. "The present subject," he continued, "on which the judge is lecturing, is an important one; and I think it my duty to make pleasure yield to interest." Precisely how long he remained to take these lectures cannot be ascertained.<sup>11</sup>

Far from home as he was, he found himself largely alone, but this of course helped to turn him to study. He wrote on September 9, 1805: "This is rather an out of the way place; and, unless, it is now and then a southerner from college, we rarely see any one from our end of Union:" and then he emphasized the fact that this led to diligent work. He was in his twenty-fourth year when he went to Litchfield, and at the very beginning of his studies (July 22, 1805) he wrote of himself and his room-mate, John M. Felder, that "both being sensible of the importance of application, at our age, have resolved to devote our time to solid and useful studies."

There was one other inducement to study in the little New England village. He came up from afar, a Republican and supporter of the existing administration of federal affairs while the bitterness felt in Connecticut against Jefferson and all his ilk has rarely been equalled in the annals of political hatred. Calhoun seems not to have been there long before he was aware of this fact, and he probably knew it already from his two years at Yale. He wrote on December 23, 1805: "I take little amusement; and live a very studious life. This place is so much agitated by party feelings, that both Mr.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, April 13, 1806.

<sup>11</sup> Calhoun wrote ("Autobiography," p. 6) that he spent eighteen months at Litchfield, but the time does not seem to have been so long, as he writes from Charleston on December 22, 1806, to Mrs. Colhoun, after having gone home by land, having spent "a few weeks" at Abbeville, and having been in Charleston for a period that he does not specify. It has been already seen that he arrived at Litchfield about July 22, 1805.

Felder and myself find it prudent to form few connections in town. This, though somewhat disagreeable is not unfavorable to our studies."

Many years later, too, he said <sup>12</sup> that he had in these early days watched the management of public affairs in New England and been much struck with "the working of the odious party machinery" of the caucus system, and convinced that it would in the end supersede the authority of law and the Constitution. But despite the general disaffection in New England at that day, he is said to have "never doubted that the great body of citizens . . . were firmly attached to the Union." <sup>13</sup>

In regard to the method of teaching at the famous school of Litchfield, the text has made it plain that at least much of the instruction was by means of lectures. These were given in Calhoun's day by Judge Reeve, the founder of the school, and James Gould, a much younger man, whom Reeve, in 1798, had called upon to aid him. Both were men of marked ability; and Gould is thought by the author of a recent sketch to have had qualities that we may well suppose to have contributed largely to the masterly power of analysis and definite statement shown so conspicuously in later days by Calhoun. Gould was extremely lucid and addicted to clear-cut rules and definitions, so that each student could, in this writer's opinion, "learn from him the faculty of stating propositions in definite and simple form, and following them up by orderly and logical methods of explanation." <sup>14</sup>

Possibly this same faculty for lucid reasoning was the quality that led Gould to admire the common law and its intense logic almost as extravagantly as Blackstone had done. A graduate of the school in 1814 wrote of him as "the last of the Romans of the Common Law lawyers, the impersonation of its genius and spirit. It was indeed in his eyes *the perfection*

<sup>12</sup> Speech in Senate; Congressional Debates, Twenty-fourth Congress, Second Session, Vol. XIII, Part 1, 1836-37, pp. 301, 302.

<sup>13</sup> "Measures not Men," &c., &c., *ut ante*, New York, 1823, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> "Sketch of Gould," by Prof. Baldwin, in Lewis's "Great American Lawyers," Vol. II, pp. 455-487, 471, 472; from which source most of the facts in the text in regard to the Litchfield Law School are derived.

of *human reason*.”<sup>15</sup> But this belief, however prevalent in Blackstone’s time, was hardly so widely held even in England in Gould’s day or Calhoun’s, and may possibly have contributed to the dislike of the law that a young man from the frontier of South Carolina early in the nineteenth century was likely to feel for a system which, while often almost logical in the sense of the school-men, too often forgot the essential justice of the question at issue and was certainly quite unfitted for application in a new country.

A few years after Calhoun’s time the regular course of study at the school was completed in fourteen months, which period included two vacations of four weeks each,—one in the spring and one in the autumn. There were occasionally students who remained longer, but not many stayed more than eighteen months, as they would have found themselves merely taking for the second time lectures that they had already heard. The number of students in 1798 had been about forty, and the fees for tuition about 1816 to 1820 were one hundred dollars for the first year and sixty dollars for a second year. The students were expected to examine and study some of the cases,—then, of necessity, almost entirely from English reports,—referred to by the lecturer, and quizzes were given at this later time, whether such was the case during Calhoun’s stay or not. Moot-courts were held once or twice a week, with Mr. Gould presiding, and here of course the future great leader in the Senate had again, as he had already had at Waddel’s school, an opportunity to cultivate a readiness to think on his legs. The “Autobiography” emphasizes the great importance of this part of the training. It is of interest, too, to note that some of the lectures, which covered a wide field of law, were upon the subjects of Constitutional Law and the Legislation of Congress.

The same authority tells us that Calhoun “acquired great distinction” at the Litchfield school, and an anonymous pamphlet of 1823<sup>16</sup> adds to this that “while at the law school, Mr.

<sup>15</sup> The words in italics are used by Blackstone in speaking of the common law.

<sup>16</sup> “Measures not Men,” &c., *ut ante*.

Calhoun was much distinguished by his talent for extemporaneous debating.”<sup>17</sup> He by no means, however, devoted himself exclusively to law, but the politics of the world as well as the smaller squabbles in his part of South Carolina had their share of attention. It is of interest to find him writing to a cousin in one letter<sup>18</sup> congratulating him upon admission to the bar and then launching out, evidently with reference to some faction at his home, that “it is high time for those selfish usurpers on the publick opinion to be painted in their true light. . . . For my part, I never could think with complacency of some upstarts in that part of the State, whose thoughts and lives have been consumed in drawing down characters whose actions have afforded volumes of proof of integrity and wisdom.” And then he soon starts off on a new subject and writes: “War between France and Austria is inevitable, Bonapart’s speech before the senate on his departure from Paris to take command of the army on the Rhine, and the Austrian manifesto are both published. The former full of confidence in victory; the latter apparently moderate, but resolute. What will be the event time alone can unfold; but I distrust the fortune of the allies.”<sup>19</sup> The period is certainly eventful.”

Though keeping aloof from social intercourse at Litchfield, he yet wrote<sup>20</sup> of it as “among the most pleasant towns I ever have been in,” and took part in some of the amusements of the new climate. On January 19, 1806, he wrote: “We have excellent sleighing here. I was out last evening for the first time this season; and found it very agreeable. It is a mode of conveyance that the people of this state are very fond of.” The climate, so different from that of his home, receives

<sup>17</sup> A biographical sketch reprinted from the “United States Telegraph” in the Charleston “Mercury” of May 10, 1831, tells us that the students at Litchfield formed a debating society, which held open meetings, and that these were at times of great interest to the inhabitants. But I cannot suppose the further statement that they selected for debate “the most agitating political questions of the day” can be relied upon.

<sup>18</sup> Letter to Andrew Pickens, dated November 24, 1805. The reference therein to factions at home is naturally not clear.

<sup>19</sup> The battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, ended the Austrian part of the war.

<sup>20</sup> Letter to Mrs. Calhoun, dated June 2, 1806.



frequent mention. The fierce colds of winter seem to have been distasteful to him, but the northern summers, so often as they were moderate, evidently suited him well. As late as July 3, of 1806, he wrote: "I have never experienced so cool a summer as this has been. We have not had a day disagreeably warm." He apparently maintained a fairly wide correspondence with friends in his own State, and is to be found occasionally expressing that regret that those far absent are pretty sure to complain of now and then at the lapse of a long period without letters from home.

Calhoun's residence in the northern climate seems to have been decidedly beneficial to his health, and it is not impossible that the hope of this was in part the moving cause that led to his selection of New Haven and Litchfield. He refers in several letters to the excellent health he was enjoying, which seems to have been interrupted only by an occasional cold and the one serious illness he had about the time of his graduation at Yale. The "unhealthy season" at home was often a sort of nightmare in those days; but he himself escaped it entirely for four or five years.<sup>21</sup> His final return to South Carolina was made late in 1806, and on October 1, 1807, after having spent a summer at home, he was able to write Mrs. Colhoun from Abbeville: "I have not had better health for many years."

With this lady, his intimacy had grown very close, and she had evidently come to rely on him a good deal, consulting him as to an instructor for her children and on similar matters. He wrote of her as being "almost a mother" to him, and felt very strongly her kindness. At one time, when his brother James had written that, owing to the closing out of his own business, he would "find it some what difficult to make the summer remittance to me," Calhoun wrote asking Mrs. Colhoun whether she could make it convenient to supply him until the fall, and added that he would "be able to return it during the course of the winter. Two hundred dollars will

<sup>21</sup> He was at Abbeville, studying law with Mr. Bowie, during the winter of 1805, but appears to have been in the North, either at New Haven or Litchfield, every summer and autumn, beginning with 1802,—or at least 1803,—and ending with 1806.

answer my present want.”<sup>22</sup> I know of nothing to show whether the loan was actually made or not, but their intimacy was such as to make it most probable.

— Mrs. Colhoun was evidently a religious woman and several times wrote Calhoun upon the subject of religion. He shared her feelings, and is to be found at this period of life very ready to discover the hand of the Deity in sickness and other ills suffered by those members of poor humanity of whose course of action he does not approve. On March 3, 1806, he wrote her :

I receive with gratitude your friendly advice and anxious solicitude for my welfare on the all important subject of religion. You do me injustice to apprehend that I should receive it otherwise than a mark of the purest and highest friendship. For surely we can give no higher evidence of our friendship, than in endeavoring to promote the best interest of the subject of it. Be assured that whatever you may say on this head will be kindly received.<sup>23</sup>

Several other references to religion are to be found in his letters to her. In 1806, he read in a New York paper a statement from some one in Charleston that a “very great seriousness and attention to religion had diffused itself over that city. What a happy change,” so he goes on to Mrs. Colhoun, “to that place; which in every thing was so extremely corrupt; and particularly so inattentive to every call of religion. I hope, and think it probable, that this change will extend itself from the city to the country. Surely no people ever so much needed a reform as those in the parishes near Charleston.”

Not many months passed, however, until information more to be relied upon than that of newspapers came to hand, and he had to inform Mrs. Colhoun that a Southern visitor told him that “the accounts of the revival of religion in Charleston which appeared in the papers some time since was unfounded. Every friend to religion and that place must regret

<sup>22</sup> Letter of July 3, 1806.

<sup>23</sup> In later days her religious ministrations seemed to a bright observer rather burdensome. “The First Forty Years of Washington Society,” by Mrs. Samuel Harrison Smith, pp. 153, 159, 160; and see *infra*, p. 283.

it." And in another letter, a year or two later, after his return home, when mentioning the good health prevailing that summer around Abbeville, he refers to the same general subject as follows :

We ought to feel thankful for this ; more especially as in some parts of the state it is said to be uncommonly sickly. The stranger's fever is said to be unusually fatal this year in Charleston. Every paper from there brings a long catalogue of deaths. This is in part no doubt to be attributed to the nature of the climate ; but a much greater part is owing to the misconduct of the inhabitants ; and may be considered as a curse for their intemperance and debaucheries.<sup>24</sup>

He maintained also more or less correspondence with his brother-in-law and former teacher, Dr. Waddel. This gentleman, whose real function on earth was surely the teaching of boys, seems to have forever had a hankering after the pulpit. In 1806 <sup>25</sup> he had a charge and wrote Calhoun that his preaching had had much effect among his then congregation, adding : " I never before had so much encouragement to labour in the gospel as there at present." Calhoun tells his correspondent that Waddel's " hopes at his other congregation were flattering ; but owing to an unhappy dissension between two of its principal members his success has not been so great."

An effort has been made on a preceding page to show what influence Calhoun's surroundings and the course of events during his early life in the upper country of South Carolina were likely to have on his future political theories. What, if anything, may we suppose to have been added to these by his residence of four years in New England in the beginning of the nineteenth century, when he was still in the plastic time of youth ? This is not the place to argue as to the then prevailing political beliefs of that section, but candid history hardly questions to-day that allegiance to the federal government was a very weak strand in their composition. The leading federalists of the East, aristocrats to the heart, were all aghast at the triumph of the rag-tag democracy — as they thought

<sup>24</sup> Letters of April 13 and June 2, 1806 and October 1, 1807.

<sup>25</sup> Letter of Calhoun to Mrs. Colhoun, March 3.

it,— of Jefferson in 1800, and could not become reconciled to the control of the federal government by a party with which they had no opinion in common and whose triumph had snatched from their hands for the time being that control of the governmental machinery in their own interest, which they thought a sacred birthright.

Even so early as the beginning of the new century, not a few of their leaders meditated the breaking up of the Union, and, as the Jeffersonians tended more and more against England in the giant contest of the day, this feeling grew steadily stronger among them, until they committed an almost overt act in the assembling of the Hartford Convention and its sending of a delegation to Washington to interview the heavily burdened President. The actual design of these emissaries has been guarded from public knowledge with such jealous secrecy that it will never be capable of demonstration, but we may at least safely say that the delegation bore with it a strong aroma of ultimate secession and certainly did not travel to Washington in order to offer a "loyal support" to President Madison. The sudden arrival of the treaty of peace and of the news of Jackson's triumph at New Orleans ended their plans and made the emissaries ridiculous. Ample evidence to prove in outline the long history of this New England secession movement has survived the holocausts of their past correspondence, which these worthy gentlemen found it advisable to indulge in during later years, at a time when their earlier views had come to be highly unfashionable; and it is only among the very partisan or the ignorant that these truths are questioned.

Of course, all this New England opinion must have come to Calhoun's ears. Doubtless, with his religious feelings, he went to church among them, and their divines were, as has been seen more than once in other latitudes, not among the slowest to express aloud opinions of the sort popular among their parishioners. It has been shown already that he largely avoided the making of friends in Litchfield because the place was "so much agitated by party feelings." But, more than this, several of his instructors were men of most ultra opinions in regard to political matters, and it will soon be shown that



one of the teachers at the law-school was directly concerned in the plots and plans to have New England break away from the Union. Dwight, too,—the President of Yale during Calhoun's years there,—had held the general Federalist views very strongly, and was quite irreconcilable with the growth of Republican opinion and power; and it has been seen that he and Calhoun had one political discussion in the class-room at Yale. Can any candid person doubt that there were other such discussions, or that the professor's opinions often came out in his lectures and explanations?

There is, however, one case plainer yet. Tapping Reeve, the head of the law school that Calhoun attended, was in private life a most estimable person, but his views upon governmental affairs,—particularly as to the nature of our Union,—were by no means such as New England has taught since she recovered her full share in the control of the federal machinery, and especially since 1861-1865. His partner, too, James Gould, was a strong Federalist and had married a daughter of Uriah Tracy, another of the irreconcilables and concerned in the separatist plans. I know of no evidence that Gould took any active part in the then plans of the New England leaders, but Reeve, while a member of the Connecticut Supreme Court, wrote for a newspaper such bitter criticism of the federal administration that he was selected by the instigator of the federal prosecutions for libel of that day as one of those to be included in the well-known indictments.<sup>26</sup>

Moreover in 1804, only a year and a half before Calhoun came up to the Law School, Reeve had written a confidential letter<sup>27</sup> to Uriah Tracy (his partner's father-in-law) in re-

<sup>26</sup> The facts in the text are taken in part from Prof. Baldwin's "Sketch of James Gould," in Lewis's "Great American Lawyers," *ut supra*, pp. 458, 471, &c. Jefferson, in accordance with his course as to cases under the Alien and Sedition Laws, disapproved of the prosecution of Judge Reeve and ordered a *nolle* entered. Reeve's prosecution cannot, as is often stated, have been based on the Sedition Act, for that statute expired by its terms on March 3, 1801. It must have been based on an effort of its originators to revive the federal doctrine of a common law of the United States. See *U. S. v. Hudson and Goodwin*, 7 Cranch, 32.

<sup>27</sup> Printed at large in Henry C. Lodge's "Life and Letters of George Cabot," pp. 442, 443. Mr. Lodge's book is a mine of information as to the then New England plans for breaking up the Union, and the author



gard to the subject of disunion and discussing what were the proper steps to take on the part of their friends in order to bring about a *preparedness* for the coming separation. "I have seen," wrote Judge Reeve, "many of our friends; and all that I have seen, and most that I have heard from, believe that we must separate, and that this is the most favorable moment. The difficulty is, how is this to be accomplished? I have heard of only three gentlemen, as yet, who appear undecided upon the subject."

If the reader will now recall the fact that during Calhoun's time at the school, or a very few years later, either the author of this letter or his partner, James Gould, delivered regular lectures in the Litchfield School upon the subjects of Constitutional Law and the Legislation of Congress, I do not think he can doubt that the lectures must have been largely tintured by the opinions that the letter shows Reeve to have held. What influence upon Calhoun such views may have had is possibly in some respects uncertain. It is conceivable that he was simply revolted at the violence and passion of the Federalists and their wild desire to shatter the Union for so petty a cause as a political defeat, which had certainly as yet brought no oppression upon them; but it may at least be said with entire confidence that if in his earlier days at home he had imbibed strong beliefs as to the rights of the States in our system, his experience of New England opinion between 1802 and 1806 during his *Lehrjahre* could not but have convinced him that the same beliefs were widespread throughout the country and especially prevalent in the opposite end of the Union from that to which he belonged.<sup>28</sup>

And we shall find this opinion confirmed and strengthened

admits (p. 440) what, of course, candor required him to admit,—that they looked upon the Union as an experiment and the separation of the States as merely a question of policy. How the historian should regret that George Cabot (and doubtless many another ultra Federalist whose views have since grown unpopular) "shortly before his death made an almost complete destruction of all his letters and papers." (Mr. Lodge's "Preface.") See also Henry Adams's "New England Federalism," *passim*.  
<sup>28</sup> It is amazing to find a learned writer, when speaking of Calhoun's days at Yale and Litchfield, dispose of the subject in the few words: Thus Calhoun "received his early training from staunch Federalists in the Union State of Connecticut."

by the events of the following years. As early as the end of 1808 the threat from New England of a division of the States was spoken of and doubtless widely known in South Carolina.<sup>29</sup> At this date, Calhoun was already embarked in public affairs, as a member of the State Legislature, of course watching from afar the debates in Congress and the conduct of public men and necessarily familiar with a matter of such boundless importance. And in the autumn of 1810 he was elected a member of the Twelfth Congress; so it may surely be assumed that he read somewhere the extravagant secession speech<sup>30</sup> of Josiah Quincy in the House of Representatives on January 14, 1811. He next served in the House with this same Quincy during one Congress and had some acquaintance with him.<sup>31</sup> Quincy was a man of marked ability, very outspoken and so determined a fighter that Washington Irving<sup>32</sup> described him as walking up and down the lobby "like a lion lashing his sides with his tail," while the House debated points of order raised against him.

Scenes and events such as these were not likely to eradicate from Calhoun's mind the impression he had imbibed during his years of study in Connecticut. Whatever their immediate effect on him may have been, when he became in time an ultra believer in States' rights he was surely only following the lead for which the circumstances of his home in early days, his observation of New England opinion at Yale and at Litchfield and his acquaintance with their public men in Congress a few years later had steadily ripened his mind.

<sup>29</sup> See the letters of Chancellor DeSaussure, a strong Federalist, to Josiah Quincy of December 7, 1808, and January 21, 1809, printed in Edmund Quincy's "Life of Josiah Quincy," pp. 189-91.

<sup>30</sup> Speaking to the bill for the admission of the Territory of Orleans as a State, Quincy said: "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States from their moral obligation, and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must." *Annals of Congress*, Eleventh Congress, Third Session, 1810-11, pp. 525-40. This, and other parts of Quincy's speech, were printed in the Charleston "Courier" of January 31, 1811.

<sup>31</sup> Quincy's "Quincy," pp. 242, 256.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

## CHAPTER V

### LEGAL CAREER

Completes Law Studies with Chancellor DeSaussure — Great Success at the Bar — Love and Marriage — Correspondence — Gives up the Law.

THE exact time at which Calhoun left Litchfield to return home cannot be ascertained. It must, however, have been quite a little later than September 11, 1806, for on that date he wrote from Litchfield to Mrs. Colhoun that he was still attending some important lectures at the Law School. He went by stage to Philadelphia and then proceeded the rest of the way alone on horseback; but the account of his journey and of his doings about this time can best be given from his letter of December 22, 1806. On that date, he wrote Mrs. Colhoun from Charleston as follows:

DEAR MADAM, Sensible that you are always desirous of hearing from me I can scarcely excuse myself in not writing till the present time. The day before I left Litchfield, I answered your last, in which I mentioned my determination to set out in a few days for Carolina by land. I proceeded to Philadelphia in the stage, where I purchased a horse and finished the remainder of the Journey on horse back, through what is generally called the uper rout. In a tour so long without a companion, and a stranger to the road I necessarily experienced many solitary hours. My reward was the perpetual gratification of curiosity in passing through a country entirely new to me, romantick in a high degree, and abounding with many objects of considerable novelty. On my arrival in Carolina I was happy to find all my friends and relations well, with only a few instances of slight fall fevers. After spending a few weeks in Abbeville I returned to this place, where I expect to continue in Mr. DeSaussure's law office till June; at which time I expect to retire to the uper country for health; as it will not be safe for me with my northern habit to

continue in Charleston. Your acquaintances here, as far as I know, are well. . . . Since my arrival here I have been very much of a recluse. I board with the French protestant minister Mr. Detarguey in Church Street. It is a quiet home and answers my purpose well.

He remained, doubtless, according to his intention, a student with Mr. DeSaussure until June, 1807, in which month he went to Abbeville village, meaning to practise law, and was admitted to the bar after examination at the next term of the Supreme Court at Columbia.<sup>1</sup> It would be interesting to know the course of study he followed with the future great Chancellor of South Carolina, but it may possibly be surmised to have had reference mainly to the special peculiarities of the system of law in his own State. He was doubtless already well grounded in general principles, but it was necessary for him to learn also how these were applied and their variations in the jurisdiction where he intended to reside. Therefore, the statutes of South Carolina were probably his main study, and possibly he was aided by his instructor in securing some knowledge of what is known among lawyers as "practice,"—the method in which suits are instituted and brought to trial and final conclusion. He was apparently not admitted to practise in the chancery courts until 1808,<sup>2</sup> the year after his admission to the ordinary courts.

Calhoun did not continue long at the bar and evidently always disliked the profession; but none the less had a marked degree of success. O'Neill<sup>3</sup> writes:

. . . He was admitted to the bar in 1807 and opened his office at Abbeville; he practised there, and at Newberry, and I presume in the other adjoining districts. . . . His reputation was extraordinary for so young a man. He was conceded, as early as 1809, to be the most promising young lawyer in the upper coun-

<sup>1</sup> Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 85. His name does not appear in O'Neill's "Bench and Bar," Vol. II, pp. 606 and 599 in the lists of those admitted to the bar, but in the separate sketch of Calhoun in *ibid.* p. 284, he is said to have been admitted in 1807. See also Jenkins's "Life," p. 32, to the same effect. This early writer bears out the surmise in the text as to the special studies followed by Calhoun under Chancellor DeSaussure. *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> Starke's "Sketch," p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> "Bench and Bar," Vol. II, p. 284.



try. Chancellor Bowie of Alabama, who lived at Abbeville and had a fine opportunity of knowing Mr. Calhoun's early reputation as a lawyer, says: "With the members of the bar as well as with the people, he stood very high in his profession. Perhaps no lawyer in the State ever acquired so high a reputation from his first appearance at the bar as he did. . . . The business of the court was nearly evenly divided between himself, Mr. Yancey and my brother George."

With such marked success and with his mental traits, it is not easy to understand why the law was so distasteful to Calhoun. It has been seen that such was the case, even while he was a student, and his letters while he was in the full tide of success at the bar contain indications of the same feeling. He evidently felt strongly his responsibility to clients, but this served only to add to the irksomeness of his exacting work.

There was another cause: He was in love during these his early years at the bar, and the object of his passion, Floride Colhoun, the only daughter of his friend and connection, Mrs. John Ewing Colhoun, lived a part of the year far away in Newport and the rest of the time at her mother's plantation near Bonneau's Ferry in South Carolina,—not much less than two hundred miles from Abbeville,—or still further away in Charleston. Naturally, the young lover chafed at his enforced absence.

The story of Calhoun's love and approaching marriage can best be told from his own letters, and they will show, if proof be needed of so patent a fact, that a man addicted in later life to the clearest and possibly coldest of reasoning can in youth be ardent enough as a lover. The same letters, too, will tell us something of his practice at the bar and give glimpses of his entrance upon public affairs, in the glory of his springtime of life. The letters are all but one addressed to his future mother-in-law, to whom he evidently first spoke upon the subject of his love. He corresponded also later with Miss Colhoun, but his letters to her, with a single exception, have been lost.

Floride Colhoun, the object of his passion, was the daughter of his deceased first cousin, John Ewing Colhoun, and was



ten years his junior. She was born February 15, 1792. Col. Starke, referring to about the time when she was seventeen years old, writes <sup>4</sup> that she "is represented as being beautiful in form and features, graceful and winning in manner and address. Being half French, she manifested the cheerful vivacity of her Huguenot ancestry, as well as those more solid qualities for which they were distinguished." Calhoun had of course seen her often as a child,—when he was studying at Yale and at Litchfield and stayed in her mother's house,—in the years from 1804 to the end of 1806. She was then, however, only twelve to fourteen years of age, and his letters of this date to the mother often send love to Floride and other young members of the family, or she is even included simply in the words "love to the children."

The friendship between Calhoun and the mother was kept up after Calhoun started out at the bar, and he spent a time at their plantation at Bonneau's Ferry in the spring of 1808.<sup>5</sup> In the spring of 1809, again, his correspondence shows that he had wanted to visit them, but was unable to do so because of the pressure of his law practice. In the summer, however, he was their guest again, and shortly after returning home wrote to the mother declaring his passion. The letter clearly shows that he had already spoken of the matter to Mrs. Calhoun, though not to the daughter. Floride was at this time not quite seventeen and a half years old, and I know of nothing to show more accurately when he first became conscious of his love. But the letters will now best carry on the story of these early years, while it should be borne in mind that he was elected to the State Legislature in the fall of 1808 and to the House of Representatives in Congress in 1810.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT CHARLESTON.

Newbury Court house 6<sup>th</sup> April 1809.

D<sup>r</sup> MADAM, I regret exceedingly that I cannot carry into effect my expectation of visiting Charleston before your departure thence. I have received during the circuit a considerable influx of Chancery business; which as that court sets in June it will be

<sup>4</sup> "Sketch," p. 86.

<sup>5</sup> Col. Starke's "Sketch," p. 86.

impossible without a considerable neglect of my professional duties. I consider myself as not a little unfortunate in this disappointment; as while you were in the up country I had no opportunity excepting amidst the hurry of business to spend any time in your company. I should have been glad to have conversed with you on many points; but we must all submit to those duties which call friends to a distance from one another. It is perhaps one of the most disagreeable circumstances in our profession, that we cannot neglect its pursuit, without being Guilty at the same time of imprudence and a breach of confidence, reposed in us by our clients. I feel myself now and while I continue in the practice of the law almost as a slave chained down to a particular place and course of life. I have been very successful on the circuit in obtaining business; and doubt not in a short time to have as much as I can conveniently attend to; however I still feel a strong aversion to the law; and am determined to forsake it as soon as I can make a decent independence; for I am not ambitious of great wealth. . . .

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

Abbeville 25<sup>th</sup> June 1809

D<sup>r</sup> MADAM, After I left you at the plantation,<sup>6</sup> I had a very pleasant, tho' solitary journey, to this place. At Pine Vile, I spent two days. I had the pleasure of meeting D<sup>r</sup> M<sup>c</sup> Bride. . . . I did not see the object of the Doctor's affections, as she was gone to Charleston; which was of considerable regret to him and myself. She has the reputation, however, of being handsome; and, which to my mind is of much more importance, an amiable fine character. I felt a delightful sympathy at the prospect of my friend's happy establishment in life. It also called up strongly in my mind another subject of interest more important to myself. You know the one I alude to. It will be useless for me to conceal from you my increased anxiety on that subject. The more I reflect on it, the more indissolubly does my happiness seem to be connected with that event. If, I should finally be disappointed by any adverse circumstance, which heaven forbid, it will be by far the most unlucky accident in my life. I look for you next fall without any doubt, and at all events; and hope nothing but an impossibility will prevent you; at which time, I hope, at least, but still much more, to get rid of my anxiety. As to any dis-

<sup>6</sup> Doubtless Mrs. Colhoun's plantation, at Bonneau's Ferry.

closure if that may be necessary; I leave it wholly to your prudence; For I feel that nothing can shake my regard. On my return I found it universally report[ed] as I conjectured. In fact to me it is quite unaccountable how such an impression should become so universal.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE 18<sup>th</sup> July 1809.

DR. MADAM, By the last mail, I received your agreeable letter of the 18<sup>th</sup> Ultimo.

Except of my hearty thanks for the promptitude of your communication; which has releaved my mind from no small degree of anxiety. I can scarcely describe my emotions, when I saw your well known hand writing with the New Port post mark. But the contrariety of emotion it excited of hope and fear quickly subsided into the most agreeable feeling on perusing its contents.

This languages does not correspond with my former opinion upon this subject. I formerly thought that it would be impossible for me to be strongly agitated in an affair of this kind; but that opinion now seems to me wholly unfounded, since, as it were in the very commencement, it can produce such effects. Do let me know in your next, at what time in the fall I may expect you. The time will seem long, and, I hope, you will make your return as soon after the sickly season as possible. So unlimited is my confidence in your prudence and friendship, that to you I make the full and entire disclosure of the most inward recesses of my thoughts; while to all the world, even to my own brothers, I am quite silent. I have a strong inclination to lay open my intention to the object of my affection by letter; if this meets with your approbation, as proper, nothing will prevent me from so doing. Will you be so good, as to let me know your sentiment, on that point; and whether I may have your assent to such correspondence.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT CHARLESTON

ABBEVILLE 20<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1810.

DR. MADAM, Without pretending to decide whether that maxim from which you draw so much of your spirit of resignation to the various events of this life, "that all is for the best," is in every instance true, yet I am sure that in many instances things falling out different from what we would have ordered contribute to

promote our happiness. This was my case the two last days I staid at the Ferry.<sup>7</sup> I spent them so pleasantly; and the reflection on them since has been such a copious source of gratification and delight, that I feel myself richly rewarded for the delay, had it been for weeks. I hope, I shall forever find cause to esteem them a fortunate and happy period of my life. Should it contribute in any degree to an event, I have so much at heart, how happy a man shall I be. May He who governs all things cause it to eventuate so happily!—I had fine weather on my return; and my journey was only made disagreeable by reflecting on the increasing distance of those for whom I have so great a regard. . . . Tell my *much esteemed Floride* that nothing could prevent me from the pleasure of writing, but that there is so much suspicion on the subject, that I am fearful of the fate of a double letter endorsed in my hand writing. I hope to see you early next month; let it not be, if possible, past the midle. I would recommend the road by Gibham's. The road from the ferry there is as good and as near as from Charleston to the same place.

[P.S.] Tell Floride that no time, or distance can in the least abate my affection, but that absence only proves how much my happiness depends on her good opinions.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE 12<sup>th</sup> June 1810.

Dr. MADAM, I got up safely. I was much favoured by the weather. I would have had a lonesome journey, had it not been that my thoughts were so much absorbed by that subject so important to me; and so near my heart. How important it is, on that occasion to have the full, and entire sanction of our reason; and how delightful it is, that the more I reflect, the greater cause I see, to thank that good providence who has directed my choice. I am not much given to enthusiasm; nor to anticipate future happiness. But, I cannot, now refrain my hopes of joy. On my part, I feel the most anxious solicitude for the happiness of one, to me dearer than all others; on her's, after a careful examination, I find none but those qualities in her character, which are suited to me; and are calculated to secure lasting enjoyment. Let me add, without the least imputation of flattery, that, to be so nearly related to yourself, is a fruitful source of happiness. I know not why, from my first acquaintance with you at New-Port,

<sup>7</sup> Bonneau's Ferry again, where Mrs. Colhoun had a plantation.



I have loved you as a mother. Sure am I, that I could not from a mother experience more kindness and tender affection. With the blessing of God I cannot but be happy; when every circumstance is so propitious. If possible, I will be in New Port next fall. I wish much that Floride would consent to that time. I will write to her about it, by my next. I think on many accounts it will be the best. If you know her sentiment I would be glad you would let me know in your next, for it will be a great inducement for me to go on, if she agrees to that time; and what is a matter of importance, will furnish a good excuse for my leaving my professional business at the fall court.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE, 30<sup>th</sup> June 1810.

Dr. MADAM, . . . I am glad you mentioned the subject, so near to my heart, to Mr. Desaussure. It always struck me it would be proper to do so, and I should have mentioned it myself, if you had not. I am convinced he is a friend to both of us. You mention that "he will have some conversation with me on the subject."<sup>8</sup> This makes me doubly anxious to see him, for whatever has the least relation to it arrests my attention.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE 18<sup>th</sup> July, 1810

. . . I have been looking out for some weeks past for a place to purchase so as to establish myself permanently for life. I was desirous of purchasing on the Savannah river near my relatives, but I find only one place for sale there and that at a price nearly double its value. At present I have a place near by brother Patrick's.<sup>9</sup> It is a valuable one and as pleasant as any in that part of the State.<sup>10</sup> If I purchase I may commence building immediately, but perhaps it will be best to postpone building till some time next winter, for should the event I have so much at heart take place next winter according to present arrangements and I should be elected to Congress next fall, of which I suppose there is no doubt, both my own inclination and the health of Floride would require the following summer to be spent in travel.

<sup>8</sup> I presume a marriage settlement for Miss Colhoun, spoken of in Calhoun's letter of September 7, 1810, shortly *infra*, is the subject referred to. I do not know whether one was made.

<sup>9</sup> "The old Calhoun homestead." Note by Col. Starke.

<sup>10</sup> "Bath." *Ibid*.



TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE 7<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1810.

DEAR MADAM, I join with you in expression of gratitude to that good providence, who has so mercifully preserved the life of one so dear to our future hopes and happiness.<sup>11</sup> The perusal of your letter filled me with joy and sympathy at the same time. Joy for her preservation; and sympathy for the pain she must have endured. How often and unmerited do we experience the kind interference of heaven! . . .

By the last mail, I had a long answer from Judge Desaussure, to a letter I had addressed him as soon as I heard of his return to Charleston. He is pleased to express himself in very flattering terms of me; and to give his entire approbation to the contemplated connection. . . . Judge Desaussure mentions the settlement of Floride's property. I know not, but that it will be indelicate in me to express my opinion on that subject. The fortune is her's. I am not directed in my choice by it. Yet, I think it a duty, that I owe to yourself and Floride to be perfectly candid on all points. From prejudice, or reason, I have been always opposed to marriage settlements. I think experience and reason prove them to be unfriendly to the happiness of the marriage state; and, that they tend to produce pecuniary embarresment. In that state there should be one interest, one happiness and one destiny. That entire confidence, which is reposed by a female in the object of her choice, in placing both her honor and her property in his custody give rise to the most sacred and tender regard. A marriage settlement implys a distrust. It is no safety against inevitable accident. It is a guard against the imprudence, or misconduct of the husband only. As far as children are concerned, it places them above the dependence of the parents. Nothing can be more unfriendly to their government, or character. As to property, it often tends to prevent farther accumulation; and prevent an extrication at the commencement of an embarresment. If successful in life, there is no benefit in one; if unsuccessful, what more disagreeable than to have property, but not to be able to pay just debts? It would to me, be wretched. It would be splendid poverty. You have my candid sentiment; dictated, not by selfish views, but a regard to our mutual happiness. It is my duty to give it. . . .

<sup>11</sup> I presume this has reference to a fall, or some such accident, suffered by Miss Colhoun.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE, 13<sup>th</sup> Sept 1810.

DEAR MADAM, I know not how to express my gratitude for that almost maternal regard, which you have always exercised towards me. Such is the warmth of affection, which, I feel towards you, that I can scarcely refrain from addressing you by the endearing epithet of mother. I hope the time now will not be long, when I may with propriety use it. That day, which will put me in that endearing relation towards you will be the happiest of my life. In yours of the 20<sup>th</sup> of August, which I received yesterday, you observe, "that should it be the will of the Almighty to unite me to Floride that you only wish, she may make me as happy as I deserve." In that event it will be mine to make her happy. Should I always remain with my present feeling, which I trust in God I may, no task will be half so sweet to me, as to make her, as happy, as the conditions of this life will permit. I have no doubt, Floride will be actuated with similar feelings towards me. This mutual love must constitute the joy of the marriage state. To be united in the sacred bonds of matrimony; to regard one another, as companions mutually united for mutual happiness, for each to place their greatest joy in the happiness of the other, is to my mind the most enviable condition on earth. O that our married life may so commence so continue and so end! And that you, our dear mother, may long continue to live, to enjoy and participate in our happiness. . . . I mentioned in my last, that it would not be possible for me to visit N. Port this fall. . . . As I shall cease issuing business after this fall, I shall have leisure to accompany you by land hereafter. Which ever way you determine, I hope you will be here by the middle of Nov<sup>r</sup>. If you conclude to come by water I shall be in Charleston by the 20<sup>th</sup> of that month, at farthest. Your friends here are all well.

TO MISS FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT NEWPORT.

ABBEVILLE, S. C., 28 Sept., 1810.

I rejoice, my dearest Floride, that the period is fast approaching when it will be no longer necessary to address you through the cold medium of a letter. At furthest it cannot be much longer than a month before I shall behold the dearest object of my hopes and desires. I am anxious to see you and my impatience daily increases. May heaven grant you a safe return. What pleasure I have experienced in your company, what delight in

the exchange of sentiment, what transport in the testimonies of mutual love. In a short time this with the permission of heaven will be renewed, and I shall be happy. To be united in mutual virtuous love is the first and best bliss that God has permitted to our natures. My dearest one, may our love strengthen with each returning day, may it ripen and mellow with our years, and may it end in immortal joys. It gives me much satisfaction that time and absence make no impression on my love for you; it glows with no less ardour than at the moment of parting, which must be a happy omen of its permanent nature. When mere personal charms attract, the impression may be violent but cannot be lasting, and it requires the perpetual presence of the object to keep it alive; but when the beauty of mind, the soft and sweet disposition, the amiable and lovable character embellished with innocence and cheerfulness are united to the attractions of personal beauty, it bids defiance to time. Such, my dear Floride, are the arms by which you have conquered, and it is by these the durability of your sovereignty is established over your subject whom you hold in willing servitude.

I am much involved in business at present. Court commences in two weeks, and in a week the election for Congress will take place. My opponent is Gen. Elmore of Laurens,<sup>12</sup> but it is thought that I will succeed by a large majority. As soon as the result is known I will inform you. Write me before you leave New Port. I wish you a pleasant journey home. May God preserve you. Adieu my love; my heart's delight.<sup>13</sup>

Mrs. Colhoun came South by water this year (1810), and arrived at Charleston in November, to find her daughter's lover on hand and awaiting them. Well may Col. Starke write that heaven had been kind to him. Not only was the attractive young woman of his choice coming home to become soon his bride, but his career at the bar had been most brilliant, he had served during two sessions in the State Legislature with marked success, and he had very recently been triumphantly elected a member of the Twelfth Congress at the early age of twenty-eight.

<sup>12</sup> Gen. John A. Elmore, a Revolutionary officer, father of Franklin H. Elmore.

<sup>13</sup> As already explained (*ante*, p. 63), after this date, mere errors of spelling in Calhoun's letters will be omitted.

For some reason, it had been desired,—possibly because of the youth of the girl,—to keep the engagement a secret, and we have seen the far-distant Calhoun hesitating at first even to send a double-weight letter to Mrs. Colhoun for fear of thus betraying the secret that he had two correspondents in that same family at Newport. At a later date, however, he did unbosom himself by writing to the object of his flame. The affair, as was to be expected, was none the less suspected at his home.

In the immediate family of the coming Mrs. Calhoun, the secret was possibly too well kept, and was long quite unknown to her brother, James Edward, a boy of fourteen. This led to an event that he narrated years afterwards to Col. Starke. The latter reminds us that intercourse between young persons of different sexes was not so free in the days of Calhoun's youth as it was even later in his time, and then goes on to say that James Edward Colhoun told him that one day when out driving with his sister and Calhoun he was highly indignant to see his sister slyly kissed by the latter. Going to his mother, upon getting home, to report the awful event,—probably bursting with the importance of his information and fired with the jealous dignity that a boy of fourteen is likely to feel towards a sister several years his senior,—James Edward was astonished that neither surprise nor indignation was shown. It may be surmised that the wise mother at once enlightened the boy.

The young couple were married on January 8, 1811, at which date Calhoun was not yet twenty-nine years of age and his bride nearing nineteen. The wedding was said by James Edward Colhoun to have been a grand affair,—“an old-time wedding,”—and he added that everybody was present. The bridal pair seems to have remained for a time at Mrs. Colhoun's plantation at Bonneau's Ferry, and later removed to a place named “Bath,”—on the ridge between the Savannah and Little rivers,—which Calhoun had bought. It was not far from the site of the original Calhoun settlement, which was then occupied by the groom's brother Patrick. His letters have shown that he had wanted to buy and settle on the Savan- X7



nah River but had been unable to secure a place at what he thought a fair price.

This new home remained the young couple's residence for some years, and Calhoun expected to live there permanently. The two were in Charleston in the May following their marriage, and we may possibly secure some idea of the bride's simple bringing up from the fact that when she was induced one evening to visit the theatre with other members of her family, but without her husband,—who was possibly not willing to go to the theatre,—she seems to have been shocked at some of the sights she witnessed. Her still rather puritanically inclined husband wrote to Mrs. Colhoun that his wife was "not at all pleased; and feels no inclination to renew her visit there. I was pleased to see that her good sense prevented her from being dazzled by the glare of the novelty."

Calhoun and his wife were in Columbia for a time in the spring of 1811, and it may possibly be conjectured that he was still practising law to some extent, or at least winding up pending cases, though his letter of September 13, 1810, indicates that he was then already pretty well determined to give up the law after that fall. Col. Starke tells us <sup>14</sup> that Calhoun made a sufficient fortune during his few years at the bar to feel that he had a moderate competence, and emphasizes in this connection particularly his chancery practice as the source of this fortune. There is, too, a letter <sup>15</sup> of Calhoun himself, which possibly lends color to this view; but it seems to me quite impossible to suppose that in the two or three short years during which he practised law he could have earned a life-long competence, even though moderate. It is far more likely that his inheritance from his father was larger than we are aware of, or that it had appreciated in value materially from the increase of population in the neighborhood.

Nor must it be forgotten that he married a woman who is described as an heiress. Her fortune added to his may well have placed the couple in very easy circumstances, especially

<sup>14</sup> "Sketch," p. 88: "A few years of law practice, particularly in the chancery court, had enabled Mr. Calhoun to accumulate that moderate competency to which he aspired."

<sup>15</sup> Letter of April 6, 1809, to Mrs. Colhoun.



as it is known that he inherited land from his father. A Southern landowner of that day, with the means to cultivate his plantation, had probably a moderate competence easily within reach. The marriage brought him, too, social position in lower Carolina, and in this way was, beyond doubt, a material aid to him in his political career.

Everything tends to show that the union between Calhoun and his cousin was a most happy one. He is to be found watching over her with devotion at all times, in the small as well as the larger things of life. During the first year of their married life, when she suffered the usual ills of coming maternity, his letters to her mother tell plainly enough the story of the kindness shown to his wife. And when, in a few years, they lost with appalling suddenness their second child,—Floride, born in 1814,—he evidently strove hard, though with little success, to console the grief of the mother, bereft of her child within the short space of one day. In 1811, within a year of his marriage, duty to the public demanded of him that he should hurry away to the meeting of Congress, and he was forced to leave Mrs. Calhoun very soon after she was delivered of their first child. Their second child, too, was born in February, 1814, during another of his attendances upon Congress, far away in Washington.

The long absence of the husband from home, upon these trips of ambition and public duty, tried him severely, and his letters betray plainly enough the homesickness and the constant longing he felt for his wife and young children. They had, as will hereafter be shown, no less than nine children.

## CHAPTER VI

### ENTRANCE UPON PUBLIC AFFAIRS

#### Legislature — Elected to House of Representatives — Personal Glimpses.

It will be necessary now to go back a few years, in order to pick up some of the threads that have been passed by for the moment.

Calhoun was still a student at law and was about to go up to Abbeville,—with a view to his admission to the bar and to being in the higher country during the heated term,—when, on June 22, 1807, an outrage was perpetrated upon our neutrality of which it is well-nigh impossible to conceive in our sturdy adolescence of to-day. On that day the British war vessel *Leopard* fired on the American man-of-war *Chesapeake* just outside the capes of Chesapeake Bay, and soon forced the sadly-unprepared American to haul down her colors and submit to the indignity of being boarded by a British officer and sailors. These then had the American crew called on deck and took away with them four men alleged to be deserters from the British ship *Melampus*.

The whole United States flared up at once,—as well it might,—and meetings were held far and wide to pledge support to the government in any steps that might be taken to vindicate the country from the wrong inflicted upon us. Calhoun had never much believed in the ultimate success of our restrictive system,<sup>1</sup> though he had given it his support. Others then and since have denounced Jefferson for the policy, but these critics have not made clear what other course was open to the

<sup>1</sup> "Autobiography," p. 10; Calhoun's speeches in the House of Representatives on June 24, 1812, and April 6, 1814. Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part II, 1811-12, pp. 1539 *et seq.*, and Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, Vol. II, 1813-14, p. 1963.

President under the circumstances prevailing at that time in our callow country, with its parts only half knit together and one large section loudly threatening disunion. Probably, the Struggle for Neutrality was necessary for us,—much as teething and a thousand other bodily ills are necessary,—and it may at least be safely said that none but the very boldest Executive would have dared to plunge this new-born land into such madness as war with the Great Britain of that day sooner than the Republican party did.

A meeting was held at Abbeville as well as a thousand other places to promise popular support to the sorely tried Jefferson; and it was here that Calhoun's public career may be said to have begun. He was selected, the "Autobiography" tells us, to prepare the resolutions for the meeting, and was then asked to present them in a speech. It was the first time in his life on which he addressed a public assemblage of his countrymen. The speech is of course lost, as are the resolutions as well, and we can do no more than imagine the scene, of which Col. Starke<sup>2</sup> writes as follows:

Standing one or two inches above six feet, the gaunt, erect young man, then in the twenty-sixth year of his age, presented that marked visage known to many in the audience, and for the first time flashed upon them the intense light from those dark brown eyes.

About one year later he was nominated for the House of Representatives in the State Legislature from his home district of Abbeville, and according to the "Autobiography" was easily elected at a time when his profession was far from popular, and no member of it had been sent to the body for many years. Abbeville was entitled to three members in the House, and those chosen at this election were Calhoun, Joseph Black and Peter Gibert.<sup>3</sup> The election was held probably soon

<sup>2</sup> "Sketch," p. 85.

<sup>3</sup> "Autobiography," p. 7. The Charleston "Times" of October 25, 1808. The "Autobiography" reads that Calhoun was first elected to the legislature "at the next election" after the meeting in regard to the *Chesapeake* outrage (the accurate date of which is unknown), and Calhoun says, in his letter of September 8, 1828, to Theodore Lyman ("Correspondence," pp. 266-269), that he was elected to the Legislature the year

after the middle of October, 1808, and the newly chosen body met on the 28th day of the following November.<sup>4</sup>

It was an important period in the history of South Carolina, for at this time was finally enacted the well-known compromise which at length composed the bickerings between the inhabitants of the upper country and those of the coastal plains. These latter, having become possessed of full power at a date when the upper country was an empty wilderness, long refused to admit the steadily increasing population of the new region to an effective share in the government, and many were the contests over this subject. At the final session of the preceding Legislature, in June, 1808, before Calhoun's election, the compromise in question had been approved by overwhelming majorities, had been subsequently advertised<sup>5</sup> in accordance with the constitutional requirement, and was now to come up before the newly chosen legislature and had to be approved by it also, with certain specified formalities, by majorities of at least two-thirds in each House in order to become effective. It was actually passed shortly after the opening of the session by unanimous votes in both branches.<sup>6</sup>

The compromise, which was thus made a part of the constitution of South Carolina, preserved the power of the low country in the Senate, while the House was remodelled on a new basis. It was made to consist of one hundred and twenty-four members, of whom sixty-two were allotted to white population and sixty-two to taxation, and an estimate was directed to be taken every ten years both of population and of the amount of taxes paid by each district.<sup>7</sup> Under this provision

he was admitted to the bar, but this must be an error of memory, unless possibly it refers to his admission to the chancery bar, which Col. Starke says was in 1808. The MSS. original journals of the Legislature show conclusively that he was first a member at the November-December session, 1808.

<sup>4</sup> The Charleston "Courier," December 3, 1808.

<sup>5</sup> The Charleston "Courier," June 29, and September 13 and 28, 1808.

<sup>6</sup> The Charleston "Courier," December 13, 15, and 17, 1808. The constitutional amendment so passed is printed in Cooper's "Statutes at Large," Vol. V, p. 566.

<sup>7</sup> In his "Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States" ("Works," Vol. I, pp. 404, 405), Calhoun writes that this provision "guards effectively against the abuse of the taxing power. The effect of such abuse would be, to give to the portion of the State which

Calhoun tells us <sup>8</sup> that the upper section gained "a preponderance equally decisive in the House of Representatives."

The amendment, in the enactment of which Calhoun thus had a hand in early life, evidently struck him as very wise, and he highly commends the action of the low country in giving up its rights under the constitution as well as that of the upper country in yielding the complete control that would have come to it from a government based on numbers only. Here he found one of the clearest and best working instances of that system of "concurrent majorities," <sup>9</sup> which he advocated <sup>10</sup> in so many other instances during his public career, as the highest political wisdom and far superior to any system based on the tyranny of a mere numerical majority. Deep impressions are often made on a man's lifelong beliefs by some event of his early years, and such was probably the case with Calhoun in this instance; but it seems clear to the writer that the tendency of the world since that time has been away from Calhoun's views in this as well as some other matters.

At the same time that Calhoun went to the Legislature, in might be overtaxed, an increased weight in the government proportional to the excess; and to diminish, in the same proportion, the weight of the section which might exempt itself from an equal share of the burden of taxation."

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 404; and see 400-406. Mr. Schafer ("Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina," printed in "Annual Report of American Historical Association for 1900," Vol. I, pp. 237 *et seq.*) thinks that Calhoun's explanation is not altogether accurate, and that the coastal region was still able in reality to dominate in the lower House, too, through the intermediate black belt's having become part and parcel of the lower country (pp. 433-437). Calhoun lived, however, at the time, and saw the machinery work; nor have there been many observers more competent to decide than he. His final statement upon the subject in his "Constitution and Government of the United States," was, moreover, written in his last days and not printed until after his death. "Works," Vol. I, "Advertisement," p. vi.

<sup>9</sup> When Webster asserts in debate (Congressional Debates, Vol. IX, Part I, 1832-33, p. 576) his difficulty in understanding what Calhoun meant by this expression, must we put this down solely to the none too honest skill of an advocate, who hopes thus to throw doubt on the contention of his opponent, or can we suppose that for a moment that intellectual giant actually failed to understand a system as old as that of England, to which the analytical mind of Calhoun applied a term possibly new?

<sup>10</sup> The idea is also largely treated in the posthumous "Disquisition on Government," "Works," Vol. I, pp. 1-107; and see also the posthumous "Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," *ibid.*, pp. 400-406.



1808, Langdon Cheves also entered upon his service in that capacity. William Lowndes, on the other hand, was not then a member, though he had been of the prior Legislature. With both of these promising characters, Calhoun was destined shortly to be associated in a wider sphere. He was early in the session appointed a member of the very large Committee of the House on Privileges and Elections, and was also a member of the far more important one on Judiciary.<sup>11</sup> Early in the session, Cheves presented "a bill for the better arrangement for the sittings of the court of equity, for the establishment of appeals for the same and for other purposes," and Calhoun was appointed one of a committee of six to which it was referred. A bill was later passed by both branches, in pursuance of Cheves's suggestion, and became a law; and the next year a law was enacted for the more easy and expeditious administration of justice.<sup>12</sup>

It is worthy of note, as showing the temper in South Carolina at that day in regard to federal affairs and the threatening foreign complications, that the Legislature preceding the one in which Calhoun served, had in December, 1807, made an appropriation of \$80,000 to arm the militia.<sup>13</sup> During his term of service, too, laws were passed to reorganize the militia,—aiming at uniformity of discipline,—as well as others to incorporate companies for navigating their rivers. I know of no actual evidence of any part taken by Calhoun on these measures, but the latter at least may well have had the active aid of the future author of the "Report on Roads and Canals."

It may be surmised, too, that he had a hand in the appointment of DeSaussure as Chancellor of the State. DeSaussure was a strong Federalist, while the Legislature was so overwhelmingly Republican that the Federalists took almost no part in the proceedings. When, however, in 1808 the selection of

<sup>11</sup> The "Courier" of December 3, and "Times" of December 6, 1808. The name is occasionally spelled Colhoun, and the "Times" of December 6 seems to show that there were two members of the family in the House.

<sup>12</sup> The "Courier" of December 13 and 21, 1808. Cooper's "Statutes at Large," Vol. V, pp. 565, 595.

<sup>13</sup> The "Courier" of December 28, 1807.

a Chancellor became necessary, the party in power possibly had difficulty to find an available person for the position from their own ranks, and DeSaussure writes that old friendships with a number of members belonging to the opposite party led to their selection of him.<sup>14</sup> It was so admirable a choice, that if, as seems likely from Calhoun's earlier relations with DeSaussure, he had any part in the selection, the fact should be mentioned in his biography.

On December 15, 1808, he was appointed by Governor Drayton one of the aides on his staff with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.<sup>15</sup> So far as I know, this was the only position of a military character ever held by him.

Calhoun sat also during the second session held in November and December, 1809,<sup>16</sup> but I have not found any actual record of his doings at this session. He writes in his "Autobiography" <sup>17</sup> that during his service he was instrumental in the passage of several important changes in the law of the State, and I think that enough has been already said to show that these claims of his campaign biography of 1843 are probably none too strong.<sup>18</sup> It seems that he was independent, as was to be expected from one of his race, and that his vote was by no means to be controlled by any one but himself. Starke tells us <sup>19</sup> that Burr's son-in-law, Joseph Alston, was a member at the same time and wanted to bring Calhoun into his clique, but soon found his efforts unavailing and remarked

<sup>14</sup> Letter of DeSaussure printed in Edmund Quincy's "Life of Josiah Quincy," pp. 190, 191.

<sup>15</sup> "City Gazette and Daily Advertiser" of January 4, 1809, as reproduced in "The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine," Vol. II, (1901), p. 163.

<sup>16</sup> The Charleston "City Gazette and Daily Advertiser" of December 13, 1809. MSS. Legislative Journals at Columbia.

<sup>17</sup> P. 8.

<sup>18</sup> In 1808 he cast some vote which Fitzwilliam Byrdsall wrote him on November 6, 1842, ("Correspondence," p. 861) was "a glorious democratic fact in your favor" and shows that "you were in 1808 what [Van Buren] was not in 1821." Calhoun had written to Byrdsall of this vote but would not allow its publication. I am quite unable to ascertain what it was. Possibly his vote for Madison for President was referred to.

<sup>19</sup> "Sketch," p. 87. B. F. Perry, too ("Reminiscences of Public Men," p. 92), tells this same story. Joseph Alston was Speaker of the House during Calhoun's first session, at least. Cooper's "Statutes at Large," Vol. V, p. 564.

to a friend: "I am afraid I shall find this long, gawky fellow from Abbeville hard to manage."

One story is told in the "Autobiography" of Calhoun's doings during his short career in the State Legislature,—a story that may serve to illustrate a faculty that we shall find clearly enough shown again in later and sadder years. Calhoun undoubtedly had his foibles, and made awful human blunders; but at times his mind seemed to cut its way through the most intricate circumstances, and he would then foretell events in a fashion little short of startling. I think this usually happened when there was some great underlying principle at hand, the effect of which he was able to foresee with a mental grasp shared by few men, and his mind, realizing this one vital element of coming events, would follow it out,—to at least some of its results,—with relentless power.

It may be surmised that in these cases in which Calhoun saw so much further ahead than did his fellows he found a natural satisfaction in turning out to be right. He was apparently not devoid of pride of intellect, and doubtless this is the reason why this particular instance finds a place in his "Autobiography."

He tells us <sup>20</sup> that

. . . It was not long after he took his seat [in the State Legislature] before he distinguished himself. Early in the session an informal meeting of the Republican portion of the members was called to nominate candidates for the places of President and Vice-President of the United States. Mr. Madison was nominated for the presidency without opposition. When the nomination for the vice-presidency was presented, Mr. Calhoun embraced the occasion to present his opinion in reference to coming events, as bearing on the nomination. He reviewed the state of the relations between the United States and Great Britain and France, the two great belligerents which were then struggling for mastery, and in their struggle trampling on the rights of neutrals, and especially ours; he touched on the restrictive system which had been resorted to by the government to protect our rights, and expressed his doubt of its efficacy, and

<sup>20</sup> "Autobiography," p. 7.

the conviction that a war with Great Britain would be unavoidable. "It was," he said, "in this state of things of the utmost importance that the ranks of the Republican party should be preserved undisturbed and unbroken by faction or discord." He then adverted to the fact, that a discontented portion of the party had given unequivocal evidence of rallying round the name of the venerable vice-president, George Clinton (whose re-nomination was proposed), and of whom he spoke highly; but he gave it as his opinion, that should he be nominated and re-elected, he would become the nucleus of all the discontented portion of the party, and thus make a formidable division in its ranks should the country be forced into war. These persons, he predicted, would ultimately rally round De Witt Clinton, the nephew, whom he described as a man of distinguished talents and aspiring disposition. To avoid the danger, he suggested the name of John Langdon, of New Hampshire, of whom he spoke highly both as to talents and patriotism.

It was Mr. Calhoun's first effort in a public capacity. The manner and matter excited great applause; and when it is recollected that these remarks preceded the declaration of war more than three years, and how events happened according to his anticipations, it affords a striking proof of that sagacity, at so early a period, for which he has since been so much distinguished. It at once gave him a stand among the most distinguished members of the Legislature.

The pay of members of the South Carolina Legislature at this time was "a sum not exceeding three dollars a day during their attendance on, going to, and returning from the legislature at the rate of thirty miles per day."<sup>21</sup> Nor did the sittings last long. Indeed, Calhoun's two sessions made up together only nine weeks<sup>22</sup> and afforded thus but scant experience for the highly important positions he was soon to hold. He must undoubtedly have shown marked capacities during this short time, or he would hardly have received his next promotion. In the spring or summer of 1810, he was nominated for the House of Representatives in Congress. His opponent

<sup>21</sup> Statute No. 1903 of 19th December, 1807, confirming a prior act of 1805, the constitutionality of which seems to have been doubted. Cooper's "Statutes at Large," Vol. V, p. 546.

<sup>22</sup> "Autobiography," p. 12.



was Gen. John A. Elmore, who had, according to Col. Starke, been nominated by those timid souls who feared the coming war and still remembered the dreadful days when "Tarleton's red dragoons had ridden over the State." Calhoun's resolutions at the Abbeville meeting upon the *Leopard* outrage doubtless pointed him out as the natural opponent of such a nomination. He is said by Col. Starke to have conducted a most active canvass, and it was early in the day all over with his opponent. The world has often been said to belong to the young, and we doubtless have in this instance another example of youthful hope and dash triumphing over the timid hesitations of age.

Even in July Calhoun wrote to Mrs. Colhoun of there being "no doubt" of his election to Congress in the fall, and his "Autobiography" says that he was elected by "an overwhelming majority." The strongly Federalist Charleston *Courier*, too, reported on October 23, 1810, that there was "no doubt of the election of this gentleman." The district for which he was chosen was composed of Abbeville, Laurens and Newberry, and it seems<sup>23</sup> that his cousin, Joseph Calhoun, who had represented the district during two Congresses, retired in his favor.

The Twelfth Congress, to which Calhoun had thus been elected in the autumn of 1810, at the early age of twenty-eight years, met, in pursuance of the call of the President, on November 4, 1811, and on November 6 Calhoun took his seat for the first time in the federal councils, where for the better part of forty years, he continued to hold a distinguished position in one department or another.

Before we enter upon the absorbing turmoil of the politics of that day, however, it will be well to devote a little space to other events of the period which throw light upon his character. It has been seen that he arrived in Washington two days after the opening of the session. But even so, he had been obliged to leave his young wife a very short time after the birth of their first child, Andrew. The following letters

<sup>23</sup> This fact is stated in the "Autobiography," p. 23, and I believe by other writers.



from him will show how this had told upon him as well as give some insight into the interest he took in other matters than politics about this period.

TO MRS. FLORIDE CALHOUN, AT CHARLESTON.

WASHINGTON 21<sup>st</sup> Dec<sup>r</sup> 1811.

DEAR MOTHER, I received last week your affectionate letter of the 20<sup>th</sup> of the last month. It came the same day with Florides; tho' hers is dated on the 26<sup>th</sup>. It contained the first direct information I had from home; and relieved me from a load of anxiety. I left Floride and our little son at so critical a period, that I almost felt an alarm at hearing from home for fear that all was not well. I feared that her anxiety of mind at my leaving her might injure her health; situated as she was; and I am sure I have great cause to be thankful that she has entirely recovered. I am as comfortably fixed here as I could be; and have nothing to render me uneasy but my solicitude for those I have left behind. Our society is delightful. This place is quite gay, during the session; but I do not participate in it much myself. You know I never had much inclination to such enjoyment. I am invited to a ball to the French minister's <sup>24</sup> on monday next; and to dine with him on Christmas day; but for political reasons have declined his invitation. I do not think at this time when a war is expected with England that much intimacy should exist with the minister of her rival; particularly as our opponents accuse us with partiality towards France.

I hope you will impress on Floride the necessity of taking sufficient exercise when the weather will permit. Nothing is so conducive to health; and I think she is rather disinclined to it. Let me hear from you often. I shall not be backward in answering tho' I have a great many letters to write. Remember me to the family and all friends.

TO MRS. JOHN C. CALHOUN, AT ST. JOHN'S, S. CA.

WASHINGTON, 1<sup>st</sup> March 1812

You will no doubt, my dearest Floride, be much gratified and suprised to find the bearer of this letter in St. Johns. Mr. Cooper called on me this morning in company of Mr. Tal-

<sup>24</sup> J. M. P. Serurier.

mage and informed me that he was on his way to the southward. . . .

I dreamed all night the last night of being home with you ; and nursing our dear son ; and regretted when I awoke to find it a dream. I was in hopes that the morning's mail would bring me a letter from you ; but was disappointed. It is near a month since I had one. I learned by a letter from Mr. Pickens a few days since that you were all well.

Remember me to our mother and John.

TO MRS. FLORIDE COLHOUN, AT CHARLESTON.

WASHINGTON, 23<sup>d</sup> Nov<sup>r</sup>. 1812.

DR MOTHER, I am induced to write you more from that sentiment of respect and affection which I hope ever to entertain for you, than any particular information which I wish to communicate. My esteem for you has rather been strengthened, than abated, by the present intimate tie which through our dear Floride and little Andrew subsists between us. Your deportment long before our connection was such as to merit my warmest affection. Floride's letter to me mentions the fine health of Andrew and his disposition to feed. I think it would be advisable for her to wean him as soon as possible. You however will be the best judge. I fear to continue him longer at the breast will be neither for his or her health.

If Floride bears my absence as badly as I do hers, she must occasionally be very impatient. I know you will not fail to keep her as cheerful as possible. I often look forward with impatience for the time of my return.

I expect we shall have a warm and important Session. We shall have to encounter every impediment that opposition can throw in the way.

If rice is a good price I would advise you to sell. The present prospect is in favour of its keeping up and being high ; but the commercial world is at present so uncertain, that no one can anticipate the change. I would be glad to hear from you.

The journey to Washington was at that time long and tedious. To traverse the two Carolinas and Virginia took from ten days' to three weeks' time,—according to the speed of the conveyance and state of the roads,—and no small risk of serious accident was always incurred. Numbers of great riv-

ers had to be passed on the way, and these were often swollen by rains and could then only be traversed on flat-boats poled by negroes. Breakdowns and upsets were of course by no means infrequent incidents, and awful taverns awaited the traveller at every stop. Different routes were followed, but they all presented merely a choice of evils, and Lowndes, at least, went in some instances by water, by the Philadelphia packet. Calhoun drove in 1825 by way of Columbia, Camden, Cheraw, Fayette, Raleigh, Warrenton, and Richmond.<sup>25</sup>

Arrived in Washington, too, that great capital of the future was found to be inconvenient to a degree. The roads in and about it were unspeakable, and the accommodations so bad that, though Lowndes found them in December, 1811, better than his imagination had painted, he yet wrote to his wife: "The comforts of a city are such in winter that I think I shall spend the next (if I come here at all) in Georgetown." And in 1815 Macon wrote his friend Nicholson, as an inducement to a visit: "I live at Mrs. Clark's in F. Street, not far east of the burnt treasury office. . . . The house is about middling, and I can I believe get a bed put in my room for you, if you should visit the city. Let me know a day beforehand, that the room may be fixed."<sup>26</sup>

Members often, or generally, lived in "messes," and such was Calhoun's home in the capital in 1811 and again in 1815. Lowndes wrote in November of the earlier year that he was established with a pleasant company, which would probably consist of Mr. and Mrs. Cheves and two children, Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, and possibly two other gentlemen. Of Calhoun he said he had heard a very favorable character, and found him well-informed, easy in manners and amiable. "I like him already better than any member of our mess," he adds, and then goes on that, as theirs was certainly the strongest war mess in Congress, they excited some surprise and even suspicion by attending parties at the house of Mr. Foster, the

<sup>25</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," p. 233. Mrs. St. Julien Ravenel's "Life and Times of William Lowndes," p. 82.

<sup>26</sup> Mrs. Ravenel's "William Lowndes," p. 91. Wm. E. Dodd's "Nathaniel Macon," p. 302. John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IV, p. 74.

British Minister.<sup>27</sup> But the discomforts of the capital were very petty trifles to these ardent youths, and the great problems that confronted them seem to have been merely an inspiration.

<sup>27</sup> Mrs. Ravenel's "William Lowndes," pp. 84-86; III. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 57. B. F. Perry ("Reminiscences of Public Men," p. 245) writes that Cheves, Clay, Calhoun, Lowndes, and Bibb of Kentucky boarded together, and that their mess was known as the "war mess."

## CHAPTER VII

### WAR WITH ENGLAND

The House of Representatives in 1811 — The "War-Hawks" — Committee on Foreign Relations — Declaration of War — The Restrictive System and its Final Abandonment.

IN the House of Representatives of the Twelfth Congress was to be found a brilliant galaxy of young men from the South and new Southwest, among whom were Lowndes, Cheves, Grundy, Clay, and Calhoun. Of these, Clay had served a few years in the Senate and Cheves a part of the preceding term in the House; but the rest were all new, and, as has been seen, Calhoun's legislative experience was only such as he had gained in the short space of nine weeks in the State Legislature. Webster had not yet reached the federal councils, and was at this time and for a few years later still engaged at Rockingham and other places in fulminating against the federal government those bitter anathemas, which contrast so strangely with his later course. All the young members named were fired with the splendid hope of youth, and several were destined to leave an undying fame behind them. Most, or all, owed their advancement to a great extent to their course upon one single subject.

The vital question of that day, far overshadowing all others, was and for some years had been the policy that should be followed by our new-born country in the war of giants which was then devastating the civilized world. Neutrals were hardly allowed to exist, and their rights were violated at every turn by the two main contestants, as for years they struggled desperately for the mastery. When we look back to that day, the question most open to doubt is which of the two did us the worst wrongs. As soon as one would push the violations a step further, in the hope of gaining an inch upon his opponent,



he was rapidly met by either a like or still more outrageous wrong done by the other, and long before 1811 the system had grown well-nigh intolerable.

These questions had all come to be of vital moment during the preceding administration of Jefferson, and that peace-inclined statesman found himself confronted with awful questions growing out of the most gigantic wars of modern times. It was the policy of Napoleon to close the whole continent of Europe against British trade, and it was equally the policy of England to shut off all trade with the continent, except that which she controlled. And in the efforts that the two contestants made to accomplish these ends, our young country suffered far more than any other not actively engaged in the hostilities. Indeed, we may be said to have been the only neutral; and in this fact lies one of the main motives impelling us to the course we long followed. The carrying trade of the world seemed to lie open before us, ready to be seized, and it was a prize of great value.<sup>1</sup> Our hardy seamen reaped vast profits for a time from our neutrality. A proper national cupidity, or rather a wise thriftiness, pointed never so clearly to the course for a young people to follow. And to this inducement of self-interest, ever so strong an incentive to national action, must be added what has already been said,—that our union and nationality were still in the pulpy age of infancy, while all the beliefs of the party in power tended strongly to lead us to avoid entangling alliances and to look upon war as a serious menace to our institutions.

No wonder that, under these circumstances, Jefferson began the Struggle for Neutrality. It is easy enough to-day, when our national fabric has grown as tough and solid as the bony

<sup>1</sup> Hayne well said in his speech of April 30, 1824, on the tariff (Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VII, p. 575): "The fact that from the commencement of the French Revolution to the fall of Napoleon, the United States occupied a neutral position, and enjoyed the privilege of monopolizing the carrying trade, and commanding for her breadstuffs the markets of the world, would sufficiently account, not only for the rapid growth and extraordinary prosperity of our country, but also for the temporary depression which must result from the loss of these advantages. Our fields have almost literally been fertilized by the blood of Europe. We have fattened on the crimes of her tyrants and the sufferings of her people."

frame of early manhood, to decry his course as pusillanimous and to say that he ought to have followed this or that other policy, but these carping critics of a time long gone by have an easy task in finding fault without responsibility and with little appreciation of the conditions of the day, while Jefferson and his successor acted under the highest responsibility and with the widest knowledge of surrounding circumstances.

The effort was then made to avoid taking part in the wars of the period, and though it failed after a series of troublous years, no one can say that the course was not a wise one at the time, or even absolutely necessary to our existence. Calhoun, who was not in general a believer in the restrictive system, tried a few years later to picture the reasons that led us to follow it. He said:<sup>2</sup>

The restrictive system sprung from an unusual state of things; it was a pacific policy, arising from the extraordinary state of the world at the time we embarked in it — and of course was a temporary rather than a permanent policy. . . . It originated at a moment when every power on the continent of Europe was arrayed against Great Britain, and no one country in Europe was then interested in the support or defence of neutral rights. There was scarcely a port in Europe, which at the time of our restrictive system was not occluded to British commerce. In this state of things, the United States, in order to avoid war, not having taken the resolution at that time to declare war, resorted to the restrictive system — resorted to it, because the extraordinary state of the European world presented a prospect that the strong pressure of this system on Great Britain might save the nation from a war into which we have since been reluctantly drawn.

It is by no means clear, moreover, that the restrictive system was necessarily doomed to failure from the start. With all the continent of Europe closed to British commerce, our refusal to trade with her undoubtedly brought dreadful distress upon her manufacturing interests and led to bitter complaints on the part of these against their own government. But, as the wars went on and Napoleon's colossal power began suddenly to totter under the mad course he followed, large

<sup>2</sup> Speech in the House of Representatives on April 6, 1814, upon Bill to Repeal the Embargo and Other Restrictive Measures. *Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I* / pp. 1962, 1963.

parts of the continent of Europe broke away from him and started in to trade with Great Britain. This at once relieved the distress caused by our restrictive measures, and Calhoun, for one, saw how such a change of circumstances would lessen the pressure exerted by our course and thought<sup>3</sup> that true policy then called upon us to open our ports to neutral nations, which would soon, in his opinion, make common cause with us.

Whether it might possibly have succeeded or not, the restrictive system was palpably failing in the course of a few years, and peace-loving Madison in turn found himself face to face with the necessity of discovering some other course to follow. It was well-nigh impossible, however, to unite the country upon any single point relating to the subject. One question much discussed at that time,—as well as ever since,—was as to which of the great belligerents had inflicted the worst outrages upon us, but it is hard to understand how this can to-day be doubted.

In the mere enforcement of utterly defenseless shipping rules, there was probably little choice between the two; but to this species of wrong the British added one other outrage of a most glaring and irritating kind. Their claim to stop American ships and impress into the British service such men as a roving captain, with a short crew, might choose to think were born in Great Britain, was not only the assertion of a right that no nation of power would submit to for a moment but was also sure to lead to interminable friction in its administration, even admitting the doctrine of permanent allegiance, upon which it was based. And this doctrine was one that America could not possibly admit. Finally, add to impressment the high-handed attack upon the American man-of-war *Chesapeake*, and surely the British must be admitted to have gone even further in the system of wrongs inflicted upon us than did the French, with whom we had not quite so many points of contact.

The result of all this was that, while a large number,—especially in New England,—favored some sort of alliance with Great Britain, there was a growing sentiment in the country for a declaration of war against her. Dubbed by their op-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

ponents "war-hawks," the leaders of this view were full of the inspiration and buoyancy of youth, and steadily grew in power and influence. They had in general supported the system of neutrality carried out by Jefferson and Madison, but only because any other course was impossible under the then circumstances. By the date of the Twelfth Congress, however, public opinion in favor of war had ripened a good deal and the power and numbers of the war-hawks had vastly grown. They were indeed soon found to be in absolute control in that body. On the very first ballot, one of the most ultra of them, Henry Clay, was elected Speaker by seventy-five votes to thirty-eight for Bibb of Georgia, the peace candidate, and three for Macon. The President's Message, moreover, was in its general features warlike, though the opinion of the day seems to have been <sup>4</sup> that many of its expressions were ambiguous; and it thus led some to wonder what course was really intended to be followed.

In the House of Representatives no possible room was left for doubt. Not only was Clay's election to the Speakership a perfectly clear indication, but the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which it will shortly be seen that Calhoun was a member, early proposed measures <sup>5</sup> to fill the existing regiments and to raise ten thousand additional regulars, as well as to prepare the militia and fit out all public vessels. Bills for some of these purposes became laws, and soon the *Constitution*, the *Chesapeake*, and the *Adams* were under process of preparation. These increases in the navy were hardly in accordance with the traditions of Jefferson and the Republican party, but none the less the ardent youths who then guided its destiny were convinced of their absolute necessity and violated so far the inherited beliefs of the past. They tried also to include in the Naval Bill a section to authorize ten new frigates, but failed to get it through the House. Cheves, the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, was braced

<sup>4</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography," p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Crallé thought that the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which recommended these measures, was drawn by Calhoun; "Advertisement" to Vol. V of Calhoun's "Works." See the "Report" in *ibid.*, pp. 1-7.



up in this effort by Quincy<sup>6</sup> in the House, and Calhoun<sup>7</sup> and doubtless many of the war-hawks earnestly supported the measure. A bill to organize the militia upon a uniform plan also failed.

Despite Calhoun's youth and lack of experience, he made his mark at once and it is doubtless true, as he writes,<sup>8</sup> that his reputation had preceded him. Otherwise, we should certainly not find him selected at the beginning of his first session to the second place on the vital Committee on Foreign Relations. Peter B. Porter, of New York, was chairman, and the other Republican members were Calhoun and Felix Grundy of Tennessee. The redoubtable John Randolph of Roanoke and Philip Barton Key from Maryland were the Federalists. Calhoun's responsibilities, too, were soon increased by the withdrawal of Porter from Congress and Calhoun's consequent advance to the chairmanship, as well as by a vote of the House, which charged his committee with many of the duties properly belonging to the Committee on Military Affairs.<sup>9</sup>

Calhoun's maiden speech was made on the fifth of December, 1811, upon the pending bill for a new apportionment; and it is curious to find him already at this early day urging that adherence to principle and setting aside of the selfish interests of the moment which so often characterized him at a later period. I think, too, he allows his fancy to run away with him a little as to the dangerous consequences to flow from the course opposed to that which he was advocating; and here seems to me to be one more tendency of his career in general. But other portions of the speech were hardly in accord with what he would have said later as to home interests. The House had passed a bill upon the subject, but this had been amended in the Senate as to the ratio of numbers to compose a Representative district, and the pending question was whether the House should insist on its bill or concur in the Senate

<sup>6</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part I, 1811-12, pp. 949-68. Quincy is said by his biographer to have made this speech "at the suggestion of some of these [southern] members, and especially of Mr. Calhoun." Quincy's "Quincy," p. 242.

<sup>7</sup> "Autobiography," p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.



amendment. It will be observed that of course the matter was one in which the Senate had no actual interest, its basis of membership being forever fixed by the fundamental law, and the constitutional provision as to the House being the sole judge of the qualifications and returns of its own members was thought by some to have an important bearing on the matter. Calhoun spoke as follows: <sup>10</sup>

Before the bill had gone to the Senate, it excited but very little interest with me. All that I had heard from gentlemen on every side convinced me that it was a squabble among the several States which should bear the loss of large fractions, rather than a serious division on principle, of one ratio in preference to another. Were I governed alone by fractions, I should not rise this day, nor oppose a concurrence with the Senate, from the pride of opinion; for the ratio which the Senate have fixed, is in accordance with my vote on the original bill, although 37,000 will leave my State with a less fraction unrepresented than 35,000; but fractions are not my object. I am not here to represent my State alone. I renounce the idea. And I will show, by my vote, that I contend for the interests of the whole people of this community. The present question, of concurring in the amendment of the Senate, seemed to be totally different, and much more important than the original one. As it now stands, it is a case of disagreement between the two Houses, and the contest is, which shall recede. A contest of this kind (on the census bill) was one of the most serious consequences to this House. The Senate, by persistence, must force this body either to adopt their ratio, or, if that cannot be effected, even annihilate this branch of the Legislature. I consider this a case of omission in our excellent constitution. The Constitution makes this House the sole judge of the qualifications and returns of its own members. This is supposed to vest the power so exclusively in us, that a few days since in a debate on the contested election from Virginia, it was contended with much force of argument, that any law on this subject, as the Senate must participate in it, would be unconstitutional. . . .

In the ordinary course of legislation, this [division of powers] furnished ample security. Far different on the census bill. Here

<sup>10</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part I, 1811-12, pp. 404-406.

the whole is inverted. The vote of the Senate is no longer the means of protection to itself, but becomes a fatal means of assailing this House. What remedy do I propose? I propose a means in strict unison with the Constitution and furnished by itself. Let us act with a fixed determination: and not accede to the amendment of the Senate. That body, unaided by precedent and opposed by the spirit of the Constitution, must recede. Let us follow the example of the House of Commons in England, in relation to money bills, and the same result will follow — but by no means reverse that example.

The Senate strengthened by precedent, will hereafter control us completely. What inducement can gentlemen have to make the surrender at this time? None can be weaker, than because some of the States have, by the ratio inserted in the Senate, small fractions, and one section of the Union has by it comparatively gained. Will gentlemen for this inconsiderable gain make so great a sacrifice? Particularly those from large States, who are the greatest gainers by large fractions? For this paltry gain, more apparent than real, which can last for but ten years, they surrender a principle of the most vital importance to them. Mr. Speaker, I wish the task of defending this important point had fallen to abler hands. I feel all that embarrassment which a young man, not much accustomed to public speaking, must necessarily experience the first time, before such an audience and in a place so trying to the voice as this hall. I shall be happy, if in the midst of my embarrassments I have been intelligible and have expressed myself with sufficient caution on so delicate a point.

The House refused at this stage to concur in the Senate amendments, but the Senate was very positive and a conference committee had to report their inability to agree. The House then receded from its disagreement to the amendments by a vote of 72 to 62 “after much debate,” which is not, however, reported. Calhoun adhered to his opinion and voted Nay. The Senate has generally, I understand, in recent years silently conceded to the House the regulation of the apportionment after the census, but there have been instances to the contrary and it may be surmised that there will be others. Such a right in one House absolutely dependent on the mere acquiescence of the other is highly unsubstantial, and, at least,

long practice alone can establish it as a principle. None the less, it is to be remembered that Calhoun's maiden speech was in regard to a difficult question of constitutional construction and that the views he maintained seem to be on the way to acceptance. On the re-apportionment after the census of 1840, while in the Senate, he still recognized this earlier belief of his and said that "in fixing a ratio of apportionment, they ought to have very great respect for the decisions of the House, if they were assured the House had deliberately resolved upon a particular ratio [but in this case he thought that] he would be acting with a due regard to the wishes of that body, by giving them an opportunity to review and reconsider the matter." <sup>11</sup>

From the beginning of the session, and more especially after his advancement to the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Calhoun occupied a position of great prominence and was active upon all the measures that led up to the war and had to do with its prosecution. He must have been closely in the confidence of the administration at all times, and was repeatedly their defender on the floor of the House. When the President's Message at the opening of the session came in, that part of it which related to foreign affairs was, in accordance with custom, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. And then at once the members of that committee, or at least its action, was most closely scrutinized by an anxious and expectant public. The next move in the vital question of War or Peace lay in their hands.

They reported early in December, recommending various measures of preparation for war,—some of which have been mentioned already,—and out of their suggestions arose quite an extensive debate upon the general subject. This was of course opened by the chairman, Porter, who was followed by Grundy on the same side. The erratic and very dangerous John Randolph of Roanoke next spoke in opposition, and was answered by Johnson of Kentucky and Wright of Maryland. Their speeches were delivered on December 10, and Calhoun

<sup>11</sup> "Congressional Globe," Twenty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, pp. 538, 540, 545. *Ibid.*, Appendix, p. 438.

then announced,—doubtless in accordance with pre-arrangement by leading men,—his wish to support the report of the committee of which he was a member; but moved an adjournment on account of the lateness of the hour. He tells us that this discussion “from the beginning excited profound interest, both in the body and the crowded audience daily assembled in the lobby and galleries, and this interest had increased as the discussion advanced. It was Mr. Calhoun’s first speech in Congress, except a few brief remarks on the Apportionment Bill. The trial was a severe one; expectation was high. The question was of the greatest magnitude, and he to whom he had to reply, a veteran statesman of unsurpassed eloquence.”

It was certainly a great trial for a young man not yet twenty-nine,—who had not brushed up much against leading men and whose only public experience consisted of a few weeks in his State Legislature,—to have to answer the fiery and often brutal Randolph, and it may well be that Calhoun had many a nervous moment until he had acquitted himself of his task on December 12th, two days later. He writes that when he closed “he was greeted by the great body of the party for his successful effort, and thenceforward took rank with the ablest and most influential members of the body.”

The press of the day, too, spoke in high terms of his speech, Ritchie of the *Richmond Enquirer* comparing him to Fox and recognizing in him “one of the master-spirits who stamp their names upon the age in which they live,” besides descanting on his power of “felling down the errors of his opponents with the club of Hercules.”<sup>12</sup> The strained eloquence of this commentator may excite a smile, but it is plain beyond peradventure that the speech was a great success and served to introduce to the public another leading statesman in the ranks of the war-hawks. It was in part as follows:

MR. SPEAKER: I understand the opinion of the Committee of Foreign Relations differently from what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has stated to be his impression. I certainly understood that committee as recommending the measures now before the House as a preparation for war. . . . Sir,

<sup>12</sup> For matters quoted from Ritchie, see “Autobiography,” pp. 9, 10.



I might prove the war, should it ensue, justifiable, by the express admissions of the gentleman from Virginia; and necessary, by facts undoubted and universally admitted, such as that gentleman did not pretend to controvert. The extent, duration, and character of the injuries received; the failure of those peaceful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, is my proof that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen; depredation on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade, continued for years, and made under laws which professedly undertake to regulate our trade with other nations; negotiation resorted to time after time, till it is become hopeless; the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and in the vain expectation of returning justice? The evil still grows, and in each succeeding year swells in extent and pretension beyond the preceding. . . . The first argument of the gentleman which I shall notice, is the unprepared state of the country. Whatever weight this argument might have, in a question of immediate war, it surely has little in that of preparation for it. If our country is unprepared, let us remedy the evil as soon as possible. . . . But it may be, and I believe was said, that the nation will not pay taxes, because the rights violated are not worth defending, or that the defence will cost more than the profit. Sir, I here enter my most solemn protest against this low and "calculating avarice" entering this hall of legislation. It is only fit for shops and counting-houses, and ought not to disgrace the seat of sovereignty by its squalid and vile appearance. Whenever it touches a sovereign power, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is an unpromising spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the balance. It is too timid to have in itself the laws of self-preservation. It is never safe but under the shield of honor. Sir, I only know of one principle to make a nation great, to produce in this country not the form but real spirit of union, and that is to protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he is backed by the Government; that its arm is his arms; and will rejoice in its increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal. This is the road that all great nations have trod. Sir, I am not versed in this calculating policy; and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars and cents the value of national independence, or national affection. I cannot dare to measure, in shillings and pence, the



misery, the stripes, and the slavery of our impressed seamen; nor even to value our shipping, commercial and agricultural losses, under the Orders in Council and the British system of blockade. . . .

Sir, . . . the gentleman from Virginia attributes preparation for war to everything but its true cause. He endeavored to find it in the probable rise in hemp. He represents the people of the Western States as willing to plunge the country into war for such base and precarious motives. I will not reason on this point. I see the cause of their ardor, not in such base motives, but in their known patriotism and disinterestedness. No less mercenary is the reason which he attributes to the Southern States. He says that the non-importation has reduced cotton to nothing, which has produced a feverish impatience. Sir, I acknowledge the cotton of our farms is worth but little; but not for the cause assigned by the gentleman from Virginia. The people of that section do not reason as he does; they do not attribute it to the efforts of their Government to maintain the peace and independence of their country; they see in the low price of the produce the hand of foreign injustice; they know well, without the market to the Continent, the deep and steady current of supply will glut that of Great Britain; they are not prepared for the colonial state to which again that Power is endeavoring to reduce us. The manly spirit of that section of our country will not submit to be regulated by any foreign Power.<sup>13</sup> . . .

When measures of preparation were so openly making, it was likely that war was not far distant. The ardor for it grew, too, under the powerful impulse of our war-hawks, while the dangers vanished to nought in their bubbling juvenile fancies. On May 6, upon a petition for the repeal of the embargo, Calhoun was evidently quite carried away by his feelings and said, "So far from being unprepared, sir, I believe that, in four weeks from the time that a declaration of war is heard on our frontier, the whole of Upper and part of Lower Canada will be in our possession."<sup>14</sup>

What a rude awakening must not Hull's surrender and our other disasters have been to such youthful exuberance! The

<sup>13</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part I, 1811-12, pp. 476-483.

<sup>14</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part II, 1811-12, p. 1397.

sad disillusion had their effect, and in less than two years this ardent youth, chastened by experience, is to be found expressing his sorrow "to see on our side considerable inactivity, whilst on the side of the enemy we behold vigilance well worthy of our imitation."<sup>15</sup> But at the same time, he and the other leaders were untiring in their efforts on behalf of measures to show a united front to the enemy and for the most active prosecution of hostilities,<sup>16</sup> Calhoun insisting in 1814 that "a regular force of at least fifty thousand ought to be ready to act against Canada by the first of May, or June, at farthest."<sup>17</sup>

Randolph had for years been a thorn in the side of the administration, and he was certainly a most unbridled member, his caustic tongue goading opponents to fury, while the long and rambling speeches he often indulged in made most serious inroads upon the time of the House. The Annals, speaking in 1816 of what was probably an outrageous tirade by this erratic genius, explain that "the length of his speech, which continued three days, and which it would take more than a week to write off from the reporter's brief notes, prevents its publication."<sup>18</sup> It was possibly in part for the purpose of curbing these endless outbursts<sup>19</sup> that the young and bold Henry Clay had given up his seat in the Senate and entered the House. Nor was it long before the new Speaker was called upon to exercise the function of suppression.

Toward the end of May, 1812, rumors were generally current that it was intended in a few days to declare war, and Randolph, who was bitterly opposed to this measure, began one of his wordy attacks. He spoke on no pending measure and was beginning to ramble far afield as to these mere rumors, when Calhoun called him to order for speaking on war, while no such question was before the House.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, p. 870.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part I, 1811-12, pp. 616, 1080. Only a carping critic would find any inconsistency with Calhoun's later career in his objection to a portion of the proposed militia law that it would "leave it in the power of the States to lock up these arms in arsenals."

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, p. 467.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, p. 840.

<sup>19</sup> Mallory's "Life and Speeches of Henry Clay," Vol. I, p. 48, so states.

At the moment, Clay was absent and the Chair was occupied by the former Speaker, Bibb. He decided against the point of order, and then Randolph,—so Calhoun said<sup>20</sup> many years later,—turned round to Calhoun “and in his peculiar sarcastic manner returned him his thanks, stating that he was very nearly exhausted and the interruption had given him time to recruit.”

But no biting manner could stop the young war-hawks, with the reins of power in their hands. Clay,—perhaps sent for,—soon took Bibb's place, and then Calhoun, “conceiving from his [Clay's] manner that he did not concur with the decision of Dr. Bibb, “again insisted that Randolph must submit to the House the proposition he intended to make, at the same time ironically telling the Roanoke member that he would thus give him a chance to thank him again. Clay at once decided that the point of order was “unquestionably” correct, “and then followed a scene of deep excitement.” Randolph, after no little wrangling and after the loss of his appeal from the decision, offered a resolution that “under existing circumstances, it is inexpedient to resort to war against Great Britain,” meaning, of course, to string his speech to this and try to weaken the chances for a declaration. But his resolution was not seconded, and Clay held that he could not speak, unless the House should take up the subject. Randolph appealed from this decision also, but later withdrew his appeal, and thus the most unruly of members was at last stopped for once and forced to hold his peace. The intended speech was not made, and Randolph and Clay sought another forum in the public prints, where the problems of parliamentary law were discussed by them at some length.<sup>21</sup> It is hardly possible to doubt that this choking off of Randolph was carried out in pursuance of a pretty well-settled plan of the young leaders to do so, at the first effort on Randolph's part to indulge in his usual habits.

The rumor referred to by Randolph was true and war at our door. On Monday, June 1, a confidential message was

<sup>20</sup> Speech of July 17, 1841, in the Senate; “Congressional Globe,” Twenty-Seventh Congress, First Session, pp. 215, 216.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part II, 1811-12, pp. 1451-79.

received from the President, the House was cleared and the message then read in secret session. It reviewed the course of England and insisted that she in reality maintained a state of war against us, while we were at peace with her. "Whether the United States," so Madison went on, "shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations . . . or, opposing force to force in defence of their national rights shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Dispenser of events . . . is a solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the Legislative Department of the Government. In recommending it to their early deliberation, I am happy in the assurance that the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation."

The message was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and on June 3 Calhoun reported from the Committee, reviewing the long series of wrongs done us by England and concluding that they "feel no hesitation in advising resistance by force. . . . Your committee recommend an immediate appeal to arms." Quincy, of Massachusetts, moved to open the doors and remove the injunction of secrecy, but his motion was defeated,—Calhoun, Lowndes, Cheves, and other Southern leaders voting against it. Finally, after one more effort to open the doors had been lost, the bill declaring war against England was passed by 79 votes to 49. On June 18 the Senate notified the House that it had passed the bill with certain amendments, which were concurred in by the House on the same day, after the defeat of various motions to postpone, and the completed bill was then at once signed by Madison. On that same day, upon the motion of Calhoun,<sup>22</sup> the injunction of secrecy as to the message and proceedings was removed.

Calhoun, Clay, and some others had been in favor of holding the discussion on the war message with open doors; but Grundy and others opposed this, so it was thought advisable to consult with the Executive. Calhoun, Clay, and Grundy

<sup>22</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, 1811-12, Part II, pp. 1546-54. *Ibid.*, Supplemental Journal, pp. 1624-31, 1633, 1637, 1679, 1682, 1683.



called accordingly upon Madison, with the result that the doors were kept closed. Later, when the vote was about to be taken, Madison sent his private secretary with a request for delay to receive a communication from him. Apparently, this message was sent direct to Calhoun, and he replied that he could not take the responsibility of a delay, but would (if authorized) state the President's wishes. This step was then taken, and in consequence the question was postponed until the intended communication came in, which turned out to be from the British Minister, intended to prevent the declaration and thus save his credit after he had written home that the Republican party could not be "kicked into a war." Here the matter ended, no further delay occurred, and the war was declared as already narrated.<sup>23</sup>

The bold, if terribly dangerous, decision was thus at length made, and our new-born federation, containing within its limits less than eight million people, was at war with a nation the most fundamentally powerful on the face of earth,—the nation which alone had been able to stand up against the colossal Empire of Napoleon, and whose ships had swept the seas of all enemies. Upon her dominions, it was said, as had been already said of other vast empires, the sun never sets; and, so wide-extended were they that the far broader, though less rhetorical, statement that it was forever exactly noon within her possessions, would have been almost literally true. An implacable enemy she was, puffed up with the arrogance of success, and despising to a degree those petty wasps, her late colonists.

In bringing about the mighty decision, which had thus at length been reached, there can be no question but that Calhoun had a leading hand. He seems to have always believed that the disputes would unavoidably end in war, and this opinion naturally led him to more and more importance among those who looked upon that as the only means of solving our difficulties, but he was not the author of the War Report which he had presented on June 3. That paper had been prepared

<sup>23</sup> Calhoun gave these details in the Senate on July 17, 1841, "Congressional Globe," Twenty-Seventh Congress, First Session, p. 215. See also "Autobiography," p. 12.



by Monroe at the request of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,—and doubtless of Calhoun himself,—on the ground that Monroe was more thoroughly conversant with the facts. It was a curious chance that its presentation should fall to the hands of Calhoun, the youngest member of the Committee, owing to the absence of the chairman, Peter B. Porter, and it has been truthfully said that “the presentation of [it] immediately gave him a national reputation.”<sup>24</sup> For some years afterward he was beyond doubt among the most popular men in the country.

There is one other speech of Calhoun’s at this First Session of Congress, which must be referred to. On June 19, 1812, the day after the declaration of war, Cheves introduced into the House from the Ways and Means Committee a bill partially suspending for a limited time the several acts prohibiting importations from Great Britain and her colonies, and on the 23rd Richardson of Massachusetts moved to amend by repealing all the prohibitory acts entirely.<sup>25</sup> Some of the majority were very restive under the restrictive system, despite the fact that it was undoubtedly the policy of the Republican

<sup>24</sup> Benton, in “Thirty Years’ View,” Vol. I, p. 680, writes that Monroe drew the report and that the absence of Porter and the hesitancy of Grundy, “the second on the committee, threw [it] into the hands of Mr. Calhoun, the third on the list,” but he is here partly in error. Calhoun was the second member. Mr. Gaillard Hunt has discovered an unpublished article by Gales of the “National Intelligencer,” which shows clearly that the War Report was drawn by Monroe. Gales had seen the report in the handwriting of Monroe’s confidential clerk, and gives other evidence also. Very possibly, Benton was the “living statesman,” at whose request Gales wrote the article in question and who only used a part of it. According to Gales, some six months after Congress met, Clay and other members had called on Madison and told him Congress was ready to declare war, if he would recommend it. He had for some time been ready, and his War Message of June 1 was soon sent in. This interview of Clay and others is doubtless the same one to which Calhoun has been shown to have referred in the Senate many years later, and which was made in order to determine whether or not the debate should be held with open doors. It was very innocent but came in time to be perverted into the oft-repeated story that Clay and others forced Madison into the Declaration by the threat that he would not otherwise be nominated for a second term. No real evidence to this effect has been produced, and there is plenty to the contrary. See Mr. Hunt’s article in “American Historical Review,” Vol. XIII, pp. 303–10; and his “Life of Madison,” pp. 316–327.

<sup>25</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part II, 1811–12, pp. 1511, 1533.

party and had been adhered to for many years by all the fathers in that faith. Indeed, according to the "Autobiography,"<sup>26</sup> the support of it had long been "the main test of party fidelity," to which the author adds that "party spirit was never higher than at the time."

These facts were not calculated to make a young man ambitious of a career come out in open opposition to a policy that had thus not only the support of all the older leaders but was also advocated by the existing Executive. The "Autobiography" speaks in the highest terms of the boldness and independence of the young Calhoun, who ventured, "when he believed that duty and the interest of the country required it, to place himself above all party considerations, and to expose manfully the defects of a system which had been so long cherished and defended by the party to which he belonged." Possibly, this is a slightly exaggerated view, for Calhoun was not the only one of the bounding young war-hawks to announce his disbelief in this particular part of the creed of his party, but still it was a bold and independent step on his part. On June 24 he spoke as follows upon the proposed bill for a partial suspension and Richardson's motion to amend by making the repeal total:

I am in favor of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Massachusetts; and as I differ from many of my friends on the subject, I feel it a duty to present the reasons which will govern me. . . . It now remains for me to touch another and far more interesting topic of argument, and which I confess has the principal weight in the formation of my opinion on this subject. The restrictive system, as a means of resistance and a mode of obtaining redress for our wrongs, has never been a favorite one with me. I wish not to censure the motive which dictated it, or to attribute weakness to those who first resorted to it for a restoration of our rights. Though I do not think the embargo a wise measure, yet I am far from thinking it a pusillanimous one. To lock up the whole commerce of the country; to say to the most trading and exporting people in the world, you shall not trade, you shall not export; to break in on the schemes of almost every man in society is far from weakness, very far from

pusillanimity. Sir, I confess, while I disapprove that more than any measure, it proves the strength of your Government and the patriotism of the people. The arm of despotism under similar circumstances could not coerce its execution more effectually, than the zeal and patriotism of the people. But, sir, I object to the restrictive system; and for the following reasons; because it does not suit the genius of our people, or that of the Government, or the geographical character of our country. We are a people essentially active. I may say we are pre-eminently so. Distance and difficulties are less to us than any people on earth. Our schemes and prospects extend everywhere and to everything. No passive system can suit such a people, in action superior to all others; in patience and endurance inferior to many.<sup>27</sup> Nor does it suit the genius of our Government. Our Government is founded on freedom and hates coercion. To make the coercive system effectual, requires the most arbitrary laws. . . .

Besides, there are other and strong objections to the system. It renders Government odious. People are not in the habit of looking back beyond the immediate cause. The farmer inquires why he cannot get more for his produce, and he is told that it is owing to the embargo, or to commercial restrictions. In this he sees only the hand of his own Government. He does not look to those acts of violence and injustice, which this system is intended to counteract. His censures fall on his Government. . . . In war it is different. The privation, it is true, may be equal or greater; but the public mind, under the strong impulses of that state of things, becomes steeled against sufferings. The difference is great between the passive and active state of the mind. Tie down a hero, and he feels the puncture of a pin; but throw him into battle, and he is scarcely sensible of vital gashes. So in war; impelled alternately by hope and fear, stimulated with revenge, depressed with shame, or elevated with victory, the people have become invincible. No privation can shake their fortitude. No calamity can break their spirit. Even where equally successful, the contrast is striking. War and restriction may leave the country equally exhausted; but the latter not only leaves you poor, but, even when successful, dispirited, divided, discontented, with diminished patriotism and the manners of a considerable portion of your people cor-

<sup>27</sup> In quoting this speech, apparently from another source, for there are numerous small variations, the "Autobiography" p. 10, has the word "none," in place of "many."

rupted. Not so in war. In that state the common danger unites all — strengthens the bonds of society, and feeds the flame of patriotism. The national character acquires energy. In exchange for the expenses of war, you obtain military and naval skill, and a more perfect organization of such parts of your Government as is [*sic*] connected with the science of national defence. You also obtain the habit of freely advancing your purse and strength in the common cause. Sir, are these advantages to be considered as trifles in the present state of the world? Can they be measured by a moneyed valuation? . . . Sir, I would prefer a single victory over the enemy by sea or land to all the good we shall ever derive from the continuation of the non-importation act. I know not that it would produce an equal pressure on the enemy; but I am certain of what is of greater consequence, it would be accompanied with more salutary effects on ourselves. The memory of a Saratoga or Eutaw is immortal. It is there you will find the country's boast and pride; the inexhaustible source of great and heroic actions.<sup>28</sup>

The motion to amend, so as to make the repeal complete, was lost by a vote of 58 Yeas to 61 Nays, Calhoun, Cheves, and Lowndes voting Yea; but the Republican members much divided. Another motion, to expunge from the bill all exceptions to the suspension of non-importation, "so as to make it total instead of partial," was soon made, and was barely lost by 59 to 60,—one member from North Carolina having changed his vote. Then an indefinite postponement was carried by 63 to 58; Calhoun, Cheves, and Lowndes in the negative.

While we are upon this general subject, it will be best to end what needs to be said of Calhoun's course in regard to it. The administration still adhered to the restrictive system, even long after the war began. On July 20, 1813, during the first session of the Thirteenth Congress, Madison sent in a secret message, recommending an embargo, and such a measure passed the House by a vote of 80 to 50, but failed in the Senate.<sup>29</sup> Calhoun and several other leaders voted against

<sup>28</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, First Session, Part II, 1811-12, pp. 1535, 1539-44.

<sup>29</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, First Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 499, 500, 503, 504.



it in the house. Very early in the next session, on December 9, 1813, Madison again sent in a secret message, with the recommendation that "an effectual embargo on exports be immediately enacted." The ground alleged was that "supplies of most essential kinds" were finding their way to British ports and even to British armies in our immediate neighborhood. Calhoun had, as has been said, voted against the proposed embargo at the preceding session; and a speech before that date has just been quoted in which he openly expressed his disbelief in the whole restrictive policy, but on this occasion his name appears among those in favor of the measure. His colleagues, Cheves and Lowndes, voted against it; but it passed both Houses and became a law on December 17, 1813.<sup>30</sup>

Of course it is clear that Calhoun's course upon this subject was not consistent; but public men often find consistency hard to attain, and there is no reason to doubt the truth of his statement<sup>31</sup> that "at the earnest entreaties of friends, and to prevent division in the party when their union was so necessary to the success of the war, [he] gave it a reluctant vote." Ingersoll, too, who sat in this same Congress, seems to have known that, though Calhoun voted for the measure, he disapproved of it. He had apparently declined to advance the bill in any way, and Grundy acted as leader.<sup>32</sup>

This was the last of the much-discussed restrictive measures, and it was a short-lived statute. Within less than four months and at the same session of Congress, on March 31, 1814, Madison recommended the repeal of the embargo and the practical abandonment of the whole restrictive system. The message was very short, and it will be best to give it at length. It was couched in the following words:

Taking into view the mutual interests which the United States and the foreign nations in amity with them have in a liberal commercial intercourse, and the extensive changes favorable thereto which have recently taken place: taking into view, also, the im-

<sup>30</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Part II, pp. 2031, 2032, 2053.

<sup>31</sup> "Autobiography," pp. 13, 14.

<sup>32</sup> Ingersoll's "Second War" (1814), Vol. II, p. 51.



portant advantages which may otherwise result from adapting the state of our commercial laws to the circumstances now existing;

I recommend to the consideration of Congress the expediency of authorizing, after a certain day, exportations, specie excepted, from the United States, in vessels of the United States, and in vessels owned and navigated by the subjects of Powers at peace with them; and a repeal of so much of our laws as prohibit the importation of articles not the property of enemies, but produced or manufactured only within their dominions.

I recommend, also, as a more effectual safeguard and encouragement to our growing manufactures, that the additional duties on imports which are to expire at the end of one year after a peace with Great Britain, be prolonged to the end of two years after that event; and that, in favor of our moneyed institutions, the exportation of specie be prohibited throughout the same period.<sup>33</sup>

The Message was referred in the House to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and on April 4 Calhoun brought in a bill to repeal the law of December 17, 1813, the non-intercourse law and for other purposes. In his report,<sup>34</sup> he states very clearly the changed circumstances that rendered the repeal advisable. "Previous to the late changes in Europe," he wrote, "the bearing of our restrictive measures was for the most part confined to our enemies. . . . At present, a prospect exists of an extended intercourse with [the friendly Powers] highly important to both parties. . . . Denmark, all Germany, and Holland, heretofore under the double restraint of internal regulation and external blockades and depredations from a commerce with the United States, appear by late events to be liberated therefrom. Like changes . . . appear to be taking place in Italy, and the most extreme parts of the Mediterranean."

During the debate, he spoke several times and insisted that the war "was, as it had been emphatically and correctly stated, a war for Free Trade and Sailors' Rights." He again expressed openly his opposition to the whole system of restric-

<sup>33</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, p. 694.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1946, 1947.

tion. "Gentlemen might say," such were his words, "that, in this view of the restrictive system, it ought to have terminated at the commencement of the war. To be candid, that was his opinion . . . he thought it ought to have terminated in war earlier than it did."

The discussion became a good deal involved with the tariff question, but into this we must not enter now. Suffice it to say that, after various unsuccessful motions to lessen the completeness of the repeal, the measure was passed by a vote of 115 to 37, much in the form in which Calhoun had introduced it. Some days later, certain Senate amendments of importance were on his motion concurred in by 68 to 52, and then with the President's signature the measure became a law.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, a law enacted on Madison's recommendation in December, 1813, was repealed upon his recommendation in April, 1814. The burden of defending this apparently inconsistent conduct fell chiefly on Calhoun as administration leader on the floor, and he had himself openly expressed disapproval of the whole restrictive system and yet had voted for the measure of December, 1813. It was in his speech upon this subject that he drew the distinction between the state of public affairs in Europe in 1807, at the inception of our restrictive system, and that existing in 1814.<sup>36</sup> At the former date, he said, there were no neutrals, while in 1814 a large portion of the Continent had at length come to be so, and its ports were open. The difference to us, consequent upon the then recent changes in Europe, were also set forth plainly enough by him in the already quoted report accompanying the bill of repeal.

His conduct of the matter was such that it is very likely many of his hearers did not fully realize what a *volte-face* the administration had made, and it certainly helped enormously to let them gracefully out of the difficulty. So much was this the case that the biographer of Webster has written:

There are few specimens of parliamentary tact, on the records

<sup>35</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. II, pp. 1962, 1963, 1983, 1984, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2014.

<sup>36</sup> See the speech quoted in part, *ante*, p. 117.

of any deliberative assembly, more ingenious than this speech of Mr. Calhoun in favor of repealing the Embargo of December, 1813. But he forgot, perhaps he wished to forget, that it *was* the Embargo of December, 1813, which he was about to repeal. He forgot that the very assertion of the President, when he recommended this as a war measure, was, that there were neutral nations, under whose flag and through whose ports an indirect commerce between Great Britain and ourselves was then allowed to be going on, which weakened us and strengthened her as belligerents, and which must therefore be suppressed, at whatsoever expense to those neutral nations. All that Mr. Calhoun said, respecting the importance of conciliating and helping the nations that were neutrals, in April, 1814, when he proposed the repeal, was true and sound; but it was just as true and sound in December, 1813, when this Embargo was laid. Moreover, Napoleon had been driven out of Russia in the winter of 1812-13; and when we laid this particular Embargo of December, 1813, putting an end to all lawful commerce with all nations, a large part of Northern Europe was preparing to combine against him, and their territories could no longer be used by him as the sphere of his own restrictive policy.<sup>37</sup>

The inconsistency of the two measures of enactment and repeal certainly seems on the surface most striking, but it is not easy to-day to judge fairly of events occurring so long ago, and I think examination will lessen our wonder. News then travelled slowly, and not only does a new alignment of nations always take long to develop but the results thereof must, even then, lie still hidden for months or years in the womb of time. After Napoleon's Russian disaster it is quite true that several of the ports of Europe, in the North especially, were soon opened to British trade, so that our embargo could have had no material effect on England; but the permanence of this condition of affairs was very uncertain. Napoleon's career had been so dazzling that it was quite natural to doubt what would be the final result. Even after the formation of a new coalition between Prussia and Russia, in February and March of 1813,—to which Austria did not accede until August,—the French Emperor had at first some

<sup>37</sup> Curtis's "Webster," Vol. I, pp. 126, 127.

astonishing successes; and it was not until October 19th that he met his first great defeat at Leipsic.

The news of this crushing blow did not reach America until the 30th of December, 1813,<sup>38</sup> two weeks after this last embargo had become a law, and three weeks after Madison had recommended it. Nor should we forget that a leading reason for advising the measure was that supplies from America were then finding their way to the British armies operating against us. This trade was, moreover, entirely enjoyed by disaffected New England, and it is doubtless true that the desire to stop this exchange, which was so profitable to the bitter opponents of the war, was in part the guiding motive of Madison and the Republicans.

The embargo of 1813 was beyond doubt ill-timed and, had it been delayed two or three weeks, would never have been recommended or passed. After the arrival of news of the battle of Leipsic, nearly every vessel coming to our shores brought reports of French reverses,<sup>39</sup> so that almost all of Europe was soon open to British trade and our restrictive measures palpably senseless for their main purpose; and in April, 1814, at the time of the final abandonment of our long-followed policy, Napoleon was actually signing his abdication.

The restrictive system thus at length came to an end. It must be admitted to have accomplished little,—whatever any of us may think the might-have-been as to it. The result possibly justified Webster's sarcasm uttered early in the debate as to his happiness "to be present at the office now to be performed, and to act a part in the funeral ceremonies of what has usually been called the restrictive system." The opposition have always an easy time and can let their tongues drip most bitter irony and invective, but are in the main restricted to such rather unavailing methods.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. IV, pp. 223-229.

<sup>39</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. IV, pp. 223-29.

<sup>40</sup> For the proceedings and debates as to this final repeal see *Annals of Congress*, Thirteenth Congress, 1813-14, Vol. II, pp. 1961-66, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2014.



## CHAPTER VIII

### ACTIVITIES IN CONGRESS

Second Session of Twelfth Congress — The Thirteenth Congress — The Loan Bill — Bank of the United States Proposed — Death of Daughter.

THE Second Session of the Twelfth Congress met on November 2, 1812, and Calhoun was present on the opening day. He had presumably been at home during the interval between the adjournment of the prior session on July 6, 1812, and the meeting of the present one in November. It was the short session, the Congress expiring by limitation on the 4th of March, 1813; and not much occurred of interest to us here. At the very beginning, an embarrassing question came up for the decision of the Speaker. South Carolina's representation included Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, Gen. David R. Williams and Calhoun, the two first men of tried ability and both, as well as Williams, at the head of important committees, while Calhoun, who had made a decided mark at the first session, was yet the youngest of the four named, both in years and in length of service. At the prior session he had succeeded to the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations upon the retirement of Porter, but there was of course difficulty in placing four members from a small State at the head of important committees.

Calhoun at once cut this Gordian knot and, according to the "Autobiography,"<sup>1</sup> with his characteristic disinterestedness, cheerfully assented to be placed second on that [committee] at the head of which he had served with so much

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 12, 13. Crallé ("Advertisement" to Vol. V. of Calhoun's "Works") tells this story somewhat differently. According to him, it was Porter, at the prior session, who gave up the chairmanship in Calhoun's favor; but Calhoun's own version is of course the true one. At the first session Calhoun had no record behind him and, moreover, Porter continued to act as chairman while he remained in the House.



distinction at the preceding session. Mr. Smilie,—an old and highly respectable member from Pennsylvania,—was placed at the head of the committee. At the first meeting the chairman, without previously intimating his intention, moved that Mr. Calhoun should be elected chairman. He objected, and insisted that Mr. Smilie should act as chairman, and declared his perfect willingness to serve under him; but he was, notwithstanding, unanimously elected, and the strongest proof that could be given of the highly satisfactory manner in which he had previously discharged his duty was thus afforded. In this connection, and as illustrative of the same disinterested character, when the speaker's chair became vacant by the appointment of Mr. Clay as one of the commissioners to negotiate for peace, Mr. Calhoun was solicited by many of the most influential members of the party to become a candidate for it; "but he peremptorily refused to oppose his distinguished colleague, Mr. Cheves, who was elected."

Early in the session a question arose of great importance to the persons concerned, and in the solution of which in a way contrary to the purposes of Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin Calhoun played a leading part. At the time of the declaration of war there was a large amount of American capital in England,—the proceeds of exports from this country,—which could not, under the terms of the still unrepealed Non-Importation Act, be sent home without becoming subject to forfeiture. The owners were far from home, and when the British Orders in Council were at length revoked after our declaration of war, they seem to have assumed that the Non-Importation Act would at once be repealed, so large numbers of ships were loaded and despatched to America. Upon arrival, however, they were all compelled to enter bond to cover the forfeiture incurred by the violation of the Non-Importation Act; and, when they petitioned for remission, the Secretary of the Treasury would not consent, unless some share of the very large profits they had made on goods then almost unknown in America should enure to the benefit of the Government.

The subject was referred to Congress by the President in

his message at the opening of the session, and he seemed to incline towards extracting some profit for the government out of the merchants' predicament. The question went next to the Committee on Ways and Means, and Cheves reported against any legislation and in favor of leaving the entire matter to the usual discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. It was evidently well known what this meant, and Cheves soon said that personally he disapproved of the report and its recommendation and only presented them in pursuance of the directions of his committee. Calhoun and Lowndes also opposed strongly the policy recommended,—despite the fact that the question is said to have assumed much of a party character.

A very large sum was involved, and here was doubtless the bait to a government almost bankrupt, as well as the pinch to the individuals in trouble. Calhoun told the House in his speech that “\$20,000,000 await your decision, a sum equal to nearly half the annual export of the country.” After much discussion, a bill passed the House and became a law, much in the line which he, with his more liberal views, had advocated. It directed the remission of the fines in all cases free from any fraud or effort at imposition, and was beyond question a very great triumph for its advocates and a striking instance of their power and independence.<sup>2</sup>

Calhoun doubtless went South again so as to pass at home the interval between the adjournment *sine die* of the Twelfth Congress on March 4, 1813, and the first meeting of the Thirteenth. The latter was appointed, by the Act of February 27, 1813, to meet on May 24th of that year. He had already been elected a member of the Thirteenth Congress in the autumn of 1812, but the district from which he was sent was quite different from that which he had represented in the Twelfth Congress, owing to the fact that, under the apportionment following upon the census of 1810, nine members were assigned to South Carolina instead of eight, to which she had formerly been entitled. The new district was made

<sup>2</sup> Annals of Congress, Twelfth Congress, Second Session, 1812-13, pp. 15, 198, 199. 216, 315-21, 1334-35. “Autobiography,” p. 13.

up of Edgefield and Abbeville, of which only the latter had been included in his former district. It seems that William Butler, who had been elected to Congress from 1800 to 1812 from the old district, of which Edgefield was a part, now in turn withdrew in Calhoun's favor. He is said to have remarked to Calhoun, "You can meet Randolph in debate, I cannot."<sup>3</sup>

That he was by this time a man of mark throughout the country is very clear, and the rapidity with which he had attained distinction so great is rarely to be found equalled. His first session had been crowded with events of vast importance to the country, in all of which he had taken a leading part, as well as in the details of getting the country ready for the ordeal of war and in the game of fence and spar for position between the two parties. That he had shown great tact, endless persistence, and a high order of broad patriotism during the whole of the time is clear enough from the records; and the same thing is also established by the fact that a man so young in years and so very young in experience had been in a position that often made him the leader for the administration upon the floor of the House. All this had, moreover, been the case also during the second session, though it was short and not so many matters of great importance came before it.

At home Calhoun was probably engaged in the routine matters of a plantation and of his family, but the relaxation must have been welcome. A far more trying service than that which he had experienced lay ahead of him in the near future. The Twelfth Congress had been chiefly occupied in declaring war in the exuberant hope of an early triumph and spurred on by a sense of the gross wrongs long done us. But the Thirteenth Congress had quite another task. Stern reality then confronted members, and the glitter of youthful hope had been sobered by lamentable disasters such as justified to no little extent the opponents of the war in referring to our efforts in the field as "two drivelling campaigns." The opposition, too, was strengthened by the arrival of Webster,

<sup>3</sup> "Autobiography," p. 23. "Memoirs of Gen. Wm. Butler," by T. P. Slider, Atlanta, 1885 (pamphlet in Charleston Library Society), p. 27.

who now began his long career in the federal service as a member of the House from New Hampshire.

New policies, moreover, came up for discussion, some of them destined for many years to hold an important place in the federal councils. The war and the preceding years of non-intercourse had led to quite a growth of manufactures, and these, as soon as the indirect protection of the war was removed, began to clamor for the passage of laws to exclude their foreign competitors from our markets and thus prevent the ruin of the home-plants. The currency and the whole financial system of the country, too, were in such a state of chaos as soon led to efforts to establish that Second Bank, which was destined to live through a chequered and tragic career. It will be found that in these questions, as in all others, Calhoun took a leading hand.

He was present at the opening of the session, and was appointed Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The other members were Grundy, Desha, Jackson of Virginia, Ingersoll, Fisk of New York, and Webster.

Early in the session he had occasion to defend the administration from an attack by Webster. This new and brilliant member, then representing a district of New Hampshire, introduced resolutions on June 10, calling upon the Executive for information "when, by whom and in what manner" intelligence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees had first been communicated to our Government. His idea was that the administration had either been deceived by the French ministry or that at the very time when war was declared they were already in possession of the repealing decree (dated April 28, 1811), and had suppressed it. The gravamen of the charge grew out of the facts that the English Orders in Council had been alleged as one of the causes of the war and that the English had said that they would repeal those orders when the French decrees were repealed. It is evident that Webster thought that he had the Government in a tight place in this matter, and for a time he carried the House with him. A general request for information upon the same point had



been passed at the prior session, but Webster thought the answer insufficient.

Webster insisted that "the revocation of the Orders in Council of Great Britain was the main point on which the war turned," and argued that therefore the date at which our Government had heard officially of the repeal was vital, and he spoke of the "contradictory evidence" on this head. Another member (Sheffey) said that, if the President had knowledge of the repeal before the war, his conduct "deserves not only the scrutiny but the reprehension of the nation, for then we had been plunged into the war needlessly. If the knowledge had been used properly," he said, "the Orders in Council, the great cause of the war, would have been done away," — *i. e.* the virtuous English would at once have repealed their Orders, if only they had been informed by Madison that the wicked French Decrees had been rescinded.

Calhoun took up the defence and objected strongly to the unusual and prying form in which the resolutions were cast. He moved to strike out the words "when, by whom and in what manner," and reminded members that the Prince Regent of Great Britain had distinctly said in August, 1812, that they would *not* repeal their Orders, even if the French did repeal the Berlin and Milan Decrees. The debate was warm for a few days, and it seems as if the administration leaders at first feared the matter, but on June 21 Calhoun withdrew his amendment, on the ground of being anxious to get to the discussion of the vital question of ways and means. Webster's view was expressed in a letter in which he wrote: "We had a warm time of it for four days, and then the other side declined further discussion." Possibly Calhoun's withdrawal of his motion was owing to his recognition of the evident fact that the House was in favor of the resolutions; but it seems more likely that by that time information from the Executive had shown that their skirts were entirely clear of duplicity in the matter and that there was not the slightest reason to fear the inquiry. The resolutions were passed on that same day (June 21) by votes of approximately 137 to



26. Several administration leaders, and among them Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes, voted in the affirmative.<sup>4</sup>

On July 12, an answer<sup>5</sup> came in through the Secretary of State, Monroe, and showed that the first knowledge of the repeal had reached our Government from Barlow, Minister to France, on July 13, 1812,—nearly a month after the declaration of war, and more than a year and two months after the date of the repeal (April 28, 1811). Barlow had first heard of it in an informal conversation with the Duke of Bassano between the 1st and 10th of May, 1812, and on the latter date it was officially communicated to him at his request. He had at once sent the very important information to our Minister in England, whence it had been dispatched to Washington by the *Wasp*. It was also at the same time communicated by our Minister to the British cabinet, and the repeal of the British Orders urged, in accordance with former intimations of the English Cabinet, but no encouragement had been given to expect a repeal. No other communication of the decree, so Monroe added, had ever been made to this Government, nor explanation given of the long failure to communicate it.

It cannot be doubted that the administration escaped with flying colors the pitfall that Webster had dug for it, and all the pother of the matter is probably to be attributed to the duplicity of the French Emperor and his agents, and their endeavor to keep a door both open and shut. To sign<sup>6</sup> a repeal on April 28, 1811, which was to take effect as of November 1st last (1810),—and then to keep it hidden away in a *dossier* until May of 1812, so that bare hints and rumors of it flitted about the world to darken and deceive,—<sup>7</sup> is a

<sup>4</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, First Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 149-52, 169 *et seq.*,—170, 172, 174-78, 302, 303. Curtis's "Webster," Vol. I, pp. 109-14.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 433: State Papers and Public Documents of the United States, Third Edition (1819), 1812-15, Vol. IV, pp. 233 *et seq.*

<sup>6</sup> Or, possibly to sign it in May, 1812, and ante-date it as of April, 1811,—as Benton thinks was done. "Abridgement of Debates of Congress," Vol. V, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Rumors of the repeal had been long prevalent, and had been referred to in Madison's Message at the opening of the First Session of the Twelfth Congress, on November 5, 1811. These rumors had been vainly used with the British cabinet to secure a repeal of the Orders in Council.

method that must often lead to grave misunderstanding. In this instance, too, flat lying seems to have been indulged in, for the French Secretary stated that he had long before told Barlow's predecessor of the repeal, as well as sent it to America to be communicated to our Government. No record of any such information, however, was to be found in our archives, either in Paris or Washington, and it may be safely said that the great news had never been made known to us or our agents. It was far too important, and the repeal was too anxiously desired by our Government to have been allowed to drop or disappear, but it was probably this statement of the French Secretary, appearing in our official correspondence, that misled Webster and made him cocksure for a time that he had Madison on the hip.

The English did finally repeal their Orders in Council on June 23, 1812,—more than a month after they had been authoritatively informed by us of the French decree of April 28, 1811, and they then alleged the recall of the French decrees as the cause of their action, but the refusal to repeal the Orders, when urged by our Minister on that very ground in May, and several utterances by the highest English authorities as well as their later suggestion to us of a repeal under conditions speak far louder, and justify the statement in Monroe's report that the real cause must have been something else.

Monroe's reply was at once referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the next day (July 13) Calhoun reported<sup>8</sup> shortly from it with a resolution that "the conduct of the Executive . . . meets with the approbation of this House." But the House declined to consider the matter, and

<sup>8</sup> Had the language of this report been remembered in 1834 by Jackson's friends, they would have used it at the time of the resolution of censure of March 26, 1834, upon his conduct in regard to the removal of the deposits. Calhoun's report of 1813 read that the committee were "aware that on ordinary occasions it is not proper for this House to express sentiments of approbation or censure on the conduct of the President, but submit with deference that, as through this body he is personally responsible to the people for the faithful discharge of his duties, there are cases in which it is not only the right but the duty of this House to express its opinion. Such, in the judgment of your committee, is the present. The language of the resolutions, and the motives avowed by their supporters, leave no alternative. To be silent would be to condemn."

went instead to the vital question of Ways and Means, and again later they declined to take it up, on Calhoun's own motion to do so. At the next session, Webster returned once more to the charge, largely on the ground that Monroe's reply was an argument and not a report. Calhoun expressed himself as quite willing to fix an early date to consider the subject, provided there was no interference with the "great business of the session," but the matter was never actually discussed. It had been a warm skirmish but was merely partisan warfare.<sup>9</sup>

It was during this session that the Massachusetts Remonstrance against the war was presented by Pickering. This paper, now so much out of fashion as to be stored away deep in the dust of history's lumber-room, took strong State-Rights ground. Speaking of "the powers reserved to the State Sovereignties," it maintained that "the States, as well as the individuals composing them, are parties to the national compact," while it sought also covertly to defend impressment by the English under the doctrine of national allegiance, which, it went on, "is too well founded, has been too long established, and is too consonant with the permanent interest, the peace and independence of all nations, to be disturbed for the purpose of substituting in its place certain visionary notions, to which the French Revolution gave birth, and which though long exploded there, seem still to have an unhappy influence in our country." It is strange to find the early Massachusetts leaders taking such grounds as these, while the youthful Calhoun expressed at once his disapproval of the doctrines asserted and said that "he certainly never would countenance what might be considered a declaration of war by one State against another."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, First Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 435, 436, 438, 442, 470, 471. *Ibid.*, Second Session, pp. 824-828; Curtis's "Webster," Vol. I, pp. 109-114, 117, 118. Curtis writes that discussion of these last resolutions "was never allowed to take place," but this fact does not appear, nor does it seem likely in view of the issue upon the subject at the prior session, unless the leaders merely desired to avoid the consumption of time imperatively needed for more important subjects.

<sup>10</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, First Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 333-41, 347, 350, 351.

Nothing more of interest to us occurred at this session, which adjourned on August 2, 1813. Calhoun was then, no doubt, once more at home for a time with his family, but was present again on Tuesday, December 7, the day after the meeting of the Second Session. This was the great session of the war and was crowded with events and policies connected with it. He was again placed at the head of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and was also the third member on a committee, of which Macon was chairman, to which was referred "so much of the President's Message as relates to the retaliation of our government, of the proceedings of the enemy, contrary to the legitimate modes of warfare." I have not found that he took any active part in the proceedings of this latter committee.

Calhoun of course supported and pressed on the bill to encourage enlistments by giving bounties, and all the measures for the active prosecution of the war, and he was often on his feet defending our conduct of it and answering the indictments of the opposition. He found frequent occasion in particular to meet the jibes of Webster, and more than once denounced the bitter opposition of this member and of others. On February 8, 1814, when a measure to raise three additional regiments of riflemen was pending, and Grosvenor of New York and Webster had been pouring out the vials of their wrath, Calhoun spoke twice in defense of our conduct of the war and expressed his astonishment "to see American citizens, in this body or elsewhere, get up and tell you that all your objects have failed." A few days earlier, too, he had spoken with no little asperity of certain views advanced by Grosvenor in regard to the slight degree of protection we owed to naturalized citizens fighting in our armies, winding up with a hope that the doctrine "was confined to himself and had not many advocates, even in his own party."<sup>11</sup> Possibly these were some of the straws that led to a serious quarrel he had with Grosvenor, as will be later shown.

The assertion that we were waging a war of conquest

<sup>11</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 1222, 1223, 1261-63.



against Canada, and that other long-lived favorite of the opposition,—the assertion of French subserviency on the part of the administration,—had of course to be met on more than one occasion. To the former Calhoun always replied by insisting that our attack upon Canada was called for by the necessity of keeping the enemy's forces out of our territory. The true criterion was "the motive and cause which led to it [the attack]." We must of course use (so his speech may be summed up) the means most likely to force the enemy to respect our rights, and the war in Canada is the very best security for our own territory by forcing the enemy to concentrate his whole force there for its defense. And on the same point, he said in substance upon another occasion, the enemy presses us both on the seaboard and on our interior frontier. On the seaboard our war must be strictly defensive, on the Canada frontier the opposite. It must there be wholly offensive. This was plainly our course, he continued, for if we have a sufficient army in that quarter, the enemy must call off all his force from our seaboard or at once lose his colonies. Fifty thousand men at least ought to be available to send against them. "He did hope," he also said, "the miserably stale and absurd objections against offensive operations in Canada had ceased, till he heard yesterday the member from New Hampshire [Mr. Webster]." <sup>12</sup>

The charge of French subserviency was met by him mainly by ridicule, as was possibly best when dealing with an assertion, to disprove which would have called for the proof of a negative, and which was altogether lacking in foundation, unless a feeling of sympathy between nations constitutes a case of subserviency. He dubbed it "a baseless accusation" as applied to us; and again after the fall of Napoleon in 1814, when referring to the then position of the English, he said: "The magic cry of French influence is lost . . . the cry of French influence, that baseless fiction, that phantom of faction, now banished." <sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 898, 995; *Ibid.*, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, pp. 466, 467.

<sup>13</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 870, 930, 995, 1261-63; *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 1685, 1687; *ibid.*, 1814-15, Vol. III, p. 466.



A condition of the utmost seriousness presented itself to our country early in 1814. Napoleon had met with his great Russian disaster during the winter of 1812-13 and was forced to abdicate on April 5, 1814. The English, then, being relieved of the war on the continent of Europe, were at once able to turn all their vast power against us. The dangers consequent upon this state of affairs were great indeed and of a character to unnerve a man who had been actively concerned in bringing on the war. But Calhoun, though his nature seems to have been in the main that of a student and thinker rather than of a born fighter, was by no means appalled. On the contrary, he was among the most urgent of the young Americans to press his countrymen on to the exertions necessary to meet the awful crisis.

The administration leaders introduced into the House what was known in the language of the day as the Loan Bill,—a measure proposing to borrow the sum of thirty million dollars. This was long debated in Committee of the Whole, and the discussion took a very wide range, members using the opportunity either to attack or to defend the justice, or policy, of the war, and indulging often in flights of eloquence doubtless intended chiefly for their constituents. The debate was evidently a brilliant one, interspersed with many stirring speeches, and its scenes lived long in the memories of the ardent youths who took part in it. The opposition expatiated upon the utter hopelessness of the contest under the circumstances, and seems to have made every effort to defeat this bill,<sup>14</sup> which sober afterjudgment must surely look upon as having been absolutely vital to our welfare, if not to our independent existence.

On February 25, Calhoun took the floor and had his share in this species of saturnalia of debate. The opposition objected that the money could only be obtained at a high rate, but Calhoun declined to enter into this question, and answered that it must be had at the best rate at which we could get it. He touched on impressment, and to the claim of the opposition that the British merely took some of our men by mistake,

<sup>14</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography," p. 14.

answered that they admitted there were sixteen hundred Americans on board their ships at the outbreak of the war and then said "the duty which the country owes to the impressed sailors originates in a single fact, that they are unjustly deprived by a foreign nation of their liberty. The principle on which they are deprived of their liberty, or the manner, constitutes no part of it. . . . It is our duty, most sacredly our duty, to protect the life and liberty of our citizens against foreign oppression. Instead of doing our duty, we have for many years quietly beheld them forced into a hateful foreign service."

Finally, in reply to the contention that, after the recent events in Europe, our efforts were useless, he admitted that the enemy's power was great and her "fortune at the flood," but then went on: "Such prosperity is the most fickle of human conditions. From the flood the tide dates its ebb. . . . He can now no more claim to be struggling for existence. We cannot renounce our right to the ocean, which Providence has spread before our doors, nor will we ever hold that which is the immediate gift of Heaven under the license of any nation. We have already had success worthy of our cause. The future is audibly pronounced by the splendid victories over the *Guerriere*, *Java* and *Macedonian*. We, and all nations, are in them taught a lesson never to be forgot. Opinion is power. The charm of British naval invincibility is broken." <sup>15</sup>

It is likely that once more Calhoun went home to his family after the adjournment of this session on April 18, 1814. During his absence, about the end of January,<sup>16</sup> his wife had given birth to their second child, Floride. He had an attack of bilious fever in the following fall<sup>17</sup> and was not present when the third session met on September 19, 1814, in pursuance of the President's proclamation. Hence, it happened that at the time he took his seat, on October 19, his former

<sup>15</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, 1813-14, Second Session, Vol. II, pp. 1673-94.

<sup>16</sup> "Correspondence," p. 126.

<sup>17</sup> Speech in the Senate on October 3, 1837, printed in "Works," Vol. III, p. 125.

position at the head of the Committee on Foreign Relations was already filled by John Forsyth; but he none the less remained very prominent upon the floor. The war was still going on and the tremendous power of our enemy now coming to be directed against us alone was a most serious problem. Of course, no one knew that peace was in reality less than three months off. Questions relating directly to the maintenance of the war occupied still the bulk of the time, but many others of a vital nature, which the changed circumstances after the war were destined to call for, began already to be bruited in the halls of legislation.

Callhoun was in Washington less than a week when, on October 25, he spoke upon the recommendation of the Ways and Means to add one hundred per cent. to the then amount of direct taxes. "He did not rise," he began by saying, "to consider whether the war was originally just and necessary; much less, whether the opposition, according to the very modest declaration of the member from New Hampshire [Mr. Webster] possessed all the talent and confidence of the country." And then he continued in substance that his object was to press for immediate action. You have for enemy the most implacable of Powers, now freed from any other contest, and who will the next campaign, direct his whole force against you. He urged action upon members, descanting upon the backward state of legislation and, soon coming to the deranged state of our finances, went on: "In the next place, it will be necessary (he presumed no member could doubt it) to take the state of the circulating medium into consideration, and to devise some measure to render it more safe and adapted to the purposes of finance. The single fact, that we have no proper medium, commensurate in its circulation with the Union — that it is all local — is calculated to produce much embarrassment in the operations of the Treasury. But, sir, after we have passed the taxes and established an adequate circulating medium, . . . much still will remain to be done." <sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, pp. 465-69.

Calhoun did not take up every partisan cry, and it is perhaps worth noting that, when a resolution was introduced for a committee to inquire into the question of alleged treasonable correspondence by blue lights, he said at once that the subject was too small to be worthy the attention of the House and hoped it would lie on the table. It was then immediately tabled by the decisive vote of 89 to 42.<sup>19</sup>

Broader questions of public policy were far more likely to receive his attention. In 1814 Hopkins of New York wanted to raise a committee to inquire into the expediency of providing by law for the relief of those who had suffered losses by irruptions of the enemy on the Niagara frontier; but Calhoun at once had the subject tabled so as to give time to reflect,—on the ground that it introduced a novel principle,—and it did not come up again at that session (the Second Session of the Thirteenth Congress).

Later, however, at the First Session of the Fourteenth Congress it was again pressed and a law was passed "to authorize the payment for property lost, captured, or destroyed by the enemy, while in the military service of the United States," and a commissioner provided to hear claims. The quoted clause or some other obscurity, however, led to such a liberal interpretation as threatened to let in a host of cases never intended to be included, and at the second session of the same Congress Forsyth and some other members wanted the House to pass a resolution requesting the President to suspend the execution of the law. Calhoun opposed this for reasons which will be shown in another place,<sup>20</sup> and the final result was the passage of a new statute to explain and limit the effect of the original one.

<sup>19</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, pp. 1127-29, 1141. Possibly he was to some extent influenced in this matter by his observations of the New England people during his years of study. The anonymous author of "Measures, not Men, &c.," *ut supra* writes (p. 6), that Calhoun at that time "studied with great attention the character of the people of the north-eastern section of the Union; and it was probably the knowledge thus acquired, that enabled him, during the darkest moments of our late conflict with Great Britain, to contemplate without alarm the storm which lowered in that quarter of our horizon. . . . He never doubted that the great body of citizens in New England, were firmly attached to the Union."

<sup>20</sup> *Infra*, p. 214.



Clay and some others had even sought to enlarge the scope of the act, despite recent experience of how such laws are pretty sure to be interpreted, but Calhoun was against any extension. He suggested the possible burning of New York, and urged that individuals must, as in the past, bear the burden of these disasters. Otherwise, any Government might well be bankrupted. There was in this law and the proposed enlargement of it, a strong flavor of that private benefit to constituents, which has always appealed strongly to our American legislators at least, but Calhoun was, I think, markedly free from such influences.<sup>21</sup>

The chief struggle during the last of the war sessions of Congress centred around the effort to establish a national bank. It was the third and final meeting of the Thirteenth Congress and what is ordinarily the short session, but this particular one had met on September 19, 1814, in pursuance of a special call of the President, and did not then adjourn until the expiration of the Congress on March 4, 1815. A great part of its time was taken up with the bank question, but it will be necessary in the first place to show in a few words what had been already done, or at least attempted, upon this subject.

On January 4, 1814, during the second session of the same Congress, Lefferts of New York had presented a petition for the establishment of a national bank. Upon Calhoun's motion, it was printed, and it was then referred, against Calhoun's wishes, to the committee on ways and means, of which John W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law, was chairman. Eppes was an uncompromising opponent of a national bank, and on January 10th reported adversely on the ground of unconstitutionality.

This was apparently the end of the matter, but Calhoun was full of devices, and on February 4th he suggested that the constitutional difficulty might be avoided by establishing the bank in the District of Columbia. This proposal was also

<sup>21</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, 1813-14, Vol. I, p. 1141. *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1806-1809. *Ibid.*, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 246, 291, 390-94, 428, 429, 1345-47.



referred to the committee of ways and means, and on February 19th the second member of the committee (Taylor) reported a bill to establish in the city of Washington a bank with a capital of thirty millions. Eppes, the chairman, seems to have been so strongly opposed to any such measure that he would not even present the bill, and Taylor expressed himself also as being against it. The proposed bank was to be entirely confined to the District, and some members were quite clear that such an institution could not possibly furnish a uniform national currency. Consequently, an effort was made to insert the power to establish branches, but it failed, and it was not then long before this plan of Calhoun's proved as abortive as had the earlier one of Lefferts. It was silently dropped.

One more effort was made late in the same session. On April 2, Grundy moved for a committee upon the subject and his nearness to the administration seems to have put life into the plan for a time. Grundy's motion was carried by a vote of 76 to 69, after the overwhelming defeat of an effort to confine the bank to the District. So slight was by that time the support of this device of Calhoun that the proposal received only 32 votes. But the session was too far gone for so vital a measure to succeed, and it was soon indefinitely postponed. The session adjourned on April 18th.

During the recess of Congress events of great importance occurred, and Ingersoll writes that "the course of hostilities . . . gave color, if not cause, for resort to a national institution." In the end of August, Washington was captured, the administration fugitive, and soon specie payments were stopped south of New England. Paper money depreciated rapidly, and at varying rates in different parts of the country, and the chaos of our finances grew even far worse than it had been. One member<sup>22</sup> told the House that "not only had Government bills been dishonored, and the interest of the public debt remained unpaid, but . . . so completely empty was the Treasury, and destitute of credit, that funds could not be

<sup>22</sup> Hanson of Maryland. *Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, p. 656.*

obtained to defray the current ordinary expenses of the different Departments. . . . The Department of State was so bare of money as to be unable even to pay its stationery bills. . . . Yes, it was well known to the citizens of the District, that the Treasury was obligated to borrow pitiful sums, which it would disgrace a merchant in tolerable credit to ask for. Mr. Hanson mentioned the instance of an acceptance of \$3500, which the War Department was unable to pay and several acceptances, which he himself had seen, for large amounts, which had been protested by the public notary. The Paymaster was unable to meet demands for paltry sums — not even for \$30, which was a well established fact."

This state of affairs was close to chaos and led to other events of great importance in relation to a bank. Since Gallatin had gone to Europe to seek peace, in May of 1813, the Treasury had done little but drift in expectation of his return. But during the winter of 1813-14 Madison learned that Gallatin's return was not to be expected. He had already been thinking of a successor and had fixed upon Alexander James Dallas, a distinguished lawyer of Philadelphia, and wanted at once to make the appointment; but Dallas had incurred the hostility of the political leaders in Pennsylvania, and his confirmation would have been more than doubtful. After the fall of Washington, however, public affairs were in such a state that even political rancor cooled off; and Ingersoll writes that Senator Lacock of Pennsylvania said to the President's private secretary: "Tell *Doctor* Madison that we are now willing to submit to his Philadelphia lawyer for head of the Treasury. The public patient is so very sick that we must swallow anything the doctor prescribes, however nauseous the bolus." Dallas was accordingly nominated by Madison on October 5, 1814, and was confirmed the next day. It was well known that his appointment meant a national bank.

Congress was then already sitting, having come together on September 19th, for its third and final session,—destined to be the last of the war sessions. The Speaker (Cheves) had again appointed Eppes Chairman of Ways and Means, but

had reconstituted the committee so that the chairman was its only anti-bank member. Eppes proposed further issues of Treasury notes and some increase of taxation, but called upon Dallas for his views, and the latter at once replied strongly in favor of a national bank. Soon, too, the House passed a resolution for such an institution with branches, and on November 7th a bank bill was accordingly reported which was in its main features the plan of Dallas. The latter had, at his request, been heard by Eppes's committee and had earnestly enforced his views.

The capital was to be \$50,000,000,—\$6,000,000 of the amount in specie, the rest in government stock issued during the war. The United States was to subscribe \$20,000,000. The bank could not sell government stock, was to be bound to loan the United States \$30,000,000, as soon as it went into operation, and the President of the United States was empowered to suspend specie payments when such suspension seemed necessary. The institution was beyond doubt primarily intended as a means of securing funds to carry on the war, and was not at all designed to lead to early resumption.

It has been seen that Calhoun had arrived late at this session of Congress, owing to an illness, and had found the committees all made up when he reached Washington, on October 19th. The bank question, moreover, was by this time well under way in the committee. Eppes had received Dallas's reply on the 17th, in which the Secretary expressed the opinion that a national bank was "the only efficient remedy," and one week later (24th) the committee reported to the House the resolution in favor of a national bank with branches in the several States. This resolution, moreover, passed on October 28th by the decisive vote of 93 to 54, after the overwhelming defeat (138 to 14) of a motion to strike out the provision for branches. On both of these votes Calhoun was with the majority.

Some twenty-three years later he told the Senate of his connection with the bank question at this time. Immediately after his arrival in Washington, he said, he had a full con-

versation upon the subject with Dallas, at the latter's request, and when the Secretary had explained his plan, Calhoun promised to give it early and favorable attention. "At the time," he added, "I had reflected but little on the subject of banking." He was urged by friends to take a prominent part on the subject and soon examined the plan fully, "with every disposition to give it my support," but had not gone far before he was struck with its extraordinary character:

". . . A bank of \$50,000,000 whose capital was to consist almost exclusively of Government credit in the shape of stock, and not bound to pay its debts during the war, and for three years afterwards, to furnish the Government with loans to carry on the war. I saw, at once, that the effect of the arrangement would be, that the Government would borrow back its own credit, and pay six per cent. per annum for what they had already paid eight or nine. It was impossible for me to give it my support under any pressure, however great. I felt the difficulty of my situation not only in opposing the leading measure of the administration at such a crisis, but, what was far more responsible, to suggest one of my own, that would afford relief to the embarrassed treasury. I cast my eyes around, and soon saw that the Government could use its own credit directly, without the intervention of a bank; which I proposed to do in the form of treasury notes, to be issued in the operations of the Government, and to be funded in the subscription to the stock of the bank. Treasury notes were, at that time, below par, even with bank paper. The opposition to them was so great on the part of the banks, that they refused to receive them on deposit, or payment, at par with their notes; while the Government, on its part, received and paid away notes of the banks at par with its own. Such was the influence of the banks, and to such degradation did the Government, in its weakness, submit. All this influence I had to encounter, with the entire weight of the administration thrown into the same scale. I hesitated not. I saw the path of duty clearly, and determined to tread it, sharp and rugged as it was — and [so he had said earlier in the



same speech] never in my life was I exposed to more calumny and abuse. . . . It was my first lesson on the subject. I shall never forget it.”<sup>23</sup>

Thus, the administration had the opposition of a man, usually one of its leading supporters, and whose power the course of this bill will soon show to have been very great. Unfortunately for us here, Calhoun's speeches upon the subject have not been preserved, for, in accordance with his general custom when opposing his friends, he declined to publish them. His object being merely to defeat the bill and not to distract his party or injure the administration, he limited himself rigidly to accomplishing his one object and bore in patience the denunciations levelled at him. By this course, according to the “Autobiography,” he generally succeeded in maintaining his standing with the party, despite his opposition upon the specific point.

It has been said that the Bank Bill was presented on November 7th. The measure was then discussed for a few days, and on November 16th Calhoun offered a substitute. His already quoted later account of the matter indicates that this was his own device, and it was certainly an ambitious undertaking for a young man, who himself has told us that he had at that time reflected but little on banking, while to this he adds in his campaign “Autobiography” that “the whole subject of banking, theoretically and practically, was, in a great measure, new to him. He had never given it a serious and careful attention.”

It seems probable that he was right in his objection to the Dallas plan, of which Professor Catterall speaks as “a monstrous scheme,” but his substitute was at least equally faulty in other ways. He fully intended that “instead of a mere paper machine, it should be a specie-paying bank, but it was to be based on the issue of new Treasury-notes, thus in reality still further drowning the country with paper money. It will be said later<sup>24</sup> that Calhoun seems to have had a predilection for Treasury Notes in these early years, and Ingersoll

<sup>23</sup> Speech of October 3, 1837, in “Works,” Vol. III, pp. 102, 125-128.

<sup>24</sup> See p. 195, *post*.



adds that there was at this time an outburst among us of advocacy of paper money. The apostles of that frequently recurring creed denied then, as often since, the value of bullion and taught the essential superiority of promises to pay. "While the bank was undergoing its many trials in Congress," writes Ingersoll, "even Mr. Calhoun was pleased with that novelty. The *National Intelligencer* was filled with its metaphysics."

Calhoun said in his later account that he accompanied his amendment with a short speech of fifteen or twenty minutes. The speech was, in accordance with his custom when opposed to his party, never published, but the "Annals" give an outline of it. They tell us that Calhoun

. . . In a very ingenious and elaborate speech, laid before the House his views on this subject, and the reasons why he should propose a total change in the features of the bill. . . . The capital of the bank remaining unchanged at 50 millions, the payments of subscriptions to this capital stock to be made in the proportion of  $\frac{1}{10}$ th in specie (which he afterwards varied to  $\frac{6}{50}$ ths) and the remainder in specie or in Treasury notes to be hereafter issued: subscriptions to be opened monthly in the last three days of each month beginning with January next, for certain proportions of the stock until the whole is subscribed — payment to be made at the time of subscribing; the shares to consist of one hundred instead of five hundred dollars each. The United States to hold no stock in bank, nor any agency in its disposal, nor control over its operations, nor rights to suspend specie payments. The amount of Treasury notes to be subscribed, viz. 45 millions, to be provided for by future Acts of Congress and to be disposed of in something like the following way, viz.: 15 millions of the amount to be placed in the hands of the agents appointed for the purpose, or in the hands of the present Commissioners of the Sinking Fund to go into the stock market, to convert the Treasury notes into stock; another sum, say five millions, to be applied to the redemption of the Treasury notes becoming due at the commencement of the ensuing year; the remaining 20 millions he proposed to throw into circulation as widely as possible. They might be used in such proportions monthly as to be absorbed in the subscriptions to the bank at the end of each month, etc. This operation, he presumed, would raise the value of Treasury notes

perhaps twenty or thirty per cent. above par, being the value of the privilege of taking the bank stock, and thus afford at the same time a bonus and an indirect loan to the Government, making unnecessary any loan by the bank until its extended circulation of paper shall enable it to make a loan which shall be advantageous to the United States. The Treasury notes so to be issued to be redeemable in stock at six per cent., disposable by the bank at its pleasure, and without the sanction of the Government; to whom neither is the bank to be compelled to loan any money. This, it is believed, is, in a few words, a fair statement of the project of Mr. Calhoun, which he supported by a variety of explanations of its operations, etc.: the notes of the bank, when in operation, to be received exclusively in the payment of all taxes, duties, and debts to the United States. The operation of this combined plan, Mr. Calhoun conceived, would be to afford 1. Relief from the immediate pressure on the Treasury; 2. A permanent elevation of the public credit; and 3. A permanent and safe circulating medium of general credit. The bank should go into operation, he proposed, in April next. . . . This motion opened a wide and interesting scene of debate.

Calhoun writes in his "Autobiography,"—and the same view is pretty clearly expressed in an anonymous pamphlet<sup>25</sup> of a few years later,—that he thought the administration bill had been drawn entirely in the interests of the financial classes, while his proposal was designed to guard those of the people. The pamphleteer says upon this point that Dallas's plan "would have resulted in giving to those from whom the government had already borrowed on very disadvantageous terms, the additional premium of the bank dividend. . . . Calhoun's scheme left the previous creditors of the government precisely where their contract had placed them; and held out to future lenders those privileges which the other scheme proposed giving to persons from whom there was nothing to expect, at least as the immediate result of the scheme."

The unknown author of this same pamphlet thinks also that Calhoun feared that grave results might flow from the vary-

<sup>25</sup> "Measures not Men," &c., *ut supra*, pp. 15, 16.

ing degrees of depreciation in different portions of the country, for all the import trade would inevitably gravitate towards that part where the depreciation was at its worst, and hence each section would vie with every other to attain this evil pre-eminence. "It requires no great sagacity," so he goes on, "to foresee that such a state of things would produce collusions extremely dangerous to the union. So deeply was Mr. Calhoun impressed with these views of the subject that he labored day and night, in the House, and out of it, during the progress of the bank bill, to communicate his impressions to the members of Congress. His views were so exclusively national and so obviously disinterested that he finally triumphed over the private interest and political opinion with which he had to contend." <sup>26</sup>

The debate on Calhoun's substitute need not be followed here, nor does it need to be said that his substitute was highly disapproved by the Secretary of the Treasury and the leaders in general. One prominent member,<sup>27</sup> who was very close to Dallas, said that while in his opinion Calhoun's "views were exhibited in a clear, connected, and well-digested discourse on this abstruse and complicated subject in which he unquestionably showed at least his own preparation and capacity for explaining and supporting any favorite project he may choose to introduce . . . I declare my unequivocal opinion that his appears to be the most fantastic, impracticable, and, I will add, pernicious of all the plans we could adopt, calculated inevitably to destroy the public credit of this Government — to damn it to all eternity."

Notwithstanding this opinion, which may well have reflected the views of the administration, Calhoun's substitute was the next day passed, with the aid of the Federalists, by a majority "of about 60 votes." A man who could so quickly bring about such a result and completely overthrow the plans of the administration, had certainly to be reckoned with. He continued very active during the balance of the debate upon

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>27</sup> Charles J. Ingersoll of Pennsylvania: "Annals of Congress," Thirteenth Congress, 1814-15, Third Session, Vol. III, p. 605.

the subject and said on one occasion that "he was extremely anxious that the bank should be established,"<sup>28</sup> but this expression is evidently to be interpreted as meaning only under the then existing circumstances and not in the abstract. Speaking some years later in the Senate of his course upon the subject in 1816, he said that he "was opposed to the system at the time and so expressed himself in his opening speech on the question. In supporting the Bank, then, he yielded to what he believed to be the necessity of the case, growing out of the connection between the Government and the banks."<sup>29</sup>

But Calhoun's scheme soon met with troubles, and his triumph was of short duration. He said<sup>30</sup> in later years that "the opposition, the adherents of the administration, and those who had constitutional scruples" combined against it. Ingham, Forsyth, and Fisk attacked the plan vigorously, and even his close friend Lowndes made an effort to reduce the capital from fifty to thirty-five millions. So numerous and extensive were the amendments, many of them carried by decisive majorities, that the "Annals" record that, when the bill was at length reported from the committee of the whole to the House, "it was so interleaved and interlined with amendments . . . that the clerk himself could hardly arrange them or the Speaker state them to the House [and] it was ordered to lie on the table, and be printed as amended."

The House was indeed at a deadlock, and on November 25, Lowndes had the bill referred to another select committee, in the hope that they might reconcile conflicting views and interests. Lowndes, Fisk, Calhoun, Ingham, Forsyth, Oakley, and Gaston were the committee, and the chairman was directed by them to write to Dallas for his opinion. Dallas, who was born in Jamaica, was, according to Ingersoll, a man of "tropical excitability." At least once during his bank troubles he threatened to resign, and he would shed tears at

<sup>28</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, p. 643.

<sup>29</sup> Speech on his Slavery Resolutions of 1838: "Works," Vol. III, p. 172; see also "Autobiography," p. 22.

<sup>30</sup> Speech of October 3, 1837, in Senate; "Works," III, pp. 102 *et seq.*, 127.



the trials he was subjected to, but there was no uncertain sound in his reply to this inquiry.

He opposed most strongly Calhoun's Treasury note plan, which would, he said, give a gratuitous advantage to new creditors over the old ones and would thus excite dissatisfaction among the latter, as well as among capitalists in general, and have an injurious effect on our credit and upon the prospects of a loan for 1815. The present owners, he went on, can only become subscribers to such a bank by selling their holdings at a loss in order to procure the needed Treasury notes, "and a general depression in the value of the public debt will inevitably ensue." The experiment, too, of issuing so large an amount (\$44,000,000) of Treasury notes was in his opinion of very uncertain success, and he even thought it would be impossible to get them into circulation, with or without depreciation. Professor Catterall is of opinion that Dallas's answer "annihilated Calhoun's position."

Efforts were made to bring Calhoun and Dallas together, but they were all unavailing, and in a short time Lowndes reported the bill back to the House from his committee, because of their inability to agree. Lowndes's motion to reduce the capital to \$30,000,000 was then carried, with the aid of the Federalists and against Calhoun's zealous opposition, and shortly afterwards the whole scheme was defeated on third reading by 104 Nays to 49 Ayes. It was at this time in large part based on Calhoun's plan, so that the House had finally turned its back on his amendment, which had but a couple of weeks before swept everything before it. His triumph had been short, indeed.

The Senate next took the matter up and soon passed a bill based on Dallas's plan. When this measure reached the House, it was for some time hotly discussed. Ingersoll writes that December 28, 1814, was "the stormiest bank day of the session"; but finally, on January 2, 1815, after Webster had made a speech upon the whole general subject,—which was, according to Ingersoll, "quite superior to anything said on either side during the session,"—the final vote was taken and



turned out to be 81 for and 80 against. Lowndes voted Aye and Calhoun No, but the bank men were once more doomed to disappointment, for Speaker Cheves, owing to his strong convictions against paper money, announced,—so the “Annals” record,—“with even more than his usual eloquence and impressiveness” his opinion that the measure was a dangerous and desperate experiment and that he should therefore exercise his right and vote against it. This reduced the vote to a tie, so once more the bank was lost.

At this point the strain seems to have been for a moment too great for Calhoun. Webster told a friend years later that upon the final loss of this bill, Calhoun, though opposed to the particular measure, was so much overcome at the predicament in which the government was left, with the finances in hopeless confusion and no means of carrying on the war, that he “walked across the floor of the House to the spot where Mr. Webster stood, and holding out both his hands to Mr. Webster, and telling him that he should rely on his assistance in preparing a new bill, burst into tears, as Mr. Webster assured him the assistance should not be withheld.”<sup>31</sup>

The persistence of members was, however, not yet exhausted. After the bank was thus lost by a tie vote, reconsideration was moved and carried and the whole plan then once again referred to a fresh special committee, and they in turn reported a bill which was to a considerable extent based on Calhoun's plan, though with several modifications. The stock was to be \$30,000,000, composed of \$5,000,000 of specie, \$10,000,000 of war stock and \$15,000,000 of treasury notes. The Dallas provisions for a compulsory loan and giving power to the President to suspend specie payments were not included. The bill passed the House shortly by a large majority, and then, after a vain struggle to amend, the Senate yielded and accepted the House bill as it stood, but still again the result was failure, for the President vetoed on the grounds that too much specie and too few notes were called for as the foundation of the bank and that it was made too independent of the Government.

<sup>31</sup> Curtis's “Webster,” Vol. I, p. 143. Webster told this story to George Ticknor, who made a record of it and later communicated it to Curtis.

One vital point of difference between opposing interests in Congress all through the long struggle had been as to the character of the stocks which should compose the capital, and Ingersoll writes that it was to this difference that the whole scheme fell a victim. The great point was whether any United States stock might serve this purpose, or whether the advantage should be confined to war loans. Dallas's plan provided for the latter, and the Federalists, wanting the profit of the bank to enure to their benefit as well as to that of the supporters of the war, were strongly opposed to this feature. Calhoun's plan of basing the institution on treasury notes to be issued, is said to have largely avoided<sup>32</sup> this point of difference, but many were the compromises offered in this "battle of the stocks."

The session was nearing its end and nothing had been accomplished, so a caucus was called which Calhoun and his friends were specially invited to attend. A compromise was then proposed based in part on his plan and in part on that of Dallas. Calhoun found this much nearer his idea, but still objectionable in some particulars, and he demanded further concessions. These were, however, refused, and he was told the bill could be passed without the aid of himself and his friends, upon which, he says, "I took up my hat and bade good night." The proposed bill was then easily passed in the Senate and sent to the House. On second reading, Calhoun says that he reminded members that they were about to vote for a measure, against their frequently expressed conviction, spurred on by a supposed necessity which had been created by those expecting to profit from it. They all knew, he told them, that the bill would not receive fifteen votes, if peace should arrive before its passage.

This suggestion must, for reasons which will immediately be apparent, have been made by him on Monday, February 13th, on which date the "Annals" merely record that he delivered "a pithy speech of moderate length." At the time,

<sup>32</sup> Catterall's "Second Bank," p. 12. I am unable to understand this, and it seems to me that Calhoun's plan was equally intended for the benefit of the holders of war issues. In his speech he expressed the opinion that it would largely raise the market value of Treasury notes,—which were entirely issued during the war.

he says, he had not the slightest anticipation of peace. The war had indeed never shown a more grim visage and England was making extensive preparations for the coming campaign. But that very evening Sturges, a member from Connecticut, told Calhoun in confidence that a treaty of peace had arrived in New York. He had heard of it by express from his brother, a merchant in that city, who wanted the news sent on at once to his connected houses in the South, so that they might buy the great staples at the then prevailing war prices. Calhoun kept the secret, but it was too big to be hidden under a bushel, and the very next day (14th) was generally known, and on the 15th officially announced.<sup>33</sup>

Calhoun said in his speech of 1837 that when peace was generally rumored the House declined to act until positive information should be received, and then on his motion the bill was laid on the table, "and I had the gratification of receiving the thanks of many for defeating the bill, who, a short time before, were almost ready to cut my throat for my persevering opposition to the measure. An offer was then made to me to come to my terms, which I refused, declaring that I would rise in my demand, and would agree to no bill which should not be formed expressly with the view to the speedy restoration of specie payments. It was afterwards postponed, on the conviction that it could not be so modified as to make it acceptable to a majority."

These details are all no doubt strictly accurate, though they do not appear either in Ingersoll or in the very incomplete "Annals." According to these latter authorities, a few days following the news of peace were passed in rejoicing, before the bank bill was again taken up in the House. On the 17th, there was desultory debate and some members wanted to press the bill on, but it was of course apparent that peace had put an entirely new face upon the matter, and before very long Lowndes suggested this fact and moved indefinite postpone-

<sup>33</sup> Parton's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 249-55, being the account given many years later by the editor of the "National Intelligencer." Ingersoll ("Second War," Vol. II, 1814, p. 311, but see p. 261) writes that the official treaty was delivered to Madison in Washington "on Tuesday evening the 13th." But Tuesday was in reality the 14th. See also Schouler's "History," Vol. II, p. 430.

ment. It may be fairly surmised that he took this step, after Calhoun had been sounded and had insisted on provisions which it was perfectly apparent could not pass. Lowndes's motion was carried by the close vote of 74 to 73, Calhoun voting Nay, and thus the eighth<sup>34</sup> consecutive effort to establish a national bank had failed, and the administration was compelled still to get on as best it could without the assistance of an agency which was in their opinion indispensable. The war was over, but the whole financial system left in awful confusion. Out of these circumstances arose other great policies, to which we must now turn. It will be necessary, moreover, to go backward somewhat in time.

Probably, the most important of the policies referred to was the tariff, and this subject is of great moment in a Life of Calhoun, for reasons which are obvious enough. During the time of the restrictive system and the war, a number of lines of manufacture had sprung up in our country, entirely new and at least many of them dependent for their existence upon the exclusion of competing foreign goods. What was to be done with these? This question came up for discussion before the end of the war, and was first brought into prominence about the time of the final repeal of the restrictive system. The repeal threatened to let foreign goods find their way into the country, and doubtless the manufacturers at once grew anxious upon the bare rumor of such a plan.

It has already been seen<sup>35</sup> that, on April 6, 1814, during the Second Session of the Thirteenth Congress, the House went into committee of the whole upon Calhoun's motion on the bill which he had introduced two days before to repeal in general the restrictive system. It was there shown that this

<sup>34</sup> Ingersoll ("Second War" (1814), Vol. II, p. 261) counts this as the ninth effort, while Prof. Catterall ("Second Bank," pp. 16, 21) calls it the sixth. It seems to me to be the eighth, but naturally persons reckon variously where it is not clear whether a particular motion is different to a sufficient degree to constitute a new plan or not. My account of the bank struggle is based chiefly on Catterall's "Second Bank," pp. 1-21; Ingersoll's "Second War," Vol. II (1814), pp. 249-263; and the Annals of Congress. I am very greatly indebted to Prof. Catterall's account, and have to a considerable extent relied on it. Ingersoll was an eyewitness of and participant in nearly all he relates.

<sup>35</sup> *Ante*, p. 136.



measure had been recommended by the President in a message of March 31. On April 5, 1814, so closely were all these plans bound together, Ingham of Pennsylvania offered in the House a resolution that "the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to report to Congress, at their next session, a general tariff of duties, conformably to the existing situation of the general and local interests of the United States"; and this, after a short discussion, was agreed to without objection.

With these proposals in mind, and in view of all the circumstances then prevailing, Calhoun spoke as follows upon the proposed repeal of the restrictive system:

"He, as a grower of produce, should certainly feel an interest in striking out that section," he said, referring to the third section, which contained provisions still to restrict the freedom of foreign shipping, "as it was the interest of the planter to let commerce run in any channel it might wear for itself. . . . As to the manufacturing interest, it could not be considered as disregarded when there existed a duty of fifty per cent. on the invoice duty [value?] of foreign goods. If this was not encouragement, he knew not what was. The vote of the House yesterday [upon Ingham's motion] required a general tariff to be laid before it [and?] conveyed a pledge that the manufacturing interest should be protected. Double duties would not protect it properly: double duties on coffee and sugar offered no encouragement to the manufacture of broad-cloth. He hoped to see manufacturing encouraged by appropriate duties, and had no idea of their being left without such protection."

Later in the same day, while opposing a motion to strike out the second section, which repealed the non-importation acts, Calhoun said further as follows:

He thought the gentleman was mistaken in supposing that our infant manufacturing institutions would be embarrassed by this measure. What was the encouragement they now received from the Government? The *ad valorem* duties now averaged about  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. Most of the importation being in neutral bottoms, the discriminating duty of 10 per cent. on such importations in foreign vessels would make it 43 per cent. and when were added



to this the freight and other expenses incident to a state of war, the actual duty on foreign and premium to domestic manufactures could not be less than 50 per cent. Was it wise to extend to our manufacturers further encouragement than this? During a state of war too great a stimulus was naturally given to manufactures — a stimulus so great that it could not be expected to be continued in a time of peace; and when peace comes, come when peace will, the vicissitude which manufacturers must experience will be much greater and injurious to them, if besides the double duties the restrictive system were retained, than it ought to or would otherwise be. The great requisite to the due encouragement of manufacturers now was, that certain manufactures in cotton and woolens, which have kindly taken root in our soil, should have a moderate but permanent protection insured to them. He knew not how that object could be better effected than by the scheme of establishing a new tariff of duties, which this House had shown a determination to adopt. To continue the present non-importation system merely to protect manufactures, when they received already so much protection, would be dangerous instead of beneficial to them.<sup>36</sup>

Such were the opinions upon this subject expressed by Calhoun during the latter part of the war. The legislative result was that the restrictive system was swept away and the new manufacturing establishments in the country left to the rates of protection indicated in Calhoun's speech above, including that incident to the regulation of foreign vessels trading from our ports. A hope was held out, too, of a general tariff bill from the next Congress.

The treaty of peace with Great Britain, concluded December 24, 1814, became generally, as well as officially, known in Washington on Tuesday, February 14, 1815, and had been generally rumored the day before.<sup>37</sup> It was beyond doubt even a greater relief to the public men in charge of government than to the citizens at large. That it had come to us after many a disaster, as well as some few great triumphs, may be freely admitted. None the less, the triumphs were of a character deeply to inspire the young nation, which had

<sup>36</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, 1813-14, Second Session, Vol. II, pp. 1983, 1984, 1989, 1990.

<sup>37</sup> See *ante*, pp. 167, 168.

with such splendid audacity thrown down the gauntlet of challenge to the giant power of England. Nor was it the only boon of about that same date. Barely ten days earlier, knowledge of Jackson's overwhelming victory at New Orleans had first come through snow and ice and varying rumors of disaster to the ears of our people breathless with suspense, and every American had felt his heart thrill with that pride which led Clay, far away in Paris, to break out: "Now I can go to England without mortification."

It was indeed an intoxicating moment, and many a flight of per-fervid eloquence was indulged in among us, but the only slight ebullition of the kind on Calhoun's part which I have found is contained in his words: <sup>38</sup> "I feel pleasure and pride in being able to say that I am of a party which drew the sword on this question, and succeeded in the contest; for, to all practical purposes, we have achieved complete success."

The war left its deep impress on him as on so many of his countrymen and was a potent factor in ending our minority and welding us into one nation. Its influence in this direction was beyond doubt the main cause which led him to urge in 1816 our complete freedom from the leading-strings of the former mother-country. "Much anxiety," he said, "has recently been evinced to be independent of English broad-cloths and muslins. He hoped it indicated the approach of a period when we should also throw off the thralldom of thought." <sup>39</sup>

The Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress adjourned *sine die* on March 4, 1815, and Calhoun then went South to be with his family for a time and look after home interests. He reached Bath on March 20th, and within three weeks had the misfortune to lose the only daughter he then had, Floride by name, a child of over a year. She was "in the bloom of health" one morning and was dead the next day. The appalling suddenness of the loss was a fearful blow to him, as well as to the bereaved mother, and his efforts to console the latter were quite without success. As indicating the tendency of his mind at this time to find the hand of the Deity person-

<sup>38</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, p. 1246.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, p. 532.

ally directing his affairs and his apparent reliance upon the stock consolations of the pastorate, the following from his letter <sup>40</sup> to his mother-in-law should be reproduced :

So fixed in sorrow is her distressed mother that every topick of consolation, which I attempt to offer but seems to grieve her the more. It is in vain I tell her it is the lot of humanity ; that almost all parents have suffered equal calamity ; that Providence may have intended it in kindness to her and ourselves, as no one can say what, had she lived, would have been her condition, whether it would have been happy or miserable ; and above all we have the consolation to know that she is far more happy than she could be here with us.

Many have perhaps found consolation in such a trite philosophy of human affairs, but surely to a mother's heart rent in twain the words might well seem merely vapid and cruel.

<sup>40</sup> " Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 128, 129.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

Circumstances of the Day — The Tariff of 1816 — Second Bank Established — The Salary Bill — Internal Improvements — Calhoun's Early Views.

THE First Session of the Fourteenth Congress was to meet at the usual time in December of 1815, and Calhoun arrived in Washington on the 28th of November, having "performed the journey in a shorter time than what I expected by several days," as he wrote his wife on the 29th. At Raleigh he had met John Taylor of South Carolina and made the journey with him the rest of the way. He adds that "the last 53 miles is performed by a steamboat; nothing can be superior to that mode of conveyance whether we regard the safety, ease or expedition of traveling. You are moved on rapidly without being sensible of it. I hope by another session there will be one from Charleston to the place."

The House convened on December 4th and upon that day Calhoun took his seat. On the 6th, in accordance with custom, various parts of the message were referred to special committees, and Calhoun was named Chairman of that on Uniform National Currency. This was of course, as the "Autobiography" says, owing to his prominence on the bank question in the prior Congress; and it may be surmised that the power he had shown at that time compelled his selection. He was also third on a Committee in regard to a National Seminary of Learning in the District of Columbia, but I have not found that he took any part in the work of this committee. Wilde of Georgia was its chairman.

As the tariff was under discussion but a few pages back, it will be best to take that subject up first and thus place close together all the material bearing upon the course of Calhoun

on one leading branch of our policy during the early years of his public life. He has always been charged, since his death as well as before, with grave inconsistency upon this subject as well as others at different periods of his career, and the whole question had best be gone into here. The record shows beyond peradventure that at this time he advocated protection to manufactures in repeated speeches and votes. But it would be very unjust to let the matter stand upon these actions alone, without regard to the circumstances surrounding him, and which made the question look so different from what it does now or even did a decade and a half after the speeches were made. Let us try to realize what those circumstances were.

Calhoun began public life with the inception of a war, which he had aided to bring about, and no man exists who would not unconsciously have his principles of government warped by the necessities of his country's circumstances at such a moment. It was inevitable that the sphere of federal functions, as defined by the Constitution, should grow in his eyes. Again, when the war was over, the financial system was chaos, the government hardly able to pay its daily debts, and citizens, who had risked their fortunes in manufacturing plants during the absolute closure of our ports by war, were faced with bankruptcy, unless the government should aid them by keeping our ports still to some extent closed against the competition of long-established foreign goods. Surely the inducements to establish the system of protection, a national bank, and other measures apparently necessary to save the country from ruin were strong enough to induce even the most sturdy believer in State Rights to yield a good deal,—and I know of no evidence that Calhoun had at this time paid much attention to the teachings of that school.

In our early days, moreover, the very existence of the new nation, known as the United States, was problematical. Causes within ourselves might well have cut short our career, and foreign powers looked upon us with a distrust quite capable of leading to some more or less successful effort to stunt our growth, if not to destroy us. The War of 1812,—the Second War of Independence, as Calhoun and other war-



hawks often called it,—showed that we were not to be despised, when aroused, but showed also to those behind the scenes the awful inefficiency of our administrative system. The inherent capabilities of the people alone enabled us then to accomplish anything. The few splendid triumphs we won were due but little to government,—almost entirely to the bravery and fiery energy of some independent command, too far away to be hampered by the timid counsels and halting methods prevailing at Washington.

When that war came to an end, too, and when shortly afterward Napoleon was finally overthrown, the crowned heads of Europe soon formed the Holy Alliance, with the view of united action to prevent the spread of those popular principles which had been so prominent a feature in our career, as well as in the French Revolution and in Bonaparte's earlier public actions. One of the powers concerned hoped to turn this device into a means of preventing the successful revolt of her wide-spread American possessions, and here was a means by which we might easily have become involved in some contest with the united powers of Europe. These powers may be said to have been the civilized world, for even England, while declining formally to join the Alliance, did not at first offer any real resistance to its policy. Here was a terrible menace to us, and no wonder that some of our public men were deeply impressed by these dangers and wanted to prepare to meet them by developing our strength.

Add to this the tangible and so vital fact already mentioned,—that after our war manufacturing establishments in some numbers existed in parts of the country, and what was the public man to do, who was impressed with the dangers from without and had supported the very measures,—the restrictive system, the war, the higher duties of that time,—which had led to the growth of those manufactures so useful to us during the war? This was the question presented to Calhoun's mind at the period of his career we have reached. How could the views of a man with such a history, and who was himself deeply impressed with the dangers to our country from with-

out,<sup>1</sup> fail to be profoundly influenced by all these circumstances in which he had lived?

It ought, then, to surprise no one, and is at least plain beyond peradventure, that in his early years Calhoun was in favor of a rather splendid government and of liberal expenditures in every direction that he thought likely to increase our strength and to knit our several peoples,— for such they were,— into one strong and solidly united nation. The tariff, the bank, internal improvements, a navy of considerable strength, an army such as could be rapidly turned into a formidable engine, — all had his decided support.

These measures were, moreover, all dovetailed together and went to form one harmonious whole. The debt could not be gradually paid, nor could the powerful government be maintained without liberal expenditures, and hence taxation in some form was vitally necessary. The tariff was intended on all hands, then as now, to be a chief source of our income, and the discussions of it by Calhoun are all largely colored by this view. The doctrine of protection in the modern sense had not then taken its place in the public affairs of the country, and no one even proposed a law, whose only or main purpose was “to foster our infant industries.” At the same time, there can, in my opinion, be no doubt whatsoever that at this date Calhoun was largely influenced in all he did or said upon the subject by the desire so to arrange the laws as to exclude from our markets foreign goods likely to compete with the domestic manufactures which had grown up during the war, and thus to *protect* the home-made article and the manufacturer.

Nor does the record of his speeches admit of the view that he was guided exclusively by the purpose of securing the largest income, without regard to saving the manufacturers from foreign competition. As far as I can judge him, his motives in fixing the rates were two: one,— possibly the main one,— to secure income, the other to protect our new manu-

<sup>1</sup> The “Autobiography,” p. 20, tells us that this was the case, and Calhoun’s speeches show the same thing. See, also, his “Correspondence,” pp. 218, 219.

factures. And this second motive seems to me to have been as much a substantive one with him as the first. It certainly cannot be hidden away under the cloak of "incidental" protection, and indeed in 1833 he admitted<sup>2</sup> that the protective principle was recognized by the Act of 1816.

We may fairly assume that his views had been influenced by the growth of protection sentiment in his home state at about this period,<sup>3</sup> and it is plainly evident that the Republican party had to some extent come under the same influence. As early as 1792, there was an effort made in Congress to secure protection for cotton, and even Macon advocated this measure. Again, two years later, both Jefferson and Madison were concerned in proceedings looking generally towards protection, and once more in 1809 some Republicans sought to extend the then existing system. These efforts failed; but they serve well to show the existence of the sentiment.<sup>4</sup> By 1815, too, it had grown to such an extent that Madison wrote in his Message of December 5, at the opening of the First Session of the Fourteenth Congress, "In adjusting the duties on imports to

<sup>2</sup> In his speech on the Force Bill in the Senate on February 15-16, 1833, he said of the Act of 1816: "It introduced, besides, the obnoxious minimum principle, which has since been so mischievously extended; and to that extent, I am constrained in candor to acknowledge, as I wish to disguise nothing, the protective principle was recognized by the act of 1816. How this was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. It escaped my observation, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was then new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject—the question of the currency." "Works," Vol. II, p. 206. It will shortly be shown (*infra*, pp. 183-186), that Calhoun spoke in favor of the minimum, and against Randolph's motion to strike the provision out, during the debates on the Act of 1816. The most undeniable advocacy of protection by him that I have found is contained in his speech of April 6, 1814 (quoted in part *supra*, p. 170), on the repeal of the embargo, when he said ("Works," Vol. II, 103-110), "As to the manufacturing interest, in regard to which some fears have been expressed, the resolution voted by the House yesterday [on Ingham's motion, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare a tariff bill], is a strong pledge that it will not suffer the manufacturers to be unprotected, in case of a repeal of the restrictive system. I hope that at all times and under every policy, they will be protected with due care."

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, pp. 189-191.

<sup>4</sup> Wm. E. Dodd's "Nathaniel Macon," pp. 66, 67 citing Annals of Congress, Second Congress, First Session, p. 560; *Ibid.*, pp. 246, 247, citing Annals of Congress, Eleventh Congress, Vol. I, pp. 182-186; Taussig's "Tariff History" (1888), p. 14, citing Jefferson's Report on Commerce, "Works," Vol. VII, p. 637, and Madison's Resolutions, Annals of Congress, 1794, pp. 155, 209.

the object of revenue, the influence of the tariff on manufactures will necessarily present itself for consideration. . . . Under circumstances giving a powerful impulse to manufacturing industry, it has made among us a progress, and exhibited an efficiency, which justify the belief that, with a protection not more than is due to the enterprising citizens, whose interests are now at stake, it will become, at an early day, not only safe against occasional competitions from abroad, but a source of domestic wealth, and even of external commerce."

It may almost be said that every one of the speeches of Calhoun at this early period shows his desire to increase the strength of the United States Government and to render us in a high degree capable of taking care of ourselves. The best way to enable the reader to form an independent judgment upon this point will be to extract to a considerable extent from the speeches in question. In so doing, it will be necessary to introduce several subjects other than the one of the tariff now mainly in view, for in this one particular they are all similar.

Thus, early in January, 1816, upon a bill to establish three additional Military Academies, he said <sup>5</sup> that the object of the bill was "to contribute to the national security, by the diffusion of military knowledge," and that the only question was as to the best mode to produce a national spirit. He hoped "it would not be long before we should have one [Military Academy] in every considerable state of the Union. Mr. Calhoun compared the feelings of this House now and previous to the war. Now, he said, we see everywhere a nationality of feeling; we hear sentiments from every part of the House in favor of Union, and against a sectional spirit. What had produced this change? The glory acquired by the late war, and the prosperity which had followed it. . . . He believed the provisions of this bill were more important than any yet on the table of the House, and as important as any that would come before the House at the present session."

During the same First Session of the Fourteenth Congress,

<sup>5</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 430, 431.



another South Carolinian, Lowndes, was chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, to which fell in the main questions of the tariff and revenue generally. On January 9, 1816, he reported a bill to make certain reductions in the revenue, and in the debate members were urgent to cut off still further sources of income. This was very far from Calhoun's wishes, and his speech upon the subject will serve to show how deeply his mind was then impressed with the absolute necessity of large governmental expenditures. "If gentlemen," he said,<sup>6</sup> "were of opinion that our navy ought not to be improved; that internal improvements should not be prosecuted; if these were their sentiments, they were right in desiring to abolish all taxes. If they thought otherwise, it was absurd, it was preposterous to say, that we should not lay taxes on the people. Mr. Calhoun said gentlemen ought not to give into the contracted idea that taxes were so much money taken from the people; properly applied, the money proceeding from taxes was money put out to the best possible interest for the people. He wished, he said, to see the nation free from external dangers and internal difficulty. . . . The broad question was now before the House, whether this Government should act on an enlarged policy; whether it would avail itself of the experience of the last war; whether it would be benefitted by the mass of knowledge acquired within the few last years; or whether we should go on in the old imbecile mode, contributing by our measures nothing to the honor, nothing to the reputation of the country."

Again, a few days later, he spoke upon the same general subject as follows:<sup>7</sup> "I am sure that future wars with England are not only possible, but I will say more, that they are highly probable — nay, that they will certainly take place. Future wars, I fear, with the honorable Speaker, future wars, long and bloody, will exist between this country and Great Britain — I lament it — but I will not close my eyes on events — I will speak what I believe to be true."

He then went on to express his reliance upon the Navy and

<sup>6</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 728, 729.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 829-40.



wanted largely to put our strength into it. He would also arm the militia, extend their term of service and in general increase their efficiency. He knew the danger of large standing armies, and looked upon the militia as the true force, "but they are not," he added, "a safe defence without making their efficiency greater."

"Your defence," he went on, "ought to depend on the land, on a regular draught from the body of the people." . . . Mr. Calhoun then proceeded to a point of less but yet of great importance,—he meant the establishment of roads and opening of canals in various parts of the country. . . . "Your population is widely dispersed. . . . We ought to contribute as much as possible to the formation of good military roads, not only on the score of general political economy, but to enable us on emergencies to collect the whole mass of our military means on the point menaced." . . .

Mr. Calhoun proceeded to another topic, the encouragement proper to be afforded to the industry of the country. In regard to the question how far manufacturers ought to be fostered, Mr. Calhoun said it was the duty of this country, as a means of defence, to encourage the domestic industry of the country; more especially that part of it which provides the necessary materials for clothing and defence. . . . "I lay the claims of the manufacturers entirely out of view," said Mr. Calhoun, "but on general principles, without regard to their interest, a certain encouragement should be extended, at least, to our woolen and cotton manufactures."

"This nation," such was his peroration, "is in a situation similar to that which one of the most beautiful writers of antiquity paints Hercules in his youth. He represents the hero as retiring into the wilderness to deliberate on the course of life which he ought to pursue. Two Goddesses approach him: one recommended to him a life of ease and pleasure: the other of labor and virtue. The hero adopted the counsel of the latter, and his fame and glory are known to the world. May this nation, the youthful Hercules, possessing his form and muscles, be inspired with similar sentiments and follow his example."

Even more remarkable were some other views in regard to

the general nature of our government which he held at about this date and for a number of years. Thus, in 1813, he wrote: <sup>8</sup>

The Supreme Court of the Union performs the highest functions under our system. It is the mediator between sovereigns, the State and General Governments, and the actual line, which separates their authority, must be drawn by this high tribunal.

Again, we are told,<sup>9</sup> that in 1824-25, at an evening party, to which he had asked J. A. Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton's son, Calhoun expressed admiration for his guest's father and then went on:

"Sir, I have a clear conviction after much reflection and an entire knowledge and familiarity with the history of our country and the working of our Government, that his policy as developed by the measures of Washington's administration, is the only true policy for the country."

Small wonder that later, when his opinions had so greatly changed, his early views were quoted at times against him.<sup>10</sup>

Some of the speeches, which have been quoted, show well how remarkably free the young Calhoun was from that special devotion to the interests of his own section which often guided his actions in later life. A very broad nationalism was then, — as well as for a number of years afterwards, — most conspicuous in his character, and the special interests of his quarter of the Union carried but little weight. This will appear more than once hereafter and seems to have been recognized <sup>11</sup> at the time; but one instance is so striking that it ought to be specially mentioned.

In December, 1814, a measure was pending in the House to draft some 80,000 militia, and Macon had offered an amendment to change the apportionment of the draft among the

<sup>8</sup> Letter of June 11, 1823, to Virgil Maxcy contained in the Maxcy-Markoe Collection in Library of Congress.

<sup>9</sup> J. A. Hamilton's "Reminiscences," p. 62. Hamilton thought that Calhoun, then a candidate for the Presidency, expected him to communicate these views to his Federal friends.

<sup>10</sup> See *e. g.* "The Charleston Courier" of 1829-30, *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> See speech of Grosvenor quoted *post*, p. 219.

States, so as to base it on "the military strength" (*i.e.* the free white population), instead of on the basis of federal representation, as the bill provided. Under the latter provision, the South's quota would have been very much larger of course, for three-fifths of the negroes would have been counted in ascertaining it. Calhoun not only voted against Macon's amendment (which was defeated) but spoke against it on the floor and said "he should vote for this provision of the bill as it now stands, upon the ground of liberality and generosity; that, as the Southern States had a considerable agency in the declaration of war and bringing about the present state of things, he is willing to take hold of the laboring oar."<sup>12</sup>

Such were some of Calhoun's views upon questions of national power and functions in his early years. The same general opinions came out, too, during the debates upon the tariff and particularly upon the bills of 1816, to which we must now more directly turn our attention. While this measure was under discussion, Huger of South Carolina moved to reduce the duties on sugar, but Lowndes from the same State was against the motion and "argued that the manufacture of sugar demanded encouragement as strongly as any other." Calhoun, too, opposed the motion and "dwelt<sup>13</sup> on the great importance of the article, and the expediency of encouraging its production in our own country, by which our supplies would be so much more certain; and he enforced particularly the necessity of encouraging all those articles at home, for which we now depended on the W. Indies, to which our trade was so precarious that a proclamation from the Governor of an island might any moment cut it off."

But his chief speech upon the tariff bill was made in opposition to a motion of John Randolph to strike out so much of the proviso to the second section as fixed the minimum price of cotton goods (except nankeens direct from China) at 25

<sup>12</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, pp. 881, 882. Calhoun's speech is not given in the Annals, but is quoted as above by Kennedy of North Carolina, who was very far from sympathizing with Calhoun's view of the matter.

<sup>13</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, p. 1262.

cents per square yard. In opposition to this motion, he spoke as follows on April 4, 1816:<sup>14</sup>

The debate heretofore on this subject has been on the degree of protection which ought to be afforded to our cotton and woollen manufactures; all professing to be friendly to those infant establishments, and to be willing to extend to them adequate encouragement. The present motion assumes a new aspect. It is introduced professedly on the ground that manufactures ought not to receive any encouragement, and will, in its operation, leave our cotton establishments exposed to the competition of the cotton goods of the E. Indies, which, it is acknowledged on all sides, they are not capable of meeting with success, without the proviso proposed to be stricken out by the motion now under discussion. Until the debate assumed this new form, he had determined to be silent; participating, as he largely did, in that general anxiety which is felt, after so long and laborious a session, to return to the bosom of our families. . . . He was no manufacturer; he was not from that portion of our country supposed to be peculiarly interested. Coming, as he did, from the South, having, in common with his immediate constituents, no interest but in the cultivation of the soil, in selling its products high, and buying cheap the wants and conveniences of life, no motive could be attributed to him but such as were disinterested.

He had asserted that the subject before them was connected with the security of the country. [After arguing that the proper development of agriculture, commerce and manufactures was necessary to the production of wealth and referring to the manner in which our currency and finance had broken down in the war.] . . . But what, he asked, is more necessary to the defence of a country than its currency and finance? Circumstanced as our country is, can these stand the shock of war? Behold the effect of the late war on them! When our manufactures are grown to a certain perfection, as they soon will under the fostering care of Government, we will no longer experience these

<sup>14</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1329-36. Calhoun said in his speech on the Force Bill on February 15 and 16, 1833, that this tariff speech was entirely *impromptu* and had been made upon the request of Ingham, who thought the House was falling into confusion. Calhoun had replied: "I was at a loss what to say, that I had been busily engaged on the currency . . . which . . . had been placed particularly under my charge," but upon Ingham's repeating his request had made the speech. "Works," II, pp. 208, 209: see also "Correspondence," p. 305.



evils. To give perfection to this state of things, it will be necessary to add, as soon as possible, a system of internal improvements, and at least such an extension of our navy as will prevent the cutting off of our coasting trade. To this distressing state of things, there were two remedies and only two: . . . he meant the Navy and domestic manufactures. By the former, we could open the way to our markets; by the latter, we bring them from beyond the ocean and naturalize them. . . . Besides, we have already surmounted the greatest difficulty that has ever been found in undertakings of this kind. The cotton and woollen manufactures are not to be introduced—they are already introduced to a great extent; freeing us entirely from the hazards and, in a great measure, the sacrifices experienced in giving the capital of the country a new direction. The restrictive measures and the war, though not intended for the purpose, have, by the necessary operation of things, turned a large amount of capital to this new branch of industry. He had often heard it said, both in and out of Congress, that this effect alone would indemnify the country for all of its losses. So high was this tone of feeling, when the want of these establishments were [*sic*] practically felt, that he remembered during the war, when some question was agitated respecting the introduction of foreign goods, that many then opposed it on the ground of injuring our manufactures. He then said that war alone furnished sufficient stimulus, and perhaps too much, as it would make their growth unnaturally rapid; but that on the return of peace, it would then be time to show our affection for them. He at that time did not expect an apathy and aversion to the extent which is now seen. But it will no doubt be said, if they are so far established and if the situation of the country is so favorable to their growth, where is the necessity for protection? It is to put them beyond the reach of contingency. . . . Afford to ingenuity and industry immediate and ample protection, and they will not fail to give a preference to this free and happy country. . . . It has been further asserted that manufactures are the fruitful cause of pauperism, and England has been referred to as furnishing evidence of its truth. For his part, he could perceive no such tendency in them, but the exact contrary, as they furnished new stimulus and means of subsistence to the working classes of the community. [The causes of the troubles referred to in England were the poor laws, those regulating the price of labor,



and the heavy taxes.] . . . It [the system of manufactures] produced an interest strictly American, as much so as agriculture; in which it had the decided advantage of commerce or navigation. The country will from this derive much advantage. Again, it is calculated to bind together more closely our widely-spread Republic. It will greatly increase our mutual dependence and intercourse; and will, as a necessary consequence, excite an increased attention to internal improvement — a subject every way so intimately connected with the ultimate attainment of national strength, and the perfection of our political institutions. He regarded the fact that it would make the parts adhere more closely; that it would form a new and most powerful cement [as] far outweighing any political objections that might be urged against the system. In his opinion, the liberty and the union of the country were inseparably united. That as the destruction of the latter would most certainly involve the former, so its maintenance would with equal certainty preserve it. . . . The basis of our Republic is too broad and its structure too strong to be shaken by them [the causes which have destroyed the liberty of other States]. Its extension and organization will be found to afford effectual security against their operation; but let it be deeply impressed on the heart of this House and country, that while they guarded against the old, they exposed us to a new and terrible danger — disunion. This single word comprehended almost the sum of our political dangers; and against it we ought to be perpetually guarded.

Randolph's motion did not come to a vote, as he subsequently withdrew it.

It is worthy of record, as showing how closely the methods of different times often resemble one another that, when the tariff bill was about to be put on final passage, Calhoun thought it necessary to say that "he wished merely to reply to the insinuation of a mysterious connexion between this bill and that to establish the bank. He denied any improper or unfair understanding, and could challenge the House to support the charge. In fact, Mr. Calhoun said, the most zealous friends of the bank were generally unfriendly to this tariff; and the warmest friends of either could not be found on the

same side.”<sup>15</sup> The bill then passed by a vote of 88 to 54.

Nor should it be left unnoted that the early part<sup>16</sup> of his chief speech on the tariff bill shows that Calhoun already had a fairly clear idea of the interest of the South, so often on his lips at a later date, as an exclusively agricultural region, against the tariff. But the charge often made that he was the author of the Tariff of 1816 is simply absurd. He was not even on the committee that drew it, and, so far as appears, had no hand in its formation except by virtue of his vote and of a few arguments on the floor. At the same time, it is of course likely that, as a leading member, he was to some extent consulted, and we are told<sup>17</sup> that the great manufacturer, Lowell, whose views on the tariff were much more moderate than those of the Rhode Island manufacturers, “finally brought Mr. Lowndes and Mr. Calhoun to support the minimum of 6¼ cents a yard, which was carried.”

In his speeches upon this subject Calhoun used not a few of the terms of the protectionists of a later date, such as “our infant industries” and “fostering care,” while the answering phrases of the free traders by no means failed to issue from Randolph’s caustic tongue, who denounced<sup>18</sup> the measure as one to support “a mushroom interest,” “a scheme of public robbery,” and the “levying an immense tax on one portion of the country to put money into the pockets of another.”

The Tariff of 1816 became a law by the President’s signature on April 27, and was on the whole a most moderate measure. The only rather ultra feature it contained was what is known as the minimum, under which artificial grades were established and low-priced goods in some cases assumed to have cost a much larger figure. Thus, all cotton cloths costing less than 25 cents per yard were to be valued for tariff purposes as if they had cost that sum and were then charged

<sup>15</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, p. 1361.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted shortly *ante*. See also precisely the same idea in his speech of April 6, 1814, quoted at p. 170, *ante*.

<sup>17</sup> Taussig’s “Tariff History,” p. 34, citing Appleton’s “Introduction to the Power Loom,” etc., p. 13.

<sup>18</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1328, 1329.

an *ad valorem* duty of 25 per cent. on that price. They thus actually paid far more than the nominal rate of 25 per cent. But, on the other hand, the law of 1816 entirely abolished the "double duties," which had been maintained during the war. On the whole, and measured by subsequent standards, the rates were certainly in general low, and the occasional higher ones were to be reduced in a few years. So moderate was it indeed in general that a leading author upon the subject of our tariff history writes:

The act of 1816, which is generally said to mark the beginning of a distinctly protective policy in this country, belongs rather to the earlier series of acts, beginning with that of 1789, than to the group of acts of 1824, 1828, and 1832. Its highest permanent rate of duty was 20 per cent.<sup>19</sup>

One other point must be emphasized. The impression seems to have got abroad that the bill was forced upon New England by the South, but this is a complete error. Prof. McMaster writes<sup>20</sup> that "the vote, both Yea and Nay, was well distributed. But the strongest opposition came from New England, and the warmest support from the South," and the conclusion is possibly correct, if the latter sentence has reference exclusively to the debates. In regard to the actual vote by which the measure was passed, however, the fact was altogether different. It received by far the greatest number of votes from the Middle States and the three new ones of Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee, while New England was in its favor by a good majority and the Southern States very largely against it. The vote in the first-mentioned section (including the three new States named) was 55 Ayes and 8 Nays, in New England 17 Ayes to 10 Nays, and in the South 16 Ayes to 36 Nays. It is quite true that Webster opposed the bill, and that Calhoun and Lowndes were its leading advocates during

<sup>19</sup> F. W. Taussig's "Tariff History," pp. 30, 68.

<sup>20</sup> "History," Vol. IV, p. 339. See also Schouler's "United States," Vol. II, p. 450, where much the same general conclusion seems to be reached. Calhoun himself, doubtless remembering in the main his own course upon the bill, vastly overestimated in later years the support given by the South so far as votes were concerned. See his speech on the Force Bill on February 15 and 16, 1833, in "Works," Vol. II, pp. 206, 207, 212.

the debate; but when the vote was taken less than half of the delegation even from South Carolina (Calhoun, Lowndes, Mayrant, Woodward) voted Aye, while three (Huger, Moore and Taylor), voted Nay and two (Chappell and Middleton) did not vote at all.

During Calhoun's earliest years as a public man and even before he was elected to the State Legislature, there had been some home-market and pro-tariff sentiment in South Carolina. Thus, at the legislative session held in June, 1808 (the one preceding his service), the House "considered and agreed to a resolution from the Senate, to appear next session in manufactures of the United States."<sup>21</sup> In the fall of that same year, too, was laid the cornerstone of the South Carolina Homespun Factory Company on the Ashley River, and an address delivered by Wm. Loughton Smith, in which he said, "No reflecting citizen can any longer question the policy of affording every encouragement to Domestick Manufactures. The hostile restrictions, which have from time to time enthralled our *external* trade, must have long ago pointed out the absolute necessity of enlarging the sphere of internal commerce."<sup>22</sup>

Again, at the legislative session of November-December, 1808, in which Calhoun sat as a member, the same Homespun Factory presented a petition "for an union with the State and for incorporation," which was favorably reported on and passed by both Senate and House.<sup>23</sup> At about this same time, too, the Constitutional Court, at the November term, 1808, upon the unanimous request of the bar altered "the rule, which required the members to appear in court with black coats and gowns, so far as to permit any other color to be worn, provided it should be of the growth and manufacture of the United States. The members of the bar then resolved

<sup>21</sup> The Charleston "Courier" of July 6, 1808.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, October 31, 1808.

<sup>23</sup> The Charleston "Courier" for December 7, 13, 17, 21, 1808. The Homespun Company was established in 1808 for manufacturing yarns and cloths and a spacious brick building erected, machinery purchased and machinists and workmen brought from the North and from England, but in three years it failed, making a loss of four-fifths of the capital, De Bow's "Commercial Review," Vol. VIII (Jan., 1850), p. 24.



to appear for the future in full suits of domestic manufacture and recommended dark grey as the color to be worn.<sup>24</sup>

There is of course no proof in these few details of any strong sentiment in favor of a protective tariff in the sense of our history; but they certainly show the existence of a line of thought tending to favor home productions and which may fairly be supposed to have had its part in leading some South Carolinians towards the doctrine of governmental protection. At a later date, too, when the Tariff of 1816 was in process of enactment, though the measure was disapproved by the strongly Federalist *Charleston Courier*, yet the paper's language recognizes clearly the wide-spread sentiment in favor of protection and appears to admit that this feeling existed in South Carolina. The issue of April 5, 1816, reproduces an article from the *Georgetown Gazette* of March 27, in which the following language is used:

This Tariff [the then pending Act of 1816], high and exorbitant as it is, will to all appearance pass, for the watchword of the day, without any *distinction of party*, seems to be protection to Manufactures. This to a certain point may be correct, but there is surely a medium in everything. The immediate effect of these high duties must be peculiarly felt by the Southern States; inasmuch as they are only consumers, whilst the Middle and Eastern States are manufacturers as well as consumers. . . . Nor is this all, for there is but too much reason to fear that it will excite countervailing duties in foreign Nations, *not* upon manufactures, but upon our raw materials, and that we shall have our rice, cotton and other exports so taxed abroad, as to be virtually excluded from what are now their best markets.

Again on April 19, 1816, the *Courier* prints a letter from Washington to its editor, dated April 12, in which the writer expresses his fear "that the mania for granting protection, as it is called, or as [it] might more properly be termed, for giving bounties to Domestic Manufactures, which carried it through this [the House] will likewise carry it in that branch of the legislature."

We have in these extracts not only another early assertion

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, December 3, 1808.



of the peculiar position of the South in regard to the tariff, such as they so often maintained in later days, but a tolerably clear recognition that, though the writers feared the results of protection upon the interests of their section, yet that there was a current in that direction and no little sentiment in favor of protection and of the interests of the home-market. And the home-market meant, too, the American market and not that of South Carolina alone. Without the existence of this sentiment, it is very unlikely, moreover, that two such leading and so popular men as Calhoun and Lowndes would be found to be active supporters of the Tariff of 1816.

The measure passed at this First Session of the Fourteenth Congress, however, which more especially emanated from Calhoun, was that which resulted in the creation of the Second Bank of the United States. This step was certainly not in accord with the inherited beliefs of the Republicans, but was dragged from them by hard necessity. Specie payments were still suspended south of New England, and our whole financial system was near the point of collapse.

The consequent difficulties of administration were most serious. The rate of discount varied materially in different parts of the country, being at its worst near Washington, but the government had been driven by necessity to collect its dues in this depreciated paper and soon fell to accepting the currency of the place of payment. It was thus robbed of its income at the very fountain-head; and a curious result, which further contributed to dry up the sources of revenue, was that the import trade of the country was turned into the waters of Chesapeake Bay, where the depression was at about its worst. The importer there paid tariff charges to the Government in the cheapest money and could then ship his goods where he pleased.

In his Message at the opening of the session Madison, who had undoubtedly been opposed to a national bank, for the first time suggested the creation of one. He was under the compelling influence of a condition before which his theories were abandoned. Administration was well-nigh impossible in the then state of financial affairs. Writing of the difficulties he

met with and of the imperative need of a uniform national currency, he went on that, until the precious metals could again be introduced, "it devolves on the wisdom of Congress to provide a substitute, which shall equally engage the confidence, and accommodate the wants of the citizens throughout the Union. If the operations of the State banks cannot produce this result, the probable operation of a National Bank will merit consideration."

It has already been said that a special committee on Uniform National Currency was created and that Calhoun, owing to his prominence upon the subject at the prior session, was selected by Speaker Clay as Chairman. Dallas's annual report had again recommended a national bank, and he now outlined the plan of one in reply to a letter from Calhoun asking his views. On January 8, 1816, Calhoun reported the bill for a bank, based upon Dallas's suggestions. Many of the subjects of contention at the prior session had been entirely removed by peace, and the purpose of Dallas and every one else at this time was to establish a specie-paying institution. The factional question, too, of whether the institution should be founded on war stock alone, or on earlier issues as well, was now removed. The plan reported provided for a capital of \$35,000,000, of which the United States were to subscribe to one-fifth and the public to four-fifths. Payment was to be made three-fourths in funded debt and one-fourth in specie. The bank was to be at Philadelphia, was to have branches, and the Government was to appoint five of the twenty-five directors. Its notes were to be received for all dues of the Government; it was to transfer money for the Government without charge, and it was to pay a bonus of \$1,500,000. On February 25, Calhoun spoke to the bill as follows: <sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1060-1066. Calhoun writes ("Autobiography," p. 23) that his speech upon this occasion was "one of the most elaborate and powerful he ever delivered. Unfortunately, it is lost. That published at the time is a meagre sketch of what took three hours in the delivery, and such as it is, never passed under his review and correction." He said in the Senate on September 10, 1837, on the bill for the issue of Treasury notes ("Works," Vol. III, pp. 67, 68: and see also later speech in *ibid.*, p. 172), "In supporting the bank of 1816, I openly declared that, as a question *de novo*, I would be decidedly against the bank, and would be

He did not propose to comprehend in this discussion the power of Congress to grant bank charters, nor the question whether the general tendency of banks was favorable or unfavorable to the liberty and prosperity of the country. . . . To discuss these questions he conceived, would be a useless consumption of time. The constitutional question had been already so freely and frequently discussed that all had made up their mind on it. . . . The state of our circulating medium was, he said, opposed to the principles of our Federal Constitution. The power was given to Congress by that instrument in express terms to regulate the currency of the United States. . . . No one, he said, who referred to the Constitution, could doubt that the money of the United States was intended to be placed entirely under the control of Congress. The only object the framers of the Constitution could have in view in giving to Congress the "power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin" must have been to give a steadiness and fixed value to the currency of the United States. . . . He presumed one of the first rules of such a bank would be to take the notes of no bank which did not pay in gold or silver. . . . This would produce a powerful effect all over the Union.

During the debate upon the bill, Calhoun always took the lead in its favor, while the Federalists and the strict constructionists headed by John Randolph offered a persistent opposition. Webster was strongly against the measure, "but many members of his party from the middle and southern states, where the evils of the financial situation appealed even to the dullest, refused to follow him, and a keen and galling exchange of criminations and recriminations between these two wings closed the final debate in the House."<sup>26</sup> On March 6, Calhoun had said in debate that "he almost despaired of the passage of the bill, after some of the indications which he had

the last to give it my support. I also stated that, in supporting the bank then, I yielded to the necessity of the case, growing out of the existing and long established connection between the Government and the banking system. I took the ground even at that early period, that so long as the connection existed—so long as the Government received and paid away bank notes as money, they were bound to regulate their value, and had no alternative but the establishment of a national bank." For the other proceedings on the bank bill in 1816, see the *Annals*, *ut supra*, pp. 494-505, 1152, 1219. See also Vol. II, pp. 51, 52.

<sup>26</sup> Catterall's "Second Bank," p. 20.

witnessed, and he began to doubt whether any bill would pass at all on the subject. For himself, Mr. Calhoun said, his anxiety for the measure was not extreme; but as long as there was a lingering hope of its success, he should omit no effort to make it an efficient remedy for the evils of the present currency." <sup>27</sup>

On March 14, it is plain to see, the House was tired of the subject, and the *Annals* record that during the latter part of the discussion on that day question was loudly called for. At length, at a late hour, relief came to wearied members, and the bill was passed by 80 to 71. On April 5, certain amendments of no great moment made by the Senate were concurred in by the House, and then the measure became a law by the President's signature on April 10, 1816. The famous Second Bank of the United States was shortly after formed under this law, and entered upon its tragic history.

Calhoun was in reality the author of the institution, and what he said eighteen years later was strictly true. "I might say with truth," so he spoke in the Senate on January 13, 1834, "that the bank owes as much to me as to any other individual in the country; and I might even add that, had it not been for my efforts, it would not have been chartered." <sup>28</sup>

The reader will have observed that in his opening speech upon presenting the bill Calhoun had expressed the opinion that one of the proposed institution's first rules would be not to accept the notes of any bank but such as paid specie. One of the great purposes in view was to bring the country back to a gold and silver basis, and on April 6, 1816, in pursuance of this purpose, Calhoun reported from his Committee on National Currency a bill to exclude from reception the notes of banks not paying specie, and thus lead to resumption. Various votes on the bill were very close, and Calhoun tried by several changes to make it more palatable to members; but the measure

<sup>27</sup> *Annals*, as above, p. 1152.

<sup>28</sup> Speech on Removal of Deposits, *Congressional Debates*, Vol. X, Part I, 1833-34, p. 213, or "Works," Vol. II, p. 325. My account of the bank struggle here is based in the main on the same authorities as have already been mentioned on p. 169, *ante*, with the addition of Calhoun's Senate speech of October 3, 1837, printed in "Works," Vol. III, pp. 125-129, and the "Autobiography," pp. 16-18.



was finally defeated on April 25 by 59 Yeas to 60 Nays.

The next day Webster, who had voted in favor of Calhoun's bill, introduced a provision very similar in general effect, in the shape of a joint resolution, which was passed on that same day by 71 to 34, Calhoun voting with the majority. This resolution was later agreed to in the Senate, and was approved by the President on April 30. It called upon the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt such measures as he might deem necessary to cause all taxes, debts, &c. due the United States, to be paid in legal currency, U. S. or Treasury Notes, or notes of the Bank of the United States, "or in notes of banks, which are payable and paid on demand in the said legal currency of the United States." February 20, 1817, was fixed by another section as the date after which no such taxes, debts, &c. "ought to be collected or received otherwise" than in the currencies specified.<sup>29</sup>

During the debates upon this measure, Calhoun had urged the fixing of an early date for resumption, and said he did not believe that the banks were sincere in their intention to resume, but that they could do so and ought to be made to. It should be noted also that his then fondness for the easy device of Treasury notes, as shown in his proposed substitute at the prior session for the Government plan of a national bank, came out here in his motion to amend by a proviso for the issuance of fifteen millions of Treasury notes. He thought this would be a great relief to the community under the pressure of resumption.<sup>30</sup>

That the bank had a large part in bringing about a return to specie payments is beyond question, but the history of the institution during its existence of twenty years, was a very chequered one and need not be gone into here, where the only purpose is to show Calhoun's relation to its origin. It will appear in later papers what was his opinion of it in more mature years.

One point in the history of the institution, however, had

<sup>29</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1345, 1356, 1437, 1440-51, 1919, 1920.

<sup>30</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1389, 1390, 1415, 1416.



better be treated now, as it bears directly on Calhoun's views at this early period. The bank was charged soon after going into business with allowing owners to make payment for their stock, not in specie which the charter specifically required for a portion of the second payment on the capital but by dint of loans made by the bank itself upon the part-paid stock. At the next session of Congress, Forsyth moved for a committee to inquire into this charge, but Calhoun was opposed to the motion and said that "it was distinctly understood at the last session that the second specie payment would necessarily be made by accommodations from the bank." Such an "understanding," against the very words of a statute, would seem to point a very facile method of avoiding most laws, but we are told by the leading authority<sup>31</sup> upon the bank's history that "every bank chartered in that day began operations in precisely the same way," and this statement seems to be borne out, not only by Calhoun's already-quoted speech, but by at least three contemporary and authoritative witnesses.<sup>32</sup>

It cannot be determined by general rule how much or how little the loose customs of business may rightfully, or even must, at times override the provisions of law, but we can at least safely accept the view of the bank's historian on this matter that the directors were "culpable in so far as they gave facilities for evading the requirements of the law." Calhoun continued to defend the bank and later in the debate "repeated his approbation of the regulation, from the impartiality it produced in the accommodations, and the unhappy effect a draft of three millions on the money market, would at this time have produced in the relation between paper and specie, which draft was obviated by the regulation. . . . He considered the notes of the bank the same as specie, because they were convertible into gold and silver at pleasure."<sup>33</sup>

Forsyth's resolution was carried by 89 to 68, but was re-

<sup>31</sup> "The Second Bank of the United States," by Ralph C. H. Catterall, p. 41.

<sup>32</sup> Mason in debate, in *Annals of Congress*, 14th Congress, First Session, 1815-16, p. 236, quoted by Prof. Catterall, p. 41; Ingham in debate, *ibid.*, Second Session, 1816-17, p. 434. Director of the Bank Lloyd's letter to Calhoun printed at *ibid.*, p. 458.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 431-36.

ferred to Calhoun's Committee on National Currency, and he reported against it on January 10, 1817. The adverse report was chiefly based on a letter from James Lloyd, a director of the bank who chanced to be in Washington at the time and was called upon for information by the committee. Lloyd wrote in reply that the notes on which the loans were made were "payable at maturity in specie, or bills of the Bank of the United States." Probably, this attempted explanation did not seem to Forsyth to clear up the matter, and on January 14 he introduced a joint resolution in regard to it, but the subject was not reached, and near the end of the session he himself had it indefinitely postponed.<sup>34</sup>

One other measure became a law at the first session of the Fourteenth Congress, which had a fateful effect on many an apparently promising career, and which may serve to show once more to the philosophical reader that the nature of man was not at that day essentially different from what it is in our own time. Members of Congress were then still paid at the rate of six dollars a day, as they had been since 1789, but they became convinced that under the changed circumstances prevailing in 1816 this was not enough. The conclusion thus arrived at was probably quite correct, but the hasty method in which a material change was made is certainly open to grave criticism.

On March 4, 1816, R. M. Johnson of Kentucky introduced the subject and thought members should be paid the sum of \$1500 per session, with a provision to reduce the pay of absent members in proportion to their absence. This change from a *per diem* sum would, he argued, tend to "the despatch of public business," and would avoid the needless prolongation of the sittings of Congress. A committee upon the subject was at once appointed at his suggestion, and in two days (March 6) it reported a bill to change the method of pay and establish the new system and the new rate advocated by Johnson. The next day (the 7th) the bill was debated and ordered to third reading "by a large majority"; and then on the 8th,

<sup>34</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 431, 454-59, 476, 1053.

after a speech in its favor by Calhoun, it was finally passed by a vote of 80 to 71, and sent to the Senate. The upper house did not act with quite such unseemly haste as the lower, but passed the measure on March 14th, and it received the President's signature on the 19th. Under its terms, the law was to go into effect at once and to apply to the Congress which had passed it. Here was surely an early case of "railroading" a bill through Congress. Calhoun voted for the measure, and in his speech upon it said as follows:

So far as this bill proposed to increase the compensation to members, he was in favor of it, because he thought the present pay very inadequate to the dignity of the station, and far short of the time, labor and sacrifice required. He thought \$1500 would be found not sufficient, and would prefer, on the ground of a due compensation as well as a due regard to principle, \$2500. . . . A majority of the members come from three hundred to eight hundred miles. In serving the country they are not only obliged to be absent a great part of the year from their families; but what is almost equally distressing, to be absent a great distance. We serve at the expense of the best sympathies of our nature. . . . This state of things ought to be counteracted as far as possible; the condition of a Member ought to be made more desirable than at present; he ought at least to be able to have his family about him, which he cannot, at the present pay, without ruin, unless he be a man of property.<sup>35</sup>

However sound these views may perhaps have been, they did not appeal to the public, and there was a furious outburst throughout the whole country against all who had advocated the law. The objections were to no little extent based on the change from daily wages to a salary, which was looked upon as unrepugnant. Some members did not even try to be re-elected, and of those who did, numbers were left at home.

"Georgia," so a well-known historian writes, "sent back but one of the old members, South Carolina but three out of nine, Maryland but four out of nine and Pennsylvania thirteen out of twenty-three. From Ohio, from Delaware, from Vermont,

<sup>35</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 1183-85. For the proceedings on the bill see *ibid.*, pp. 303, 1127-34, 1150, 1158-77, 1188, 1801.

not one was returned. Connecticut re-elected two out of seven."<sup>36</sup>

Down to this time, Calhoun had been a very popular man in his district, so much so that not only had two prior Members of Congress withdrawn so as to leave him a free field, but we are told by Jenkins<sup>37</sup> that "he was returned without opposition in the fall of 1812 and again in 1814, to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congress." He was of course often ridiculed by the opposition, and the *Charleston Courier* seems to have been particularly fond of printing such criticisms of him, coupled with sadly erroneous prophecies as to his future. Thus, on January 17, 1812, it gave some "Scraps of Debate in Congress" from the *Baltimore Federal Republican*, in which were contained a few sentences from a speech of Calhoun on the expenses of the war, in order to ridicule a figure of speech he had used as to "frightening the eye." Certain remarks he made, too, in regard to his recollections of the whisky tax were ridiculed upon the ground that he was almost an infant at the time, and this then served to lead up to the forecast "there is no great prospect of his ever arriving at maturity as a statesman."

But in a very few years, at least his leading position was fully recognized. On February 10, 1816, the *Courier* reproduced from the *Georgetown Federal Republican* of February 1st a portion of his speech on the revenue bill and then adds: "We consider it of deep import, as indicating the secret purposes, or [at] least the expectations of the Cabinet and its party." In this speech, Calhoun is quoted as referring to the danger of war with Great Britain, and then saying: "We have now our Jackson to oppose to her Wellington!!!"<sup>38</sup> The article goes on that he was first in favor of the navy and

<sup>36</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. IV, p. 362.

<sup>37</sup> "Life of Calhoun," p. 64.

<sup>38</sup> Calhoun's actual words were: "If Britain has her Wellington, we have our Jacksons, Browns, and Scotts. If she has her naval heroes, we have them not less renowned, for they have snatched the laurel from her brows." *Annals of Congress*, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, p. 833. His speech on the Repeal of the Direct Tax Bill on January 31, 1816, as printed in "Works," Vol. III, 149, makes him say: "but I believe that steam frigates ought at least to constitute a part of the means" of our naval defence.



steam-vessels and wanted an army of 10,000 men and military roads. "In short he was for suborning everything to the purposes of war and military parade. Our manufactures, he said, deserved to be encouraged, but still *in a military view*."

The almost universal outburst of passion consequent upon the passage of the compensation Bill, shook Calhoun's popularity for a time. When he reached home after the adjournment in April, he writes<sup>39</sup> that he "found, for the first time, the tide of popular favor against him. So strong was the current, that his two predecessors, who had retired in his favor, General Butler and Colonel Calhoun, the latter a near relative, were both violently opposed to him, and the former came out as a candidate against him. They were both men of great influence." Calhoun was advised, we are told by the same authority, to appeal to the kind feelings of his constituents and apologize for his vote, but this he absolutely declined to do. The election for the next Congress was to be held in the autumn so that the course he followed was vital to his future. Having declined the ill advice given him, he said that all he wanted was the opportunity to address his constituents upon the subject.

Days were accordingly appointed for that purpose in Abbeville and Edgefield, which composed his Congressional district, and Calhoun spoke at the court-houses. He writes in his "Autobiography" that he confined himself entirely to the merits of the question, without a hint of apology or regret, and the result in October was that he was "triumphantly re-elected."<sup>40</sup> There were three other candidates in the field, and it may well be that this aided him, but none the less the boldness of his course was certainly most creditable. The outburst against him seems to have been merely temporary and

<sup>39</sup> "Autobiography," p. 23.

<sup>40</sup> P. 23. The Charleston "Courier" of October 24, 1816, prints an item from the Augusta "Chronicle" of the 18th in the following words: "We learn by a gentleman from South Carolina, who reached this place last evening, that Mr. Calhoun has been re-elected to Congress from that State by a large majority." The "Courier" of September 16 gives the names of the candidates in Calhoun's district as being John C. Calhoun, Gen. Wm. Butler, Dr. E. S. Davis, and Edmund Bacon.



in 1820, while Secretary of State, he told John Quincy Adams<sup>41</sup> that he was "the most popular man in his district."

On the second day of the next session a bill was introduced to repeal this law, so hastily rushed through Congress. It will be observed that this was after the elections for the Fifteenth Congress, when not only the successful members, but those who had been defeated, knew their fates and that many of their voices would not be heard at the session to meet after the one then sitting. Calhoun spoke and maintained that his opinion remained unaltered in favor of an annual, rather than a *per diem*, sum, but added that he was willing to vote for the latter, if it was fixed at an adequate rate,—say \$8 or \$9 a day. He was willing to do this on the ground that such a method of payment had a better chance of being permanent, because the members of the next Congress would not be free agents, and had, he said, most of them already committed themselves during the canvass. He maintained, too, that members were not obliged to follow the popular clamor and were not subject to *instruction*, which had existed in none of the governments of antiquity and was an English corruption. Of course, at the same time he did not contend, he said during the debate in reply to a critic, that the voice of the people was to be disregarded; the permanent feelings of the community will impress itself on us; what he maintained was that instructions were not obligatory.<sup>42</sup>

The bill was passed by a vote of 138 to 27, Calhoun voting *Nay*. It also passed the Senate, and then received the signature of the President on February 6, 1817. By its terms the Act making the increase was in turn repealed, with a proviso that the new law should not revive any act repealed or suspended by the Act of the prior session. Thus, the whole subject was left open for future regulation. In the next Congress, when Calhoun was not a member, a new law<sup>43</sup> was passed

<sup>41</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, p. 10.

<sup>42</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 232, 243, 574-82, 653, 654, 714; *ibid.*, "Appendix," 1278.

<sup>43</sup> Peters's "U. S. Statutes at Large," Vol. III, pp. 404, 405.

upon the subject, fixing the pay of senators and representatives at eight dollars a day with an allowance for mileage of eight dollars for every twenty miles.

The rate thus fixed was at least one-third larger than had been allowed by the old law and as high as the sum which Calhoun had expressed himself as ready to vote for, and this result seems to have been accepted by the public with little demur. The total received by members under the new law must have averaged less than it would have been under the fifteen hundred dollars a session law of 1816, unless the large allowance for mileage would have served to bring it up to as large a sum; but Calhoun had sat in the House during two very long sessions, and at one of these the opposite would have been the case. The first session of the Twelfth Congress lasted 244 days and the third session of the Thirteenth Congress 166 days; so that, at \$8 *per diem*, members would have drawn \$1952 and \$1328 respectively, mileage excluded.

This is not the only instance in the history of the American people in which they have burst out into a volcanic tempest of passion far greater than the circumstances call for, and then have later accepted with complete docility a final result not so greatly different from that at which they had stormed and railed shortly before. Many a public man of promise has been forever eclipsed by these popular tempests, which in our day are fanned and even made by a reckless press, regardless of the truth, if only a sensation can be created and large editions be in demand, while in early days the railing stump orator was probably a leading factor. In the instance here concerned, an increase of salary was doubtless called for by the change of circumstances in the course of twenty-seven years, and the only sound subject of criticism seems to have been the improper and foolish haste with which the measure had been hurried through Congress.

There remains one other leading subject upon which Calhoun spoke at this the last session in which he ever sat in the House of Representatives. There were also points of lesser moment, which must be touched upon, but the matter now referred to was evidently in his opinion of prime importance,

and his already-quoted speeches have in several instances referred to it.

During the war the greatest difficulty had been found in transporting men and material from one part of the country to another over the most terrible of roads,— and often where there were none,— and the expense had of course been a very heavy burden. Ingersoll<sup>44</sup> writes:

It was estimated that it cost a thousand dollars for every cannon conveyed to Sackett's Harbor. The flour for Harrison's army was said to cost a hundred dollars per barrel. The multiplied incidental but inevitable charges of travel over wilderness regions without roads, required, among other things, thousands of pack horses, each of which could carry only half a barrel of provisions, and must be attended by trains of other horses with forage for those laden with provisions. ¶ The distances were hundreds of miles over trackless deserts. Few horses survived more than one trip; many sunk under one. Of four thousand pack-horses to supply Harrison's small army, but eight hundred were alive after the winter of 1812-13. Large quantities of flour were buried in mud and snow, from inability to carry it any farther, large quantities damaged when arrived at the place of destination.

Those having charge of public affairs were of course deeply impressed with all this, and Madison's first message to the Fourteenth Congress,— the first session to come together after peace,— was in no little part colored by the trying experiences of the war. Many subjects were suggested to Congress as proper matters for legislation, and one portion of the Message read:

Among the means of advancing the public interest, the occasion is a proper one for recalling the attention of Congress to the great importance of establishing throughout our country the roads and canals which can be executed under the national authority. . . . And it is a happy reflection, that any defect of constitutional authority, which may be encountered, can be supplied in a mode which the constitution itself has providently pointed out.

<sup>44</sup> "Second War" (1812-13), Vol. I, p. 283.

Nothing came of this suggestion at the time, and Calhoun himself opposed it as inopportune; but at the beginning of the next session the President again referred to the subject in his message: Thus he wrote to Congress:

And I particularly invite, again, their attention to the expediency of exercising their powers, and, where necessary, of resorting to the prescribed mode of enlarging them, in order to effectuate a comprehensive system of roads and canals, such as will have the effect of drawing more closely together every part of our country, by promoting intercourse and improvements, and by increasing the share of every part in the common stock of national prosperity.

In a few days,—on December 16, 1816,—Calhoun moved for a committee on the expediency of setting aside the bonus and the net annual proceeds received from the National Bank as a fund for internal improvement. He remarked that a like proposition had been made at the prior session, but was then opposed by him as inopportune. A committee, consisting of Calhoun, Sheffey, Creighton, Grosvenor, and Ingham was appointed, and from it Calhoun reported on December 23 a bill providing that “the United States’s share of the dividends of the National Bank, and the bonus for its charter, be and the same are hereby set apart and permanently pledged as a fund for constructing roads and canals; and that it be subject to such specific appropriations, in that respect, as Congress may hereafter make.”<sup>45</sup>

The “Autobiography” tells us that, in introducing this bill, Calhoun supposed that he was acting in strict conformity to the President’s recommendations. It will be observed that no specific appropriation was made for any particular purpose, and Calhoun’s speech shows pretty plainly that he had intentionally so drawn the measure for the very purpose of steering clear of the constitutional scruples of some members. Indeed, he emphasizes this point in the “Autobiography,” and states that the bill did not “intend to affirm that Congress had any power, much less to fix the limits of its power, over the

<sup>45</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 296, 297, 361.



subject; but to leave both, as well as the appropriations thereafter to be made, to abide the decision of Congress, in conformity with the President's views."<sup>46</sup>

This method of leading people on half-way in some measure by virtue of a device to enable the advocate to maintain plausibly that nothing is really done has always been one of the ways in which the successful public man accomplishes numbers of his ends. The bold man of determined character knows the trap too well to fall into it, but easy-going members, who want to please every one and probably need in turn to secure votes for some pet progeny of their own, are often caught and wake up later to find it extremely difficult to oppose a policy which has by that time grown greatly by what it has fed on, and yet which in their hearts they thoroughly disapprove.

There can be little doubt, it seems to me, that such was Calhoun's purpose in the form he gave to this measure, but the general plan he had in mind and his speech upon the subject were certainly in a high degree statesmanlike. Indeed, the subject was one to give fine scope to a mind inclined to deal with such subjects from the view-point of the very highest statesmanship, for what can be a better ideal for a public man than to arrange affairs so that the entirely voluntary action of the millions shall have free scope to carry out their own plans and thus better themselves and their country? How much better simply to lay the opportunity before all the people than to be forever struggling for the passage of laws and still more laws, which are directed in the main to command the involuntary action of but a small number.

Calhoun felt this strongly, and his speech will show how he appreciated the value to his country and his countrymen of the measure he advocated. The constitutional question<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> P. 21.

<sup>47</sup> The "Autobiography," (pp. 21, 22), has it that Calhoun's "impression, like that of most of the young men of the party at the time, was, that it [the constitutional power] was comprehended under the money-power of the government. Experience and reflection soon taught him that this was an error—one, in all probability, originating with him, and others of his own age, in the precedent of the Cumberland Road, which may be regarded as the first departure by the Republican party from the



does not seem to have carried much weight with him, unless so far as it was an obstruction to be cleared away from the minds of some hesitating members; and I cannot but think that this was largely typical of his viewpoint during all these early years of his congressional service. Once more upon this measure, we find his mainspring of action to be the desire to do everything to advance the power of the country, and as one method of contributing to this end to furnish the means by which the aggregate of our people might have the opportunity to increase their wealth. Nor did the additional military power to be conferred upon us by any means remain forgotten by him. It will be found that a few years later, while Secretary of War, he returned to the same subject and in his well-known report developed at length his plan of a system of roads and canals. His speech upon the subject in the House was made on February 4, 1817, and seems to have been widely admired throughout the Union. It was long, but the following<sup>48</sup> quotation will give his main points. After referring to the importance of roads and canals to the development of national wealth, he continues:

In fact, if we look into the nature of wealth, we will find that nothing can be more favorable to its growth than good roads and canals. . . . Let it not be said that internal improvements may be wholly left to the enterprise of the States and of individuals. He knew, he said, that much might justly be expected to be done by them. . . . But many of the improvements contemplated, said Mr. Calhoun, are on too great a scale for the resources of the States or individuals; and many of such a nature, that the rival jealousy of the States, if left alone, might prevent. . . . But there are higher and more powerful considerations why Congress ought to take charge of this subject. If we were only to consider the pecuniary advantages of a good system of roads and canals, it might admit of some doubt whether they ought not to be left wholly to individual exertions; but when we come to consider how intimately the strength and political prosperity of the Republic are connected with this subject, we find true construction of the Constitution in reference to that dangerous power."

<sup>48</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 851-858.

the most urgent reasons why we should apply our resources to them. In many respects no country of equal population and wealth possesses equal materials of power with ours. The people, in muscular power, in hardy and enterprising habits, and in a lofty and gallant courage, are surpassed by none. In one respect, and, in my opinion, in one only, are we materially weak. We occupy a surface prodigiously great in proportion to our numbers. The common strength is brought to bear with great difficulty on the point that may be menaced by an enemy. . . . Good roads and canals, judiciously laid out are the proper remedy. . . . But on this subject of national power, what, said Mr. Calhoun, can be more important than a perfect unity in every part, in feelings and sentiments? And what can tend more powerfully to produce it than overcoming the effects of distance? No country, enjoying freedom, ever occupied anything like as great an extent of country as this Republic. . . . Let it not, however, be forgotten, let it, said he, be forever kept in mind, that it [our vastness] exposes us to the greatest of all calamities, next to the loss of liberty, and even to that in its consequence — *disunion*. We are great, and rapidly — he was about to say fearfully — growing. This, said he, is our pride and our danger — our weakness and our strength. Little, said Mr. Calhoun, does he deserve to be intrusted with the liberties of this people, who does not raise his mind to these truths. We are under the most imperious obligation to counteract every tendency to disunion. The strongest of all cements is, undoubtedly, the wisdom, justice, and, above all, the moderation of this House; yet the great object on which we are now deliberating, in this respect, deserves the most serious consideration. . . . Let us then, said Mr. Calhoun, bind the Republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals. Let us conquer space. . . . So situated, said he, blessed with a form of Government at once combining liberty and strength, we may reasonably raise our eyes to a most splendid future, if we only act in a manner worthy of our advantages. If, however, neglecting them, we permit a low, sordid, selfish, and sectional spirit to take possession of this House, this happy scene will vanish. We will divide, and in its consequences will follow misery and degradation. . . .

Such, then, being the obvious advantages of internal improvements, why, said Mr. Calhoun, should the House hesitate to commence the system? He understood there were, with some

members, constitutional objections. The power of Congress is objected to — first, that they have none to cut a road or canal through a State without its consent; and next, that the public moneys can only be appropriated to effect the particular powers enumerated in the constitution. The first of these objections, it is plain, does not apply to this bill. No particular road or canal is proposed to be cut through any State. The bill simply appropriates money to the general purpose of improving the means of communication. When a bill is introduced to apply the money to a particular object in any State, then, and not till then, will the question be fairly before us. Mr. Calhoun gave no opinion on this point. In fact, he scarcely thought it worth the discussion, since the good sense of the States might be relied on. They will in all cases readily yield their assent. The fear is in a different direction; in a too great solicitude to obtain an undue share to be expended within their respective limits. In fact, he said, he understood this was not the objection insisted on. It was mainly urged that the Congress can only apply the public money in execution of the enumerated powers. He was no advocate for refined arguments on the constitution. The instrument was not intended as a thesis for the logician to exercise his ingenuity on. It ought to be construed with plain, good sense; and what can be more express than the constitution on this very point? The first power delegated to Congress is comprised in these words “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States”; First — the power is given to lay taxes; next, the objects are enumerated to which the money accruing from the exercise of this power may be applied; to pay the debts, provide for the common defence and promote the general welfare. . . . If the framers had intended to limit the use of the money to the powers afterwards enumerated and defined, nothing could have been more easy than to have expressed it plainly. He knew it was the opinion of some that the words “to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare” which he had just cited were not intended to be referred to the power of laying taxes, contained in the first part of the section, but that they are to be understood as distinct and independent powers, granted in general terms; and are gratified by a more detailed

enumeration of powers in the subsequent part of the constitution. . . . [He did not accept this view.] . . . He asked the Members to read the section with attention, and it would, he conceived, plainly appear that such could not be the intention. The whole section seemed to him to be about taxes. It plainly commenced and ended with it, and nothing else could be more strained than to suppose the intermediate words "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare" were to be taken as independent and distinct powers. Forced, however, as such a construction was, he might admit it and urge that the words do constitute a part of the enumerated powers. . . . But suppose the constitution to be silent, said Mr. Calhoun, why should we be confined to the application of money to the enumerated powers? There is nothing in the reason of the thing that he could perceive, why it should be so restricted; and the habitual and uniform practice of the Government coincided with his opinion. [He here cited instances of charitable bequests, the purchase of Louisiana, the appropriations for the Cumberland road.] . . . In reply to this uniform course of legislation, Mr. Calhoun expected it would be said that our constitution was founded on positive and written principles, and not on precedents. He did not deny the position; but he introduced these instances to prove the uniform sense of Congress and of the country (for they had not been objected to) as to our powers; and surely, said he, they furnish better evidence of the true interpretation of the constitution than the most refined and subtle arguments.

Let it not be urged that the construction for which he contended gave a dangerous extent to the powers of Congress. In this point of view, he conceived it to be more safe than the opposite. By giving a reasonable extent to the money power, it exempted us from the necessity of giving a strained and forced construction to the other enumerated powers. . . . He was not adverse to presenting his views [as to the internal improvements to be carried out]. The first great object was to perfect the communication from Maine to Louisiana. This might fairly be considered as the principal artery of the whole system. The next was the connexion of the Lakes with the Hudson river. . . . The next object of chief importance was to connect all the great commercial points on the Atlantic, Philadelphia, Boston, Washington, Richmond [*sic*], Charleston and Savannah, with



the Western States; and finally to perfect the intercourse between the West and New Orleans. These seemed to him to be the great objects.

The bill passed the House on February 8, 1817, by the close vote of 86 to 84, and was sent to the President for his approval, after certain Senate amendments had been concurred in.<sup>49</sup> It was by this time a very different measure from that which Calhoun had proposed, and it is curious to find<sup>50</sup> that, among other amendments made to this proposal of the future strong advocate of State Rights, was one that owed its origin to the rampant Federalist, Pickering, and required the consent of any State to the building of a road or canal within its limits.

But a serious disappointment awaited the author of the measure. It has been said that Calhoun thought he was acting directly in the line desired by Madison, and it seems to me clear that the two messages quoted justified this belief. A bill to do less in the matter of internal improvements would have been hard to draw; and, if Madison meant to suggest a constitutional amendment and no present legislative action, his two messages should apparently have contained simply a recommendation of the amendment and nothing else. But it is possible that his mind was not made up at the time and that later reflection convinced him that no power upon the subject was vested in Congress.

Calhoun's knowledge of the intention to veto came to him in a curious way. The bill reached the President a few days before the end of his term and his final retirement from public life, and while it was still in his hands Calhoun called to take leave. It was his farewell visit, and he congratulated the retiring veteran upon the success of the Administration

<sup>49</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 185-88, 191, 934, 1052, 1059-62.

<sup>50</sup> Pickering moved an amendment requiring among other things the assent of a State to the building of a road, or canal, within its limits; and when Calhoun moved to amend the amendment by striking out the words "with the consent of the State," the motion was lost by a large majority, and Pickering's amendment was agreed to without a division. Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 875, 916-18, 922.



and expressed the happiness he felt at having been able to coöperate during the most trying period. He then took his leave. Madison, however, called him back when he had already reached the door; and for the first time the President disclosed his belief that the measure was unconstitutional, and added that he intended to veto it.

Calhoun, we are told, expressed deep regret that Madison should hold this belief and had not earlier intimated his feeling, and added that, if he had been informed in time, he would have spared the President the necessity, so late in the day, of vetoing a measure passed by the votes of his friends and would himself have avoided seeing the name and authority of the President brought against him upon the question. Calhoun even entreated the President to reconsider the question; but it was too late. Madison's mind was made up, and the veto came in upon March 3, 1817.<sup>51</sup> It was based upon the fact that the power was not among those enumerated and could not be derived from any of the general expressions. It could not by any just interpretation be included within the power to make laws necessary and proper, nor could the power to regulate commerce among the several States include it, in the President's opinion, "without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms," while to refer it to the power to provide for the common defence and general welfare would be contrary to the established rules of interpretation.

Thus came to an untimely end a measure that had probably been a pet one with Calhoun. It would be interesting to know

<sup>51</sup> "Autobiography," p. 21; *Annals of Congress*, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 1060, 1061. Calhoun told a friend in 1831 that he had always had his doubts and had never once committed himself on the constitutional question as to internal improvements,—“That he had refused to do so in his Bonus Bill Report, against the wishes both of Clay and Lowndes, telling them he had his doubts. . . . Mr. Madison did it [vetoed the bill] to please Mr. Jefferson. Mr. Calhoun said he had been immediately transferred from Congress to the War Department and had never had an opportunity of vindicating himself from the various charges made upon him on this score which he felt himself prepared to do most triumphantly whenever called upon in such a manner that he could come out with propriety.” J. H. Hammond's *Memorandum of Calhoun's Conversation of Mar. 18, 1831, in Nullification in South Carolina, 1830-34*. “*Amer. Historical Review*,” Vol. VI, (1900-1), pp. 741-45.

how he felt and what he said as to the author of his discomfiture, whose action was certainly not to be anticipated after what had preceded it; but Calhoun did not keep a diary in which to pour out gall in relation to the actions of his contemporaries, nor do I know of any letter to an intimate in which he expressed his feelings. There can be no doubt that his advocacy of a federal system of roads and canals was to a considerable extent induced by the prevalence of a like system in South Carolina.

It has been already said that there were several matters of lesser importance upon which Calhoun spoke and in which he took a leading part during his service in the House. He seems to have been always present, was thoroughly conversant with the details of our system of administration, and it is evident that, though he was often on the floor, he was carefully listened to and wielded great power over the assemblage. In some of these instances it is easy to find traces of the later tendencies of his mind, but in others this is not the case. In all he threw light upon the subject under discussion and was certainly a very useful member.

On January 9, 1816, while the House had under discussion a bill for carrying into effect the Convention of Commerce between the United States and Great Britain, he spoke<sup>52</sup> upon that thorn of constitutional students, the treaty-making power under our constitution and reasoned upon it so closely, that William Pinkney is said to have referred to him in the following words uttered later in the debate:

The subject has already been treated with an admirable force and perspicuity, on all sides of the House. The strong power of argument has drawn aside, as it ought to do, the veil which is supposed to belong to it, and which some of us seem unwilling to disturb; and the stronger power of genius, from a higher

<sup>52</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 526-33. Pinkney's speech, quoted immediately *infra*, is to be found in *ibid.*, pp. 564-65. "Autobiography," p. 24. The "Autobiography" furnishes the only positive proof that Pinkney referred in particular to Calhoun's speech, though the debate makes this seem highly likely. The student of the treaty-making power can find it treated again by Calhoun at a later date in his "Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," "Works," Vol. I, pp. 201-204.

region than that of argument, has thrown upon it all the light with which it is the prerogative of genius to invest and illustrate everything.

In the course of the same debate, this defender par excellence in later days of Southern views spoke as follows,<sup>53</sup> in referring to the provision of the constitution to allow the slave-trade until 1808:

It covered him with confusion to name it here. He felt ashamed of such a tolerance, and took a large part of the disgrace, as he represented a part of the Union by whose influence it might be supposed to have been introduced. Though Congress alone is prohibited by the words of the clause from inhibiting that odious traffic, yet his colleague would admit that it was intended to be a general prohibition on the Government of the Union. He perceived his colleague indicated his dissent.

Some will find here a grave inconsistency with the speaker's later views, which the present writer, however, does not think has any essential existence. I should say that the young Calhoun in this instance merely spoke out his views freely in regard to a subject that had not then become vital by the agitation of the slavery issue. Later, when the very civilization of his home region seemed to him to be endangered thereby, he would certainly not have openly expressed this same feeling, though he may well have continued to feel it.

On December 17, 1816, when there was pending a proposal to amend the Constitution so as "to establish an uniformity of the mode of election [*i. e.* by districts] in all the States, of Representatives to Congress and Electors of President and Vice-President," Calhoun observed<sup>54</sup> that "he considered this a question of great importance. He thought the proposed amendment to the constitution, if adopted, would remove some evils which experience has shown to exist, and which in future time, if uncorrected, may menace the existence of the Republic. He therefore thought this subject en-

<sup>53</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 531, 532.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, Second Session, 1816-17, p. 311. The same subject is advocated by him in letters of 1825; "Correspondence," p. 230; "Bulletin of the New York Public Library," Vol. III (1889), pp. 328, 329.

titled to the most mature consideration." The same amendment was in later years advocated by other members, but I am not aware that Calhoun then took any active interest in it.

When questions of public law began to come before Congress in regard to the revolting Spanish-American colonies, Calhoun, in common with other members, said<sup>55</sup> that he wished the colonies well, but added that he would not allow these wishes to influence him to permit a violation of our neutrality. He seems, however, to have been rather easy in his view as to what constituted neutrality and in reply to Hopkinson of Pennsylvania contended that "to sell vessels to either of the belligerents was no violation of our neutrality, and that a trade in arms and munitions, or in vessels, stood on the same footing. Spain herself purchased vessels at Havana for the public service, and she could not object to an act in others, which she had done herself. . . . To sell armed vessels in our own ports to a belligerent, he acknowledged would be illegal, but maintained that they might be transferred after their departure beyond the jurisdiction of the country."

He was a strong believer, it seems, in holding governmental agencies strictly to the law. On one occasion, when the statute,—already referred to,—to pay owners for property destroyed by the enemy under certain conditions seems to have been interpreted by the Commissioner thereunder in a way to threaten the Government with bankruptcy, Forsyth introduced resolutions to request the President to order the further execution of the law suspended, but Calhoun at once said that the defect was not in the law but in its execution, and added that he did not want to give his support to any proposition that assumed the power of the House to suspend a law. The result was that the law was amended and limited.<sup>56</sup>

Another instance in which he aimed to curb the Executive is not altogether dissimilar. Under some interpretation of a statute, it was then the custom for the President to transfer appropriations at his discretion from one branch of the serv-

<sup>55</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 747, 752.

<sup>56</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 246, 291, 390-94, 1345-47.



ice to another in the War and Navy departments, and this was a power that those in authority wanted to preserve. Calhoun expressed himself very strongly against it. He said:

It was a sheer abuse of power, not justified by the existing laws, as lax as they unfortunately are on this point. . . . The further we progress in this business, the more apparent is the necessity of abolishing the whole power of transfers. . . . Not a cent of money ought to be applied but by our direction and under our control. How stands the fact? We are told that most extensive and superb stone barracks, sufficient to receive two thousand troops, have, the last year, been erected near Sackett's Harbor, though not a cent was appropriated to this object. . . . He conceived it to be indispensable that our appropriations should be made in many respects more specific. . . . It is then indispensable that the right of transferring, or rather dispensing with appropriations, be repealed and prohibited. In the next place, the year for the appropriation and for expenditure should coincide.

He had already moved a resolution looking to repeal of the power of transfer, and later in the session a statute was passed to curtail it, though not so completely as Calhoun had wanted. This result was accomplished, too, in spite of the opposition of the Executive and of Cheves, the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.<sup>57</sup>

In relation to military matters, he was active, both during the war and after it, and was evidently well-informed for a civilian. Herein may possibly be found one of the reasons for that transfer of his services to the War Department at which we have now nearly arrived. This subject has already been referred to in part, but some other details remain, which show moreover, that he stood very close to Monroe during the latter's administration of the War Department. On November 10, 1814, Calhoun offered resolutions directing the Committee on Military Affairs to inquire into the expediency of changing the then mode of supplying the army by con-

<sup>57</sup> Journal of the House, Second Session, Fourteenth Congress, p. 119. Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 374, 956-960: *Ibid.*, "Appendix," p. 1336; "Autobiography," p. 24; "Calhoun Correspondence," p. 795.



tract, and to report; and also that the Secretary of War be directed to inform the House whether the army was trained by one uniform system of discipline, and if not what causes have prevented it.<sup>58</sup> In a short speech, he said he heard from reliable sources that, under the prevailing system of supply, speculation was not infrequent and the army often left inefficient. He also referred to the vital necessity of good training and then told the House that there was no unity of discipline, as many as five or six systems being employed. "So great was this variance,"—such was the lamentable picture he drew of our lack of military unity,—“that no large body of our Army, Brown’s command perhaps excepted, could be properly exercised together.”

Monroe replied to the inquiry in a few days (November 23rd) that “no uniform system of discipline has heretofore been practised in training the Armies of the United States, either in line, by battalion, or company,” and he recommended a Board of General and Field Officers to digest and report a plan. On Calhoun’s motion, the matter was referred to a special committee, from which he soon reported a resolution “that the Secretary of War be directed to appoint a Board of Officers to modify ‘the rules and regulations for the field exercise and manœuvres of the French infantry,’ as translated by Macdonald, so as to make them correspond with the organization of the Army of the United States, and to make such additions and retrenchments as may be thought proper; and to lay the same as soon as possible before this House.” The resolution was agreed to by the House, but the matter seems to have gone no further.

Surely, here was an awful exposé of our unfitness for the serious business of war, and here was a field for the ambition of any man having the ability to conceive and introduce a system where such chaos then prevailed!

Calhoun by no means belonged in that class of fiery and aggressive members who are forever in a wrangle with some

<sup>58</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, pp. 550, 551. Monroe’s reply to the inquiry is in *ibid.*, p. 638, and for later proceedings see pp. 988, 989. As to Calhoun’s relations with Monroe, see also p. 226, *post*.

one; but at the same time it has been shown that he was always ready, in case of need, to meet the very ablest of his colleagues, and even such as were much his senior and celebrated for their caustic tongue. He had either volunteered or been selected early in his service to cross swords with the bitter Randolph, and in several other instances had minor clashes with him. With Webster, too, by far the most brilliant of those then just coming upon the stage of public events and bursting with the most ultra opposition to all the measures of his country, Calhoun had numerous exchanges in debate, but all these passed off kindly and evidently left no feeling. So far as Webster is concerned, his relations then as well as all through their long association were generally friendly, and I find no instance in which even Randolph found occasion to quarrel with the young South Carolinian, despite the fact that they were constantly on opposite sides and were often directly pitted against each other. Randolph will, indeed, be shortly quoted as speaking in terms of high praise of the younger member, even at the very moment of disagreeing from him *toto cælo*.

He was, however, too prominent on the floor not to be singled out now and then for attack. In November, 1814, when the war outlook was black indeed and the bank bill once more in the throes of failure, Hanson of Maryland said:

I am glad to see that gentlemen on the other side of the House have at last collected the courage, and manifested their determination to pursue what they call an *ignis fatuus* (Mr. Calhoun) no further. An *ignis fatuus*, truly, sir, and which, like other jack-o'-lanterns, engendered in the fens of party, will play about the surface of those stagnated pools until it sinks and is extinguished. It was this same bold and false prophet who led us into Canada to conquer free trade and sailors' rights; and such is the sanguine nature of the late Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, that I have no doubt even now he would contract, if he could find security for the forfeiture, to capture in six weeks, more or less, the whole British army and deliver them, bound hand and foot, at the Capitol.

Here the ironical member was called to order by the Speaker

and continued in a milder key. Calhoun at once replied, but his speech is not printed and the "Annals" merely record that during the speeches of both, "they were called to order more than once by the Speaker."<sup>59</sup>

So far as I have found, there was but one instance in these days in which Calhoun fell into an actual quarrel with a member. Thomas P. Grosvenor was a leading representative from New York during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, as well as part of the Twelfth Congresses at the same time with Calhoun, and was a strong opponent of the war. So bitter indeed was his opposition that Charles J. Ingersoll, who was a member with him during the war, writes<sup>60</sup> of "Grosvenor and Pickering, always opposed to the administration, whatever it wanted." A couple of instances have already been cited<sup>61</sup> in which Calhoun expressed indignation at certain sentiments uttered by Grosvenor in debate, and it was there suggested that these differences may well have been concerned in leading up to the trouble.

The actual quarrel, so the "Autobiography"<sup>62</sup> tells us, occurred in one of the secret sessions during the war, and after that time the two members were not on speaking terms. Another authority<sup>63</sup> tells us that the matter went so far that a duel was arranged for and was only prevented by the interference of Clay. The latter, so this story runs, was called upon "in his retirement by a learned gentleman, indifferent to both parties, who desired his official interference. Refusing for obvious reasons this species of interposition, Mr. Clay, however, volunteered his friendly efforts at a pacification, and succeeded just in time to avert extremities."

<sup>59</sup> Annals of Congress, Thirteenth Congress, Third Session, 1814-15, Vol. III, pp. 662-665.

<sup>60</sup> "Second War," Vol. II (1814), p. 262.

<sup>61</sup> P. 149, *ante*.

<sup>62</sup> Pp. 23, 24.

<sup>63</sup> "An Argument on the Powers, Duties and Conduct of the Hon. John C. Calhoun as Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate" (reprinted from the "National Journal"), Washington, 1827. Letter No. 5 ("National Journal," August 8, 1826), p. 56. The "Autobiography," (p. 31) and Jenkins ("Life," p. 159) both write that these anonymous letters were supposed to have been written by the then President, John Quincy Adams, but this subject will be considered later. Mr. Jervey ("Robert Y. Hayne and his Times," p. 50) writes that Clay and Senator Bibb of Georgia were Calhoun's seconds.

This quarrel with Grosvenor was presumably made up at a later date, for near the close of the session, and the very day after Calhoun's speech in opposition to the repeal of the increase of salary bill, Grosvenor said on the floor of the House:

I have heard, with peculiar satisfaction, the able, manly, and constitutional speech of the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I will not be restrained. No barrier shall exist which I will not leap over for the purpose of offering to that gentleman my thanks for the judicious, independent, and national course, which he has pursued in this House for the last two years, and particularly upon the subject now before us. Let the honorable gentleman continue with the same manly independence, aloof from party views and local prejudices, to pursue the great interests of his country, and fulfil the high destiny for which it is manifest he was born. The buzz of popular applause may not cheer him on his way, but he will inevitably arrive at a high and happy elevation in the view of his country and the world.<sup>64</sup>

The reader, who is familiar with Calhoun's method of approaching constitutional questions in later life, will, I think, have observed how differently these questions were regarded by him in his earlier years. There was, of course, during his term of service in the House the vast difference that, for reasons already referred to, he generally wanted to find the power, and here is a motive that absolutely controls many minds and vastly influences all. But it is to me impossible to imagine the older Calhoun omitting to discuss<sup>65</sup> the question of the constitutional power to create a bank, even when members' minds were made up; or to no little extent basing another power on a short-lived and occasional practice of the government;<sup>66</sup> and still less making such arguments as those which he has been shown to have made upon the question of

<sup>64</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, p. 621. Grosvenor was at this time by no means cheered on by "the buzz of popular applause." He was one of the victims of the Salary Bill, for which he had voted,—as had Calhoun,—but the New Yorker was less fortunate than the South Carolinian and was never again in Congress.

<sup>65</sup> Quoted *ante*, p. 193.

<sup>66</sup> Speech on Internal Improvements quoted *ante*, pp. 206-210.



the federal control of the finances, or as to internal improvements.<sup>67</sup> The easy interpretation<sup>68</sup> that a statute reading that certain payments on the bank's capital should be made in specie was fulfilled by payment in banknotes, loaned by the bank upon the stock itself as security, is much of the same general character.

A great difference, too, is to be found in the mere style of his speeches in later life and as a young man. In the earlier period there is a tendency to antithesis, a possible redundancy of expression, and a general straining after oratorical methods, utterly unknown to the little ornamented but so compelling logic of his later years. As a young man, he undoubtedly cultivated the arts of the orator, and his style is often florid and, in some instances,—so it seems to the writer,—even sophomoric. The peroration to one of his speeches on a revenue question already quoted,<sup>69</sup> may well serve as an illustration of the latter point, while nearly all bear traces of the other tendencies,—perhaps notably those upon the repeal of the embargo and upon the Loan Bill in 1814.<sup>70</sup> He was evidently looked upon as a rising orator, in the sense of one who convinces or influences by moving appeals and brilliant language,<sup>71</sup> and not at all chiefly by cold-cut reasoning. The "Autobiography" records that William Lowndes was struck with Calhoun's great improvement in speaking and urged him not to leave the halls of legislation.

Some contemporary authorities may serve to give us an idea of his manner. One of these writes:<sup>72</sup>

Mr. Calhoun is a young man of great sensibility—has had the advantage of an excellent education, aided by astonishing powers of memory—recites in debate the anecdotes and incidents of both modern and ancient history with wonderful facility

<sup>67</sup> Quoted respectively *ante*, pp. 193 and 206 *et seq.*

<sup>68</sup> See *ante*, p. 196.

<sup>69</sup> *Ante*, p. 181.

<sup>70</sup> *Ante*, pp. 132-134 and 152.

<sup>71</sup> "Measures not Men," *ut supra*, regards his speech on the Direct Tax Bill.—a small portion of which is quoted at pages 180, 181, *ante*,—as "a perfect model of parliamentary eloquence"; p. 26.

<sup>72</sup> The New York "Evening Post" of March 15, 1814, quoted in Jervy's "Hayne," p. 51.



and accuracy — is dexterous in the management of a political cause — exercises a goodly share of zeal — commands a rapid though limited eloquence, little embellished by metaphor or imagery — supported by a charming metaphysical analysis and prompted by an apparent sagacity almost peculiar to himself on the floor, where he exhibits. He is the leader of what is called the Administration party in the House.

And Ingersoll writes: <sup>73</sup>

John Caldwell Calhoun was the same slender, erect, and ardent logician, politician, and sectarian in the House of Representatives in 1814 that he is in the Senate of 1847. Speaking with aggressive aspect, flashing eye, rapid action and enunciation, unadorned argument, eccentricity of judgment, unbounded love of rule, impatient, precipitate ambition, kind temper, excelling in colloquial attraction, caressing the young, not courting rulers; conception, perception, and demonstration quick and clear, with logical precision arguing paradoxes, and carrying home conviction beyond rhetorical illustration; his own impressions so intense as to discredit, scarcely listen to, any other suggestions; well educated and informed.

In far simpler language a prominent Republican of Maine, after hearing the speech on the bonus bill, wrote <sup>74</sup> of Calhoun in 1817 as being both in the writer's and the general opinion "the most elegant speaker that sits in the House," and then goes on: "His gestures are easy and graceful, his manner forcible, and language elegant; but above all, he confines himself closely to the subject, which he always understands, and enlightens every one within his hearing; having said all that a statesman should say, he is done. I am told that he has the most weight in that body, and so he should have, for he can more fully comprehend a subject, and is always ruled by a liberal and enlightened policy."

Finally, a few words more must be said in the interest of historic truth, and by no means with any desire to carp at the human frailties of a great statesman,—in regard to the fact

<sup>73</sup> "Second War," Vol. II, 1814, p. 258.

<sup>74</sup> James C. Jewett to Gen. Dearborn, from Washington, February 5, 1817: "William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine," Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Oct., 1908), pp. 139-144.

that no long course of years elapsed before Calhoun's opinions on many of the subjects he discussed in the House between 1811 and 1817 had undergone a very great and fundamental change. The human mind is forever growing, and it should not be a discredit to a public man that he has thought differently of the same subject at different times. Not only do one's tendencies and consequent beliefs inevitably vary, as the swift years rush by, but circumstances change so enormously in the complicated affairs of man that the subject itself becomes quite another one in a relative sense.

The stern and unbending Tory of early youth grows into the advocate of household suffrage and Irish Home Rule in later life. The anti-monarchist and almost-Republican of youthful days turns into the man of blood and iron and creates the German Empire, overriding law and ruthlessly crushing his earlier partners in belief. The freetrader Webster, forever breathing in early days the unpatriotic opposition of his section to the War of 1812 and full of prophecies of evil to our constitutional "compact," becomes a leader of the protective forces, the expounder of the Constitution, the man who probably did more, prior to 1861, than any other of the sons of men to make America a nation. So of all of us; and so a biographer must be allowed to say, without impropriety, of his chosen subject.

An observer, whose pen was probably not guided by prejudice, wrote thus of Calhoun about 1823:—"He is ardent, persevering, industrious and temperate, of great activity and quickness of perception, and rapidity of utterance; as a politician too theorizing, speculative and metaphysical — magnificent in his views of the powers and capacities of the government, and of the virtue, intelligence and wisdom of the *people*. He is in favor of elevating, cherishing and increasing all the institutions of the government, and of a vigorous and energetic administration of it. From his rapidity of thought, he is often wrong in his conclusions, and his theories are sometimes wild, extravagant and impractical." <sup>75</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Letter of Elijah H. Mills, undated but supposed to be of 1823 and to his wife, in "Proceedings Mass. Historical Society," Vol. XIX (1881-82), pp. 37, 38. Mills was elected to the Senate from Massachusetts in 1821 and sat until 1827.

During Calhoun's early days in the Legislature, one at least of the older men, but a crabbed character and long a mere Thersites, saw the tendency of Calhoun's then views to cripple the power of the States and turn all eyes to the federal government, so that it cannot be said that the issue was entirely un-made up. John Randolph of Roanoke spoke as follows in reply to a speech<sup>70</sup> of Calhoun's in 1816 in favor of a strong army and navy and advocating protection and internal improvements:

I must say, in the abstract, I was pleased with the gentleman's speech, but I have long believed there was a tendency in the administration of this Government, in the system itself indeed, to consolidation, and the remarks made by the honorable member from South Carolina have not tended to allay any fears I have entertained from that quarter. . . . He put it to the Committee, to the gentleman himself, whether the gentleman's principles (which he had demonstrated with an ability honorable to the State which he represented, to the House, and to himself) did not go to the destruction of the State governments. . . . I say that these doctrines go to prostrate the State governments at the feet of the General Government. . . . Upon whom bears the duty on coarse woolens, and linens, and blankets, upon salt, and all the necessities of life? On poor men and on slave-holders.

There is no evidence, so far as I know, that these remarks were sown on good ground and soon grew in Calhoun's mind; but they were possibly not forgotten, and in no long course of years,—when the younger man had changed and had come to think much as Randolph had so much earlier thought upon the interests of the South in all these matters,—the views of his older colleague evidently came to mind, and he probably felt that Randolph had in general been right. Indeed, as to the latter's course upon the first outbreak of the slavery trouble, Calhoun expressly said in the Senate on January 12, 1838, that his bitter opposition to the Missouri Compromise might have resulted in crushing abolition at its birth, and then

<sup>70</sup> Quoted at pp. 180, 181, *ante*. Randolph's speech is from the Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1815-16, pp. 840-42. Macon, too, pointed out the danger a few years later. "If Congress can make canals," he wrote, "they can with more propriety emancipate." William E. Dodd's "Nathaniel Macon," pp. 310-11.

went on that he himself had at the time thought Randolph "too unyielding, too uncompromising, too impracticable, but had been taught his error and took pleasure in acknowledging it." <sup>77</sup>

In 1837, too, when his later beliefs had pretty well taken shape, Calhoun said <sup>78</sup> in the Senate on February 18th, in opposition to a resolution for the purchase of the Madison manuscripts, that he "admitted that when a young man, and at his entrance upon political life, he had been inclined to that interpretation of the constitution which favored a latitude of powers, but experience, observation and reflection had wrought a great change in his views; and, above all, the transcendent argument of Mr. Madison himself, in his celebrated resolutions of 1798, had done more than all other things to convince him of his error."

In very late life, too, he had clearly come to think that a national bank,—one of which he had done so much to create,—was a most undesirable agency for us. He wrote <sup>79</sup> near the close of his days, referring to the first bank and possibly thinking also of the second, and with evident approval, that Jefferson "took strong positions against the Bank of the United States, and laid the foundations for its final overthrow"; and again that "it was due to the Democratic party, to say that they are "entitled to the credit of putting down the Bank of the United States." <sup>80</sup> Finally, when in this same writing he considers the centralizing tendencies of the War of 1812 and refers to how largely it contributed to drive us away from the earlier and sounder Republican system, one cannot help supposing that he had in mind the influence of that war upon his own beliefs and actions. <sup>81</sup>

<sup>77</sup> "Works," Vol. III, p. 185.

<sup>78</sup> "Congressional Debates," Vol. XIII, Part I, 1836-37, p. 866.

<sup>79</sup> "Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," "Works," Vol. I, p. 359.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 361-364.

## CHAPTER X

### IN MONROE'S CABINET

Secretary of War — Internal Improvements — Cabinet Discussions — Missouri Compromise — Party Politics — Rip-Rap Contract Investigation — Political Calumny — The Tar-iff — South Carolina Politics — Calhoun's Home.

WHEN, after the close of the Fourteenth Congress on March 3, 1817, Calhoun once more returned South to his home, he bore with him a reputation such as few men of thirty-five attain. He ranked, beyond doubt, among the very first of the leaders in Congress and was favorably known far and wide throughout the country. Coming to Washington but six years before, quite unknown except to the rather small circle of his home, he had steadily grown both as an orator and political manager, and a great future seemed to lie before him. He was, moreover, already a member-elect of the Fifteenth Congress, having been triumphantly chosen in spite of the opposition caused by his vote on the Compensation Bill. All the probabilities seemed to indicate that he would remain in the halls of Congress and continue to develop in the special line in which he had achieved such marked success. But the Fates had another lot in store for him.

Monroe was inaugurated as President on March 4, 1817, and had at first designed to select his cabinet in such a way as to have each one of the great sections of the country represented; but the plan was found difficult to carry out and was in the end to some extent abandoned. He began by filling only three of the portfolios; taking Adams from the East for the State Department, Crawford from the South for the Treasury, and Isaac Shelby of Kentucky for the War Office. The latter position had been already offered to Clay, but had been refused, apparently with some anger, as Clay wanted to be



Secretary of State, with an eye to the succession. Jackson, too, had been thought of before Shelby but had soon intimated a desire not to be nominated.

Shelby, who was an old man, declined the appointment, and the War Office was temporarily filled by George Graham, — long its chief clerk. In the fall Monroe tendered it in turn to Lowndes, who had been asked by Madison late in his administration to accept the same place. Lowndes also declined, however; and then Monroe thought of Calhoun and of General John Williams of Tennessee. The choice fell upon Calhoun, and the portfolio was offered to him by letter of October 10, and accepted by the next mail in a letter dated November 1.<sup>1</sup>

In later years there was a controversy as to how Calhoun's appointment had come about, Crawford, or his friends, seeming to claim that it was due in the main to Crawford's advice; but there is little doubt as to the real facts. In the troubled times of the war, Calhoun had shown much interest in military affairs and had been very close to Monroe, who was Secretary of War for some months after the fall of Washington in 1814; and it must be that he then exhibited some qualities that led both Monroe and army officers to feel kindly toward him. Monroe once stated to Calhoun that during his tour of inspection in the summer of 1817 he had "found a very general desire among the principal officers that I [Calhoun] should be appointed Secretary"; and this, coupled with that "long and intimate personal acquaintance formed under the most trying circumstances," — of which Calhoun writes in his letters of December 9, 1827, to Monroe, — was doubtless the real cause for the selection being made, as soon as desired political combinations permitted.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," p. 131; Hunt's "Writings of Madison," Vol. VIII, pp. 369-71; "Writings of Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 4, 5; J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 15, 70, 71, 73; Schurz's "Clay," Vol. I, p. 141. Clay had been offered the War Office by Madison in the summer of 1816. "Letters, etc., of Madison," 1865, Vol. IV, p. 556. I presume that John Williams of Tennessee, Colonel of the 39th Infantry is the "Gen. Williams" in question. Monroe says nothing of his having been under consideration, but Calhoun does.

<sup>2</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 251-254; and see Monroe's answer of December 16, in "The Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VII, pp. 136,

As Calhoun's official appointment bears date the 8th of October, it is likely that he had already been sounded in some way. Inherent probability, too, points to the same conclusion, and he writes in his "Autobiography" that he consulted with friends before accepting the offer. Lowndes and the friends generally advised against his acceptance, on the ground that Congress was the true field for his talents and that it was there that his mental powers would be specially useful. They seem to have doubted his fitness for an executive office, but Calhoun felt a conviction that this was an error and decided that he could successfully take up the very practical and exceedingly difficult task of bringing order out of the chaos that had long prevailed in the department tendered him. He was succeeded<sup>3</sup> in the House by Eldred Simkins, who was long a friend in South Carolina.

The United States War Office was then in a lamentable condition for a people just engaged in war with one of the most powerful nations on earth. All through the contest the portfolio had been indeed a most difficult problem, and Monroe himself had filled it for some five months at the same time that he was also acting as Secretary of State in Madison's Cabinet. Upon Monroe's resignation of the War Department portion of these double duties, General Dearborn had been named by Madison; but the Senate rejected the appointment, and the office was for a time left in the temporary charge of Crawford. After Monroe's accession to the Presidency, moreover, it still remained for over seven months without responsible head other than the chief clerk. Indeed from the time of Monroe's resignation in February, 1815, until Calhoun entered upon his duties in December, 1817,—a period of two years and ten months,—there was never a head of the army with a single eye to its interest. Small wonder that with such a history there was no control, no unity,—

137. Crawford was apparently quite sincere in thinking that Calhoun owed the appointment to him. See expression in his entirely private letter of 1811; Shipp's "Crawford," p. 250. Some people always think that their lightest words accomplish marvels.

<sup>3</sup> Charleston "Courier" of December 30, 1817. Simkins took his seat in Congress on February 9, 1818.

hardly a single one of the elements essential to military success.

So loose was the management that hosts of unbalanced and unsettled accounts stood upon the books of the department, their total actually reaching the then enormous sum (for our young country) of forty-five million dollars. There was not only no headship in the office but the duties of the Secretary himself were quite undefined, and his actions, as will shortly be shown, often in violation of all military rule. With such chaos prevailing at the centre, it is not surprising that the widely scattered army was in hopeless confusion. It is with a sense of blank amazement, and with wonder that we ever emerged from the War of 1812 still a nation, that one reads the facts, which it has been shown <sup>4</sup> Calhoun had brought to the attention of Congress in 1814, in regard to the complete lack of unity in our army.

But there were by this time both army men and other officials who had become conscious of these defects; and it is no bold surmise to assume that Calhoun was one of these. The fact that he introduced the resolution that brought out the lamentable truth of the matter, probably after discussion with Monroe,—who was then acting as Secretary of War,—indicates that he and Monroe appreciated the difficulty and designed to correct it; and the already detailed subsequent resolution he introduced for the creation of a Board of Officers to prepare rules and regulations for field service points the same way. He wanted, too, at the same time to inquire into and to change the then prevailing and most inefficient mode of supplying our armies by contract. Nothing seems to have come of these efforts, and probably the matters were forgotten when peace soon followed. The difficulties continued to exist and came later under Calhoun's more direct control as head of the War Department.

One other element contributing to the confusion and to its cure must be mentioned. Men given to bold and hot-headed ways not infrequently accomplish great ends, if their character or the surrounding circumstances be such that they must

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 215, 216.

be listened to. Jackson was eminently a man of this type. When any one trod on his toes, personal or official, trouble was sure to follow, and he was so often right on the main question that he carried his point in many instances. It has been said that the actions of our Secretaries of War in these early days were often in violation of all military rule. Thus, they had a practice of sending vital orders direct to some subordinate officer, instead of through his official superior,—even going so far as to detach the subordinate and send him far away, without the superior's knowledge.

An instance in point occurred in Jackson's command in 1814 and led to a vigorous remonstrance on his part. Again, in 1817, orders were issued from the Department to one of his subordinates, without his being so much as informed of the fact, and he then "resolved to settle the difficulty in his own way." The method he adopted was not very suave, but at least it brought matters to a head and was in the end effective. He issued of his own motion an order to his command,—dated April 22, 1817,—directing the officers under him to refuse in the future to obey such behests of the War Office; and when, before long, this order of his was obeyed by a subordinate and a command direct from the department was not carried out, Jackson wrote to the President on August 12, 1817, assuming all responsibility for the "proper disobedience" of his subordinate. Here was a serious issue with a general of boundless popularity.

When Calhoun took up the duties of his new position on December 8,<sup>5</sup> 1817, this dispute with Jackson must have been one of the first questions to call for decision. It is evident that Monroe in the main sided with the department and against Jackson in the matter, but he says he wanted to shield the general, and possibly he was anxious to avoid a quarrel with a leading officer; so the matter was shortly settled by a rule, which doubtless had the approval of the President as

<sup>5</sup> The Charleston "Courier" of December 17, 1817, quotes from the Washington "Gazette" of the 9th an item to the effect that Calhoun "was yesterday qualified and entered upon his duties"; see also McDuffie's "Statement in the Mix Investigation," Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXI, p. 405. Calhoun had arrived in Washington on December 2nd. "Courier" of December 13.



well as of the new Secretary, to the effect that in future all orders should issue to the commanders of divisions, except in extraordinary cases, and then the commander should at once be notified. Jackson had carried his point, and his violent and hot-headed method had led to the correction of a great abuse.<sup>6</sup>

One or two other matters of importance, which occurred shortly before Calhoun took charge of his office, must be mentioned. On April 24, 1816, a statute was passed to organize what was called the "general staff," but it must be remembered that these words had then quite a different meaning from either that which they came to bear in a very few years or that which belongs to them to-day. The new law was in the main based on the prior one of March 3, 1815, and provided (*e. g.*) for a Quartermaster General and necessary assistants in each division. The idea of one Quartermaster General, one Commissary General, and so on for the whole army with subordinates in the divisions, responsible to the head of the particular branch, had not yet found expression. The commander-in-chief of the army at this time was Major-General Jacob Brown, who had been named on June 15, 1815, and continued to hold the office until his death, February 24, 1828. He was a Quaker and had been a schoolmaster in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, but showed himself to be a most efficient officer and would doubtless be better remembered to-day but that the brilliance of Jackson's achievement at New Orleans led to the eclipse of his brother officers.

One other important step had been taken in 1816 in our military organization. Madison<sup>7</sup> had called out from France and named as Chief Engineer of the Army Simon Bernard, who had been an aide-de-camp and prominent officer of en-

<sup>6</sup> Parton's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 375, 376. "The Military Policy of the United States," by Major General Emory Upton, published by the Government, 1904, pp. 145, 146. "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VII, pp. 141, 143. The dispute with Jackson arose out of an order issued by Chief Clerk Graham detaching the officer in question without notice. Jackson was much pleased at the method of its settlement by Calhoun's order: Narrative by Wm. B. Lewis in Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, p. 311.

<sup>7</sup> It was often said that Calhoun had caused General Bernard to be sent for, but such was not the case. "Congressional Debates," Vol. XI, Part I, 1834-35, p. 609.



gineers under Napoleon. This was not done without causing serious dissatisfaction among our own officers, but the eminent Frenchman long held his position with us and rendered most valuable service. Like so many of his countrymen, he returned later to his native land and died there.

Such was approximately the condition of the War Office when Calhoun took charge. Everything lay before him to learn. We are told by his "Autobiography" that he had paid but little attention to military matters and had never read a treatise on the subject, except a small volume on the staff. What he did know must have been acquired through touch with the department during the war, and this can have been but little and had, of course, placed him under no responsibility. To add to his troubles, he took charge at the very time when Congress was coming together and was sure to throw at him a thousand requests for information far easier to ask than to answer, while members must have been forever besieging him with propositions of every kind on behalf of their constituents.

In addition to these difficulties, the long-time chief clerk, George Graham, resigned at this very time,<sup>8</sup> and the new Secretary was thus deprived of the aid of his great experience. Major Christopher Van Deventer, who was selected in his place, was without experience in the office, but had been in the army from 1809 to 1816 and had held the position of deputy Quartermaster General from March, 1813, to June, 1815. During most of this time, however, he was confined in Canada<sup>9</sup> as a hostage, so that he had apparently had but little experience in war, but he became a most efficient chief clerk, as well as a life-long friend and supporter of Calhoun. The official position he occupied in the War Office was one of a very confidential nature and corresponded with that nowadays known as Assistant Secretary.<sup>10</sup>

The new head determined,—so we are told in the "Auto-

<sup>8</sup> "Autobiography," p. 25; Charleston "Courier" of December 17, 1817.

<sup>9</sup> Van Deventer's own statement before the Investigating Committee of 1822 upon the Rip Rap Contract, printed in Niles's "Register," Vol. XXII, p. 262.

<sup>10</sup> Mr. Gaillard Hunt in his "Life of Calhoun," pp. 45, 46.

biography,"—to do as little as possible for the time but to listen and observe closely until he could gain a knowledge of the actual state of the department and its needs. Even thus, however, plenty of work was found by him during these days of observation, and he writes that not less than fourteen or fifteen hours of severe labor were necessary to get through with the daily duties.<sup>11</sup> Near the end of December, he had to make a report<sup>12</sup> to the President, in order to enable the latter to comply with a House resolution of December 11th; but it was not a very elaborate document and merely gave details of the strength of the army, and went on to state that the force was sufficient to keep the fortifications in a state of preservation, but wholly inadequate for defense against regular attack.

To this the report added,—thus showing that a design was already afoot in which the Secretary was very active later on,—that "a board of the most skillful officers in our service had been constituted to examine the whole line of our frontier, and to determine on the position and extent of works that may be necessary to the defense of the country." Upon this subject Calhoun asserted in 1838, in the course of an angry debate with Webster that he had projected and commenced the system of fortifications for the defense of our harbors, but only three years before he had said that he was not "the author of the system of fortifications. . . . They were commenced in 1816, under General Bernard, who was called from France by the preceding administration to superintend the erection of fortifications."<sup>13</sup> He was, beyond doubt, at least a main factor in continuing them.

But the session of Congress did not go by without the enactment into law of a conception of the utmost moment, and in-

<sup>11</sup> "Autobiography," pp. 25, 30.

<sup>12</sup> "Report to President," dated December 22, 1817, American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. I, p. 669, *et seq.*

<sup>13</sup> Speeches in the Senate on February 24, 1835 ("Congressional Debates," Vol. X, Part I, 1834-35, p. 609), and on March 22, 1838 ("Congressional Globe," Twenty-Fifth Congress, Second Session, Appendix, p. 246). Monroe had written on February 22, 1815, in a Report to Congress ("Writings," Vol. V, p. 325): "It seems to be our duty to fortify our coast in such a manner as to afford protection to our principal cities, harbors and even to our great bays and inlets."

deed Calhoun must have been actively engaged on this matter within two months of taking charge of his office. What seems to have led to it was a marked case of failure in the then system of supplying our armies by local contracts. During the operations against the Seminoles, the contractor had failed,—as not infrequently happened,—to deliver the required articles at the places directed, and “the situation [of the army] had become well-nigh desperate.” Williams, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, on January 21, 1818, moved a resolution calling for information upon this subject, to which Monroe answered on the 30th by a report from Calhoun setting forth the contract and the contractor's failure. Meanwhile Tichenor had offered resolutions in the Senate (January 22nd) looking to the abolition of hospital surgeons and some other grades, on the ground of economy. It will be found that the bill later passed was urged to no little extent on the plea of saving expense, and it was called *An Act to Reduce the Staff*.

But before any bill was even introduced there were some very important conferences between the Secretary of War and Williams, in which the former broached that idea of placing one chief officer of high rank at the head of certain branches of the staff, which soon resulted in bureau or departmental administration. Under the system prevailing in our army down to that date, each separate command had a chief Commissary, Surgeon, Judge Advocate, etc., but there was no supreme head of the particular department to whom all its members were subordinate and to whom they reported. So far as appears, the change,—by which one officer was to be put at the head of a department and made responsible for its conduct,—was first broached by Calhoun in his conversations upon the subject with Williams.<sup>14</sup> Fortunately for us, he summed up his ideas in a letter to Williams under date of February 5, 1818. In this he wrote:

<sup>14</sup> “The Army of the United States” by Theo. F. Rodenbaugh and Wm. L. Haskins, p. 50; and Thomas H. S. Hamersly's “Complete Regular Army Register of the United States,” 1779-1879, p. 244, both speak of the reforms then created as originating with Calhoun. See also General Emory Upton's “Military Policy of the United States,” pp. 149-151.

Feeling as I do the importance of a well regulated staff, I regret that want of minute knowledge in relation to it, which would enable me to state my ideas with great decision, both as to the present system, and such amendments as it may be susceptible of.

If the Committee should think that so much of the act of 1816, as creates the offices of Hospital Surgeons and Hospital surgeon's mates, and judge advocates, ought to be repealed, I would suggest the propriety of creating in lieu of them, the offices of Surgeon General and Judge Advocate general. I have already offered to you my ideas in relation to them in conversation, and now will only briefly restate them. The medical staff is at present without responsibility; and must, I conceive, remain so till its duties are brought to a centre. To introduce responsibility, it should be the duty of the surgeons of the Army, to make quarterly return of the manner in which they have performed their duties. These returns ought among other particulars to contain a list of the sick, their disease, the prescriptions and issues of medical stores. It must be apparent that there ought to be a medical character of eminence, to report to the Head of Department on these returns. . . . The Judge Advocate general would be the adviser of the Department, in all cases touching martial laws; and would in important trials be ordered to act as Judge advocate. . . . The Quarter master's Department may, I conceive, be rendered more simple and efficient. I would suggest the propriety of one quarter master general, with one deputy for each division and as many assistants as the same may require. No branch of the general staff is more important or difficult to be managed than the quarter master's; none requires more eminently the control of a single and responsible head. . . .

On the 18th of February, Williams brought in a bill "to reduce the staff," which was based on these ideas of Calhoun, but there was one other suggestion of great moment made in the Senate. On the same day when the bill was presented, James Barbour of Virginia offered resolutions in regard to substituting a cheaper and more effective mode of supplying the army by subjecting those undertaking the duty to military law,<sup>15</sup> and this was approved by the Senate. Later this pro-

<sup>15</sup> It will be remembered that while in the House Calhoun had suggested a change in the method of supplying the army; but there is nothing to show what system he wanted to adopt. *Ante*, p. 215.



posed amendment and another were referred back to the Committee; and they again reported the bill, on March 20, with a section embodying Barbour's suggestion. The bill was finally passed by the Senate on March 26 and sent to the House.

The "Autobiography" tells us that the scheme was denounced as wild and impracticable, and in the House (the debate in the Senate is hardly reported at all) there were at least two members who spoke against it,—Colston and Desha. The measure passed, however, on April 8th, with amendments of no great moment, which were agreed to in the Senate on the same day, and the bill was then approved by the President on April 14th. The prophets of evil were certainly wrong as to this measure, but it was beyond question a radical change. Probably, it was for this reason that the law was limited by its terms to the period of five years.<sup>10</sup>

The new statute thus passed introduced for the first time in our history the idea of unity of control in the staff. In several branches an officer of high grade was to be placed at the head of the particular department,—a man who should be responsible for its proper management and to whom all those employed in it should be directly subordinate. The old contract system, by which separate contracts were made in each command with a result similar to that in the Seminole case, was done away with and the modern subsistence department established, with purchase by a central bureau. A Commissary-General, a Surgeon-General, and a Quartermaster General were by its terms all created for the first time. Large discretion as to the necessary regulations for all this new machinery was left to the Secretary of War and the President.

In carrying out the law great care was taken in the selection of the various heads. Colonel Gibson was named Commissary-General; General Jesup, Quartermaster-General, and Dr. Joseph Lovell, Surgeon-General. Nor, by these selections, was the work more than begun; but the new officers,

<sup>10</sup> For the progress of this measure through Congress, see "Annals of Congress," Fifteenth Congress, First Session, 1817-18, Vol. I, pp. 119, 129, 131, 160, 210, 211, 213, 268, 273, 289, 290, 293, 350: *ibid.*, II, pp. 1568, 1687, 1687, 1690, 1692.



doubtless more than the Secretary himself, became at once actively engaged in organizing the bureaus under them. Jesup soon submitted to Calhoun a projet of the nature and functions of the office in his charge, and doubtless the other heads must have done the same thing. These were then published with the force of law by the Secretary and President, and the new departments entered on their history, destined to survive in the main the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish flurry and then merely to be modified by a further extension of the principle of unity of control.<sup>17</sup>

The main idea of the plan to form bureaus at Washington under the supreme direction of one head and in close touch with the Secretary of War, and thus secure energy and promptness, seems<sup>18</sup> to have been realized at the time of the law's enactment; and in a few years after its origin the system was extended to cover all branches of the staff, and ere long the head of the army<sup>19</sup> as well as the heads of the various bureaus were all centered in Washington, "thus bringing," so wrote Calhoun in 1822,<sup>20</sup> "the military administration of the army, as well as its pecuniary, through the several subordinate branches, under the immediate inspection and control of the Government. There is reason to believe that the arrangement will be highly useful." This was in close accord with the view he had expressed<sup>21</sup> in 1820 that the true principle was that "every distinct branch of the staff should terminate in a chief, to be stationed, at least in peace, near the seat of Government, and to be made responsible for its condition."

It is of course impossible to ascertain with accuracy from whose mind these really great improvements came, and doubt-

<sup>17</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 137, 140, 141. Rodenbaugh and Haskins's "Army of the United States," pp. 50-52, 74, 75, 87, 106, 113, 351. Hamersly's "Army Register," pp. 244, 329.

<sup>18</sup> "National Intelligencer," as quoted in Niles's "Register," Vol. XIV, p. 224 (May 23, 1818).

<sup>19</sup> John Quincy Adams ("Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 31) tells us that the Major-General of the army was fixed to reside at Washington by the General Orders of May 17, 1821, issued in pursuance of the Act of March 2, 1821, for the reduction of the army.

<sup>20</sup> Report of Dec. 3, 1822, on the Condition of the Military Establishments and Fortifications, "Works," Vol. V, p. 123.

<sup>21</sup> Report of December 12, 1820, "Works," V, p. 85.

less the truth is that many men contributed to them. Calhoun's lack of military training makes it highly unlikely that the whole credit can be his; but there is every appearance that he had a far larger share in the matter than belonged to his mere functions as Secretary,<sup>22</sup> and there is at least no shadow of doubt but that he filled those functions to the full. Hearing and comparing, and then rejecting or adopting, the views of the technically educated men around him, he certainly was a chief factor in the selection of a good plan from the many opinions advanced and then in securing its legal sanction and in putting into form the thousand details necessary to apply it in practice.

He wrote to a correspondent in 1823 "Our military organization, and system of instruction, tho' not the same as either the French, or English, yet are based substantially on the same principles. What we have done is to modify and apply them to the circumstances in which we are placed."<sup>23</sup> And in later years he said<sup>24</sup> that his hand had drawn the Act of 1818 by which the change was first introduced, and also that which required that accounts,—instead of going as theretofore direct to the Treasury Department, without passing through the War Department,—should all first be endorsed by the head of the proper bureau and then be sent to the Chief of the War Department for final approval.

One hint of the origin of the plan is to be found in a letter to Calhoun of later years. According to Virgil Maxcy,<sup>25</sup> Major Van Deventer, the chief clerk in the War Office, was the first to suggest the idea, and Calhoun availed himself of

<sup>22</sup> John Quincy Adams's opinion of 1828 ("Diary," Vol. VIII, pp. 446, 447), that Calhoun "had no more share of mind in them [the improvements in military matters during his Secretaryship] than I have in the Acts of Congress to which I affix my signature of approbation," may in my opinion be disregarded as due almost entirely to the bitterness of Adams's then feelings in general and particularly against Calhoun.

<sup>23</sup> "Correspondence," p. 212.

<sup>24</sup> "Autobiography," p. 25. See also speech in Senate in 1838 in answer to Clay: "Congressional Globe," Second Session, Twenty-fifth Congress, "Appendix," 181, or Benton's "View," Vol. II, p. 112. "Congressional Globe," Thirtieth Congress, First Session, pp. 697, 698, 704-707. I am unable to find any Act of Congress containing regulations for the disposition of accounts, and presume that they were probably contained in some departmental order.

<sup>25</sup> Calhoun "Correspondence," pp. 791-93.

the suggestion and recommended it to Congress before the arrival of Generals Brown and Jesup in Washington. On the other hand, these two officers, both highly capable men, seem to have claimed a good deal of the credit for themselves.

Brown, in particular, before a Congressional Committee in 1827,<sup>26</sup> made light of the claims of the "civil gentlemen," and said that the "improvements suggested themselves to the officers of the army: they communicated them to Mr. Calhoun, who perceived their importance and utility, and adopted and embodied them, and was the organ, if I may so call it, of making them known. I have never understood, nor do I believe Mr. Calhoun claimed any great merit or applause for his agency in the business." Brown rather seems, however, later on in his testimony, to admit that Calhoun was entitled to much of the credit for the change in the Commissary Department, and he specially emphasizes the services in the whole matter of General John Williams, the chairman of the Senate Military Committee.

General Jesup, in his testimony<sup>27</sup> in the same matter, was more liberal to Calhoun and said he believed that the then organization of the army was the result of one or more conferences between the Secretary of War and some members of the Senate Military Committee; but later on he seems at first blush to assert of the bill, which became a law: "I put [it] into form, at the request of Colonel Williams and Colonel Trimble, from memoranda furnished by them." But the apparent contradiction of Calhoun in this statement is made clear by the fact,—which becomes evident on more careful inspection,—that Jesup referred to the later act of 1821 for the reduction of the Army and not at all to the initial one of 1818, which inaugurated the changes. Of this law he expressly said that he believed it was the result of the combined efforts of the Secretary of War and of Colonel Williams of the Senate.

Both Brown and Jesup admitted the high value of Cal-

<sup>26</sup> House Committee appointed by the House on December 29, 1826, on a letter of Vice President Calhoun asking for an investigation of his conduct while Secretary of War. House Report, No. 79, Nineteenth Congress, Second Session, pp. 164, 165.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 162.

houn's services in general as Secretary of War and united with Generals Macomb and Roberdeau and other army and department men in the testimonial to the retiring Secretary dated February 28, 1825, in which they said "the degree of perfection to which you have carried the several branches of this department is believed to be without parallel."<sup>28</sup>

Many reports of the Secretary of War show the good results flowing from the changes. It has been said<sup>29</sup> that, on March 4, 1817, there remained unsettled on the books of the auditors, accounts for past military expenditures to the amount of over forty-five million dollars. By the rigid system of accountability introduced under the new regulations, these arrearages were reduced by September 30, 1822, to \$4,689,292, and by December, 1824, to \$3,136,991, and this small balance consisted of losses and accounts that never could be settled.<sup>30</sup>

Since March 4, 1817, the Department had expended nearly forty-one million dollars, of which all had been settled by September 30, 1822, but six and a quarter millions of recent expenditures, the greater part of which was made up of accounts in the regular and due course of settlement. In the first three-quarters of 1822, there was drawn from the Treasury on account of military expenses \$1,930,464, of which the vast bulk had been already accounted for by the end of November,—and the Secretary wrote that "there is reasonable ground to believe that the disbursements of the year will be made without any loss to the Government."<sup>31</sup> This forecast was, moreover, borne out by the event; and in his report of December, 1823,<sup>32</sup> he was able to state that of the total expenditures of his department for the preceding year amounting to over four and a half million,—this total included pensions,—“there has not been a single defalcation, nor the loss of a cent to the Government.” A similar result for 1823 appears from the annual report of December, 1824.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXVIII, pp. 37, 38.

<sup>29</sup> *Ante*, p. 228.

<sup>30</sup> Reports of November, 1822, and December, 1824; "Works," Vol. V, pp. 125, 137. "Autobiography," p. 26.

<sup>31</sup> Report to the President, dated November 26, 1822, "Works," Vol. V, pp. 123-126.

<sup>32</sup> Report for 1823, *ibid.*, pp. 133, 134.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137-147.



In 1822, in obedience to a resolution of the House, Calhoun made a statement of the comparative cost of the army per man from 1818 to 1822.<sup>34</sup> After allowing for the difference of prices, he divided the expenses into two classes — one made up of elements such as pay, fixed by law and not capable of being affected by administration, and the other consisting of supplies in general, which are highly capable of reduction by good management. Then, taking the annual totals for the second class, he found that the average amount of these charges for each man had been in 1818, \$299.64; in 1819, \$275.98; in 1820, \$175.43; in 1821, \$150.40, and in 1822 (partly estimated), \$144.16.

If calculations of this nature are often quagmires of error and self deception, we have an entirely reliable comparison of the results in one department (the Paymaster's) made in later years by another hand. In 1839, Paymaster General Towson reported that from 1808 to 1811, the average annual loss by defalcation under the system of regimental and battalion paymasters amounted to 1.58 per centum of the amount disbursed and the annual average expenses for paying the army were 3.10 per centum. From the beginning of the war down to 1816, under the same system, these averages were defalcations 2.98 per centum and expenses 4.36 per centum. From the organization of the new plan, with a Paymaster General at the head, from 1821 to 1825, the average defalcations were 0.22 per centum and the expenses 2.13 per centum. From 1825, when the system had been well established, there was not one dollar of loss by defalcation, and the expenses were 1.33 per centum.<sup>35</sup>

One other army report of Calhoun's is worthy of careful examination and shows that he had already in 1820 a pretty

<sup>34</sup> Report to the House, dated March 5, 1823; "Works," Vol. V, pp. 115-122.

<sup>35</sup> Rodenbaugh and Haskins's "Army of the United States," p. 106. Before the House Committee of 1826-27 on the conduct of the Vice-President (Calhoun), Towson testified that during the four or five years preceding 1822, the defalcations in the Paymaster's departments had been from \$250,000 to \$350,000, and since then only about \$14,000. Report No. 79. House of Representatives, Nineteenth Congress, Second Session, p. 153.



clear idea of the system used in modern days by which a comparatively small peace establishment can easily and very rapidly be enlarged in case of war into a far larger and yet highly efficient body of men. On December 12, 1820, in compliance with a resolution of the House of the prior session, he suggested a method for the reduction of the army from 10,000 to 6,000 men, which was based on this design. The chief idea seems to have been to reduce the rank and file, while the corps of officers already existing was to be mainly preserved. After some remarks upon our peculiar situation and needs, he wrote in part as follows:

The great and leading objects, then, of a military establishment in peace, ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience; so that, at all times, the country may have at its command a body of officers, sufficiently numerous, and well instructed in every branch of duty, both of the line and staff; and the organization of the army ought to be such as to enable the Government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly organized and prepared for actual service. . . .

To give such an organization, the leading principles in its formation ought to be, that, at the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and war formation of the army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the only change in passing from the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary.

It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder; and the weakness and danger, which otherwise would be inevitable, be avoided. Two consequences flow from this principle. First, the organization of the staff in a peace establishment, ought to be such, that every branch of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and post occupied may render necessary; and secondly, that the organization of the line ought, so far as practicable, to be such that, in passing from the peace to the war formation, the force may be sufficiently augmented without adding new regiments or battalions;

thus raising the war on the basis of the peace establishment, instead of creating a new army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late war.

The Secretary then presented a plan with tables, to carry out the ideas advanced, by which he proposed to reduce the army to 6316 non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates; and this little army could be easily expanded in case of war to 19,035, officers and men. Very high authority<sup>36</sup> has said of this report and of Calhoun's plans for the army in general: "It will be perceived from the above that nearly sixty years ago one of our leading statesmen strongly urged the expansive organization which now prevails in every army of Europe. His plan, in brief, for the Adjutant General's, Quartermaster General's and Commissary's Departments consisted in having a permanent chief for each, nearly all of the subordinate grades being filled by details from the line." But the same eminent authority adds that there were two defects certain to insure failure, the neglect to provide in the higher regimental grades the requisite numbers of officers to insure uniform operation, and the neglect to replace captains and lieutenants detailed from the line by the same number of supernumeraries. But for these defects and the omission to provide that in time of peace all officers detailed from the line should return periodically to their companies, "the plan of Mr. Calhoun, had it been adopted, would have given us all the advantages of the most modern staff organizations."

Here, again, there is no direct evidence that I know of to show whose mind conceived the plan detailed, but the head of the department is certainly entitled to high credit for his suggestions. They were not, however, adopted by Congress, but a reduction made on quite another basis and which did not include the advantages presented by the Secretary's far-seeing plan.

From the time when Calhoun took charge of his office, a new spirit was infused into the army. Officers found that

<sup>36</sup> "The Military Policy of the United States," by Major-General Emory Upton, pp. 150, 151. General Upton does not seem to have known of the Act of April 14, 1818. Probably, the statutes were in his day less easy to find than now.

appreciation was the lot of the deserving, and the admirable material then and always in our military service responded at once. Watching closely the affairs of his department and making occasional trips of inspection<sup>37</sup> Calhoun doubtless knew the characters of the commanding officers, and they must all have soon felt the complete control of the immediate head of their branch in Washington, while back of him was the strong hand of the Secretary ready in case of need to hold them rigidly to duty.

Even the irascible and boundlessly popular Jackson was called to account<sup>38</sup> in 1819 for failures of officers under his command to carry out the new regulations, and the rebuke was made plain enough, if the hand administering it was a little gloved. After calling attention to the neglects, the Secretary wrote in a confidential letter:

I am persuaded that no one is more deeply convinced of the truth of this proposition [the necessity of a rigid adherence to the laws and regulations] than yourself, and that it is only necessary to call your attention to the irregularities which I have stated to relieve me from the necessity of determining whether I shall permit the orders of the Government to be habitually neglected, or resort to the proper means of enforcing them. Should the alternative be presented, I will not hesitate to do my duty.

The effort to unify the system and no longer to permit that as in the past different commands could not be exercised together was very marked. As early as 1818, General Scott was engaged by the Department in writing a manual of infantry tactics,<sup>39</sup> and in 1820, in pursuance of the directions of an Act of Congress of December 22, 1819, Scott was also preparing, under the directions of the Secretary, a system of field service and police, and Judge Advocate Major Storrow

<sup>37</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 177, 178, 225. In the trip of 1820, he went as far as Boston and was much fêted by Webster and others, Curtis's Webster, Vol. I, pp. 176, 177. That of 1824 was to the summit of the Alleghenies, and was descanted upon by the partisan Thomas Cooper in his well-known pamphlet "Consolidation" as a *frolic*.

<sup>38</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 160, 161.

<sup>39</sup> Calhoun "Correspondence," p. 140.

a system of martial law.<sup>40</sup> In 1821 the Secretary was urging the adoption for our service of General Lallemand's Treatise on Artillery.<sup>41</sup> In 1823, when it was found,—after the reduction of the army in 1821,—that the artillery was distributed in such small masses that it could not be properly exercised, a School of Artillery was established at Fortress Monroe,<sup>42</sup> and in 1824, a board of officers was engaged in revising the book of field exercise and military manœuvres of infantry, which had been adopted at the close of the war, in order to adapt it to our then army system and to the use of militia.<sup>43</sup>

Military expeditions were, moreover, sent out in 1819, under the command of Colonels Atkinson and Leavenworth, to the upper waters of the Missouri and of the Mississippi, with a view to the control of the powerful Indian tribes and to preventing the domination of the fur trade by the British.<sup>44</sup> It is worthy of observation that the Secretary suggested to Colonel Atkinson the advisability of the use of steamboats, and it should also be noted that the idea of sending military expeditions to the wild regions of our northwestern frontier had been advanced by Monroe in 1815.<sup>45</sup>

Among Calhoun's many reports are to be found numbers upon the subject of the Indians and the best way to manage that once so difficult branch of the army's duties. In 1819, an annual appropriation of \$10,000 for their civilization was decided upon, and the Secretary devised regulations by which this sum might be expended by the hands of beneficial societies. He reported upon this more than once, and in his regulations insisted that the societies to receive any share of the money should instruct the boys in agriculture and the girls in spinning, weaving and sewing. He had also a large share in carrying into effect the plan originated by Jefferson for

<sup>40</sup> Calhoun's Report of December 22, 1820, to the House, in American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. II, pp. 199, *et seq.*

<sup>41</sup> "Correspondence," p. 192.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 208.

<sup>43</sup> "Works," Vol. V, p. 138.

<sup>44</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 134, 148, 155, 159, 166, 171, "Works," Vol. V, p. 62.

<sup>45</sup> Letter of February 22, 1815, to the Senate Military Committee: "Writings," Vol. V, p. 325.



the removal of the Indians to the west of the Mississippi, and told Benton in the Senate in 1835 that the recommendation of Monroe to that effect was founded on "a report of which I was the author as Secretary of War." This was a matter of great moment in those days to the States east of the Mississippi.<sup>46</sup>

The West Point Military Academy, which owed its origin to an Act of 1802 but was still a part of the Corps of Engineers, with the cadets attached exclusively to that branch of the service, was to a considerable extent reorganized and given a standing of its own, while the Chief of Engineers was removed to Washington in accordance with the general policy of centering there all the heads of the various branches of the army. Two reports of the Secretary, of 1819 and 1820,<sup>47</sup> bore on this subject, and in the earlier one he advocated — largely as he had done in the House of Representatives — one additional Military Academy, to be placed where it would accommodate the Southern and Western portions of the country. In both reports, he urged also as a means of further military education the establishment of "a school of application and practice."

In other ways, too, he made good use of the materials within his reach, not only aiming to create an efficient military system but to turn it to good account, whenever possible. Interested himself in scientific matters,<sup>48</sup> he secured from the army surgeons not only extensive reports upon the diseases they were called upon to treat, but had them furnished with thermometers, barometers and hygrometers, and required reports of the weather to be sent by them to the surgeon-general. These, or at least parts of them were later printed in a sup-

<sup>46</sup> See his Reports in "Works," Vol. V, pp. 68-72, 99-108. American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. II, p. 541, &c. "Congressional Debates," Vol. XI, Part I, 1834-35, p. 435.

<sup>47</sup> "Works," Vol. V, pp. 54-57, 72-80.

<sup>48</sup> Calhoun was among the subscribers to "Silliman's Journal" in 1818, and in 1825 wrote Silliman agreeing to contribute one hundred dollars (and more, if necessary to make up the sum required) to some purpose having reference to Yale College. He said he looked upon Yale as "one of the lights of the nation, which under Providence, has mainly contributed to guide this people in the path of political, moral and religious duties," and he was fully convinced of the utility of the "Journal." Geo. P. Fisher's "Life of Silliman," Vol. I, pp. 288, 325.



plement to the "Army Meteorological Register" of 1840, and were moreover used by Dr. Samuel Forry in the preparation of his extensive work on "The Climate of the United States" and of the "Statistical Report of the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States," which was compiled by him and published under the directions of the Surgeon General. Forry recognized in his book on Climate how much was due in the matter to Calhoun's enlarged views, and we may safely assume that the Secretary's policy in this matter helped materially to lead up to the Weather Bureau of more modern days.<sup>49</sup>

It will be remembered that, while Calhoun was a member of the House, he had sought in 1816-17 to lead up to a system of public improvements by the federal government, but had been met at the last minute by a quite unexpected veto of Madison, on the ground of lack of constitutional power.<sup>50</sup> Even at that date the idea was not new, for quite an elaborate report had been made upon the subject by Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin in 1808,<sup>51</sup> in obedience to a resolution of the Senate, and Gallatin's recommendations were to a considerable extent similar to those made by Calhoun some nine years later.

Nor was Calhoun's voice the only one which had been heard upon the subject at the session of 1816-17. Clay had thanked him on the floor for bringing the bill before Congress and "for the able and luminous view which he had submitted" of the matter, and at this same session a committee had moreover been appointed on that part of the President's message relating to roads and canals. From this committee Thomas Wilson of Pennsylvania reported on February 9th, specifying

<sup>49</sup> The Library of Congress has a copy of the Statistical Report. The other two books are in the Library of the Weather Bureau.

<sup>50</sup> *Ante*, p. 210, *et seq.*

<sup>51</sup> Annals of Congress, Tenth Congress, First Session, 1807-08, Vol. I, pp. 207, 332. Gallatin's Report is printed in American State Papers, Miscellaneous, Vol. I, pp. 724-921. It is a most elaborate paper, made up from many sources and touching advised and projected, as well as existing, improvements. John Quincy Adams claims ("Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 444) that he was the first to urge internal improvements as a system to be adopted by Congress, by a resolution he offered in the Senate on February 23, 1807. See Annals of Congress, Ninth Congress, Second Session, 1806-7, pp. 77, 78.

the routes thought advisable in a way very similar to what Calhoun had already advocated on the floor and what we shall soon see that he urged again later in another capacity.<sup>52</sup>

The rebuff of Madison's veto was a serious blow to the young representative, but his opportunity came again while Secretary of War, and this though his then chief was clearly on record against him. Monroe had indeed considered the subject and written to Madison about it early in his term of office, and in his very first message expressed a "settled conviction . . . that Congress does not possess the power." He went on then to recommend that a constitutional amendment should be obtained, and again in 1819 wanted to make the same recommendation.<sup>53</sup> In 1822, also, a few years later than Calhoun's report about to be mentioned, Monroe perhaps showed his general adherence to this opinion by vetoing the bill for the repair of the Cumberland Road and for erecting and maintaining toll-gates upon it.

On April 4, 1818, the House passed a resolution calling on the Secretary of War to report at the next session "a plan for the application of such means as are within the power of Congress, for the purpose of opening and constructing such roads and canals as may deserve and require the aid of Government, with a view to military operations in time of war," etc., etc. In reply Calhoun wrote a letter<sup>54</sup> to Speaker Clay in which he did not discuss at all the constitutional question, thinking it improper to do so under the resolution, but said that "the measures proposed must be considered as depending on the decision of that question." The report was of some length, with plans, and detailed the military roads and public highways already constructed by Congress or the States. The works it proposed for the United States Government to undertake were similar to those he had advocated in the House in 1817, and which he again suggested in his last annual re-

<sup>52</sup> Annals of Congress, Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 1816-17, pp. 866, 924-33.

<sup>53</sup> John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 462-64, 468-70; Schouler's "United States," Vol. IV, p. 248; "Monroe's Writings," Vol. VI, p. 32.

<sup>54</sup> "Works," Vol. V, pp. 40-54.

port to the President, after an Act had passed Congress authorizing the necessary survey and plans.

Before the letter to Clay was sent, however, a meeting of the Cabinet was held to consider the matter. Monroe thought it irregular of the House to call for a report direct to them from his subordinate and put to the cabinet the question whether it could be made consistently with his declaration in his message at the opening of the prior session of the opinion that Congress has not the constitutional power. The discussion developed the fact that the Houses of Congress had often asked for reports direct to them, and Calhoun readily agreed to omit certain portions of his draft containing intimations of a duty upon Congress to make internal improvements, which of course conflicted very strongly with Monroe's expressed opinions. The report was then sent in, but Adams thought it had been asked for in this way with the very object of embarrassing the President and exciting divisions in his councils.<sup>55</sup>

There was, however, so much attraction in the idea of splendid public improvements and they grew so popular, that Monroe finally yielded upon the subject, possibly carried away to some extent (as the partisan Cooper charged in his pamphlet "Consolidation") by the great influence sure to flow from the large expenditures they would necessitate. In a few years the Act of April 30, 1824, became a law with the President's approval, and he was authorized "to cause the necessary surveys, plans and estimates to be made of the routes of such roads and canals as he may deem of national importance in a commercial or military point of view, or necessary to the transportation of the mails." This "Survey Bill," as it was called, was evidently a matter of great interest to the public, and the debates were extensively reproduced in the newspapers. It seems almost a direct carrying out of the suggestions made by Calhoun<sup>56</sup> in his letter to Clay in 1819, that a military survey of the country should be made under the engineers of the army, as a means of de-

<sup>55</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 217, 218.

<sup>56</sup> "Works," Vol. V, pp. 48, 50.

ciding on the best system of highways to be constructed.

The execution of the law fell to Calhoun's department and a board of engineers was constituted, consisting of General Bernard and Colonel Totten, of the engineer corps, and John L. Sullivan, a civil engineer.<sup>57</sup> Under their direction, a survey was begun of such routes as the Secretary of War determined to be of national importance. This was late in Calhoun's term, but he was enabled to get the plan under way, and in his last annual report of December, 1824, he went at length into the question of the most desirable routes. As this was his latest official notice of the subject and the plan had then taken positive shape, it will be well to go to it to ascertain his final views in regard to the routes most desirable to improve. He wrote:

. . . The United States may be considered, in a geographical point of view, as consisting of three distinct parts; of which the portion extending along the shores of the Atlantic, and back to the Allegheny mountains, constitutes one; that lying on the lakes and the St. Lawrence, another; and that watered by the Mississippi—including its various branches, the other. These several portions are very distinctly marked by well-defined lines, and have naturally but little connection, particularly in a commercial point of view. It is only by artificial means of communication that this natural separation can be overcome; to effect which much has already been done. The great canal of New York firmly unites the country of the lakes with the Atlantic, through the channel of the North River; and the National Road from Cumberland to Wheeling, commenced under the administration of Mr. Jefferson, unites, but more imperfectly, the Western with the Atlantic States. But the complete union of these separate parts, which geographically constitute our country, can only be effected by the completion of the projected canal to the Ohio and Lake Erie, by means of which, the country lying on the lakes will be firmly united to that on the Western waters, and both with the Atlantic States, and the whole intimately connected with the centre. These considerations, of themselves, without taking into view others, fairly bring this great work within the provisions of the act directing the surveys; but when we extend

<sup>57</sup> "Works," Vol. V, p. 140.



our view, and consider the Ohio and the Mississippi, with their great branches, but as a prolongation of the canal, it must be admitted to be, not only of national importance, but of the very highest national importance, in a commercial military and political point of view. Thus considered, it involves the completion of the improvements in the navigation of both these rivers, which has been commenced under the appropriations of the last session of Congress; and also canals around the falls of the Ohio at Louisville, and Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River; both of which, it is believed, can be executed at a moderate expense. With these improvements, the projected canal would not only unite the three great sections of the country together, as has been pointed out, but would also unite, in the most intimate manner, all of the States on the lakes and the Western waters among themselves, and give complete effect to whatever improvement may be made by those States individually. The advantages, in fact, from the completion of this single work, as proposed, would be so extended and ramified throughout these great divisions of our country, already containing so large a portion of our population, and destined, in a few generations, to outnumber the most populous States of Europe, as to leave in that quarter, no other work for the execution of the General Government, excepting only the extension of the Cumberland Road from Wheeling to St. Louis, which is also conceived to be of "national importance."

The route which is deemed next in importance, in a national point of view, is the one extending through the entire tier of the Atlantic States, including those on the Gulf of Mexico. By averting to the division of our country through which this route must pass, it will be seen that there is a striking difference in geographical features between the portions which extend north and south of the seat of Government,—including the Chesapeake Bay, with its various arms, in the latter division. In the northern part of the division, all the great rivers terminate in deep and bold navigable estuaries,—while an opposite character distinguishes the mouths of the rivers in the other. This difference gives greater advantage to improvement by canal in the northern, and less in the southern division. In the former, it is conceived to be of high national importance to unite its deep and capacious bays by a series of canals; and the board was accordingly instructed to examine the routes for canals between



the Delaware and the Raritan,—between Barnstable and Buzzard's Bay,—and Boston Harbor and Narragansett Bay. The execution of the very important link in this line of communication between the Delaware and the Chesapeake, having been already commenced, was not comprehended in the order. These orders will be executed by the board before the termination of the season. The important results which would follow from the completion of this chain, in a commercial, military, and political point of view, are so striking that they need not be dwelt on. It would, at all times,—in peace and war,—afford a prompt, cheap and safe communication between all of the States north of the seat of Government, and greatly facilitate their communication with the centre of the Union. The States of New Hampshire and Maine, though lying beyond the point where these improvements would terminate, would not, on that account, less participate in the advantages, as they are no less interested than Massachusetts herself, in avoiding the long and dangerous passage round Cape Cod, which would be effected by the union of Barnstable with Buzzard's Bay.

In the section lying south of this, none of these advantages of communication by canal exist. A line of inland navigation, it is true, extends along nearly the whole line of coast, which is susceptible of improvement, and may be rendered highly serviceable; particularly in war, and on that account may be fairly considered of "national importance." The Dismal Swamp Canal, from Chesapeake Bay to Albemarle Sound,—which is nearly completed, constitutes a very important link in this navigation. But it is conceived that, for the southern division of our country, the improvement which would best affect the views of Congress, would be a durable road, extending from the seat of Government to New Orleans, through the Atlantic States; and the board will, accordingly, receive instructions to examine the route as soon as the next season will permit.

The completion of this work, and the line of canals to the north, would unite the several Atlantic States,—including those on the Gulf, in a strong bond of union, and connect the whole with the centre,—which would also be united, as has been shown, with those on the lakes and Western waters, by the improvements projected in that quarter.

These three great works, then,—the canal to Ohio and Lake Erie, with the improvement of the navigation of the Ohio, Mis-

issippi, and the canal round the Muscle Shoals,—the series of canals connecting the bays north of the seat of Government—and a durable road extending from the seat of Government to New Orleans, uniting the whole of the Southern Atlantic States, are conceived to be the most important objects within the provisions of the act of the last session. . . .<sup>58</sup>

As a member of the President's advisory council, it is clear that Calhoun was highly useful. Regular in attendance, always or often throwing light upon the subject under discussion and, though strongly inclined to believe his view right, yet by no means incapable of yielding it to that of some one else which seemed better, he was,—so we are told by one very capable of judging, when not blinded by passion,—specially remarkable for the capacity to see into a question very rapidly. He and Adams were, indeed, at this time close friends,<sup>59</sup> and the diarist's opinions may be accepted more safely than later, when his mind was distorted by jealousy and disappointment. The conflict between the ambitions of the two men had not yet driven them apart, and Adams was still as roseate as his strange puritan nature permitted with hope for a great political career. A very different color on this and other subjects is given to the diary after the utter breakdown of his presidency and the cold blight of hope consequent upon being turned out of public life in 1829.

Some details of importance are given by Adams of Calhoun's opinions in the cabinet, though far fewer than a biographer would wish. To one of these, a quite unmerited importance was added in later years by the well-known quarrel of Jackson with Calhoun. When in 1818 the administration learned that their Southern General had, without either leave or orders, suddenly taken it into his head to march upon Spanish territory, capture a Spanish town and shoot two British subjects, it is little wonder that they were not only alarmed, but were indignant against their subordinate.

The offence, for such it was, had special reference to Cal-

<sup>58</sup> "Works," Vol. V, pp. 142-146.

<sup>59</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 267.

houn's department, and he at first suspected that the movement of the general had connection with an American land-speculation at St. Marks's.<sup>60</sup> Accordingly, it was quite natural that at the early cabinet meetings upon the subject the Secretary of War was very decided in opinion against Jackson. Adams, on the other hand, was the leading supporter of the general and thought his difficulties so great, owing either to the inability or unwillingness of the Spaniards to restrain their lawless classes, that he was justified in invading foreign territory in self-defense, while the two Englishmen had in effect made themselves outlaws.

The discussion between Adams and Calhoun was for a time very animated, but Calhoun failed to convince his associates and in the end Adams's opinion was in the main acted on, except as to continuing to hold the captured territory. This conclusion seems to have been what Monroe had wanted from the start. The action of the American general was defended as necessary under the circumstances, while St. Mark's was handed over again to Spanish hands. Calhoun wrote in effect in later years that he was convinced by the discussions, and that the decision of the cabinet was unanimous; but when his first impressions in the matter became known to Jackson some years later, the knowledge contributed largely to inflame the latter's irascible temper, and thus had probably a very great influence in preventing Calhoun from attaining the position that was long the acme of his ambition.<sup>61</sup>

In regard to that assertion of our national determination, which has been known as the Monroe Doctrine and which is often curiously enough thought to be a clause of some international code of law, Adams gives a little information as to the opinion advanced by Calhoun, while the matter was under discussion in the cabinet, though here again provokingly little. Thus, he tells us that the Secretary of War, and Monroe, too, were in his opinion unduly alarmed as to the intentions of the Holy Alliance, thinking that the sovereigns meant to restore

<sup>60</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IV, p. 115; *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 332.

<sup>61</sup> Letter of May 29, 1830, to Jackson in "Works," Vol. VI, pp. 370-72. "Monroe's Works," Vol. VII, pp. 209-13, 225-27.

her South American dominions to Spain, and were then likely to attack us as the most conspicuous example of successful popular rebellion.

For these reasons, Calhoun wanted at once to take advantage of the opportunity offered by Canning's proposal to Rush, in order to detach Great Britain from the Alliance and hence favored giving our minister discretion to join in a declaration against interference by the united monarchs. In the repeated discussions of this vital question in the Cabinet, he took an active and leading part, not only in matters of substance but in such details as softening the too effusive expressions of republicanism contained in some of Adams's drafts, but it seems that the great motive power guiding him throughout the whole discussion was that distrust and fear which it has been already seen he had of the Holy Alliance.<sup>62</sup>

On the very first day in their lives on which Adams and Calhoun saw each other, they were both decidedly opposed to accepting some overtures from Clay, looking to an agreement as to the best mode of carrying out his plans for our recognition of Buenos Ayres or Chili. Again, at another cabinet meeting not much later, they united in the wish to retain Amelia Island, and Adams writes that the newly arrived member urged his view "with great force and effect," adding further that he "thinks for himself, independently of all the rest, with sound judgment, quick discrimination, and keen observation. He supports his opinions, too, with powerful eloquence."

In the course of the discussion of Adams's Florida negotiations, the Southerner's comprehension of the vital impor-

<sup>62</sup> "Memoirs of John Quincy Adams," Vol. VI, pp. 177, 185, 186, 194, 195, 203, 206. At a much later date, in 1846, while opposing a flaming resolution of Allen upon the general subject, Calhoun gave some details of the origin and scope of the Monroe Doctrine. He had no doubt that Adams was entitled to the credit of its paternity, but insisted that it had reference solely to a specific instance, the Holy Alliance. Adams himself had, Calhoun went on, made a broader declaration, but this had never come before the cabinet. Calhoun was of opinion that we should make no such general declaration as was proposed by Allen but meet each particular case, as it might arise, and he was evidently inclined to limit the scope of the doctrine in general. "Congressional Globe, Twenty-Ninth Congress, First Session," pp. 197, 198, 243-48; *ibid.*, Thirtieth Congress, First Session, p. 590.



tance to us of the Mississippi River came out very plainly from the start: and we learn, too, that as early as 1822 he had "a most ardent desire that the island of Cuba should become a part of the United States." He was not then ready to face war with Great Britain for that purpose, but did want the Executive to make a *confidential* communication to Congress in regard to a proposal lately received in a roundabout way from leading citizens of the island for them to declare independence and ask admission to the American Union. Adams regarded this plan of Calhoun's as utterly impractical, and saw clearly that the whole subject would have become known to the world in a week, or even a day.<sup>63</sup>

The Missouri question burst into view as a flaming portent of evil early in 1819; and rarely has a single issue so clearly made or rather marked the fundamental difference between the sections of a united and apparently contented country. It was at first long discussed in the halls of Congress, before the Executive had any function in the matter, and we have only general indications of the views of members of the cabinet. On January 21, 1820, so we are told, Calhoun failed to attend a meeting of the President's council, having gone to the Senate to hear William Pinkney's wonderful speech upon the subject. Adams, to whom we owe this information, does not tell us Calhoun's impression of the eloquent Marylander, but he himself and members of his family also heard portions of the speech and they were somewhat disappointed. Adams admitted,—as certainly any one reading to-day the printed speech must admit,—that "his language is good, his fluency without interruption or hesitation, his manner impressive," but adds the conclusion, which was of course due to his own feelings in the matter, that the argument was weak, "from the inherent weakness of his cause."<sup>64</sup>

A month later the same diligent recorder, to whom history is often so deeply indebted, tells us more of his colleague's views upon the general matter. On February 24, he called upon Calhoun at the War Office and the two so utterly diver-

<sup>63</sup> "Memoirs of John Quincy Adams," Vol. IV, pp. 28, 36, 47, 48, 51, 266, 267; Vol. VI, pp. 70, 71.

<sup>64</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 510-12.



gent types of men had a long conversation upon the subject, which deeply interested Adams and led him, insensibly to himself, to detain the Southerner until at least an hour after the latter's dinner hour.

Calhoun, we are told, did not think the question would produce a dissolution of the Union, but added that, "if it should, the South would be from necessity compelled to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain," and admitted the justice of Adams's remark that this would be pretty much returning to the colonial state, insisting, however, that they would be forced to such a course. When Adams then asked whether he thought that if the North should find itself in this way "cut off from its natural outlet upon the ocean, it would fall back upon its rocks bound hand and foot, to starve, or whether it would not retain its powers of locomotion to move southward by land," Calhoun replied that in that case "they would find it necessary to make their communities all military," and Adams pressed the conversation no further. We are told no more of Calhoun's opinion in this conversation, which led the diarist "into a momentous train of reflection."<sup>65</sup>

In March, 1820, the first Missouri struggle came to an end in Congress in the well-known Compromise, and the bill was sent to the President for approval. A meeting of all the cabinet was then at once called to secure their answers in writing, to be deposited in the Department of State,<sup>66</sup> upon two questions: (1) Whether Congress had a constitutional right to prohibit slavery in a territory, and (2) whether the prohibition in the bill *forever* prohibiting slavery within certain limits was applicable only to Territories or could extend also to the States that might be formed therefrom. As to the first

<sup>65</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 530, 531.

<sup>66</sup> These answers perhaps appear to have been so deposited, and it is clear that the intention was that they should be; but, if they were all collected and filed, they have since been removed, and nothing now remains but the envelope in which they were once contained, Schouler's *United States*, III, p. 167. Calhoun was positive in 1848 that he had not given any written opinion, nor is there any strong evidence that he was wrong about this. Such matters are easily neglected. Unavailing search had at that time been made for the answers. "Congressional Globe," Thirtieth Congress, First Session, Appendix, pp. 1178-80.

question, it was unanimously agreed (so Adams tells us) that Congress have the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories, despite the fact that neither Crawford, Calhoun, nor Wirt, could find any express power to that effect and that Wirt declared himself very much against implied powers. We are then given some of the diarist's views of the contrasts between the Southerners' principles and actions on this question of implied powers, but they have no application to Calhoun, who was not as yet much troubled in mind by these "refinements."

I have found no evidence that Calhoun ever questioned but that he had at this date been of opinion that Congress have the power to prohibit slavery in the territories, and in one instance, on the contrary, with an openness which is not often exhibited by public men, he volunteered as late as 1838 to say openly in the Senate that "he was not a member of Congress when that [the Missouri] Compromise was made; but it is due to candor to state that his impressions were in its favor," and then added that he had since come to think otherwise.<sup>67</sup>

On the second question submitted by Monroe to his cabinet, there was a long and acrimonious discussion, chiefly between Crawford and Adams, but the discussion is of great importance in a Life of Calhoun, for some of the New Englander's views cannot have failed to make a deep mark on the mind of a Southerner when he later came to realize the isolated position of his section. Adams began by expressing the opinion that the word "forever" would have application to a State as well as a Territory, and when Crawford denied this and added that even in such new States as had been admitted upon the express condition of the perpetual interdiction of slavery, an ordinary Act of their Legislature might sanction slavery, Adams expressed views which would have seemed very ultra to most Southerners. Indeed, they had greatly inflamed the South and excited their deep apprehension, when once already thought to have been expressed by Rufus King<sup>68</sup> in the Senate.

<sup>67</sup> Speech of January 12, 1838, on his resolutions on slavery and State rights submitted December 27, 1837; "Works," Vol. III, p. 185.

<sup>68</sup> It is not possible to-day to ascertain what King did actually say in his speeches on the Missouri question. As outlined in Moore's "American Eloquence," II, pp. 44-51, and again in his "Life and Correspondence," by Charles R. King, Vol. VI, Appendix IV, pp. 690-703 (see also his letter

Basing himself on the assertion in the Declaration of Independence of the natural equality of all men and their inalienable right to liberty, Adams drew the conclusion that the just powers of government, which are said in the Declaration to be derived from the consent of the governed, could not extend to justify making slaves of some. Such a power, he said, can never be derived from consent, and is therefore not a just power. And he added that this opinion, which Crawford said had been *attributed* to King, was undoubtedly held by King, as well as by himself, "was an opinion universal where there are no slaves," and was held by all those members of Congress who had voted for the restriction upon Missouri and many of

of November 22, 1819, in the same volume, pp. 233-34), it contained little or nothing that is startling, and even the remarks ("Works," Vol. VI, p. 696) as to what the judiciary might do in the matter, do not seem to go very far. But this evidence consists of little-but notes of argument, and these may well have been greatly developed in the actual utterance. It seems plain that he must have said more, or Pinkney never could have spoken in his answer of King's "deadly speculations, which invoking the name of God to aid their faculties for mischief, strike at all establishments" (Benton's "Abridgement," Vol. VI, p. 436), and again (*ibid.*, p. 443) Mr. King "has told us as a proof of his great position, that man cannot enslave his fellow-man, in which is implied that all laws upholding slavery are nullities." King's letter above shows a desire on his part to avoid the admission of having expressed some opinions which had evidently been attributed to him, and asserts that he never assented to or encouraged any measure that would affect the security of property in slaves or tend to disturb the adjustment established by the constitution, and desired his remarks to be construed as having reference only to slavery in the territories. But if he really said no more than this, Pinkney's answer is incomprehensible, and it is clear enough that King's *opinions* at least, according to Adams's understanding of them, went much further. The Southern understanding of what he had said is perhaps fairly summed up in a letter from Washington, dated February 12, 1820, and printed in the Charleston "Courier" of February 20th. The writer charges that King,—not to be outdone by Clinton or his friends, two of the most conspicuous of whom had (so the letter-writer goes on) affirmed in the New York Legislature that slavery did not exist in the United States and that the Supreme Court of the United States would so decide,—contended that the Constitution of the United States had not sanctioned slavery but had only foreborne to interfere with it. The letter then goes on that King, "declaring with his peculiar emphasis that one man could not make a slave of another, that a plurality of individuals could not do so; and for the same reason communities, however organized, could not do it, that all laws or compacts imposing such a condition upon any human being were absolutely void, because contrary to the law of nature, which was the law of God, and above all human control . . . and he intimated, in language too distinct to be misunderstood, that it was not less the duty, than the right of this nation, to maintain those principles."

those who voted against it. Terrible words to be heard by a Southerner, an affectionate father of children, when once he realized what their application must mean to his home and to those dear to him!

All the cabinet except Adams were of opinion that the word "forever" would apply only during the territorial state, but he then insisted that in his written answer he must give at length the reasons for holding his view. Calhoun thought it very undesirable to go into this matter in the answer and suggested to alter the second question so as to read whether the eighth section of the bill was consistent with the constitution, to which Adams could answer with a simple affirmation and the other members could do the same, with the addition that they considered it applicable only to the territorial state. Adams says that he readily agreed to this, and it is evident that, after the long and excited difference with his colleagues, he soon came to realize that pride of opinion and his impatience of contradiction had led him to express ultra ideas such as he would have been very sorry to see in print or permit to be generally known. The theories he had advanced were indeed abstract, and he would not have dreamed of asking to apply them in practice.

It is, however, strange to read the opinion expressed by Calhoun of what Adams had said. As reported to us, he seems to have had no thought of its serious nature to the South; but to have considered the matter in the abstract entirely, even while trying, in a way hard to comprehend to-day,<sup>69</sup> to explain the Southern view of slavery. Adams records:

After this meeting [of the Cabinet] I walked home with Calhoun who said that the principles which I had avowed were just and noble; but that in the Southern country, whenever they were mentioned they were always understood as applying only to white men. Domestic labor was confined to the blacks, and such was the prejudice, that if he, who was the most popular man in his district, were to have a white servant in his house, his character and reputation would be irretrievably ruined.

<sup>69</sup> The curious will find Calhoun's meaning much more clearly explained in his speech, in 1848, on the Oregon bill. "Works," Vol. IV, pp. 505, 506.



I said that this confounding of the ideas of servitude and labor was one of the bad effects of slavery; but he thought it attended with many excellent consequences. It did not apply to all kinds of labor — not, for example, to farming. He himself had often held the plough; so had his father. Manufacturing and mechanical labor was not degrading. It was only manual labor — the proper work of slaves. No white person could descend to that. And it was the best guarantee to equality among the whites. It produced an unvarying level among them. It not only did not excite, but did not even admit of inequalities, by which one white man could domineer over another.

I told Calhoun I could not see things in the same light. It is, in truth, all perverted sentiment — mistaking labor for slavery, and dominion for freedom. The discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed the secret of their souls. In the abstract they admit that slavery is an evil, they disclaim all participation in the introduction of it, and cast it all upon the shoulders of our old Grandam Britain. But when probed to the quick upon it, they show at the bottom of their souls pride and vain glory in their condition of masterdom. They fancy themselves more generous and noble-hearted than the plain freemen who labor for subsistence. They look down upon the simplicity of a Yankee's manners, because he has no habits of overbearing like theirs and cannot treat negroes like dogs. . . .<sup>70</sup>

When, in November of the same year 1820, a second Missouri struggle was evidently coming on, we learn from Adams that Calhoun was in great concern at its re-appearance. This came out in one of those confidences between the two men, which were at this time common enough. Adams had called upon him, and they discussed this matter, as they rode together in Calhoun's carriage to the President's. On another of Adams's calls, too, some six months earlier, they rode together into the country to make a visit and conversed on many subjects. Calhoun was on this occasion in no cheerful mood, and I cannot but think that the views of public affairs he then expressed must have had their part some few years later in leading to his change of political view, though he did not at all at the time find the troubles he referred to

<sup>70</sup> "Memoirs of John Quincy Adams," Vol. V, pp. 5-11, 13.



exclusively in the South or attribute them to any attempt to isolate and exploit that section. Adams writes:

We conversed of politics, past, present and future. Calhoun's anticipations are gloomy. He says there has been within these two years an immense revolution of fortunes in every part of the Union; enormous numbers of persons utterly ruined; multitudes in deep distress; and a general mass of disaffection to the Government, not concentrated in any particular direction, but ready to seize upon any event and looking out anywhere for a leader. The Missouri question and the debates on the tariff were merely incidental to this state of things. It was a vague but wide-spread discontent, caused by the disordered circumstances of individuals, but resulting in an impression that there was something radically wrong in the administration of the Government. These observations are undoubtedly well-founded.

Then Adams goes on to express the opinion that the troubles Calhoun referred to were due primarily to paper money and other forms of fictitious capital.<sup>71</sup>

Calhoun's position as Secretary of War was at no time a bed of roses and, as the years passed and he grew steadily more prominent and soon became a leading candidate for the presidency, the numbers of those struggling to pull him down rapidly increased. It seems indeed that as early as 1819, before his presidential aspirations had taken any shape, there was a tendency among some in Congress to carp at his administration of the War Department, and from that date on to the end of his term of service, he was constantly pestered with prying inquiries in regard to every matter under his charge. The expenses of the Yellowstone Expedition, of the Indian Department, of the system of fortifications and of the War Department in general, were all called for in several instances nor did the matter by any means end with these rather broad questions of policy. On the contrary, all sorts of details were demanded as to the contracts, which had been entered into, as to the names and pay of all the persons employed in the Indian Department, and again as to the number of officers and mes-

<sup>71</sup> "Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. V, pp. 127, 128, 199.

sengers in the War Office and whether they were all necessary.<sup>72</sup>

Of course, such inquiries are often perfectly proper, and they may be inspired by the highest motives of patriotism, but it is clear that these were in general of quite a different stamp. It is well known that there was long the most bitter partisan opposition to Calhoun, and as early as 1821, in spite of the general praise given his administration of the War Office, it was charged by a clique in Congress to be inefficient and extravagant. These attacks were believed by Adams<sup>73</sup> to be instigated by William H. Crawford, and there can be little doubt that such was the case and that the controlling motive back of them was the desire to win that seductive American siren, the Presidency.

Crawford was the focus of the hopes of the party or faction in question, known as Radicals. They existed especially in Georgia and some other Southern States, but were to be found also in New York and, in scattering numbers, elsewhere. Claiming, as did others, too, to be Simon-pure Democrats,—the direct and only heirs of Jefferson and the Republican party,—the Radicals were often strict constructionists to a high degree, were at about this time and for a few years later the State Rights party *par excellence* as well as always and most especially in favor of a high degree of economy and of limiting Governmental agencies to such an extent as Calhoun and many who had had any part in the War of 1812 looked upon as ruinous. There can be little doubt, I think, that the catching claim of economy constituted no little part of their stock in trade. Possibly the most pregnant hint as to their tendencies is to be found in the fact, the knowledge of which we owe to one of the band,<sup>74</sup> that they were at the time called "ruthless radicals."

<sup>72</sup> Some of the answers to these inquiries are to be found in the American State Papers. The following citations are merely samples, and many more could be found from the references in the Calendar of Calhoun Letters in Prof. Jameson's "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 25-38; American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. I, pp. 848-860, in February, 1819; *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 48-51, 68-69, 368-375, 419, 420-422; *ibid.*, Indian Affairs, Vol. II, pp. 266, 267, 271-74, 364-371, 826-833; *ibid.*, Miscellaneous, Vol. II, p. 983.

<sup>73</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. V, pp. 314-316, 326; Vol. VI, p. 8.

<sup>74</sup> Gov. Floyd, in his remarks in Congress (as quoted in Niles's "Reg-

To these hints can fortunately be added a fairly clear outline of the struggle of the day from the pen of a very capable politician, who was concerned in it. James Buchanan wrote in his autobiography :

When I first entered the House of Representatives [in December, 1821], there was a party in it which was called the Radical party, in favor of cutting down the expenses of the Government to the lowest possible standard without as I supposed sufficiently considering the real necessities of the country. Its leaders were the late Governor Floyd of Virginia, Mr. Williams of North Carolina, General Cocke of Tennessee, and others. These gentlemen were all the friends of Mr. Crawford, and were peculiarly hostile to Mr. Calhoun, whose alleged extravagance as Secretary of War they denounced in no measured terms. I did not perceive in the House the slightest trace of the old distinction between Federal and Democrat. So far from it that several of them elected as federalists held to a considerable extent Democratic principles; while many of those who had been called Democrats held high toned federal principles. The names were still continued; but the things signified by those names no longer existed. Mr. Monroe's administration whilst it was Democratic in name, generally pursued the federal policy.

Buchanan then goes on to detail an instance of Calhoun's troubles. For two or three years Congress had regularly appropriated \$200,000 or more for the Indian Department, and a system had grown up which called for about this sum. On the very last day, however, of the session ending March 3, 1821, under some impulse of economy the amount had been largely reduced and the Secretary suddenly — according to Buchanan, without "notice of any intention to change this settled policy" — found himself with only \$100,000 for the purposes of that department. Previous to this time, Buchanan goes on, the impulse had been given under the old system, and it could not be stopped within a year. The consequence was that, though Calhoun did his best after the passage of the bill to curtail the expenses, they none the less exceeded the appropriation by \$70,000, and he was obliged to ask for an

ister," Vol. XXXI, p. 396) upon the report of the committee on the Mix contract.

appropriation to meet this deficiency and "was denounced as extravagant and a contemner of the law." After a struggle, in which Buchanan aided the Secretary, the appropriation was passed.<sup>75</sup>

There is, however, at the same time evidence that Calhoun became occasionally very restless under such methods of Congress and in some instances even went on and carried his wishes through, despite their action. Thus, in 1822, when the appropriation for a portion of the defences of New Orleans was cut off, work on the Dauphin Island fortifications had none the less been carried on and a contract entered into which soon became a source of some anxiety to Calhoun and the Administration. Adams wrote in regard to these works: "Congress have refused appropriations for continuing them, and large advances have been made to the contractors, which must now be recovered back from them." The method of doing this was a subject of some consideration, and Adams thought that "Calhoun's object is to escape the investigation of the contract by Congress." Nor need we wonder at this wish of the Secretary in view of the 6th section of the Act of May 1, 1820, which distinctly provided that no contract should be entered into except in pursuance of a law and an appropriation.<sup>76</sup>

Adams thought, too, that Calhoun's allowances of contingent extra emoluments to officers of the army were based on a very questionable construction of the law, and they were much criticised by the opposition. He himself continued the practice during his presidency, however, on the ground of its being a settled construction and perhaps in order to avoid unpopularity with army officers; but Jackson in the course of his "reforms" at once fell upon this practice and stopped it.<sup>77</sup>

Calhoun had also a clash with Congress and carried through his own wishes in regard to the army regulations which had been drawn up by Scott at the Secretary's instance. These

<sup>75</sup> Moore's "Works of James Buchanan," "Autobiographical Sketch," Vol. XII, pp. 300, 301.

<sup>76</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, pp. 542-543; Peters's "U. S. Statutes at Large," Vol. III, p. 568.

<sup>77</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 151.



had been established in 1821 by a clause of the Act of March 2 of that year, but when this clause was for some reason later repealed by Congress, Calhoun simply had them continued by an Executive order and the House was then upon inquiry informed of this action of the President and told that "the said regulations are therefore continued in force by his authority in all cases where they do not conflict with positive legislation." It would be difficult to discover the hidden motives lying back of this dispute.<sup>78</sup>

The constant efforts to reduce the army were probably among the most distasteful of these measures of economy, so far as Calhoun was concerned. They also were doubtless largely partisan in origin, but another motive back of them was of course the unavoidable distrust of an army in a democracy. This feeling came down to the then rulers of public affairs from the long history of our race, and John Quincy Adams wrote<sup>79</sup> in marked approval of the very reduction of 1821, which was made so much in opposition to the wishes of the Secretary of War. It is worthy of mention, too, as showing that the same charges were made then as now, or perhaps that the same means were employed in that day as are in our own time, in order to secure liberal appropriations for armament, that alarms of possible wars were alleged to be used for this purpose in 1820.<sup>80</sup>

Calhoun was, beyond doubt, from the beginning opposed to reducing the army.<sup>81</sup> In a report to the House under date of December 11, 1818, in answer to a resolution calling for information as to what reduction might be safely made, the whole argument showed most clearly his opposition to any such action, and he stated that "the act of the last session [Act of April 14, 1818], it is believed, has made all the reduction which ought to be attempted." Doubtless, this same belief was often expressed in conversation, too, with all the energy

<sup>78</sup> American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. II, p. 623.

<sup>79</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VII, pp. 446, 447. Possibly this judgment does not represent Adams's opinion with accuracy. It was written under the sting of great bitterness against Calhoun.

<sup>80</sup> John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, pp. 17, 34.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 115. For Calhoun's Report, see "Works," Vol. V, pp. 25, 30.

and strange persuasiveness which belonged to Calhoun, but the contrary feeling was too prevalent to be long curbed.

Early in the session of 1819-20 the House called for a report on the strength of the army, which was sent in on December 31. Later in the same session a resolution was submitted by Clay calling for a plan to reduce the army to 6000, and this was adopted on May 11th, 1820. It was in reply to this resolution, and in an effort to modify its possible ill effects, that Calhoun sent in at the next session his Report of December 12, 1820, already referred to, containing a plan for a small army capable of being rapidly augmented. The House did not, as has been seen, adopt the Secretary's views, and on March 2, 1821,<sup>82</sup> an act was passed reducing the military peace establishment to 6183 men and taking little note of the plan suggested.

Calhoun seems to have continued to dread still further reduction, and wrote Joel Poinsett on July 3 of the same year urging him to remain in Congress and expressing his fear that at the coming session "the temper exhibited by so many members of the House of Representatives at the last session to prostrate the whole of our establishments, will again reappear." In 1824, too, in a letter of June 8 to Henry A. S. Dearborn, he pointedly expressed his disapproval of those politicians who had struggled to nullify his efforts in favor of *preparation* and once more bore upon the dangers to us from the Holy Alliance.

One of the attacks made upon Calhoun must be gone into more at length. On July 25, 1818, some seven or eight months after he took charge of the War Department and shortly after his return from a visit to the South, but before his reforms were well under way, a contract was made by the Engineer Department with one Elijah Mix for the delivery of a large quantity of stone at the Rip-Raps, in the lower part of Chesapeake Bay. It was to be used toward the erection of a fort,—which was intended to be called Fort Calhoun,—at this place and was a part of the great system of fortifications then plan-

<sup>82</sup> This is the law of which General Jesup said: "I put (it) into form, at the request of Colonel Williams and Colonel Trimble, from memoranda furnished by them." *Ante*, pp. 238, 241, 242.

ning. Mix in some way managed to carry through his contract, but there was a deal of trouble with him, and he was a thoroughly unreliable character.

In giving out the contract, the loose methods long prevalent had been used by the Engineers, though other army expenditures at about the same time were far more carefully managed. There was no advertisement of the Rip-Rap contract, and the chief dealers in stone were merely informed of the matter and asked to bid. Moreover, army officers made personal investigations in advance as to what would be a fair charge for the service required. The testimony was clear that this was and long had been the custom at that day and that public advertisements were not usually made, when the field of operations was near at hand and personal visitations could fairly well cover it. This was the case, too, as to other departments than the army.

One very evil custom of our administration at that time came out in this case. Officers and employes in the various departments were often interested in contracts and even held them themselves and would then at times force contractors to take their "due-bills" in place of money and thus secure credit at the Treasury for so much paid.<sup>83</sup> There was nothing so bad as this in the Rip-Rap contract, but the following did occur: Major Van Deventer, the Chief Clerk, was a brother-in-law of Elijah Mix, and when the latter soon found himself in serious straits to do what is nowadays called "finance" the matter, Van Deventer came somehow to assume a liability to protect others against Mix's failure. As is usually the case, the obligations thus assumed grew by what they fed on, and the guarantor found ere long that he might be liable for a sum over \$5500 and more than everything he owned in the world.

Under the pinch of this trouble, he sought means to protect himself, but Mix was practically insolvent and there was probably but one way,—the assignment by Mix of a portion of his rights in the contract. The evidence is perfectly clear

<sup>83</sup> Testimony of General Jesup before the Committee on the conduct of the Vice-President. House Report No. 79, Nineteenth Congress, Second Session, pp. 157, 158.

that Van Deventer had originally no interest whatsoever in the matter and was absolutely without influence as to giving out the contract—it was indeed entirely in the hands of the Engineers with whom he had no power or weight. But, as his danger grew more imminent, he spoke to Calhoun about the matter and asked whether it would be improper for him to invest money in the contract and was told in reply that it would not be illegal, as there was no law to prohibit it, but that it might expose him (Van Deventer) to improper insinuations and would therefore be injurious.

In spite of this good advice from his chief, the subordinate did take some sort of transfer of one-quarter of Mix's interest as security for his responsibility at about the time in 1818 when he first incurred the risk, and in April of 1819 he took a formal assignment of one-half interest, apparently paying something therefor. All this was done without the knowledge of the Secretary, and when the matter reached his ears he told Van Deventer that, if it became necessary to make a decision in the department in favor of the assigned share, the chief clerk's connection with the office would be at once terminated.

Mix's contract seems to have been for some time looked upon as a losing one, but in the end of 1819 and beginning of 1820 changes in prices rendered it a much more hopeful venture. After this, Van Deventer having succeeded in protecting himself from loss and feeling the delicacy of his situation, sold out all his interest, in part to Mix and in part to his and Mix's father-in-law Cooper, expecting when the matter was fully settled to realize about three or four thousand dollars.

But the trouble was not yet over, for some dispute arose between Mix and others as to who was entitled to certain payments from the War Office, and Calhoun was called upon to make a decision upon this question. As the point was of vital interest to the share Van Deventer had assigned to Cooper and indirectly to Van Deventer himself,—who at that time had not been fully paid for what he had sold,—Calhoun told his chief clerk that, if the decision had to be made, the latter's removal from office would be a necessary result. Time for the parties to settle their differences amicably was, however,



allowed, and Van Deventer went to New York near the end of March, 1821, to see Mix and endeavor to obviate this trouble. He wrote Mix of his coming and added that upon the latter's conduct in the matter would "depend whether or no I shall return to my functions in this department. It has finally come to that unfortunate result. You can stay the evil or complete the ruin."

As a result of this visit, some adjustment was made, the need of a decision by Calhoun was removed, and Van Deventer remained in his office. But in some way Dame Rumor got hold of the matter and it became a subject of discussion in the House of Representatives on April 22, 1821, when a committee of investigation was appointed. They reported the facts about as above, expressed the opinion that no contract should be given out but upon public advertisement and then concluded that this particular one "was not formed in the manner which the law prescribes," and recommended a resolution "that further appropriations, to be expended under the contract made by the engineer department with Elijah Mix, ought not to be made."

The only suspicion of impropriety in the matter down to this date, so far as the Government was concerned, attached to Van Deventer, and his conduct seems to have been the result of imprudence under very trying circumstances. But at the same time the report did reflect strongly upon the general management of the War Department by Calhoun and was full of innuendoes of inefficiency; and the resolution recommended, if passed, would have been the strongest condemnation. The House, however, did not take the same view of the matter as did the committee, and an appropriation in continuance of the work was finally carried and became a law. In the House, it passed by a large majority, and that branch refused to agree to an amendment of the Senate that the appropriation should not be considered as an affirmation of the contract with Mix. The Senate then receded.

Such involved contests, however, especially when complicated with impropriety on some one's part, are hard to put to rest, and this particular one burst its cerements and arose once

more from the grave, with far uglier aspect, some four to five years later when Calhoun had been Vice-President for nearly two years. He had, while at the head of the War Office, dismissed a paymaster, Major Satterlee Clark, for not settling his accounts; and Clark later wrote a series of letters under assumed names to New York papers, abusing Calhoun in round terms. Mix, seeing these letters and thinking that Calhoun had been very hard on him in the Rip-Rap contract, wrote to Clark on November 1, 1825, saying that "if any information is wanted on the subject of Mr. Calhoun's infidelity, . . . I have written letters of Van Deventer's which most positively mention that he [Calhoun] was engaged, and received some portion of the contract." Small wonder that a person belonging to "the editorial profession" told Clark that this letter, if published, "would make a devil of a noise." But strangely enough this unenterprising editor allowed his opportunity to slip away, and the letter was not at once made public.

In the end of 1826, however, Calhoun's successor, James Barbour, was about to award a contract in an entirely new matter to Mix, who was the lowest bidder. Clark, who had carefully preserved Mix's letter and taken a copy of it, came to Washington about this time and met Mix's chief competitor. As a result of their manœuvres and of the exhibition of the precious letter, not only did Mix fail to get the hoped-for contract (Barbour saying that the charge against Calhoun was "a foul calumny," and that Mix would probably charge him also with "going snacks") but Mix's letter to Clark was published in full in an Alexandria paper on December 28, with editorial comments. There was at once, as had been predicted by another editor, "the devil of a noise," and the intended fort came soon to be known to the public as "Castle Calhoun."

The day after the publication, the Vice-President wrote to the House of Representatives asking that it should, as "grand inquest of the nation," investigate this charge; and also wrote to the Senate informing it of this action on his part, adding that "a sense of propriety forbids me from resuming my station till the House has disposed of the subject." The House

at once appointed a committee of seven, which examined a number of witnesses and reported unanimously on February 13 that "there are no facts which will authorize the belief, or even suspicion, that the Vice-President was ever interested, or that he participated, directly or indirectly, in the profits of any contract with the government through the department of war" at any time.

The whole proceedings, however, were far from satisfactory to either Calhoun or his friend McDuffie, who had attended the meetings in his interest. Calhoun complains that the committee was composed "with the exception of two, of hostile materials," and that they spun out their sittings to an unseemly length on other matters than that which they were appointed to investigate. The report contained also numbers of hints as to careless and inefficient management. In the investigation of 1822, the committee had found that one Jennings owned from the start a quarter interest in the contract, but this had now come to be an entirely vague hint as to some mysterious secret partner, whose identity could not be ascertained.

The committee had, moreover, intended to close the testimony some two weeks sooner, without having examined several high officers of the army, but this was prevented by a protest from McDuffie. General Brown and others were then called and testified strongly, if in rather general terms, as to the improvements in administration brought about during Calhoun's service and partly at least by him. Mix fared badly on all hands and was reported to be absolutely unworthy of belief and to have fraudulently altered and mutilated letters and other papers.

This subject has taken some space, but was of vital interest to Calhoun at one time, though now little but an impediment that had to be cleared away. Some friends thought at the time that the Vice-President's action in calling for an investigation was unnecessary, because of the degraded character of his accusers; but his Presidential aspirations probably made him see ahead more clearly than did they, and they were later satisfied that he had been right in thinking that otherwise at

some time in the future, when Mix's character was forgotten, the charges and insinuations would have been generally accepted and have ruined him.

On February 14, the day after the committee had made its report, Calhoun resumed his seat as presiding officer and the incident was ended as to him for all time; but Van Deventer was at once dismissed from his office by Barbour. Nor did the matter go off without one of those alarms of a duel, which were so common in the days of artificial and often fantastic honor. McDuffie fell into a wordy wrangle by correspondence with General Thomas Metcalfe, who had been a member of the committee of 1822, and the lie circumstantial, or at least with an "if," was passed on both sides. The result was that McDuffie challenged Metcalfe, but the latter chose rifles as the weapons, at a distance of ninety feet.

Some correspondence then ensued between the seconds, but Major James Hamilton, Jr., objected that McDuffie was quite disabled from handling a rifle by wounds received in a prior duel, and then the other second replied that Metcalfe had absolutely no knowledge of a pistol and had never fired one in his life. The subject was discussed for a time between the seconds, and doubtless the extent of the challenged party's right to choose weapons was elaborately debated by the whole guild of duellists, but neither side would yield and the intended meeting was never held.<sup>84</sup>

A few words must be said here of the tariff, for the subject was destined in a few years to become of vital moment not only to Calhoun but to the country as well. During Monroe's presidency, it was several times under discussion. The Act of 1816 had provided for reductions in some of the rates in 1819, but in 1818 this term was extended to 1826 and the rates on unmanufactured iron were increased. At the next session

<sup>84</sup> The proceedings in regard to the two investigations growing out of the Rip-Rap contract are pretty extensively given in Niles's "Register," Vol. XXII, pp. 251-263, 279-282; *ibid.*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 292, 293, 300, 302, 305, 394-407; *ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, pp. 1-8. The complete report of the earlier committee (of 1822) is to be found in American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. II, pp. 431-439. The official report of the second committee (1826-27) is Report No. 79. House of Representatives, Nineteenth Congress, Second Session. See "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 239-41, 791.



(December, 1819), the usual House Committee on Commerce and Manufactures was divided and a special standing Committee on Manufactures secured, of which Baldwin of Pennsylvania was made chairman, and at that same session his bill for an increase barely failed by one vote in the Senate, after having passed the House. It is to be noted that the South, a majority of whose members had, it has been shown, opposed even the Act of 1816, was overwhelmingly opposed to the bill of 1820: of the 55 members of the House from that section, only 3 voted in its favor, while 40 voted against it and there were 12 not voting.

The subject continued to be agitated, chiefly in the Middle and Western States, and at length in his annual messages of December 1822 and 1823 Monroe was induced to recommend additional encouragement. This was, we are told,<sup>85</sup> against the advice of Calhoun, who was by that time evidently in accord with the general view of his section on the subject. He always thought<sup>86</sup> that injustice had been done to the iron men of Pennsylvania by the Act of 1816, and I know of no proof as to his opinion in regard to the measure of 1818 or the attempted increase of 1820; but as early as 1821 he had evidently become restless at the growing hunger for ever higher rates and probably quite conscious of the South's tendency in the other direction. In March of that year, when Monroe's second inaugural was read in advance to the cabinet, "there were expressions," so Adams writes,<sup>87</sup> "favorable to the manufacturing interests, to which Mr. Calhoun made some objections, and which were slightly modified."

It may doubtless be accepted therefore that Calhoun was by that time already falling into accord with Southern opinion upon the general subject, and though there seems to be no further positive proof, we may safely assume that his early biographer is right in saying that he was opposed to the Act of 1824, which made a considerable increase in the rates in general. This law and the other efforts of the period were

<sup>85</sup> Jenkins's "Life," p. 150.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, and see Calhoun's speech of February 15 and 16, 1833, in the Senate on the Force Bill, "Works," Vol. II, p. 206.

<sup>87</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. V, p. 309.

led to by the depression of 1819, the changes incident to the end of the Napoleonic wars, further English corn-laws of about that date and the great changes taking place in our own economic growth.

One other fact in the matter must be emphasized here. So strong and wide-spread was the Southern opposition to the "American system" that on the final vote upon the tariff bill of 1824,<sup>88</sup> out of the 56 members of the House from the seven contiguous States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi, but one single member voted Aye, while 54 voted Nay, and there was one not voting. This fact is vital to be remembered in regard to the struggle between the North and South, then near at hand, and it will be found that a similar result appeared in each one of the great tariff votes down to the Compromise Measure of 1833. No one can possibly comprehend the state of feeling throughout the South, unless he will carefully bear in mind this remarkable unanimity.

The politics of South Carolina were of course during these years and ever after of vital moment to Calhoun, and there is reason to suppose that from an early date he had a powerful hand in the management of the State. Judge William Smith was also a potent factor and by no means friendly to Calhoun. Twenty years the senior, Smith had been president of the South Carolina Senate at the time when Calhoun was in the lower house, and was elected to a vacancy in the United States Senate in 1816. In this capacity, he voted against Calhoun's bonus bill — looking to a system of public improvements by the federal government — which the younger man had introduced and largely made his own. Probably, Smith looked upon Cal-

<sup>88</sup> While this bill was under discussion in the House, Joel R. Poinsett wrote from Washington on February 26, 1824, to Judge Hopkinson, hoping that delays might defeat it, and adding that, if it should pass an anti-tariff candidate would carry all the Southern States, and that the reaction from it "will be certain and sudden and the opposition to it will rise on its ruin. . . . I do not know in what light you view it, but I would sooner vote for a war with the holy alliance than vote for this bill. I believe the operation of this law, if it becomes one, will be more injurious to the character of the people, the prosperity of the country and the durability of the Union, than a long expensive and bloody war." Letter in the Hopkinson Collection in possession of Edward Hopkinson, Esq., of Philadelphia.

houn as a mere stripling and he was of course far from pleased to see the immense power which had fallen so rapidly into the lap of his youthful rival. There was not room in the politics of South Carolina for these two men.

Smith had served for a number of years on the State bench, but it may be surmised that he always hankered after the din and struggle of politics. Of unknown origin and at one time of intemperate habits, he was reformed by his wife and was beyond doubt a most dangerous enemy. A rugged, determined, character, a bitter hater, not knowing what defeat means, he continued for years his struggle with Calhoun and only finally, when the latter had completely triumphed, removed to Alabama to live far away from the influence of his successful rival.<sup>89</sup>

If Calhoun's views changed, no one can doubt that Smith always changed, too, at about the same time, possibly even in order that he might be able to continue the struggle. He belonged at the time with which we are now concerned to the "Radicals" in South Carolina, who, it has been already said, were closely related to the party of the same name in Georgia and were generally supporters of Crawford for the Presidency, as well as of ultra State Rights tendencies.<sup>90</sup> In 1822, when Smith's term in the Senate was about to expire, Crawford wrote to a friend: "great exertions will be made by the friends of Mr. Calhoun to prevent the election of Judge Smith in South Carolina, but I presume without effect."<sup>91</sup>

The eminent Georgian was in part right, and no doubt Calhoun left no stone unturned in the effort to defeat Smith. He wrote to his brother-in-law about State politics on May 14 and again on July 1 of that year, urging him to remain in public affairs and then went on:

I am glad to see a disposition to leave Smith at home. I do not think that he fairly represents the state. He is narrow minded and I believe wedded to the Georgia politicians. If re-

<sup>89</sup> For Smith see J. B. O'Neill's "Bench and Bar," Vol. I, pp. 106-20 and Jervey's "Hayne," pp. 137 *et seq.*

<sup>90</sup> "The Life and Times of Robert Y. Hayne," by Theodore D. Jervey, p. 84; Shipp's "Crawford," p. 169. *Ante*, pp. 262, 263.

<sup>91</sup> Letter printed in Shipp's "Crawford," p. 235.

elected I doubt not that he will come out openly, which would do much mischief. Hayne is the man that ought to be elected. He has talents and eloquence and will honour the state. It would be imprudent however to utter those sentiments as coming from me.

The letter went on with further references to home politics, the writer urging that Warren R. Davis should be elected to the House from Pendleton in place of John Wilson, the then member, whom he thought honest but "very little calculated for the post." Finally, he enclosed a prospectus of the intended Washington *Republican*, adding that "it will be conducted with zeal and abilities, and I hope will be well supported. We have need of such a paper. You must subscribe for it, and get as many others as you can conveniently. By putting it into the hands of Joseph Gresham, or some other active person at the court house, I dare say many subscribers might be obtained. Should any be obtained, care must be taken to have the list returned."

Some evidence as to Calhoun's degree of success in the management of political affairs is to be found in the fact that, when the Senatorial election came to be held, his candidate, Robert Y. Hayne, then a man of but thirty-one years of age, was elected over Smith by a vote of 91 to 74,<sup>92</sup> while Wilson was at that date re-elected to the House but was defeated by Warren R. Davis in 1826, by the narrow margin of 25 votes.<sup>93</sup>

But the struggle with Smith was by no means over. He returned to the State and there in 1824 attacked Calhoun, McDuffie and Hayne with much vigor in the newspapers.<sup>94</sup> Elected to the State Legislature, he still waged the same bitter warfare, and introduced resolutions aimed against some of the leading policies of his enemies, particularly internal improvements and a tariff for protection. These resolutions were, moreover, carried by him in the House in December, 1825, by a two-thirds vote and they got through the Senate

<sup>92</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," p. 143.

<sup>93</sup> Letter of Calhoun in "Correspondence," p. 238.

<sup>94</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," pp. 169, *et seq.*



by a majority of one. Calhoun's personal and political friend, Simkins, protested against them in the Senate.<sup>95</sup>

To have the Legislature of his own State thus declare against one policy, which was a leading one with him at that very time, and another with which he had been closely associated but a few years earlier must have been gall and wormwood to Calhoun, but the cup was not yet full. In December, 1826, Smith was again elected to the United States Senate, after the death of John Gaillard, by a vote of 83 to 81 for D. E. Huger. The Georgia papers were delighted at this choice of a Crawford supporter, the *Constitutionalist* of Augusta declaring it to be evidence that "Calhoun was not all powerful in the State of South Carolina."<sup>96</sup> Later pages will show how little foundation for this view remained in a few years, serious as was perhaps the blow to Calhoun's prestige in 1826.

In all this contest there was evidently little real difference of principle between the two contending factions. It was almost entirely a struggle for power between leaders, and just what were the actual opinions of Calhoun or Smith in regard to the fundamental questions at issue is very doubtful. One house of the legislature passed in December, 1824, the Ramsay resolutions<sup>97</sup> protesting in the strongest terms against any

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188. South Carolina Laws, etc., 1825, pp. 88, 89. The same resolutions had passed the Senate at the prior session but failed in the House (Herman V. Ames's *State Documents on Federal Relations*, p. 136). The first resolution was that "Congress does not possess the power under the constitution, to adopt a general system of internal improvement as a national measure," and the fifth, "That it is an unconstitutional exercise of power, on the part of Congress, to lay duties to protect domestic manufactures."

<sup>96</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," p. 193. Gaillard had died at a time when the South Carolina Legislature was not in session, and the Governor appointed William Harper to fill the vacancy. Thomas Cooper wrote that Harper would go all lengths in favor of internal improvements and against State rights, "provided Calhoun does not lead him," but feared he might be gained over by Calhoun, as, he says, William C. Preston had been. (Letters of Thomas Cooper, 1825-32, printed in "*American Historical Review*," Vol. VI (1900-01, p. 728). Harper was in a few years one of the strongest supporters of nullification, but was evidently not gained over at the time, for it may be assumed that in the election by the Legislature the Calhoun forces supported Huger. Huger, on the other hand, became an opponent of Calhoun in a few years on the nullification issue. Such were the changes in South Carolina upon that question.

<sup>97</sup> Charleston "*Courier*" of December 9, 1824.

claim of right on the part of the United States to interfere in any way in relation to the Negro Seamen Act, while the other house tabled these and passed instead by a large majority the Prioleau resolutions,<sup>98</sup> which were as mild as well could be, and spoke of having respectfully considered the letter of the President of the United States upon the subject. On the other hand, both branches of the Legislature united at the very next session on the ultra Smith resolutions. These moves were all beyond doubt personal politics, the mere game of fence and spar for position among the leaders.<sup>99</sup>

A charge against Calhoun's character made by John Quincy Adams at about the time of his career with which we are now concerned must be noticed. He maintains more or less clearly that in a number of instances,—during their Presidential rivalry and later,—the Secretary of War was not direct, but would profess friendship for one whom his supporters were all at the same time actively hounding. Again, the pages of the Diary complain that Calhoun was forever seeking the favor of the multitude and in one instance reports General Brown as speaking of his "excessive thirst of . . . turning everything into instruments for the promotion of his own popularity." In the same direction, too, Adams writes that in 1821, at the time of the bitter quarrel between Jackson and Judge Fromentin, Calhoun wanted,—in order to escape the unpopularity of not nominating Fromentin and thus seeming to take sides,—to have the President send his nomination in to the Senate and at the same time confidentially communicate the whole correspondence, and thus leave it to the Senate to reject the nomination, if members should see fit.<sup>100</sup>

That this was an instance of over-refinement can hardly be doubted, and it may have been induced by the desire to avoid

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, of December 22, 1824.

<sup>99</sup> W. J. Grayson in his "Memoir of James Louis Petrigu," p. 93 emphasizes this fact.

<sup>100</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, p. 442; Vol. VI, pp. 277, 537. The color so often given to those pages is shown by an entry (*ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 69) to the effect that Clay thought in 1825 that Calhoun "intrigued" for votes against his confirmation as Secretary of State by the Senate. There was surely no valid reason why he should not try to defeat the nomination, but to *intrigue* is indirect and underhand, so that word is selected.

an unpopular act; but who shall 'scape a whipping, if public men are to be so lightly condemned? It is difficult to meet specifically charges that are at best vague and were written years ago by one of the most jealous and bitter of the sons of men, in the small hours of the morning, when alone and stung by opposition or impending failure. Nor must it be forgotten that the opinions expressed were based largely on partisan whisperings of lieutenants, always high-colored and often false. No reputation can stand, if we are to accept the thrice-distilled gall of the suspicious author of the *Diary*.

Calhoun's career in general must furnish the answer to these charges. His course on the Compensation Bill is in point for the period already covered, and his later history will show plainly that he often did unpopular things and would boldly face situations of grave difficulty which could easily have been avoided. At the same time, he was beyond question a man of the intellectual type and by no means one of those born fighters who hurl themselves blindly against every obstruction; he had the lawyer's habit, too, of always emphasizing one side of a case and of skillfully concealing the other, but he cannot be justly classed as underhand and indirect. What successful public man has ever been in the habit of blurting out the whole naked truth?

Calhoun had, moreover, open and bitter quarrels with too many of his contemporaries to have been a man of the indirect type. Some of these have been mentioned, and others will appear later. Already at this early day, he and Clay had had a falling out. It is said <sup>101</sup> that their relations were strained about the time (March, 1816) when the congressional caucus was held to nominate a successor to Madison. Calhoun had at first opposed holding one, but attended in the end as an ardent and leading supporter of Monroe, while Clay was to the last opposed to the meeting. During this dispute, their strong wills clashed and a coolness arose between them, which was never really removed. How often did they later have desperate encounters, marked on both sides by anything but

<sup>101</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," p. 66: McMaster's "United States," Vol. IV, p. 364.

the methods of indirection! With Benton and many others, too, the same was the case.

It has been seen that while Calhoun was a member of the House his family did not come to Washington with him, and he lived in a mess. While he was Secretary of War, however, the case was otherwise. He and Mrs. Calhoun made the long journey in November, 1817, in their own carriage, bringing their children (then two) with them, and the father wrote that the children stood the travelling much better and were "far less troublesome than we expected." Andrew, the eldest, was not well, but his chill was thought to be less severe on the day of the letter than it had been.

Arrived in Washington, they seem to have stayed for a time with Lowndes and not to have had permanent quarters until March, 1818, when they took a house on the south side of E. St. North, between 6th and 7th Sts., W., in the block east of the post office department.<sup>102</sup> This residence was near that occupied by William Winston Seaton (one of the editors of the *National Intelligencer*), whose wife wrote to a friend:

I have mentioned the very agreeable accession to our neighborhood in the Calhouns. You could not fail to love and appreciate as I do, her charming qualities; a devoted mother, tender wife, industrious, cheerful, intelligent, with the most perfectly equable temper. Mr. Calhoun is a profound statesman and elegant scholar, you know by public report; but his manners in a private circle are endearing, as well as captivating; and it is as much impossible not to love him at home, as it would be to refuse your admiration of his oratorical powers in the Hall of Representatives. Since his absence in Carolina,<sup>103</sup> his wife has spent much time with me, coming down in the morning and stop-

<sup>102</sup> A reproduction of an old Washington directory of 1822, owned by Mr. J. C. Fitzpatrick of the MSS. Department in the Library of Congress, gives this as the Calhoun residence in that year, and presumably it was the one to which they went in 1818. The same reprint has W. W. Seaton as living on E St. North, opposite the general post office.

<sup>103</sup> "William Winston Seaton, a biographical sketch," pp. 135, 136. Mrs. Seaton's letter, as printed, is dated "March, 1818," but this is probably an error, for the session of Congress did not end until April 20th and Calhoun did not go South until after that time. See McDuffie's statement in the Mix investigation, Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXI, p. 405, and see also Calhoun's letter to Charles Tait, dated July 20, printed in "Gulf States Historical Magazine," Vol. I (September, 1902), pp. 92, 93.



ping till ten at night, and we generally go to church together on Sunday.

In the summer of 1823, the Secretary of War and his family were out at Georgetown, where they had probably temporarily rented a house. Calhoun wrote on August 7th that they were on the heights and found the residence delightful. "The health of the children," so the devoted father went on, "is very much improved by the fine air and the abundant exercise in the Grove." It must have been not very many months after this that they bought a place,—“Oakly,”—at Georgetown which became their residence for at least a year or two.<sup>104</sup> This was after Calhoun had given up hope of the Presidency for the time being but was almost certain of election to second place, and Mrs. Smith wrote on April 11, 1824:

Mr. Calhoun has removed to his house on the hills behind George Town and will live I suspect quite retired the rest of the session. He does not look well and feels very deeply the disappointment of his ambition.

It must remain a matter of conjecture to what extent this judgment was justified.

“Oakly” had apparently been purchased in part at least by the mother-in-law and was probably sold again in 1828.<sup>105</sup> But before this date, some time during the year 1826, they had concluded to fix their permanent residence in the South, instead of Washington. Calhoun wrote that this change of intention was partly owing to a desperate illness in his family. His son John hovered long between life and death in Washington during the spring and summer of 1826, and they finally determined, as a last resource, to take him South. On the journey the boy continued to sink, until they reached Salisbury, when medicines,—or the rest and change,—restored him, and they were later able to go on and reach home where “on the very day of our arrival his cough ceased and has not since returned.” This harrowing experience was enough to induce their change, and to it were doubtless to be added reasons of

<sup>104</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Diary," Vol. VI, p. 300; "Calhoun Correspondence," p. 233.

<sup>105</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 256, 257.

economy, the inconvenience and even danger of the long journeys, and possibly some political motives.<sup>106</sup>

After this date, Calhoun's letters during the session are all dated from Washington. Presumably, they rented or boarded in the capital, and the children were no longer all brought North,—there were six in 1827,—but were left with either friends or relatives and at school. Mrs. Calhoun still came to Washington with her husband sometimes for a part of the year, but the long journey and the separation from the children were of course serious troubles and in 1826–27 and in 1827–28 she remained in the South,<sup>107</sup> and in the spring of 1829, she went home, we are told by one of her friends,<sup>108</sup> “not to return again, at least for four years,”—words which, of course, have reference to Calhoun's expected succession to the Presidency after Jackson's intended one term.

In South Carolina Calhoun still owned a plantation in Abbeville, but Pendleton was already his home. He seems to have begun to live there in 1825, at a place called Clergy Hall, which his mother-in-law had rented as early as 1819; but during 1826 he either bought this place or acquired it by exchange, and intended at one time to build a new house “on the hill to the left of the road to the court house.” But this purpose does not seem to have been carried out, and he probably altered the existing mansion.<sup>109</sup> His home here was the one known as Fort Hill, where he lived for the balance of his life. The name was derived from “an old fortification built by General Pickens, in Revolutionary times to overawe the Cherokees,” situated on a hill visible in the distance from the House.<sup>110</sup>


<sup>106</sup> Letters of Calhoun dated May 28, June 14, and December 24, 1826, and February 14 and August 26, 1827; “Correspondence,” pp. 233–236, 237–240.

<sup>107</sup> “Calhoun Correspondence,” pp. 238, 256, 257.

<sup>108</sup> “The First Forty Years of Washington Society,” by Mrs. Samuel Harrison Smith, p. 290.

<sup>109</sup> “Calhoun Correspondence,” p. 236, for the intention to build a new house, but this plan was contingent on securing certain land, and Mrs. Mell (foot-note 110 *infra*) says clearly that part of the house was quite old. See also “Correspondence,” 235, 236.

<sup>110</sup> “John C. Calhoun, from a Southern Standpoint,” by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, in “Lippincott's Magazine,” Vol. LXII (July, 1808), pp. 81–90, and see Mrs. Patrick Hues Mell's article on “John C. Calhoun's Home at Fort Hill” in the Charleston “News” of Sunday, April 30,



FORT HILL





The mansion escaped the passions of the Civil War and is still standing to-day.

During much at least of the time of Calhoun's residence in Washington and Georgetown, his mother-in-law was a part of his family, and he had expressed to her in 1820<sup>111</sup> the hope that she would take up her permanent abode with him. She was a woman of strong religious tendencies and evidently highly evangelical. On one occasion, we learn that she pursued with almost daily visits a Mrs. Tasslet, who is described as being at the time "the ghost of what she was," and whom Mrs. Colhoun thought to be under a *religious concern*. The writer much feared that in the distracted state of Mrs. Tasslet, Mrs. Colhoun was not "the most useful friend she could have."

Again, in the autumn of 1822, a revival was held in Washington and two young pastors had been brought in as aids. With one of these, Mrs. Colhoun went out despite a drenching rain, in order, according to her daughter's expression, "to beat up recruits" for church in the evening. The eloquent preacher was said never to have been known to exhort without making at least half a dozen converts, and only a few evenings before one of the gayest and most fashionable young ladies had been *convicted* and converted. So overcome by her feelings was this butterfly of fashion, whose name is suppressed, that she had run forward and thrown herself on the exhorter's shoulder and lain there, sobbing and crying, "while he inquired into her feelings and talked most powerfully and pathetically with her."<sup>112</sup>

Perhaps, such performances as these and some of the daughter's expressions as to her mother's course of action may lead

1905. Another writer dates the old fort back still further to the wars of the Indians among themselves, "Scribner's Magazine," Vol. XXI, (April, 1880), pp. 802-805.

<sup>111</sup> Letter of May 7 in "Correspondence," p. 173. She was, however, at least not always with him. See his letters to her in the spring and summer of 1826, "Correspondence," pp. 233-236.

<sup>112</sup> Mrs. Smith's "First Forty Years," etc., pp. 153, 154, 159, 160. Perhaps, this revival was in part owing to the prevalence of cholera and other diseases at that time in parts of the country. In Washington, however, it was not severe, and the reports of deaths from cholera printed in the "National Intelligencer" for August-October call for but 25 deaths in the three months.

us to think that Calhoun and his wife did not fully sympathize in this matter with Mrs. Calhoun. But no one can fail to be pleased with another scene of the time from the Calhoun interior. In March, 1820, their infant daughter grew ill and died on the 22nd of the month. This was before the days of trained nurses, but their absence was at least lightened. All the family's acquaintance volunteered assistance. Mrs. Smith stayed two days and sat up one night, and she adds: <sup>113</sup>

I never in my life witnessed such attention. Ladies of the first and gayest fashion, as well as particular friends, pressed their attendance in a way not to be denied. The President called every day, and his daughter Mrs. Hay, although in the midst of bridal festivities, came three evenings successively to beg to sit up and was denied as other ladies were engaged. . . . Mrs. Adams in the like manner and twenty others would attend. . . . All this was not a mere tribute to rank, no,—I am persuaded much of it was from that good will which both Mr. and Mrs. Calhoun have universally excited; they are really beloved.

Calhoun and his family took no little part during these years in the social life of Washington, and he seems to have been known in advance as having social talents. Mrs. Smith wrote in 1817 of every one as being pleased with his and Wirt's appointments and added: "they will be most agreeable additions to our society." The forecast was certainly right, and Calhoun gave and received dinners; and Mrs. Smith <sup>114</sup> tells us that in February, 1819, he gave a very large ball—"five rooms crowded"—which she "could not resist attending." Some few years later (1829) the Smiths had several parties at home, of which the largest of about forty persons "was made in compliment to our old friends, Mr. and Mrs. Calhoun."

On another occasion, in 1819, after having been to hear Clay speak on the Seminole war, Mrs. Smith dined at the Calhouns', of which occasion she wrote as follows:

At dinner I gave Mr. Calhoun an ample detail of the speech, which led to a great deal of conversation of men, measures and

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 149, 150.

<sup>114</sup> "First Forty Years," etc., p. 148.

facts. You know how frank and communicative he is, and considering I was very much animated by the scene of the morning, perhaps you will not be surprised at our conversing without any interruption until 9 o'clock. I several times after tea begged him to read or write and make no stranger of me, but this his politeness would not permit him to do. . . . At last I jumped up declaring I would keep him no longer from business, and proposed to Mrs. Calhoun to adjourn to our chamber.<sup>115</sup>

There was probably no period in Calhoun's public career that was on the whole so full of happiness as the more than seven years during which he held the position of Secretary of War. But forty-three years of age at its close, he had apparently every reason to be in the highest degree contented with his lot. Happily married and surrounded with a family of five children, in whom he was deeply interested, taking no little part in the social life of the capital, and indulging constantly in that highly interested and interesting exchange of views with the bright men and women about him, which always characterized him, he had, too, broader and perhaps more intoxicating causes of contentment. Ambition, the guiding star of some and the ruin of others, was undoubtedly a part of his nature, and surely he had reason to be satisfied as to his position in the public eye and the promise of the future. Feeling his powers and making a splendid record in the office he held, and with such a meteoric rise as his had been, since he was sent to Congress in 1811, the highest office in the country seemed certainly and easily within his grasp. Probably there was not a man in public life whom so many would have picked out as likely to attain that highest ambition of any American.

Possibly, the cold critic might have thought,—with John Quincy Adams,—that his rise had been too rapid for his own good. It is a valuable training for all men to serve during their early years in minor places and bear the buffetings of the struggle on the lower rungs of fame's ladder, to do a good share of drudgery and endure the humiliations of many kinds which plastic youth takes so easily. But Calhoun had had none of this. Practising law but for two or three years and

<sup>115</sup> Mrs. Smith's "First Forty Years" etc., p. 147.

even then in the first ranks, his nine weeks' service in the State Legislature was far too short a term to temper and mould the mettle within him, so that it should slowly crystallize into proper form, and in the House of Representatives he rushed with the speed of a meteor to intoxicating national fame and power. The reader must decide for himself whether this was an advantage in the long run to the brilliant almost stripling or whether his career might otherwise have been even greater and free from some of the mistakes with which he has been charged.



## CHAPTER XI

### ADAMS AND CALHOUN

Political Rivalry — The Presidential Election of 1824-25 — The Washington *Republican* — Troubles in the Republican Camp — Calhoun's Loss of Pennsylvania — Withdraws from Candidacy — Elected Vice-President — John Randolph — "Patrick Henry" and "Onslow."

THE reader will have observed how close were the relations prevailing between Adams and Calhoun in the early years of Monroe's administration. They were, indeed, at that time intimate friends, entertained each other socially, met for conversation and comparison of opinion, and presumably Calhoun thought of Adams about as well as Adams did of him. The latter's "Diary" for a few years after 1818 has repeated references to its author's admiration of the South Carolinian, speaking of him, for instance, as "a man of fair and candid mind, of honorable principles, of clear and quick understanding, of cool self-possession, of enlarged philosophical views, and of ardent patriotism. He is above all sectional and factious prejudices more than any other statesman of this Union with whom I have ever acted. He is more sensitive to the transient manifestations of momentary public opinion, more afraid of the first impressions of the public opinion than I am." Probably, the frigid and forbidding Puritan has recorded of few men, as he once does of Calhoun: "I took a long evening ramble" with him.

In the end of 1819, too, Adams urged his colleague to accept the Mission to France, telling him that he "expected more from him than from any man living to the benefit of the public service of this nation," and intimating that a residence in Europe would much enlarge his sphere of usefulness. Calhoun admitted this but said he could not meet the expense.

Whether Adams was partially and perhaps unconsciously influenced in this suggestion by the desire to remove to a distance one who might become a rival to his ambition must remain unknown.<sup>1</sup>

There was one quite evident reason for Adams's admiration. Though he had broken away from the old Federalists at the time when they wanted to separate the East from the Union, he was at no time a real Republican but always in thorough accord with the centralizing tendencies of the party he had left. Calhoun, too, was at this date still in favor of a strong and splendid federal government and not as yet much troubled with scruples as to constitutional power. He remained still the Calhoun of the House of Representatives during and after the War of 1812. No wonder then that instances arose occasionally in which Adams wrote, as quoted above from the Diary of 1819, of the younger man as being above all sectional prejudices, or in 1822 that he "has no petty scruples about constructive powers and state rights."<sup>2</sup> Nor can it in my opinion be doubted that these expressions of opinion represented fairly well Calhoun's opinions at that time and for a few years later.

But the friendship between the two men could not stand the strain when they became rivals for the Presidency of 1825. In that memorable contest, when the leading characters of the Revolution had reached a time of life too far advanced to bear the burden of the office and when what has been called "the Virginia dynasty" was coming to an end, there were a number of competitors. It was the turn of tide in the era of good feeling and there was no opposition to the Republican party; but it split for the time into numerous factions guided by personal preference rather than by difference of principle. Adams was longing for the office by March, 1818, and his name had been suggested by friends in New England as early as 1817. Crawford and Clay were also already leading candidates and by 1818 Jackson's friends were pushing his claims.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, p. 361; *ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 407, 477, 512, 524.

<sup>2</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 62, 197, 198. Schouler's "United States," Vol. III, p. 238.

To these names were added ere long those of Lowndes and Calhoun. Crawford was undoubtedly at first the main representative of the Southern interest, but he met with serious rebuffs in his own State in 1819 and 1821, and it is likely he was right in thinking that these defeats inspired the two South Carolinians with the hope to supplant him. In 1819 his personal enemy Clark, with whom he had had a duel, was elected Governor of Georgia over Troup by a narrow majority, and again in the fall of 1821 Clark defeated Troup, this time by only 2 votes, it seems. Crawford wrote with acrimony from Washington in November that he presumed there was "great joy in one of the departments, at least, at this place," and added that Calhoun was known to have expressed the opinion that, if Clark should again succeed, Georgia would be against Crawford. Some months later the Secretary of the Treasury was still writing bitterly of "our Mars," who, he complains, gets all the offices and is regarded by the public as "the lord of the ascendant." He goes on that Calhoun and Lowndes, looking upon him as *hors du combat*, supposed "the Southern interest would become the property of the first adventurer. Mr. Calhoun had made a tour of observation in Pennsylvania, whilst Mr. Lowndes kept watch at home."

According to Crawford, some time prior to these events, the Missouri contest and the election of Taylor over Lowndes as Speaker in November of 1820, upon Clay's resignation, had convinced Calhoun that a geographical party had been formed, which would for several years control the course of events: and during the following Congressional session and until late in the year 1821, the same authority tells us that Calhoun had openly supported the claims of Adams to the Presidency. He further adds, too, that on October 16, 1821, before Clark's second triumph and shortly after Calhoun's return from his tour of observation in Pennsylvania,—which presumably refers to his visit to Bedford Springs in September, 1821,—Calhoun voluntarily assured him that he would under no circumstances be a candidate, and Crawford was evidently of the opinion that Calhoun had in view the attainment of the office by himself only some years later. Adams, too, writes that in

March of 1821 Calhoun had "no view to himself for the presidency."

Soon after Clark's second election in Georgia, however, according to Crawford, Calhoun threw himself on Pennsylvania,—"the old stamping-ground," "his native State,"—and Lowndes was also nominated by members of the South Carolina Legislature, under the same belief that the Southern interest had become derelict. The appearance of these two nominees did not escape Adams's close observation of the field, but as late as January, 1822, he was told by one of his lieutenants who had conversed with Calhoun that the latter looked upon himself as a candidate only in case the nominee should be a Southerner and that he would not oppose the claims of Adams or any other Northerner.<sup>4</sup>

Most of these suspicions and fancies may probably be dismissed as of little consequence, nor is it easy to see why Calhoun should not change his mind and determine later to be a candidate at the then approaching election. There is not the least reason to suppose that his earlier action was meant to mislead his rivals. What is clear in the matter is that, after the second defeat of Crawford's candidate Troup in Georgia in the fall of 1821, Lowndes was nominated for the presidency by a caucus of the South Carolina Legislature held on December 18, 1821; and that on December 28 Calhoun was called upon at his lodgings in Washington in the evening by a deputation of members of Congress and asked to allow the use of his name as a candidate. After some consideration, he consented and agreed to stand.<sup>5</sup> From this time on for a

<sup>4</sup> Letters of Crawford printed in Shipp's "Crawford," pp. 229, 230, 232, 233, and in Henry Adams's "Life of Gallatin," pp. 579-582. J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, pp. 327, 447, 478. "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 195-97.

<sup>5</sup> "National Intelligencer" of January 10 and 19, 1822. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, pp. 466, 468, 470. Of the total of 169 members of the South Carolina Legislature 110 attended the caucus, and of these 57 favored a nomination at that time, while 53 were opposed. There is a hint that the 53 were to some extent guided by friendship for Calhoun, but Lowndes, whose health was then already breaking, received a unanimous vote. J. Q. Adams writes later (*ibid.*, VI, pp. 242, 243) that S. D. Ingham and Thomas J. Rogers (a manufacturer) were the leaders in this movement for Calhoun, but it is not entirely clear whether the calling delegation was entirely composed of Pennsylvanians or was partly from the North and partly from the South.



number of years he was, beyond doubt, most eager for the office.

In regard to these movements, Calhoun wrote Maxcy on December 31, 1821,<sup>6</sup> that the nomination of Lowndes was "a very rash and foolish movement. . . . I was informed by my friends," he continues, "of this state of the public opinion [the unpopularity of Adams and Crawford] and proposed to be brought forward by them. I, however, adhered still to the ground, which I at first assumed, not thinking that there was sufficient evidence of such a state of facts existing, which, taking place, I have always thought that it would be my duty to run all hazards."

This decision of his and the unpopularity of the candidates led to the movement in South Carolina. He adds that there was no disagreement between himself and Lowndes, and that he had told the latter at an earlier date that he would not resist the opinion of those who thought he ought to be brought forward, and Lowndes had agreed to the sufficiency of his reasons. Lowndes had called on Calhoun, after hearing of his own nomination in South Carolina, and Calhoun asked whether he ought to retire, but Lowndes answered No. They took measures, also, to prevent any clash of their friends. In regard to the opinion Adams might possibly hold of his entering the field, Calhoun further wrote Maxcy that the nomination of Lowndes proves, that I remained on the ground, which I had at first assumed, as long as I could with safety to myself, and must satisfy Mr. Adams and his friends, that I was compelled by the course of events to assume a more distinct position."

None the less, from about this time the friendship between Calhoun and Adams waned, and the latter became bitterly jealous of his new rival. Their relations were for a time entirely broken and were never again in reality resumed. Crawford's friendship with Calhoun had already become a sacrifice, evidently, in the main, to the like clash of ambitions. The two men, though from different States, at home lived not far from each other and are said to have been long on friendly

<sup>6</sup> Maxcy-Markoe Collection in Library of Congress.

terms; but they began to break apart at an early day in Calhoun's public career. It is quite likely that, as has been suggested, Calhoun's advocacy of Monroe in 1816 was the starting point of their separation. The elderly Georgian, who appreciated to the full his own abilities, and probably felt that long services entitled him to the nomination, was a man of vindictive nature and may well have thought the action of the young South Carolinian little short of a crime.

An early instance of his opposition to the Secretary of War is to be found in the already mentioned effort made in 1821 to break down that system of fortifications which had been decided upon in 1815-16 and was a favorite interest of Calhoun. This was accomplished by defeating, under the plea of economy, the appropriations for certain works in connection with the defences of New Orleans, and is said to have been aimed at Monroe as well as at Calhoun. The President evidently felt it strongly, and on March 26, 1822, wrote a special message to Congress upon the subject, in which he inveighed against its impolicy in language plain enough despite its restraint.

The rivalry between the Secretaries of War and of the Treasury grew steadily more bitter and became soon a positive enmity. Though of course more or less veiled while they were serving together in Monroe's cabinet, yet even then there was a period when they "had no friendly communication with each other," and John Quincy Adams recorded in 1822 that the cabinet discussions between them "had become painful by the tone in which they express their opinions—being that of suppressed hatred and subdued anger."<sup>7</sup> All this rivalry and constant friction led Calhoun to entertain a very poor opinion of Crawford, while John Quincy Adams with characteristic bitterness found at about this time the hidden hand of Crawford in almost every instance in which he did not have his own way. It was not very long before the diarist began to devote a large share of the same secret venom to abuse of Calhoun, but such distorted fancies of contempo-

<sup>7</sup> "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VII, p. 229; and see "Autobiography," p. 28. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, pp. 243-46.

aries are always to be accepted with the greatest hesitation.<sup>8</sup>

Far different was the case with the friendship between Calhoun and Lowndes, which seems never to have been even shaken, despite the fact that they were rivals in the same State. Immediately upon being put in nomination, it is said that Calhoun in turn called on Lowndes to tell him that the nomination was made "without his procurement or solicitation," and that he hoped the fact of their being opposing candidates would make no difference in their private relations. Lowndes assured him that it would not and added that he, too, had been nominated without his knowledge. Lowndes even wrote James Hamilton soon, expressing the wish that, if enough States should support Calhoun, South Carolina would transfer her vote to him, and the political wiseacres of the time are said to have been greatly surprised to see these two rivals still continue, as in the past, their daily walk together to the Capitol, without the slightest difference having been brought about by the new circumstances. Lowndes's health was at this time already failing and he died in October, 1822.<sup>9</sup>

The campaign of 1824-25 began very early in its course to be conducted with a great deal of abuse, and Calhoun complained bitterly in some letters in the spring of 1822 of the *City Gazette* of Washington and its constant attacks on him. This paper was Crawford's organ, and in the summer of that year Calhoun and his friends seem to have concluded that they also must have a paper in their interest. Accordingly, the *Washington Republican* was started in August with Col. T. L. McKenney as its editor. McKenney had been a clerk in the War Office under Calhoun but did not hold the position during his editorship. Adams writes in 1824 that he was an unnaturalized Englishman, but this point cannot be solved to-day nor is it of any real importance.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Schouler's "United States," Vol. III, p. 261. "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VII, p. 82; Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 57.

<sup>9</sup> Jenkins's "Life of Calhoun," 154, 155. Mrs. Ravenel's "William Lowndes," 226-230.

<sup>10</sup> Gaillard Hunt's "Calhoun," p. 46; John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 291; and see pp. 47, 48, 56, 66, 69, *et seq.*; Schouler's "United States," Vol. III, p. 265.

Calhoun was active in starting the paper, had at least a hand in the prospectus and in obtaining subscribers, and writes, too, of furnishing the editor with some reflections which McKenney was to bring out in his own words.<sup>11</sup> It is not unlikely, too, that he supplied to some extent the financial means to start and carry it on. He complains of heavy expenses at this time and was apparently borrowing money in December of 1823,<sup>12</sup> and the paper came to an end and sold its plant to the *National Journal* in 1824, at about the date when Calhoun abandoned his presidential aspirations. Adams writes that it had not been a financial success.<sup>13</sup>

The *Washington Republican*,—such was its title,—was an evening paper, at first published twice a week, later three times, and finally daily. It bore for a motto the words "*Virtus Libertas et natale Solum*," and was bright, well-written and above the standard of the day. The *City Gazette*, Crawford's organ, was quite unable to cope with it. Of course it was decidedly partisan and indulged in the newspaper wit then usual. Thus about the time of the Congressional Caucus of 1824, in which Van Buren was actively concerned, its columns contained various fictitious notices, one of which was signed: "By order of the General Caucus. Martin Van Bring-up, Corporal on the Look-out," and another "King Caucus," and countersigned "M. Van-der-Buck-Tail, Prime Minister and Grand Sachem. Month of Wind."

The serious purpose of the paper, however, was of course to advocate Calhoun for the presidency and to write down Crawford in particular. Mrs. Smith even wrote that McKenney was making every effort to drive the latter from the cabinet, and he was forever under fire in its columns, but I know of only one instance in which his personal honesty was at-

<sup>11</sup> Letter of August 2, 1822, to Virgil Maxcy, in the Maxcy-Markoe papers in the Library of Congress.

<sup>12</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 206, 213, 216. The same complaint of heavy expenses occurs in Calhoun's letters of other dates. See *infra*, p. 345.

<sup>13</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VI, pp. 291, 396, 400. The first number of the "Republican" was issued on August 7, 1822, and the last, July 10, 1824. The "National Journal," which succeeded it, was edited by Peter Force, and was in the interest of Adams and his friends.



tacked. This was during the year 1823 and in a series of very scurrilous articles signed "A. B.," in reality written by Ninian Edwards. They charged Crawford with corrupt dealings with the banks and other disgraceful transactions; but the charges became later a subject of Congressional investigation, and Crawford was exonerated and Edwards totally discredited.

This "A. B. plot," as it was called at the time, was in Benton's opinion<sup>14</sup> detrimental to Calhoun in the end, but there is nothing, so far as I know, to show that he had any hand in the appearance of the articles. It may be worth while to add that McKenney was in turn charged not much later with being a defaulter.<sup>15</sup>

Calhoun was very popular in Pennsylvania, and long remained full of hopes of success in that State. The *Franklin Gazette* of Philadelphia,—of which he wrote on March 18, 1822,<sup>16</sup> that it "comes out with great tone" for him,—was a supporter, and there is evidence that during that year there was some thought among his friends of securing a formal nomination, probably by the Democratic members of the Pennsylvania Legislature. This led, however, to violent attacks by the friends of Clay and Crawford, and the plan was abandoned for the time.<sup>17</sup>

The next year, again, at the meeting of the State Convention at Harrisburg on March 4, Calhoun's friends evidently planned to secure his endorsement, if possible, but the design had again to be given up. The general question was for a time before the body, when a delegate from Westmoreland County, in obedience to express instructions, offered a resolution

<sup>14</sup> "Thirty Years' View," I, pp. 34-36. The file of the "Republican" in the Library of Congress is very imperfect, and I have seen but one of the "A.B." letters. They are, however, of very little importance, and the one number sufficiently indicates their character.

<sup>15</sup> The "Republican" for 1824, *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> Letter to Virgil Maxcy, in Maxcy-Markoe papers in Library of Congress.

<sup>17</sup> Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, pp. 42, 43. See also the denial in "The National Intelligencer" of February 7, 1822, of the report that the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress had sent two of their members to Harrisburg; and the same paper a week or two earlier denies that the Pennsylvania delegation had held a caucus in Washington.

recommending Jackson for President, but the members were not inclined to run the risk of coming out so early and in favor of a man perhaps not destined to succeed in the end. One can almost feel the fright and skurrying to and fro of the politicians, when we read in the *Franklin Gazette* <sup>18</sup> that "several motions were made to lay the resolution on the table, and to proceed to its consideration, but almost by common consent the convention declined to have anything to do with it. They deemed it inexpedient to perform any formal act upon a subject of so much delicacy and importance so early."

In regard to this result, Calhoun wrote <sup>19</sup> on March 12 and 13 to Virgil Maxcy, his friend and lieutenant in Maryland:

I have just heard from Mr. Dallas. The question of taking up the nomination of President was tried on presenting the name of General Jackson, by the delegates from Westmoreland, who had been instructed to that effect. My friends were prepared to bring my name forward if the question should be entertained; but there appeared such aversion to the subject both on account of the want of authority in the members and the fear that it might distract their state election, that they thought it prudent not to bring my name forward at all, so that even the appearance of an abortive attempt has been avoided.

It was fully ascertained that I had 2/3 of the convention against all of the other candidates combined; and my friends in the state were never in better spirits.

Arrangements must be made to bring out the next Legislature at the commencement of the session; and in the meantime as much spirit given both to correspondence and papers as may be practicable.

It is certain that the election is with Pennsylvania and New York. If they unite they choose their man; if they divide their respective candidates must become the rival candidates. This simple view combined with my known strength in Pennsylvania places me on high ground. The idea must be scouted that I have withdrawn, or that there is the least foundation for its assertion.

. . . I may be mistaken, but it appears to me my prospect was never better. I stand on the great republican cause free

<sup>18</sup> Number for March 8, 1823.

<sup>19</sup> Letters in Maxcy-Markoe collection in Library of Congress.

alike from the charge of federalism or radicalism. If you can obtain any support for the paper here [doubtless, the *Republican*] it would be desirable. A thousand or even five hundred dollars would be at present important to the editors. Mr. Cox the Mayor of Georgetown would indorse for the editor. He has very extensive possessions but not a command of cash at present. Without some support I fear the editor may encounter insurmountable difficulties.

These letters show how sanguine Calhoun was in 1823,<sup>20</sup> and his published correspondence shows the same thing in 1822. He wrote his brother-in-law on March 19 of the latter year that his friends, thought his "political prospect good, in fact better than any other who is spoken of. I do not think Mr. L. [Lowndes] is much spoken of. He has few opponents but still fewer ardent friends. My own opinion is that the contest will be between Adams, Crawford and myself." Crawford, on the other hand, thought<sup>21</sup> in February, 1823, that Calhoun was "*hors du combat*, having consigned his forces, that were disposable, to an Eastern general."

This was, however, merely the view of a rival, and it has plainly appeared that Calhoun was full of hope at this very time, as well as both earlier and later, and only six months after Crawford wrote as above, Calhoun told Maxcy<sup>22</sup> "Crawford is certainly done. A warm and intimate friend of his from Georgia, who is well acquainted with the state, acknowledges that it is doubtful whether he can take the state

<sup>20</sup> On March 27, 1823, he wrote Micah Sterling, his former classmate at Yale, under the same inspiration. Sterling was one of his aids in New York, and Calhoun wished him to write and write often for the press, and outlined his own claims as follows: "My past services, my identity with the late war and the administration, my uniform Republican course, my habits of industry and business, the distinctness of my political principles, and the openness and candour which even my enemies concede to me, all furnish topics for arguments to sustain the cause." A later letter of May 28, 1823, to Sterling admits that Adams had undoubtedly gained and was then very strong, but adds "I still think, however, though not now as strong as he is, that I have some striking advantages over him, which will manifest themselves strongly before the end of the contest" (Letters in the collection of John Gribbel, Esq., of Philadelphia). See also Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Letter of February 16 to Tait, printed in Shipp's "Crawford," p. 236.

<sup>22</sup> Letter of August 13, 1823, in the Maxcy-Markoe papers in the Library of Congress.

from me, and thinks the election between the Clark and Crawford candidates doubtful. His neighbors have abandoned him. It is time to make a move on our own ground, and to separate our cause from all others, particularly Adams." Here we have another mistaken judgment, but in November, when the Crawford candidate had been elected in Georgia, Calhoun consoled himself with the solace that his friends looked upon the circumstances attending the election as likely "to strengthen my prospect rather than to weaken it."<sup>23</sup>

It has been seen that Calhoun looked upon New York and Pennsylvania as the most important states, and, though he had generally little hope from the former, yet he evidently watched the ground carefully and corresponded upon the matter with Monroe's son-in-law, Gouverneur, during 1823, and both McDuffie and another of his lieutenants made visits there in his interest. In his letters Van Buren "and the rest of the intriguers" were handled without gloves; and in November, when Calhoun's friends, "the People's party," had a decided success in New York City, Maxcy wrote: "the impression is rapidly increasing that he will get this powerful State, without whose votes no candidate can be chosen by the Electors." Calhoun, too, then thought that Van Buren, Crawford and the intended Congressional Caucus in the interest of the latter were crushed, but in the end, as is well known, Van Buren triumphed absolutely and New York became one of the strongest supporters of Crawford.<sup>24</sup>

Movements in Calhoun's favor were made in various States and on November 29, 1823, after the death of Lowndes, he was nominated by the South Carolina Legislature by an almost unanimous vote. At about the same time, he advised delay in a proposed movement at Annapolis, writing that "certainty is more important than promptitude."<sup>25</sup> As time wore on, the contest grew steadily more bitter and Jackson kept for-

<sup>23</sup> Letter of November 25, 1823, to Maxcy in the Maxcy-Markoe papers in Library of Congress.

<sup>24</sup> Letters of Calhoun to Sam'l. L. Gouverneur, printed in "Bulletin of the New York Public Library," Vol. III (1899), pp. 324-327. Letter of Virgil Maxcy to R. S. Garnett in "American Historical Review," Vol. XII (No. 3: April, 1907), pp. 600, 601.

<sup>25</sup> "Correspondence," p. 216. Niles's "Register," of December 20, 1823.



ever gaining in popularity so that there were soon no less than five leading candidates,—Adams, Crawford, Clay, Calhoun, and Jackson. No wonder that all sorts of rumors flew about, some absolutely false, others probably inspired by leakage from plans more or less under discussion as possible courses of action in some one of the camps.

Thus, as early as January, 1824, it was whispered abroad that there was to be a coalition between Calhoun and Adams, but Calhoun wrote on January 30 that this was "one of the devices of the enemy. It is a report wholly destitute of fact to support it; and is not believed by those who circulate it. I stand wholly on my own basis, and shall continue so to stand. The prospect is good. The election will be left as it ought to be to the people. They alone have the right. Our friends oppose a caucus not through a fear of weakness in Congress, but through principle. A Congressional caucus will certainly fail."

The method of nominating Presidential candidates was then far from fixed. There was no National Nominating Convention held until 1831–32, and candidates were suggested in various ways by unauthorized but usually important bodies, while the seal of "regularity" had been given in the past by the Congressional Caucus. At this time, however, that old piece of political machinery was visibly breaking down and had for some years been looked upon with growing disfavor. Calhoun had attended the caucus of 1812 as a supporter of Madison, and again in 1816, though he is said to have been opposed to holding one and to have long stood out against it, yet in the end he attended, in order to avoid a split in the party.<sup>26</sup> Crawford relied upon securing its endorsement that year, while Monroe's friends had opposed calling the body together. When it met, the vote was in favor of Monroe by a small majority. Calhoun was strongly in favor of the latter, and as early as January 4, 1815, had expressed in a letter to a relative his opinion that Monroe "will be the coming man."

<sup>26</sup> "Autobiography," pp. 28–29, J. E. D. Shipp's "Life and Times of William H. Crawford," pp. 173–75. Jenkins's "Life," p. 155.

In 1820 a congressional caucus was called, but was a failure. Only very few attended, and they decided against making any nomination. There was, indeed, no real opposition that year, and Monroe was reelected by a practically unanimous vote. But in 1824 the question became once more vital. Crawford was again in favor of a caucus, but several Legislatures declared against it, and the friends of Adams, Calhoun, Clay, and Jackson united in opposition to calling one.<sup>27</sup> In the different States various political meetings declared themselves one way or the other upon this subject, and some proposals were made that seem to have been highly important in the growth of our present system of making nominations.

In Pennsylvania, as early as January 10, 1824, the Democratic members of the Legislature met at the State Capitol and recommended Democrats throughout the State to choose a number of delegates equal to the number of their senators and representatives, to meet at Harrisburg on the 4th of March next and "form an Electoral Ticket to be supported by the Democratic party, at the ensuing election for Electors of President and Vice-President."<sup>28</sup> Nor was this all. Two days earlier, a meeting of Democrats in Lancaster County in the same State, after resolving in favor of a Congressional Caucus, had gone on to express their opinion that a Convention of delegates from all the States of the Union would be the best method of selecting a candidate for the Presidency but for the fact that our country was so immense as to render this method impossible.<sup>29</sup> Here was an idea of great moment,

<sup>27</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, p. 60; Vol. VI, pp. 191, 231, 232, 240, 241; Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 25-29.

<sup>28</sup> "The National Intelligencer" of January 15, 1824.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, of January 17, 1824. An unnamed Democratic member of Congress wrote from Washington on January 6 to the "Franklin Gazette," sending the anti-caucus circular signed by 14 Democratic members from Pennsylvania (soon to be mentioned), and then saying: "I sincerely hope that Pennsylvania will take the lead in recommending a national convention. It is the only plan calculated to conciliate and harmonize the Republican party throughout the Union." Niles's "Register," Vol. XXV, p. 306. About the same time, too, some body of delegates in the Northern Liberties (now a part of Philadelphia) resolved that "a national convention composed of delegates from each congressional district presents at once the most practicable and the most republican mode of effecting a nomination for the presidency." "Franklin Gazette" of January 13, 1824. Three years later (January 13, 1827), Van Buren wrote from Washington

which was destined to be realized in a few years, but which the lack of transportation facilities then rendered impracticable.

The other and more modest idea of a State Convention for nominating purposes<sup>30</sup> was also at that date far from fully developed but took strongly, and it will be found that the body met at the time suggested. In the steps leading up to it, moreover, events occurred which are of great moment to us here and which exercised a vital influence on the hopes of all the presidential candidates.

Calhoun's popularity continued long in Pennsylvania, and I think there can be little doubt that down to a late date he was generally regarded as the man most likely to receive the support of that leading State. But, as time wore on, Jackson's strength grew steadily. He had the backing of several most astute political leaders throughout the country, and they succeeded wonderfully in pressing him forward as the candidate of the common people, while the glamor of his dazzling military achievement served to attract the support of thousands. Indorsements of him began to be made at Democratic meetings here and there throughout the State, and the influence of these was probably not much diminished by the occasional complaint of the *Franklin Gazette* early in 1824 that these meetings were noisy and "irregular."

Doubtless they were noisy and often unorthodox, but they

to Thomas Ritchie, calling attention to an article in the "Argus" on a national convention and then going on to say that the measure will soon be brought forward here, "It was first suggested to me by the Vice-President; he and Mr. Ingham of Pennsylvania are the only persons with whom I have as yet conversed." Letter in Van Buren Papers in Library of Congress. On the general subject, see "The First National Nominating Convention," by S. E. Morrison in "American Historical Review," Vol. XVII, (July, 1912), pp. 744-63, which cites "The First National Nominating Convention," by John S. Murdock in *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 680, and Luetecher's "Political Machinery," Chaps. III and IV.

<sup>30</sup> Such Conventions had been held a number of years earlier. Some account of their development is to be found in "The Development of the Nominating Convention in Rhode Island," by Neil Andrews; Reprinted from the Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society; Providence, Rhode Island, 1894. "Nominating Conventions in Pennsylvania," by Joseph S. Walton, "American Historical Review," Vol. II (January, 1897), pp. 262 *et seq.*, "Pennsylvania Politics early in the [Nineteenth] Century," by William M. Meigs, "Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography," Vol. XVII, pp. 485 *et seq.*

were evidently the expression of the uprising of the American Democracy. As the Jackson tide kept thus forever rising and spreading, it was, no doubt, a cause of great anxiety to Calhoun and his friends, despite the fact that down to a late date the *Republican* continued to insist that Calhoun's chances had never been better. His organ could of course say nothing else, but there was the sound of fate in those small but ever-growing voices in favor of Jackson.

The latter's friends grew bolder, too, as time wore on. At a meeting held in Carlisle, apparently in January, 1824, and called by Calhoun's friends, resolutions in his favor were offered, but it is said that some member then moved to amend by striking out Calhoun's name and inserting that of Jackson, and that this was at once carried by acclamation.<sup>31</sup>

Whether this incident actually occurred or not, the following is certain. At some convention in Nether Providence, Delaware Co., on February 7, a committee was appointed to prepare resolutions, and they reported one resolution to approve of the proposed Convention at Harrisburg on March 4, and another to instruct the delegates to support the candidates nominated by the Congressional Caucūs, if one should be held, and if not, then such men as would be most likely to represent the wishes of Democrats. One can see here the fine hand of some non-committal politician, but rebellion was afoot. The first resolution was soon unanimously passed, but Geo. G. Leiper offered as a substitute for the second a resolution in words approving of General Jackson for President, and this was adopted by the meeting.<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, still other events were taking place, which had in the end a great influence in crushing Calhoun's hopes for

<sup>31</sup> Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 28, 29. I have been unable to find this instance in the files of the various newspapers I have gone over, but they are almost always imperfect, and the absence of an item of news from the papers of that day is little evidence that the incident in question did not occur. Perhaps, on the other hand, Parton wrote on the authority of some verbal informant, and this informant's memory retained an inaccurate impression of the Delaware County instance mentioned in the text.

<sup>32</sup> "Franklin Gazette" of February 11, 1824.



that year. The question of caucus or no caucus was actively under discussion. On January 6, 1824, fourteen of the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress published<sup>33</sup> a notice against a caucus and intimated that they would not attend, if one were held, and a month later a card, signed by twenty-four members from numerous States, appeared in the *Intelligencer*, in which they announced that they had been asked by many of their colleagues to ascertain the number of members who disapproved of holding a caucus and had found that, of the total number of 261, there were 181 "who deem it inexpedient, under existing circumstances, to meet in caucus" for that purpose.<sup>34</sup>

This ought to have been a hard blow to the advocates of a caucus; but the very same day (February 7th) another notice was published in the *Intelligencer*,—signed by eleven members from as many different States, announcing that a caucus would be held on Saturday, February 14th. When this meeting came together at the time appointed, it was at once apparent that Crawford's friends controlled it. Every effort had been made to secure a large attendance. Macon was pressed in vain to come, and they tried even to "draw out" an expression of opinion from the aged Jefferson. A week before the meeting it was hoped that as many as 100 would attend,<sup>35</sup> but there were actually only 66 members present in person and two by proxy.

On the only ballot Crawford received 64 votes as against 2 for Adams, one for Jackson and one for Macon. Gallatin was selected for Vice-President, and it is worthy of note that Van Buren attended, possibly guided to some extent by the politician's fondness for that form of orthodoxy which he calls regularity. He had not yet come to be a supporter of

<sup>33</sup> Adams ("Memoirs," Vol. VI, pp. 242, 243) says that this movement originated with Ingham and Rogers, who had been leaders in bringing Calhoun forward. See also *ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>34</sup> "The National Intelligencer" of January 15th and of February 7th, 10th, and 12th, 1824. The "U. S. Gazette" of February 9th reprints from the "Intelligencer" of February 6th both the notice for and that against the caucus.

<sup>35</sup> Adams's "Gallatin," pp. 593-96.

Jackson. There was some hissing in the galleries on the announcement of the vote for President.<sup>36</sup>

Looking back to-day not much less than a hundred years, it seems that such an evidently rump convention ought to have carried little weight,<sup>37</sup> especially as fully one-half of the vote for Crawford was said to come from the two States of New York and Virginia. But the outlook was evidently thought at first blush to be very serious, and the movement had, at least, the advantage of regularity and might perhaps have resulted in concentrating popular support upon its nominee. It will shortly be shown, too, from a letter of Calhoun that the "Caucussers" were thought to have a scheme for the immediate endorsement of Crawford in two leading States and hoped thus to sweep the party on to his support.

The troubles in the Republican camp were all owing to a surplus of candidates and the resulting division. Concentration was imperative, and among those opposed to Crawford Jackson had gained so much support in Pennsylvania that there could by that time be little doubt that he was the most popular man in the State. Accordingly when, only four days after the Crawford Caucus, a meeting was held in Philadelphia on February 18 to revise the proceedings of the ward meetings, which had appointed delegates to the coming State Convention, events occurred of the utmost importance to us here. George M. Dallas, then a young man with a long career ahead of him, attended the meeting and was known to have been a leading supporter of Calhoun for the Presidency, but he introduced resolutions outspoken in favor of Jackson.

Dallas was at the time a candidate for the mission to Mexico, and an unsuccessful effort had been recently made by Ingham to induce the Secretary of State to withdraw his opposition to the appointment.<sup>38</sup> He was also said to be seeking an ap-

<sup>36</sup> "The National Intelligencer" of February 17, 1824. "The Washington Republican" of February 14th, as quoted in the "U. S. Gazette" of February 18, 1824, has it that there was universal hissing, and one other newspaper, which I have seen but failed to note, admitted the occurrence of slight hissing.

<sup>37</sup> A writer of the time tells us that the nomination soon injured Crawford more than it helped him: Cobb's "Leisure Labors," pp. 207, 208.

<sup>38</sup> John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, pp. 243-46.

pointment in the State, and of course his action in the convention was by some put down to interested motives; but there is no reason to seek so far. The very recent caucus and the supposed plans of its supporters had evidently alarmed him and his friends, and it will shortly be seen that he had already informed Calhoun that the latter's cause was lost in Pennsylvania.

The resolutions offered by Dallas called upon Democrats to sacrifice their personal predilections and to "unite in one harmonious and simultaneous movement" for the election of Jackson, and further recited that "it is expedient, in order signally to defeat a project so subversive of fundamental principles [as the caucus nomination of Crawford] to concentrate the energy of all sound Democrats in favor of a single illustrious individual." In his speech offering the resolutions, Dallas spoke of the caucus as formidable and then said:

It concentrated for its favorite candidate the force of a desperate and heedless faction; and it could only be encountered effectually by a similar concentration of its opponents. We must cease to contend for persons; principles which lie at the root of our politics were involved; and we were bound to make common cause against the caucus, in the mode most likely to achieve a signal triumph. . . .

Another paper of the day reported him as follows:

The subject of deliberation was one of too general importance and of too much national interest to justify any indulgence of personal partiality or dislike. . . . He was about tendering to what he believed was the good of the country and the preservation of the Republican party, a sacrifice of individual predilection, the magnitude of which his own particular friends, and perhaps his fellow citizens at large, could easily appreciate. A crisis had, however, arrived, which appealed forcibly to the patriotic feelings of every man attached to the institutions of the country, to their safety from foreign aggression and from domestic usurpation. . . . He adverted to the caucus lately held at Washington. . . . It was the caucus of a *miserable and infatuated minority*. . . . One entire half of the vote given to the

nominated candidate — could it be credited! — came from two States only, New York and Virginia.

Mr. Dallas said that his partiality for one distinguished statesman as a presidential candidate had always been avowed, and was known to his fellow citizens. His respect and attachment for that individual, his admiration of his principles, his perfect confidence in his virtues and abilities, and his deep sense of his services to this country, were undiminished and could never change. But predilections must be sacrificed: the cause of the nation, the cause of the democratic party, were, in his opinion, at stake: we must forego subordinate differences of opinion and rally energetically on him who, while he possessed every qualification that can be desired in an American pilot, would lead us by his merited popularity, through the storm.<sup>39</sup>

In one sense Dallas's step was a fateful one for Calhoun, but in reality it only recognized that which the growth of popular opinion had already brought about in Pennsylvania. Niles's "Register," in reporting the matter, wrote that it was understood that Dallas's action "expressed the sentiment of the friends of Mr. Calhoun in Pennsylvania generally," and the same result would inevitably have occurred in a few days, in any event, at the Harrisburg Convention. The *Republican* in Washington had a difficult task to explain its position, but met the disaster with dignity. In the leading editorial, February 23, 1824, it wrote:

We publish, this day, the Proceedings in the Town-Meeting at Philadelphia, with the observation made by Mr. Dallas on the occasion; from which it may be inferred, that it is no longer doubtful that the whole political and moral influence of Pennsylvania will be concentrated on General Jackson. The movement, we believe, was wholly unpremeditated and spontaneous. Information had just been received of the proceedings of the partial caucus; and it being evident that the object of the caucus was to force Mr. Crawford upon Pennsylvania, immediate concentration on Mr. Calhoun or General Jackson, who alone divided the State, became necessary, in order to defeat the success of the

<sup>39</sup> "The National Intelligencer" of February 24th, 1824. "The Democratic Press" of February 21, quoting from the "Franklin Gazette." Niles's "Register," Vol. XXV, p. 408.



caucus scheme. It was found that this concentration could be most readily made upon General Jackson, and the friends of Mr. Calhoun, with that disinterestedness which has characterized them through every stage of the canvass of the Presidential question, determined to sacrifice personal predilection to the good of the cause. The concentration of the Republican forces accordingly took place on General Jackson, which places him out of the reach of competition in that great state, and leaves not a shadow of hope that the caucus nomination here can have the slightest influence in Pennsylvania. This movement destroys the last hope of the caucussers. Their scheme, undoubtedly, was to obtain, without delay, the confirmation of the caucus nomination, by the Legislatures of Virginia and New York, which had previously pledged themselves to support the movement at Washington; and taking advantage of the distraction in Pennsylvania, between the friends of Mr. Calhoun and General Jackson, they calculated to operate on the Convention at Harrisburg, in favor of Mr. Crawford, by means of the nomination thus confirmed at Richmond and Albany. The scheme was ingenious, and might, by possibility, have succeeded, had not the friends of Mr. Calhoun made the noble and disinterested sacrifice which they have made. At this result we heartily rejoice, as every well wisher of the country must; while it is impossible not to feel a deep regret that it has been found thus necessary, for the common good, to diminish the prospects of that candidate (whose prospects were otherwise so fair) with whose elevation we have ever considered the best interests of the country to be connected. . . .

Better evidence of the sentiments of Calhoun himself upon this shipwreck of his hopes is to be found in a letter <sup>40</sup> of February 27, written from Washington to his friend Maxcy, in which he says:

I have just read your letter enclosing the Penna circular. The movement at Philadelphia was as unexpected to me as it could have been to any of my friends.<sup>41</sup> It has produced here the deepest excitement. Mr. Dallas had informed me about a week be-

<sup>40</sup> Maxcy-Markoe Papers, in Library of Congress.

<sup>41</sup> J. R. Poinsett, then a close political friend of Calhoun, wrote on February 26 to Joseph Hopkinson (?) to precisely the same effect. Hopkinson Collection of letters in possession of Edward Hopkinson, Esq., of Philadelphia.

fore that he thought the cause was lost in Penna and that we should have to yield there, at the Harrisburg convention. Tho' prepared for a defeat [at] Harrisburg, no movement in advance was anticipated. What took place was unpremeditated and under a sudden impulse received from the caucus nomination here, and the loss of Berks which decided the contest in favor of Genl. Jackson in Penna. I have no doubt the motives were pure; and tho' ill timed as it regards Dallas and our cause, yet not unfavorable to the great point of defeating the Radicals.

Our friends have come to the conclusion that we ought to hold to our position, and wait events. It is thought to be the best in every point of view whether it regards the country, or ourselves. Nor will there be much difficulty. South Carolina and Jersey can easily be retained as they are. In North Carolina, the friends of Jackson will not start another ticket, with the understanding that the one formed will support him, should I have no prospect. In Penna a ticket will be formed favorable to me as a second choice, and the same course will be pursued in Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. In Maryland it is highly desirable that my friends should run in as many districts as possible, taking Jackson if necessary as a second choice, or taking position simply against the caucus with the determination to support the strongest.

Jackson's friends indicate a disposition to add my name to his ticket in Penna as V. P. We have determined in relation to it to leave events to take their own course, that is to leave the determination to his friends. Standing as I do before the American people, I can look to no other position than that which I now occupy.

Had Penna decided favourably, the prospect would have been most fair. Taking the U. S. together I never had a fairer prospect than on the day we lost the State.

Two weeks later, on March 4, the State Nominating Convention met at Harrisburg and was largely attended. There were present 125 delegates, representing all the counties but four. No effort in Calhoun's favor seems to have been made, and doubtless this and the Convention's action as to him were in pursuance of the understanding between the Jackson and Calhoun forces described in Calhoun's letter. A motion to indorse Crawford was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of

only 2 Yeas to 123 Nays, and then a resolution in favor of Jackson was carried by 124 to 1. Calhoun was nominated for Vice-President, receiving 87 votes, to 10 for Clay, 10 for Gallatin, and 17 scattering.<sup>42</sup> Before very long, too, Calhoun was taken up by the friends of Adams as their candidate for Vice-President, and thus he was rapidly being forced toward second position.

His "Autobiography" tells us that his name "was finally withdrawn in compliance with his wishes," and there is no reason to question the truth of this statement,<sup>43</sup> but it is impossible to ascertain the date at which the withdrawal was made. Probably the process was a gradual one and forced upon him by the logic of events. It has been seen that Dallas's action at the meeting in February was unexpected to Calhoun, and that he proposed still to keep himself in the field after that time. It was indeed hardly in human nature for him to do otherwise, fired as he was by an honorable ambition to be President, even though he was but forty-two and could therefore well afford to wait,—so far as mere years were concerned. There is, moreover, evidence that his hopes continued for a number of months yet. John Quincy Adams, for instance, though he thought in April, 1824, that Calhoun was at heart for him and was only aiming to secure the Vice-Presidency for himself, was apparently shaken in this belief as late as the ensuing August, and even then was in doubt as to Calhoun's plans.<sup>44</sup>

The campaign of 1824-25 was a bitter struggle, but there is no need here of going much further into its details. After Calhoun was taken up by the friends of both Adams and

<sup>42</sup> "United States Gazette" of March 8 and 10, 1824; "The National Intelligencer" of March 10, 1824.

<sup>43</sup> Calhoun said in a speech at a dinner given him at Abbeville on May 27, 1825: "From first to last, one leading principle governed me, that the voice of the people should prevail. . . . I did not hesitate, by withdrawing, to contract the sphere of election, and thereby to endeavor as far as in me lay, to terminate the election by the people, without its being referred to the house of representatives." Niles's "Register," Vol. XXVIII, pp. 256-67. Mr. Jervcy has also been unable to determine at just what time Calhoun withdrew, and thinks his popularity in South Carolina was much diminished at about this time, and that he was the object of many attacks. "Life of Hayne," pp. 173-77.

<sup>44</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VI, pp. 290, 292, 407.

Jackson for the Vice-Presidency and withdrew from the struggle for the highest office, the result as to him became a foregone conclusion, and he was triumphantly chosen by 182 electoral votes out of a total of 261. There was, however, no election of a President on the popular vote, and the House of Representatives then chose John Quincy Adams.

Some glimpses of the struggle thus terminated reach us from Mrs. Smith, who has already been quoted. She knew in 1823 that Calhoun and Adams were not such friends as they had been, and in January, 1825, when the choice of President was about to come on in the House, she wrote her sister:

You must know society is now divided into separate battalions as it were. Mrs. Adams collected a large party and went one night [to the theatre], Mrs. Calhoun another, so it was thought by our friends that Mrs. Crawford should go, too, to show our strength. . . . The fate of the election is as uncertain as ever.<sup>45</sup>

Mrs. Smith, despite her friendship for the Calhouns, was a partisan of Crawford for the Presidency, but it is not apparent why Calhoun should then take an active part. He was not a candidate for the office and had already been elected to the Vice-Presidency by the popular vote.

On March 4, 1825, Calhoun took the oath of office as Vice-President and was widely looked upon as a leading candidate for the Presidency four years thence. But when that period had gone by, as will be shown later, he once more found it necessary to stand aside. Jackson's strength was far too great to be stemmed. Calhoun was then taken up as Vice-President by Jackson's friends and was once more elected (in 1829) to that office. Again this time he seemed to have every prospect of succeeding to the Presidency, but the alluring prize was destined never to be his.

These events are a few years ahead of the time with which we are now mainly concerned, but are introduced here because of their bearing on Calhoun's years as Vice-President. In the same connection, it will be well to quote from one more

<sup>45</sup> Mrs. Smith's "First Forty Years" etc., pp. 163, 170, 171.



letter of Mrs. Smith, giving some view of his idea of political struggles. On January 30, 1829, after his second election as Vice-President, and after Jackson had triumphed over Adams, she wrote to her son:

I . . . told you we were going to have a small party, a small, but very select and agreeable one it was. Mr. and Mrs. Calhoun, she as friendly and social, he as charming and interesting as ever. . . . Mr. Calhoun [spoke with me] about the late election and the characters of some of the leaders on both sides . . . "What a pity it is," observed Mr. Calhoun to me, "that all the ladies cannot carry it off (their defeat) as charmingly as Mrs. Porter [Gen. Porter's wife], but some I hear take it much to heart. . . . After all," said Mr. Calhoun, "these things are, as it were, the mere charity of war and triumph of defeat, change sides and every one takes his turn, so that one ought not to feel great elevation or depression, but in either case take the result with moderation, but above all, as far as possible to avoid mingling personal with political feelings. There is nothing from which I have really suffered in the late conflict of parties, but the division it has created between me and personal friends; as for the enmity and abuse of political opponents, that is nothing — wounds which leave no scar."<sup>46</sup>

The period of nearly eight years during which Calhoun held the office of Vice-President was of vital importance to him and marks, indeed, the turning point of his career. It will be found that these years contained many a disappointment, some situations of immense difficulty for a statesman, and embraced a time when his mind must have been distraught by doubts. They ushered in, moreover, the long term during which his nation-wide popularity was largely broken and he came to represent only a section of the country.

It seems to have been generally agreed that he made an admirable presiding officer of the Senate. Regular in attendance, he himself wrote<sup>47</sup> that during the long and laborious session of 1825-26 he was not absent from his post for a moment, "and often remained in the chair, without

<sup>46</sup> Mrs. Smith's "First Forty Years" etc., pp. 268-270.

<sup>47</sup> Calhoun as "Onslow," in "Works," Vol. VI, p. 347.

leaving it, from eight to twelve hours." Dignified in manner, probably feeling the lofty character of the duties belonging to the body, he imparted some of this feeling to members, and they in general responded to his lead. But it will shortly be shown that there was one member who formed a conspicuous exception to this rule.

Calhoun introduced the custom of addressing the members of the body as "Senators" instead of "Gentlemen," as had been the practice theretofore, and this has prevailed ever since. He always made a point of being at his post of duty, considering that the office he held, as well as all others, called for diligent service on the part of the incumbent, and he only absented himself near the end of the session, so as to permit the election of a President *pro tempore*. Far different had been the course of his predecessors, who had let the office become very much of a sinecure.<sup>48</sup>

There have, perhaps, been few Presidencies during which the mere game of politics was played to so large an extent as during that of John Quincy Adams. And this was probably inevitable from the surrounding circumstances. It was a period of transition and of purely personal politics, and it is curious to think to-day that John Quincy Adams owed his election to the party of Jefferson. A man further removed than Adams from the views of the founder of the Republicans could hardly be found; and he was scarcely in office before he broke away entirely from their principles. Among many strongly Federalistic policies advocated by him, the Panama Mission was a favorite one; and it was urged, moreover, coupled with extravagant claims of executive power in the matter. Certainly far from Jeffersonian in its nature, it came soon, too, to touch on the tender subject of slavery. The South was already much alarmed on the subject of the blacks in general and wanted little to do with South American countries which admitted them to an equality. The proposed mission came hence to be the subject upon which lengthy discussions were had of slavery in all its aspects.

<sup>48</sup> Josiah Quincy's "Figures of the Past," pp. 262, 263; and see also (e.g.) W. H. Sparks's "Memoirs of Fifty Years," p. 55.

At this time, the South had a doughty champion in John Randolph of Roanoke. Long in the political field, with as bitter a tongue as is often vouchsafed to the sons of men, foreseeing more clearly than almost any one of his contemporaries the threatening ruin of the then Southern civilization, and utterly uncompromising, Randolph was by this time a man past fifty years, and long habits of intemperance had had their usual effect on a mind always erratic but which even yet had flashes of brilliancy.

He was sent to the Senate from Virginia in 1825 and soon became one of the very first leaders of the opposition. It was said of him, with probable truth, that he did more than any other single man to break down the administration.<sup>49</sup> In the course of his many abusive harangues, which were disjointed and disconnected to a degree,—and often openly accentuated by liberal potations of spirits while on the floor,—he undoubtedly went very far beyond any proper rules of decorum in debate, while the sting of his words was often burning and must at times have caused positive pain to those at whom they were aimed. Possibly, too, this was increased by the fact that the half-insane mind of this diseased man, in pouring out his diatribes, would still not infrequently clothe them in language which genius alone can lend, as well as flash out the soundest views of some phase of public affairs.

One of the worst of these attacks of Randolph was contained in his speech<sup>50</sup> of March 30, 1826, on Executive Powers. It grew out of Adams's course as to the proposed Panama Mission, and was fairly ribald as to the President and his Secretary of State. The latter was compared to "Black George," while the former became "Blifil," the Puritanical hypocrite and swindler; and their alleged corrupt bargain was depicted in language clear enough, despite the fact that no human being could possibly unravel the wordy tangle and discover a thread to the speech. Clay, as is well known, resorted to a challenge, and there was held ere long between him and

<sup>49</sup> Vance in the House of Representatives on January 29, 1828. Adams's "Randolph," p. 290.

<sup>50</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. II, Part I, 1825-26, pp. 389-404; 398, 401.

Randolph what Benton calls the last "high-toned duel" he ever witnessed. With this, however, we are not here concerned.

This speech and others of a like nature made by Randolph during his two years in the Senate constitute, of course, the instances above referred to in which the dignity of the body was not maintained during Calhoun's Vice-Presidency; and the chair soon came to be violently abused in many quarters for not calling the unruly member to order. The question was evidently widely discussed among Senators as well as outside the body and, when amendments of the rules were shortly passed to rescind those sections that left to the presiding officer the appointment of committees and the supervision of the Journal, Calhoun took advantage,—on April 15,—of the opportunity to explain his position in regard to the matter in general.

After quoting the words of the 6th and 7th Rules, he said:

The chair . . . has bestowed its most deliberate and anxious attention, by day and by night, on the question of the extent of its powers, under a correct construction of these rules, and has settled in the conviction, that the right *to call to order*, on questions touching the *latitude* or *freedom* of debate, belongs exclusively to the members of this body, and not to the chair. The power of the presiding officer, on these great points, is an appellate power only; and consequently, the duties of the chair commence when a Senator is called to order by a Senator.<sup>51</sup> . . .

The subject was soon bruited in the newspapers, and some writer under the name of "A Western Senator" defended the Vice-President. Then ere long a series of articles over the signature of "Patrick Henry" began to appear in the

<sup>51</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. II, Part I, 1825-26, pp. 572-573. The 6th and 7th Rules, there quoted, read: "When a member shall be called to order, he shall sit down, until the President shall have determined whether he is in order or not; and every question of order shall be decided by the President, without debate; but if there be a doubt in his mind, he may call for the sense of the Senate.

"If the member be called to order, for words spoken, the exceptionable words shall be immediately taken down, in writing, that the President may be better enabled to judge of the matter."

The rules contained no other provision upon the subject.



*National Journal* of Washington,<sup>52</sup> most strongly taking the opposite side. The writer of the articles wielded an able and a most caustic pen, and it was apparently generally assumed, then as well as later, that the President of the United States was the real author. Calhoun was openly accused of perverting the Rules and neglecting to do his plain duty in the matter, in order to attain the ends of his own ambition, and vituperation was poured upon him from the beginning to the end of the series.

"Patrick Henry's" first letter was answered by "Onslow" in two numbers of *The National Intelligencer*,<sup>53</sup> and here again it seems to have been generally assumed that the author was a person in high standing,—none less than the alleged culprit himself, Calhoun. "Onslow" was quite as full of vituperation as "Patrick Henry," and it was certainly a unique sight thus to see these two high officers charged in turn with perversions and falsifyings, and the motives and conduct of each

<sup>52</sup> The five letters of "Patrick Henry" are to be found in the issues of May 1, June 7, and August 4, 5, and 8, 1826. They were also later printed in pamphlet form and make a pamphlet of over fifty pages. There is, so far as I can find, no direct evidence whatsoever that John Quincy Adams was the author of "Patrick Henry," and Mr. Worthington C. Ford, who is editing "Adams's Works," has kindly written me in advance that he thinks it "safe to reject the whole story" of Adams's share in the publication. But I cannot escape the conclusion that Adams had a large hand in the matter. "Onslow" publicly stated and *assumed* that fact ("Calhoun's Works," Vol. VI, p. 322). Calhoun's "Autobiography" of 1843 (p. 31) again does the same thing, speaking of the author as "a writer of great power (supposed to be the President himself)"; and Crallé, in editing Calhoun's works, writes ("Works," Vol. VI, p. 322) as if such were the ascertained and known fact. See also Jenkins's "Life," p. 159. So far as I know, Adams did not at any time either deny the charge or refer to it,—either publicly or in his "Diary." Perhaps internal evidence is not altogether wanting. The great length (over fifty pages) and labored argument are very like Adams, and the allegation that the duty of the Vice-President to call to order rested on "deeper and holier foundations" than any Rule of the Senate, is just such as he would have made. Some persons are, I think, of opinion that the articles were actually composed by Philip Richard Fendall (then a Clerk in the Office of the Secretary of State), and the publication supervised by Adams; and perhaps this is as near the truth as it is possible to-day to get.

<sup>53</sup> There were three numbers of "Onslow." The first was originally sent to the "National Journal," but was refused publication. It was then sent to the "National Intelligencer" and printed in the issue of May 20. The two remaining numbers,—the more important ones,—are contained in the "Intelligencer" of June 27 and 29 and in "Calhoun's Works," Vol. VI, pp. 322-348. The first number is not printed in the "Works."

attacked in about as high a style of invective as is often used among the cultivated; while both authors assumed,—and the public, at least, thought it knew,—that the President and Vice-President were the actual authors. “Patrick Henry’s” later numbers were even formally addressed to “Hon. John C. Calhoun, Vice-President,” etc.

The main contention of “Patrick Henry” was that, under the constitutional provision that made the Vice-President the presiding officer of the Senate, it was *ex vi termini* his duty to preserve decorum and of his own motion to call a member to order for words improperly spoken in debate. Calhoun answered that this view neglected another provision to the effect that “each House may determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.” With this provision conferring an express authority on the Senate to make its own rules, it is impossible, he argued, to suppose that the power of calling to order was intended to be vested in the Vice-President. The Senate had, moreover, enacted rules of order and yet had not made any such provision, while the Rules of the House were express that the Speaker should call to order.

In his later letters, “Patrick Henry” maintained that the 6th and 7th Rules were plainly intended to have application only when a member should call to order, and purposely left that duty with the presiding officer in all cases where members failed to do so. This obligation of the Vice-President, he wrote, “rested on deeper and holier foundations” than any rule of the Senate and could not be taken away from him by the body. He also cited Jefferson’s Manual, some language of which tended to bear out his general view; and he contended that Calhoun had in fact called another member to order. The argument was undoubtedly labored, and ran into great length.

Calhoun’s whole discussion of the matter was contained in three papers covering twenty-six smaller pages, and he never even answered the last four letters of his opponent, despite their effort to draw him on. His main argument rested

on the express power conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate to make its own rules, but he also maintained that it could not be supposed that the Fathers had designed to place one man over the Senate, armed with such a weapon, and then, *more suo*, dilated on the awful tyranny that might result in some instances from admitting the theory of "Patrick Henry." The *one-man power* figured largely throughout the discussion, and Calhoun was careful to limit what he said to the specific point at issue,—of the power to call to order upon questions touching the latitude or freedom of debate.

The marked difference between the powers conferred by the rules of the two houses on the Speaker and Vice-President respectively, was emphasized by "Onslow," and the reason alleged to be that in the one case the officer is absolutely responsible for his conduct to the body under him, while in the other he is not. The close analogy on this point between the Commons and the House of Lords was of course also mentioned. The alleged instance on his own part of calling to order he distinguished, and showed further that the member in question agreed with his view and did not think himself unfairly dealt with. Jefferson's authority against him could not be entirely cleared away.

It seems to the present writer that Calhoun had certainly the better of the discussion and that "Patrick Henry" was rash in assuming such large results as flowing from a bald provision that a certain officer should be the presiding officer but he was doubtless stung to madness by the outrageous language of Randolph and the evident crumbling to pieces of his Administration. Calhoun wrote later that his two papers "so completely demolished the argument of 'Patrick Henry' as to turn the tide in his favor." And such seems to have been the opinion at the time. In 1828, too, while he was still Vice-President, a new rule was passed by the Senate, expressly conferring on the presiding officer the power to call to order; and here again Calhoun finds his justification, adding that the new rule was enacted "with an almost unanimous approval of his decision."<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> "Autobiography," pp. 31, 32, Jenkins's "Life," p. 159. O'Neill's "Bench and Bar of South Carolina," Vol. II, p. 300.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE GROWTH OF SECTIONAL HOSTILITY

Calhoun's Change of View and Causes Leading Thereto — Champion of State Rights — The Missouri Struggle — Early Abolition Proposals — The Tariff.

DURING the years we have been recently considering, Calhoun had gone through that great change of opinion as to public affairs which has been several times referred to in these pages. His early views have been already seen, and he evidently adhered in the main to these, until about the time when his Vice-Presidency began in 1825; but the close of his first term in that office, in 1829, found him holding quite different opinions.

By the latter date, though his change was not known far and wide among the masses throughout the country, yet his intimates and public men in general,—in South Carolina at least,—knew very well that he had come to think a tariff for protection unconstitutional and that he had formulated the method of practically applying the doctrine of Nullification or State Veto. They knew, too, that he thought the time was nearly come when the Southern States should interpose to arrest the progress of what he and they thought a most oppressive course of legislation. From this time on, he rapidly drifted into the position of the champion *par excellence* of State Rights.

It has been said glibly and many times over that disappointed ambition,—the evident shipwreck of his Presidential aspiration,—led to his change,<sup>1</sup> but the reader will find that he had actually formulated the doctrines of his later life and put them down in black and white, as well as announced them widely among his political acquaintance, at a time when he had every

<sup>1</sup> Jackson so charged in his famous Proclamation of 1832.



reason to count upon the Presidency as likely to fall to him in due time. By 1828 Jackson had indeed grown too popular for Calhoun to think of contesting against him; but the General was expected to serve but four years,—from 1829 to 1833,—and Calhoun had been selected for the second office, with excellent prospects for the succession in 1833. Not until nearly the middle of Jackson's first term did Calhoun's Presidential hopes meet with disaster, and he had actually undergone his conversion during John Quincy Adams's Presidency,—two or more years before Jackson had even attained the office, and hence several years before the disappointment of Calhoun's ambition came about.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in regard to protection, on which the contest actually first arose, it will be shown that his change had begun as early as 1820.

It is a difficult chapter in this Life to write, for the silence almost of the tomb is what reaches us for a long time from Calhoun. He occupied the Vice-Presidency during the greater part of the period, an office which not only did not call for expressions of opinion on his part but the proprieties of which demanded that he should be slow to blurt out new views that might break in upon him, which might yet turn out to be but half-fledged fancies. Nor is this all: his private correspondence long throws no light upon the subject. He was a reticent man as to a matter of this kind, and evidently did not write, nor probably talk, much about it until his mind was well made up.

We are hence left to the general history of the period in order to find out the earlier causes leading to his change, but I think we shall find them plain enough and almost compelling his course. It will be necessary, too, to go back to some extent to the very foundation of our government; for some of the controlling influences date back to that time, and even earlier.

The truth is that when the present Constitution was drawn and our Union formed, in 1787-89, the country brought to-

<sup>2</sup> Calhoun himself touches slightly upon all this in his speech of February 15, and 16, 1833, on the Force Bill. "Works," Vol. II, pp. 216-18. See also "Autobiography," p. 34.

gether contained two widely different civilizations. The frigid North of the Puritans and the sub-tropical South with its slavery and hordes of negroes had little in common other than opposition of both to the mother country and an evident need to unite for protection. Their economical and social systems were radically different, and each section formed a fairly solid unit within itself. The North occupied a large and united territory, throughout which much the same civilization prevailed; while the South stretched along the lower Atlantic, back to the mountains and to some extent beyond them, and all this contiguous region of theirs was based upon another and strikingly different system, of which slavery was an integral and controlling element.

This difference cropped out as early as the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and again in 1790 it seems that the admission of Kentucky into the Union was delayed by the North, until Vermont should be ready<sup>3</sup> to serve as a Northern counterweight to the new Southern sister. Probably it was the same cause, also, that led the elder Adams at some time during his Presidency to refuse the use of his name to aid a college in Tennessee, on the ground that the Union could not last and there was, hence, no reason for New Englanders to promote a literary institution in the South and thereby give "strength to those who were to be their enemies."<sup>4</sup>

The words of a debater during the Missouri struggle seem to indicate other early symptoms of the same fundamental difference. Said this member:

It is now at least twenty years, that I have, with some pain and apprehension, remarked the increasing spirit of local and sectional envy and dislike between the North and the South. A continued series of sarcasms upon each other's circumstances, modes of living, and manners, so foolishly persevered in, has produced at length that keen controversy which now enlists us in masses against each other on the opposite sides of the line of latitude.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Clay so asserted in the Missouri debates, Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, pp. 473, 474.

<sup>4</sup> "Jefferson's Works" (Ford's edition), Vol. I, p. 300.

<sup>5</sup> Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 478.

It seems, also, that Macon as early as 1818 foresaw pretty clearly the coming struggle. "The South country will be ruined," he wrote a friend in that year; and then inveighed against the abolition societies, predicting that they would yet try the question of emancipation. "If Congress can make canals," he added, having in view no doubt the liberal interpretation advocated by Calhoun and some others, "they can with more propriety emancipate. Be not deceived. I speak soberly in the fear of God and love of the constitution."<sup>6</sup>

The country in general, however, and most even of its leading men, took little thought of this matter, and it remained for the struggle over Missouri, flashing suddenly into flame, to awaken public attention and strike terror to the hearts of the older patriots, who soon came to realize that a cause existed in our midst which bore every promise of having the capacity to rend us asunder. It was on the 15th day of February, 1819, that Tallmadge proposed the restriction on the State of Missouri to prohibit slavery within her limits; and from that time on until the final admission of the State, on August 10, 1821,—free of restriction, but with the well-known Compromise between the two sections of the country that slavery should be excluded from all the later territories north of latitude 36° 30',—the desperate struggle continued.

Into its details we do not need to enter here, but the student should bear in mind that the whole contest evinced most clearly a design to arrest the spread of the Southern social system and to limit it to those States in which it had already been established. Indeed, it proposed to do more, for slavery was to be extirpated in Missouri, where it had already existed for years, and efforts were also made to forbid it in Arkansas, which was then erected into a territory and where it had already been actually introduced.<sup>7</sup> These efforts failed, but they spoke in stentorian tones of the underlying object of the North.

It should also be mentioned here, in explanation of Southern outbursts against Rufus King, that when the flames of the

<sup>6</sup> Wm. E. Dodd's "Nathaniel Macon," pp. 310, 313.

<sup>7</sup> Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 367, foot-note.

contest seemed to die down after the session of Congress ending with March 3, 1819, King was very active in setting on foot the concert of measures that resulted, as John Quincy Adams wrote<sup>8</sup> on February 20, 1820, "in the struggle which now shakes the Union to its centre." The South was not likely to forget the man whose opinions were among the most radical ones on the general subject,<sup>9</sup> and to whom was due the renewed effort to exclude her from a region where her system seemed to belong, and into which it had already at that date actually penetrated.

It was, then, during the Missouri contest that the two great sections of our country for the first time and most distinctly stood in fairly hostile array against each other. The South felt herself attacked and heard bitter,—if for the time somewhat veiled,—invectives against a system which was a part of her very bone and fibre. These invectives came, too, with no good grace from a section that had but recently rid itself of the same system. It was hardly for the North so soon to wrap itself in a cloak of virtue and denounce the South on that subject.

The attacks were, however, well-nigh universal and by no means to be found only in the fumes of volatile Congressional eloquence. The press, pamphlets, the 4th of July and other public meetings throughout the country, the pulpit,—so often merely echoing the popular passion of the hour,—all showered anathemas on the South, even going so far as to demand openly the abolition of slavery in general. Beginning in the great cities and thickly-settled regions of the North, "these resolutions . . . were reëchoed by county meetings, by grand juries, and by town meetings all over the States from Maryland eastward, and in time by legislatures."<sup>10</sup>

No wonder the Southerners were alarmed, for the agitation assumed a brand of inferiority in them, and threatened not only to stop absolutely their expansion but also in the end to tear their civilization up by the roots. Slavery was too closely

<sup>8</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. IV, p. 529.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 257, 258.

<sup>10</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. IV, pp. 577, 578.



interwoven with every fibre of the Southerners' lives for them to face its extirpation,— especially at the hands of others. Numbers of their leaders had been active, it is true, in the American Colonization Society and had expressed opinions against slavery; but the then proposals had in view at most only a very gradual process and were largely under the control of those who lived in the South. The effort of 1819 was to exert Congressional authority and suddenly to uproot and abolish slavery in Missouri, while the denunciations of the system from all sources in the North foretold in warning notes what was in the womb of Time, and unavoidably drove into an attitude of self-defense the men of the South, who had grown up with slavery from earliest infancy and saw its web and woof all around them on every side.

How could it have been extirpated except by revolution, or by the slowest and most groping steps? And even if it might have been gradually worn out, the question of what to do with the hordes of fundamentally incapable negroes stared the men of the South of that day in the face so squarely that they realized, if darkly and dimly, the terrible problem the blacks have been since the Civil War and to-day still are. Perhaps it would be better to say they *felt* but did not dare face it, much as we to-day feel that there is something wrong in our money system or our labor system, with their crushing effects on individuals; but most of us do not dare to undertake their amendment. The problem was a too terrible one for the men of any particular time to attempt to solve, and Macon did but express the opinion of his whole section when in 1806 he said<sup>11</sup> in the Senate: "It is in vain to talk of turning these creatures loose to cut our throats."

At the very same time, too, when the Missouri contest was thus driving the Southerners to unite in defence of their

<sup>11</sup> Annals of Congress, Ninth Congress, Second Session, p. 225. This was said during the discussions of the bill to prohibit the importation of slaves after 1807, when an amendment was offered to make free any blacks imported in violation of the law. Macon said that there was but one opinion on the general subject, and that was to prohibit importations after that date; but that a law must be made that would be effective everywhere, and this amendment would not attain that end (*ibid.*, pp. 172, 173). Later in the same discussion he made the remark quoted in the text.

equality in the Union, another question was raised, upon which there was much the same alignment of the sections. In the spring of 1820, Baldwin of Pennsylvania brought in a tariff bill making material increases in the rates, and this passed the House but failed in the Senate, by votes very much the same as those on the Missouri question. It has been shown already that, contrary to what is often stated, the South had cast a majority of her votes against the Tariff of 1816, and on the bill of 1820 her vote in the House was 40 Nays to 3 Yeas (12 not voting). At this time, she was already beginning to awake to her isolation in the Union, and the *Southern Patriot*,<sup>12</sup> of Charleston, wrote of the fact that new party distinctions were coming on "of a far more dangerous character and complexion. We allude to those of a geographical nature, which a few restless spirits are laboring to build up."

This idea of a coming geographical party — meaning evidently the North uniting against the South — was probably widely held throughout the South at that time, and John Taylor of Caroline wrote of it,<sup>13</sup> though he was of opinion that it could only be a transitory line of division and that otherwise it would certainly lead to disunion. Calhoun, too, in 1827, at a date close to his completed change, wrote of the same general idea and expressed the opinion that the constitution did not sufficiently guard the different geographical interests.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Issue of April 22, 1820; see also issues of April 5, 18, 19, and May 13. That of May 13 contains a letter from Eldred Simkins, Calhoun's intimate friend and successor in the House of Representatives, expressing the opinion that the Baldwin bill would be "deeply injurious to our great *agricultural* and *commercial* interests."

<sup>13</sup> Letter of December 30, 1820, printed by Prof. Wm. E. Dodd in "The Nation" of March 30, 1911. The name of Taylor's correspondent does not appear.

<sup>14</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 250, 251. This was evidently the germ of his view, in very late life: that both sections should elect a President. See "Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States" in "Works," Vol. I, pp. 392-96, and see also *post*, Vol. II, pp. 455, 456. The general sense of isolation was well-nigh universal throughout the South in a few years. Chancellor Harper said in his Address of September 20, 1830, at Columbia: "But it is needless and impracticable to disguise the fact that the South is in a permanent minority, and that there is a sectional majority against it." Pamphlet in the Library of the University of South Carolina, and also in the Library Co. of Philadelphia.

In 1820 resolutions were offered in the House of Representatives of South Carolina, denouncing the tariff bills which had been proposed in Congress, but they failed of passage. A committee, to which they were referred, while earnestly deprecating "the restrictive system attempted to be forced on the nation, as premature and pernicious," yet recommended that they should be rejected, and spoke of "the practice, unfortunately become too common, of arraying upon the question of national policy, the states as *distinct and independent sovereignties* in opposition to, or (what is much the same thing) with a view to exercise a control *over* the general government." <sup>15</sup> Such was the moderation in South Carolina in the early days of the protective movement.

In the same year 1820, too, a meeting was held in Charleston and a memorial drafted against the proposed Baldwin law. <sup>16</sup> This was equally a most temperate document, but presented the Southern case with great force and much as the protests of later years did, except for the heat and the assertion of unconstitutionality. It said:

The Southern States are not and cannot for a long series of years become a manufacturing nation. We have not a population equal to the cultivation of our soil, and the insalubrity of our climate forbids the hope that this deficiency will soon if ever be supplied by a population of white laborers. We will, and must continue to raise, provisions, articles of the first necessity for man in every climate, and raw materials for the use and consumption of manufacturing nations. It is, therefore, peculiarly our interest, that our interchange with the world should be free; that the markets for the consumption of our produce should be extended as widely as the habitations of man. It is equally our interest that the articles we are compelled to consume should be procured on the most advantageous terms.

The address then expressed the ever present Southern fear <sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Ames's "State Documents," &c., pp. 134, 135.

<sup>16</sup> The "Southern Patriot" for September 15 and 16, 1820; Jervey's "Hayne," pp. 106-112.

<sup>17</sup> This fear was not without justification, and a few years after the peace of 1815 the British did try unsuccessfully to supply their wants from the East Indies. McMaster's "United States," Vol. V, p. 169. In our day, too, both the British and Germans are at least making similar efforts.

that Great Britain would put a tax on articles of Southern growth or procure them from other countries, and concluded, "To manufacturers we repeat we have no hostility. We wish them to share the general prosperity of our country, and repose and flourish under its liberal protection. But we perceive in them no features which entitle them to partial favors or particular privileges. Against a system, therefore, calculated to elevate one interest in a society to an undue influence and *importance*, against a system intended to enrich one description of citizens at the expense of every other class, against a system calculated to aggrandize and enrich some states to the injury of others, against a system in every aspect partial, unequal and unjust we most solemnly protest."

Nor were even the Missouri struggle and the proposed Baldwin tariff the only portents of about that same time to the South; for but two years later, in the spring of 1822, a servile insurrection broke out in and near Charleston, instigated in great part by a free mulatto, Denmark Vesey; and during the trials growing out of it there was direct evidence that the language in regard to slavery uttered by Rufus King in the Senate during the Missouri debate had been used to incite the uprising.<sup>18</sup> Modern men, by recalling the state of panicky excitement we have witnessed during labor strikes, can perhaps realize to some extent the feeling with which the South must have regarded this infinitely more appalling forerunner of the oft-threatened general strike.

All these causes tended to drive the men of the South to united action in defense of their interests, and particularly against any suggestion of interference with slavery; but they were by no means allowed to live in peace on this question. From the time of the Missouri contest,—but little before it,—proposal after proposal was made in a formal way looking to

<sup>18</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," p. 185. "Brutus" also wrote in the "Crisis," (No. XXVI, p. 133): "By the Missouri question, our slaves thought that there was a charter of liberties granted them by Congress, and the events of the summer of 1822, as will appear by the records of the trials, and the dying confessions of the misguided wretches, will long be remembered, as amongst the choicest fruits of the agitation of that question in Congress."



its abolition or curtailment by the federal power, and these were offered by men who had no personal interest in the subject and had probably given but little thought to it. Doubtless, the authors were often merely vying with one another in the effort to please constituents.

Anti-slavery proposals of various kinds were made during the progress of the Missouri contest. Thus, a Southerner wanted to establish a registry of slaves by the federal government with the object of preventing their introduction into the United States or any territory.<sup>19</sup> Foot, of Connecticut moved resolutions prohibiting slavery in any of the territories and requiring each intended new State to insert in its constitution an express prohibition thereof,<sup>20</sup> and resolutions to this same effect were presented early in 1820 from the Legislatures of New York,<sup>21</sup> Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, and Indiana, all resolved against admitting Missouri without a prohibition of slavery,<sup>22</sup> Pennsylvania putting in her resolution the sting of denouncing the Missouri bill as "a measure, in brief, which proposed to spread the crimes and cruelties of slavery, from the banks of the Mississippi to the shores of the Pacific." Some of King's ideas as to slavery's having no legal existence at all in any part of the country have been already mentioned, and Calhoun himself heard these same views broadly maintained by John Quincy Adams.<sup>23</sup>

Ohio resolved at about this same general period that slavery was "a national calamity as well as a great moral and political evil" and wanted her delegation to use their utmost exertions to exclude it from all the territories or any new State.<sup>24</sup> The American Colonization Society, despite its support for some years by Southern men, was suspected of hidden abolition

<sup>19</sup> Charleston "Courier" of January 28, 1820. Annals of Congress, Sixteenth Congress, First Session, Vol. I, (1819-20), p. 925.

<sup>20</sup> Charleston "Courier" of February 17, 1820. Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 515.

<sup>21</sup> Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 424.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 416. Ames's "State Documents," etc., pp. 196, 197.

<sup>23</sup> *Ante*, pp. 257-259.

<sup>24</sup> Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 434.

tendencies as early as 1821, and by 1824 its proceedings surely bore out this suspicion.<sup>25</sup> The Society soon found it advisable to enter a denial and assert its entire impartiality.<sup>26</sup> New Jersey in 1824 adopted resolutions in favor of gradual emancipation and colonization<sup>27</sup> and in this same year Ohio spoke once more on the subject.

These Ohio resolutions of 1824 were very elaborate and looked to gradual abolition throughout the Union by consent and co-operation of the States and of Congress. The idea was that this could be done, without infringing any one's rights, through a system of colonization "by the passage of a law by the general government (with the consent of the slave-holding States) which should provide, that all children of persons now held in slavery, born after the passage of such law, should be free at the age of 21 years (being supported during their minority by the persons claiming the service of their parents) providing that they consent to be transported to the intended place of colonization."<sup>28</sup> Was this mere agitation, or a half-remembered dream of some raw reformer who did not even stop to think of the absolute impossibility of securing the necessary agreements to his plan?

Ohio was very active upon the subject and spoke once more in 1828. This time the proposal was that her delegation should "use their efforts to induce the government of the United States to aid the American Colonization Society in effecting the object of their institution, which is so eminently calculated to advance the honor and interest of our common country."<sup>29</sup> In this same year 1828, too, an effort was made to enlist Pennsylvania in the cause, and her House passed

<sup>25</sup> Brutus's "Crisis," No. XXV, pp. 121, 122 of pamphlet. Report of Seventh annual meeting of the American Colonization Society, pp. 7, 13, and *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXIX, pp. 329, 330, giving account of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Society, January 29, 1826.

<sup>27</sup> Alice Davis Adams's "Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery in America" (Radcliffe College Monographs, No. XIV) p. 91. Eighth Annual Report of American Colonization Society.

<sup>28</sup> Alice Davis Adams's "Neglected Period," p. 91. "A Political History of Slavery," by Wm. H. Smith, Vol. I, pp. 23, 24. Charleston "Courier" of December 9, 1824.

<sup>29</sup> Resolution of the General Assembly of Ohio, contained in Acts of Local Nature, First Session, Twenty-Sixth General Assembly, p. 177.

resolutions against the existence of slavery in the District of Columbia. Early the next year both branches of her Legislature agreed upon similar resolutions.<sup>30</sup>

Bitter contests arose, also, over the South Carolina "Negro Seamen Act" of 1822, a law which grew out of the regulation of free negroes. These latter were a very serious trouble, where slavery existed, and to a considerable extent throughout the whole country,<sup>31</sup> down to as late as 1865. In the South, they constituted a chief means by which abolition ideas were disseminated among the slaves, and it has been already seen that the South Carolina Insurrection of 1822 owed its origin in part at least to instigation of the slaves through them.

Two years before that insurrection, a law<sup>32</sup> had been passed upon the subject, prohibiting the incoming of free negroes and providing that, in case any one violating the law should fail to leave the State upon warning, he might, after certain steps, be sold into slavery for five years. And in 1822,—the same year as the uprising,—another broader law<sup>33</sup> was enacted which has generally been known, from the provisions of its third section as the "Negro Seamen Act." This section provided that free negroes on any vessel coming into South Carolina ports might be detained in gaol at the captain's expense while the vessel remained, and if these expenses should not be paid the negro might be sold as an absolute slave. A harsh provision certainly, according to modern lights, and it led to representations in Washington from Great Britain and was in the opinion of our Attorney General unconstitutional. This was, moreover, later decided by Judge Johnson in the United States Circuit Court<sup>34</sup> of South Carolina.

<sup>30</sup> Vol. V, Register of Debates, p. 180; Alice Davis Adams's "Neglected Period," etc., p. 91; Laws of Pennsylvania, 1828-29, p. 371.

<sup>31</sup> Several Northern States passed laws to exclude negroes or to supervise their incoming, down to nearly as late as the Civil War. Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and even Oregon, did so,—the last-named adopting a constitutional amendment in 1857 to exclude them. Illinois, by a law of 1853, excluded them and directed that, in case of violation of this provision, the offending negro should be fined and sold for a time to pay the debt. "Virginia's Attitude toward Slavery and Secession," by Beverley B. Mumford, Chap. XI, pp. 66-74, 169-174.

<sup>32</sup> South Carolina Laws, 1820, pp. 22-24.

<sup>33</sup> South Carolina Laws, 1822, pp. 11-14.

<sup>34</sup> *Elkinson vs. Deliesseline*, Brunner's Collected Cases (N. S.) Vol. I,

Secretary of State Adams corresponded with the Governor of South Carolina upon the subject, representing the impropriety of the law and the foreign troubles it created,<sup>35</sup> and here was another conflict between the federal government and Calhoun's native State, which he must have watched closely while Secretary of War, and in which he can hardly have long, if at all, sided against those in his home region.

During the contest, Georgia proposed about 1824 an amendment to the federal constitution that no part of it should be interpreted to authorize the ingress of persons of color into any State contrary to its laws,<sup>36</sup> and resolutions were offered in the South Carolina Legislature by Dr. John Ramsay<sup>37</sup> in 1824, reciting that the Legislature "*protests* against any claim of right, of the United States, to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic regulations and preservatory measures in respect to that part of her property which forms the colored population of the State, and which property they will not permit to be meddled with, or tampered with, or in any manner ordered, regulated or controlled by any other power, foreign or domestic, than this legislature."<sup>38</sup>

These resolutions were passed in the Senate, while in the House, far more moderate ones were offered by Prioleau and passed by a large majority, but even these, after reciting that the letters of the President on the subject had been "respectfully" considered, went on that the measures in question were "simply part of a general system of domestic policy, defensible as such, and absolutely necessary to ensure the safety of the citizens; that in the opinion therefore of this Legislature, the principle contained in said section<sup>39</sup> neither

(U. S.); p. 431. Technically, Johnson's opinion was probably not more than a dictum, but it was so positive as to carry great weight.

<sup>35</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. V, p. 203.

<sup>36</sup> Message of the Governor of South Carolina of December, 1824, as contained in the Charleston "Courier" of December 7, 1824.

<sup>37</sup> Mr. Hunt writes ("Calhoun," p. 80) that these resolutions were not drawn by Ramsay, but by Robert J. Turnbull, the author of "The Crisis."

<sup>38</sup> The Charleston "Courier" of December 9, 1824.

<sup>39</sup> The third section providing for the detention in jail of free negro sailors on vessels coming into port, and their possible sale into slavery.



can nor ought to be repealed.”<sup>40</sup> Neither set of resolutions received the vote of the two Houses, but they both show the almost universal belief in the State as to the necessity of the laws in question and a conviction that they must be adhered to, notwithstanding the representations of the federal power and of foreign nations.

Calhoun, who was in 1824 himself concerned in the contest of Georgia with the federal government in regard to the Cherokee lands, answered a delegation of objecting Indians by telling them they must give up the lands in question, and upon their refusal so to do wrote the Governor of Georgia informing him of their decision, and this answer brought forth a hot answer from the fiery Troup, denouncing the federal government for its sloth and failure to keep its agreement to extinguish the Indian title. Calhoun saw, too, of course, a very few years later and while he was an opponent of Adams’s administration, that Troup went on and made a survey of the lands in question, in the teeth of Adams’s threat to stop him by force.<sup>41</sup>

The extent of the Southern excitement on the general subject crops out in other ways. In 1823, John Quincy Adams records<sup>42</sup> that at a dinner, when the decision of Judge Johnson that the Negro Seamen Act was unconstitutional became a subject of conversation, Hayne — then and always a close friend of Calhoun — “discovered so much excitement and temper that it became painful and necessary to change the topic,” and the same authority writes<sup>43</sup> of Rufus King’s telling him in May, 1824, that it would be absolutely necessary to annex a limitation to the Slave Trade Convention then pending in the Senate, so great was the panic of the South-

<sup>40</sup> The Charleston “Courier” of December 22, 1824. It is often not mentioned that the Act was, after all, very materially altered by a new law upon the subject passed in 1823, the 8th section of which provided that the Act should not apply to free negroes on any war vessel of the United States or of a European power in amity with us, unless found on shore after being warned to stay on board. It also repealed the provision for sale of the negro, and directed corporal punishment. South Carolina Laws, 1823, pp. 59-63. Jervcy’s “Hayne,” p. 179. This act of 1823 was again amended and extended in 1835 (Laws, &c., pp. 34-39), but the provisions of the 8th section were not changed.

<sup>41</sup> McMaster’s “United States,” Vol. V, pp. 177-201.

<sup>42</sup> “Memoirs,” Vol. VI, p. 176.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 329.

ern members over late speeches in the British Parliament in regard to abolition. Again, Adams tells us<sup>44</sup> in March, 1825, that the Southern men were uniting together — a very indicative symptom of the day, sure to have had its influence on Calhoun,— while in the same year a prominent Charleston paper<sup>45</sup> spoke of King's proposal in the Senate to raise a fund from the sales of public lands to aid in emancipation and colonization as "an inflammatory proposition . . . an unhallowed and desperate attempt to excite the public mind upon a certain subject."

During the debates in 1826 on the proposed Panama Mission, when it came out that propositions possibly looking to abolition were likely to be among the subjects of discussion, Hayne declared solemnly that the Southern States "never will permit and never can permit any interference whatever in their domestic concerns, and that the very day on which the unhallowed attempt shall be made by the authority of the Federal Government, we will consider ourselves as driven from the Union."<sup>46</sup> And in 1828 Georgia resolved that "this State never can and never will so far compromise her interests on a certain subject of such deep and vital concern to her self-preservation as to suffer this question to be brought into consideration."<sup>47</sup>

Despite all this heat and wrangling in regard to the slavery question, the first breach between the sections did not arise on that issue. Slavery was beyond question the great underlying first cause, as we may say,—and it will be found that Calhoun realized this in a few years,—but the actual breach sprang up upon another difference. The advocates of protection by no means remained contented with their repulse in 1820. On the contrary, their appetite grew, and the next

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 525.

<sup>45</sup> The "Gazette" of June 1, 1825, cited in Jervay's "Hayne," p. 186; King's proposal was offered on February 18, 1825, and is to be found in Congressional Debates, Vol. I (1824-25), p. 623.

<sup>46</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. V, p. 446. Congressional Debates, Vol. II, Part I (1825-26), p. 165. Hayne was speaking in reference to some resolutions that he had introduced in answer to those of King, just referred to. King's resolutions were not allowed to be debated, and Hayne took this way of meeting them.

<sup>47</sup> Georgia Laws, 1828, pp. 174-79.

decade witnessed a vast increase of the tariff hunger and the passage of laws containing rates which would not have been dreamed to be possible earlier.

At the very next session after the defeat of 1820, Baldwin presented resolutions favoring an increase, and in 1823 his successor as chairman of the Committee on Manufactures, Tod of Pennsylvania, brought in a bill to raise the rates, but failed to get it through the House.<sup>48</sup> Finally, in 1824 the friends of the "American System" succeeded in enacting a new law upon the subject, which made a general increase. These efforts by no means went without criticism in the South, and upon the bill of 1824, as upon all the other tariff laws of the period, that section voted against it with practical unanimity. Of the fifty-six members in the House from the seven contiguous States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, fifty-four voted Nay, one did not vote, and there was but one single Aye, coming from Virginia.

Unanimity of this sort does not arise either from chance or from mere perversity. There must have been a reason for it, and the truth is that the reason was as plain as the noon-day sun and quite enough to bring about the result. The South produced cotton and some other crops, of which a large portion was sent abroad from their own harbors. In carrying on this export, the vessels that came to Southern ports for cotton for the English mills arrived laden with foreign-made wares. All sorts of articles were brought from abroad and sold at prices with which domestic manufacturers could not pretend to compete. The interchange thus arising had, moreover, gone on for a number of years, so that every vessel coming from Liverpool to Charleston or Savannah for cotton is said to have been laden with articles the planters consumed, and an "immense trade had grown up between Great Britain and the South."<sup>49</sup>

This system had in time closely interwoven itself with the lives of the Southern planters, and their social and economical

<sup>48</sup> Stanwood's "Tariff Controversies," Vol. I, pp. 197, 198.

<sup>49</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. V, p. 228.

habits were largely based on it. Their houses and farms were full of its products. Thousands of Southern people must have gained their daily bread by looking after its business details, and they owned, as well as built, not a few of the vessels engaged in the commerce. The interchange had indeed become an integral part of their civilization. In every step of the process, they were thrown into close connection of many kinds with Great Britain, and this course of business, so markedly different from what prevailed in the country in general, had developed throughout the whole South a strong feeling of solidarity and of unity among the people of that section.

Perhaps it will be said that these very close relations with a foreign country tended to make the Southerners forget to some extent that they were Americans; but, if some see in this a theoretical substratum of truth, it had, at least, not found actual expression; and the South had at no time been slow to assume a generous part in all our struggles and battles.

Remembering, then, the system of commercial relations that had grown up and sent its roots deep down all through the Southern States, what did the Tariff Act of 1824 and the still more radical later ones propose to do? Their very design was to break up and dislocate all these habits of years and to force the Southern planters to change enormously their long formed habits. They must cease buying the articles they wanted and were used to, that fitted in their houses and on their farms, that they had learned to handle in youth; and they were now to be compelled for the benefit of the other section of the country to buy instead more or less different and for the time at least inferior articles of home make at higher prices.

This was to be the case, too, not merely as to some classes of citizens but as to all,—or the vast majority,—of those whose lot was cast in any one of the seven States named. The indictment was drawn against the whole people. They must all learn new methods at the behests of the North, and many thousands engaged in the commerce I have attempted to depict were to find their occupations swept away from them



so that they must start anew in life. Nor could there be any valid pretence of a design to raise the price of what the planters sold, and thus make up to them the losses they were forced to suffer from having to buy in a restricted market.

Can we wonder, when we are told <sup>50</sup> that in 1825 the Southerners were beginning to unite for self-protection? Or that they objected and scolded, remonstrated, passed many resolutions, denounced, threatened, all in their fiery Southern way? Or even that they began in a few years to calculate the value of the Union, while the hotter heads among them advocated secession or some sort of violence, and that finally after ten long years of agitation and utterly unavailing effort, one among them endowed with a mind of most unusual power, seeking a remedy for his people, thought he found it in State Interposition or Nullification — the means which it is to my mind demonstrable (unless words be really designed for the purpose of hiding our meaning) that Jefferson and Madison and others of the Fathers had pointed out as the strictly legal mode of stopping extra-constitutional actions on the part of the federal government?

There is one other view of the matter which it is vital to bear in mind. The fundamental point in contest between the North and South, then, as well as before and after, was at bottom the question of control. Each section wanted to have the upper hand in the Union and not to run any risk of being exploited or injured by the other. In the earlier days, when the South had the greater power in federal affairs and there was a succession of Southern Presidents, New England was for years in a chronic state of disunion sentiment, and the hysterical, strident, scolding of her men of the cold Northern type will easily rival that of the hot-blooded Southrons, with which we have to deal, when they in turn found themselves drifting into a minority.

This fundamental cause seems as plain as any single element can well be in complicated public affairs,<sup>51</sup> but not much

<sup>50</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VI, p. 525.

<sup>51</sup> J. A. Woodburn, in his article on "The Historical Significance of the Missouri Compromise" (Report of American Historical Association, 1893, pp. 251-297), writes, at p. 294, that at the time of the struggle, the

is in general said of it. Scattering recognitions are to be found at the time in question, but historians generally leave it out of view and write glowingly of the moral causes which led for instance to the effort to exclude slavery from Missouri. It is by no means my purpose to question the existence of these motives, and they undoubtedly were the controlling ones as to the actions of many private citizens. It may perhaps even be that a majority of Northerners, not actively engaged in the political struggle, felt somewhat as it will be shown <sup>52</sup> that in 1820 and 1821 Calhoun understood them to feel, that the struggle involved only the question of the extension of slavery. "Under this view," he went on, "it is not to be wondered at, that much excitement was caused. They viewed it in some degree in the same light, that they would the opening of the ports to the introduction of Africans."

But it is a far call from this to the belief that the politicians, big or little, who made the issue and persistently fanned its flames, were blind to its strategic value in the game they were playing, or that hosts of private citizens failed to appreciate that here was the way "to be rid of Southern Presidents." <sup>53</sup> To suppose that Rufus King, for example, when he intentionally laid the mines between the end of one and beginning of another Congress to start the issue up anew, was not far more guided by the desire to secure the mastery for his section and even party, is to suppose that he and those with him had lost the Anglo-Saxon instinct for self-government.

It was again in connection with the Missouri contest that this question of control first became very prominent. No less than eight <sup>54</sup> members referred to it during the debates, one saying:

Southerners "first came to believe that the issue of this struggle for more slave states involved their political destiny and identity. This is the true significance of the Missouri question."

<sup>52</sup> *Infra*, p. 342.

<sup>53</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. IV, pp. 577, *et seq.*

<sup>54</sup> "James Barbour of Virginia," Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. IV, p. 429; "Roberts of Pennsylvania," *ibid.*, p. 432; "Pinkney of Maryland," *ibid.*, p. 439; "Clay of Kentucky," *ibid.*, pp. 471, 473, 474; "Hardin of Kentucky," *ibid.*, pp. 499, 500; "Johnson of Virginia," *ibid.*, p. 544; "Darl-

I greatly fear . . . that gentlemen are fighting under false colors—that they have not yet hoisted their true flag. . . . Would it not be more magnanimous to haul down the colors on which are engraven humanity, morality and religion and in lieu thereof unfurl the genuine banner, on which is written a contest for political consequence and mastery?

Lowndes, too, realized at an early day that the question was fundamentally one of power between the sections, and predicted<sup>55</sup> that it would affect opinion in the North as to the then pending treaty for the acquisition of Florida. He doubtless foresaw that the North would no longer want to take into the Union a large territory, which must contribute to the increase of her rival's power. How right he was, the near future showed,<sup>56</sup> and even the draughtsman of the treaty on the American side, who had long been intensely interested, became soon very cold in regard to the whole matter.

The South also lost interest in Florida at about the same time,<sup>57</sup> and evidently for similar reasons. Thus, Jefferson wrote Monroe in May, 1820,<sup>58</sup> suggesting that the Florida treaty be set aside and that "we should look to the occupation of Texas." He can only have meant that if the North intended to try and curb the Southern growth in Missouri, the South should in turn make every effort to secure for the Union some other larger stretch of territory still more sure to be under the control of Southern civilization.

At about the time with which we have to do, a marked change in the relative power of the two sections was taking place. Hence, doubtless, this proposal of Jefferson's and hence all the other efforts of Southerners,—then and later,—to have the Union acquire more land that should be under their control. This was their answer to the design to make of them a dwin-

ington of Pennsylvania," *ibid.*, p. 547; "Tucker of Virginia," *ibid.*, p. 559. The quotation is from Hardin's speech.

<sup>55</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IV, pp. 480, 496, 502, 503, 506. Adams also saw that the question was one of power, *ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 15, 19, 26.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 26, 53.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101, 180.

<sup>58</sup> Mentioned in *ibid.*, p. 128. The diarist records in February 1820, that two Southern Senators wanted to "take" Texas; "Memoirs," Vol. IV, p. 518.

dling minority, which was shown at the time of the Missouri outburst. In earlier days, they had had far more power and their outlook in general had been far brighter.

After the peace with Great Britain in 1815, and the end of the long European wars, a great demand had sprung up abroad for the products of the Southern soil. Fortune seemed to smile on that section and there was soon an extensive migration of her people to the region west of them, and a vast area of virgin land of immense fertility was rapidly opened. What influence this had on prices and on the later depression in the South will be touched upon hereafter, but the peace held forth the promise of a great future to them, and their people were buoyant with hope. On the other hand, the same causes largely took from New England the carrying trade of the world, and soon the market abroad for her grain was also greatly curtailed. The South,—both before and at this time and for several years afterward,—largely controlled the Union, but somewhere about 1820 this control began to leave her and to gravitate into the hands of the North.

The falling behind of the South is usually put down to slavery; and doubtless that institution was a contributing cause, but there was another very potent one, and that was the new States and the rapidly growing territories northwest of the Ohio River. Words have had a vast influence in the formation of historical, as of all human, beliefs, and the two words “the West” seem often to have misled us. In and near the days of our constitutional origin, those words were used almost exclusively to denote the new States of Kentucky and Tennessee, coming ere long to include also the more southern portion of the Louisiana purchase. All this region must evidently be a part of the South, and few, if any, were far seeing enough to anticipate so early the rush of settlement to the more northern portions of our vacant territory. Hence, the bitter Northern opposition to “the West,” and her unquestionable effort in early days to curb its growth.

How different was all this in a few years,—say, by 1820,—when the country had grown used to Kentucky and Tennessee, had accepted as a necessity Louisiana, Mississippi and Ala-



bama, and "the West" had come to refer far more to the highly prosperous States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois and the other rapidly advancing regions of the Northwest — all certain in the main to add their voices and power to the North. New England was by this date far less inclined to burst forth into strident opposition to "the West," and in the Hayne-Webster debate a decade later both sections strove hard to win the support of the new region. The change in the meaning of the term was hardly recognized even then; but the South soon came to know that the West of about 1820-30 would never be a part of her.

In this increase of power of the North through the growth of the new West is undoubtedly to be found the cause that rendered it possible to wage the Missouri contest and force a compromise by virtue of which the South was thenceforth to be excluded from regions of latitude into which the experience of Missouri had shown that she could carry her civilization; and to the power of the votes from the same new region were also largely due the various Tariff Acts, which the South looked upon as so injurious to her.

The chief question here, of course, is how all this growth of public sentiment and affairs throughout the country, and more especially in his home section, was likely to affect Calhoun. It has been gone into at some length, for the reason that it is absolutely vital to an understanding of him at this period of his life. It was the air he breathed, the soil in which his opinions grew, his daily and hourly environment. If we cannot to some extent realize his feeling and that of the South upon the subjects in dispute, it will be vain to attempt to understand either him or his section: but, if we can do so, their course will seem far more natural, and perhaps even unavoidable; always bearing in mind, however, that the lurid passion shown below Mason and Dixon's line was ever pitched in a higher key than belongs to the colder blood of the North.

It is trite to say that we can form no just judgment of history, or of the characters of the dead, unless we to some extent bring back their surroundings and bathe ourselves anew, as it were, in the civilization of their day. The reader must

then bear in mind what has already been emphasized more than once: that slavery, inherited from the past, was almost drunk in by the Southerner with his mother's milk, was all about him and tied up with his whole social and economical system by a thousand vital chords. And he must remember, too, the apparent impossibility of eradicating it and the natural dread of interference by a Central Government, the control of which was at that very time visibly passing out of Southern hands.

Some of their leaders early saw the dangers ahead of them. Macon and Randolph, for instance, were from the beginning most decided in opposition to any discussion at all of slavery in Congress, and Randolph said<sup>59</sup> in 1826 that he and Macon, at the time of the Missouri struggle "were determined to have no compromise at all on this subject. They determined to cavil on the nineteenth part of a hair in a matter of sheer right — touching the dearest interests — the life-blood of the Southern States." And Benton, who, though a Southerner and a slaveholder, was a strong Union man during the times of the prologue to the Civil War, gave us an idea of the feeling at the time of the Missouri struggle, when he wrote late in life:

It was a period of deep apprehension, filling with dismay the hearts of the steadiest patriots. . . . The movement to put the slavery restriction on Arkansas . . . seemed to menace the slave States with total exclusion from the province of Louisiana.<sup>60</sup>

Far different was the case with Calhoun, who seems to have been for some time unconscious of the real meaning of the Missouri contest. It is true that on August 12, 1820, when the third contest was looming up, he wrote:<sup>61</sup>

I can scarcely conceive of a cause of sufficient power to divide

<sup>59</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. II, Part I, 1825-26, p. 354. In 1838, Calhoun expressed the opinion ("Works," Vol. III, p. 185), that if Randolph's course, which he had then thought "too unyielding, too uncompromising, too impracticable," had been followed, "abolition might have been crushed forever in its birth."

<sup>60</sup> "Abridgment of Debates," etc., Vol. VI, p. 372. This refers to the period after the total failure of the Missouri Bill in March, 1819, at the expiration of the Fifteenth Congress.

<sup>61</sup> Letter to Gallaway in the Markoe Papers in Library of Congress, quoted in Hunt's "Calhoun," pp. 54, 55.

this Union, unless a belief in the slaveholding states, that it is the intention of the other states gradually to undermine their property in their slaves and that a disunion is the only means to avert the evil. Should so dangerous a mode of believing once take root, no one can calculate the consequences; and it will be found that a reagitation of the Missouri question will tend strongly to excite such a belief.

But this letter appears to set forth his fears rather than his beliefs, and he wrote quite differently in a slightly later and more careful expression of opinion. This was dated August 26, 1820, and addressed to Judge Charles Tait, an old friend who had migrated to Alabama:<sup>62</sup>

I cannot but think that the impression, which exists on the minds of many of your virtuous and well informed citizens to the South, and among others are your own, that there has commenced between the North and the South a premeditated struggle for superiority, is not correct. That there are some individuals to the north, who for private objects, wish to create such a struggle, I do not doubt. It suits their ambition, and gives them hopes of success, as the majority of votes both in Congress and the electoral college is from the north; or rather from the non-slave holding States. But their number is very small, and the few there are, are to be found almost wholly in New York, and the middle states. I by no means identify the advocates for restriction on<sup>63</sup> Missouri with them. The advocates of restriction are actuated by a variety of motives. ✓The great body of them are actuated by motives perfectly honest. Very few indeed look to emancipation. I state the case, as I am well assured that it exists. ✓We to the South ought not to assent easily to the belief, that there is a conspiracy either against our property, or just weight in the Union. A belief of the former might, and probably would, lead to the most disastrous consequence. Nothing would lead more directly to disunion with all of its horrors. ✓. . . I have sometimes fears that the Missouri question will create suspicions to the south very unfavorable to a correct policy.<sup>64</sup> Should emancipation be attempted it must, and will be

<sup>62</sup> "Gulf States Historical Magazine," Vol. I, (September, 1902), pp. 98-100.

<sup>63</sup> In the letter as printed, "on" is "and," but this must be an error.

<sup>64</sup> Meaning a liberal federal policy, such as Calhoun had theretofore advocated.

resisted at all costs, but let us be certain first that it is the real object, not by a few, but by a large portion of the non-slave holding states. Our political horizon presents no reasons to expect a storm. All exhibit marks of quiet, which I hope, may long continue. . . .

Again, a year later, after the admission of Missouri and the end of the contest and when Calhoun had evidently heard very different opinions from his own from Tait, he wrote<sup>65</sup> him to much the same effect as in his letter of 1820. After expressing the conviction that his correspondent's views were erroneous, he writes that he did not "in the least doubt, but that the Missouri question was got up by a few designing politicians in order to extend their influence and power. . . ." And goes on:

But we are not to infer, that, as the politicians were sustained by the North on the Missouri question, the people in that quarter entered into their views, or that even the leaders were actuated by a hatred to the South, rather than a restless ambition. The North considered it as a single question, involving only the extension of slavery, and under this view, it is not to be wondered at, that much excitement was caused. They viewed it in some degree in the same light, that they would the office [opening?] of the ports to the introduction of Africans while the South, regarding its possible tendency, considered it in a character wholly different, and as involving in its consequence the question of abolition. . . . When I see one of your age, experience, wisdom and virtue thinking as you do on this point, I confess, I am alarmed if I say to myself, if the Missouri question has excited such feelings in the breast of so experienced and virtuous a citizen, what must be its effects in our section of the country on those less wise and virtuous. . . .

It is thus evident that Calhoun did not then see the Missouri contest as the beginning of that struggle between the sections which history has since shown it to have been; but his letter to Tait makes it clear at the same time that he was deeply impressed, and even alarmed, by the views held on the subject

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 102-104.



by his correspondent and feared they were wide-spread through the South.

Some other hints upon the general subject reach us, and he was evidently a close observer of the events of the day. Thus, he went to the Senate to hear William Pinkney's famous speech on the Missouri question. He had several talks with Adams in regard to the struggle, and in one of these the two friends discussed what would happen in case of the Union's breaking asunder. He heard, too (it has been shown), in March, 1820, Adams's assertion of the bald opinion that slavery had no legal existence in the country, and that the courts would so declare. Adams found him in May, 1820, when the Compromise as to Missouri had been passed, but the wounds it had left were still gaping, full of gloomy views as to public affairs, and in November of that same year, when the sectional struggle burst out again over the clause as to free negroes in the Missouri constitution, the diarist records that Calhoun was in great concern at its reappearance.<sup>66</sup>

In regard to the other chief bone of contention,—the tariff,—it has been seen <sup>67</sup> that Calhoun both spoke and voted in favor of the Act of 1816; but it must be remembered that that Act, though beyond question a measure for protection, was yet a most moderate law and was loudly called for by almost a duty to save from palpable ruin certain manufactures which had grown up during the war and had contributed in no small degree to render life tolerable in the United States during that time and the period of restriction. To leave them in the lurch, when peace was made, would have been a measure of doubtful morality, and could hardly be expected from a leading supporter of the war. Even this act, however, has been shown <sup>68</sup> to have met with much criticism in the South, and it has been said that Calhoun was severely censured for his part in the matter and charged with selling his State for the Presidency.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *Ante*, pp. 256-261.

<sup>67</sup> *Ante*, pp. 183-187.

<sup>68</sup> *Ante*, pp. 190, 191.

<sup>69</sup> D. F. H. Houston's "Study of Nullification in South Carolina," p. 5. I have found no evidence going nearly so far as this.

South Carolina was, probably as early as 1816, opposed to protection, and her course on the bills of a few years later shows beyond doubt that she, at least, soon realized that her interest was against such measures, and felt that she could not be a manufacturing State. The Charleston "Memorial" against the bill of 1820 put this feature of the matter in bold relief. All these views Calhoun must have heard expressed thousands of times by his friends and associates, and the almost unanimous votes of South Carolina against the later bills are the strongest evidence that the opinions he heard at home were nearly all the same. He was, of course, influenced by this, and his opinions on protection—which there is no reason to suppose had been strongly held,—soon show the effect of this, or of some other cause of like tendency.

The very next opinion upon the subject that we have from him is that of opposition to the Baldwin bill of 1820, which he considered "as violent in degree and altogether unnecessary."<sup>70</sup> In this, he was in exact agreement with South Carolina and the South generally, which had voted against that measure in the House by more than ten to one. It will be remembered that Baldwin's proposal was brought in during the Missouri struggle, and the rapidly growing alignment of the sections was well shown by the fact that the votes on it and the Missouri question were very similar. Again in 1821 Calhoun opposed some pro-tariff expressions contained in the draft of Monroe's second inaugural, and they were slightly modified to meet his objections.<sup>71</sup>

No actual expression from him as to the Act of 1824 seems to have survived, but with the history of his earlier actions just narrated, it may safely be assumed that Jenkins,—his biographer of 1850,—was justified in saying that he was opposed to that act. Hayne and Calhoun's friends in Congress generally opposed the bill most strenuously, and, indeed, the whole South was by that time closely knit together on the subject. By this date they had come to denounce a pro-

<sup>70</sup> Letter of Virgil Maxcy to R. S. Garnett, dated November 16, 1823, and outlining Calhoun's views, "American Historical Review," Vol. XII (April, 1907), pp. 600, 601.

<sup>71</sup> *Ante*, p. 273.

protective tariff as unconstitutional and were, moreover, beginning to advance State Rights doctrines in their defense.<sup>72</sup> Calhoun can hardly have been untouched by all this, while an all-sufficient reason for his silence is to be found in the fact that he was a presidential candidate and hence desirous to avoid driving either party from him.

Perhaps another reason was the factional struggle going on at that time in South Carolina between Judge Smith and Calhoun's friends. This long-lasting feud assumed great activity in their legislature in December, 1824, and culminated a year later in the passage of the Smith resolutions declaring both internal improvements and a protective tariff unconstitutional. With this contest long ramifying throughout the State, it would perhaps have been awkward for Calhoun to announce widely his possibly rapidly changing opinion, and it is hardly likely that he already at that time regarded a protective tariff as unconstitutional.

It is also to be noted that from as early as 1817 down to 1828, Calhoun's correspondence shows him complaining of the expenses he met, of enforced borrowing, and of the reduction of his income.<sup>73</sup> How much of this was due to the financial troubles, which were at the time so usual, and how much perhaps to an expensive household and to probable outlay for his political ambition,<sup>74</sup> can, of course, not be determined, but he was at least likely to attribute it chiefly to any cause which was visibly affecting the financial prosperity of his section; and it is perfectly plain that the immediate effect of the tariff laws was to force the Southerner to pay higher for many of the articles he bought.

These facts were doubtless in his mind, when toward the end of 1821, he spoke to John Quincy Adams of the high prosperity of manufacturers, while farm products had greatly

<sup>72</sup> Hayne's speech summarized in Jervey's "Hayne," pp. 158-167; Houston's "Nullification," pp. 54, 55; Stanwood's "Tariff Controversies," Vol. I, pp. 180, 220, 293.

<sup>73</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 132, 180, 206, 207, 213, 216, 236, 264.

<sup>74</sup> It is said that in 1829 he gave a splendid dinner in Washington to some eighteen editors as a means to advance his claims to the succession to Jackson. Letter of Coleman, editor of the "N. Y. Evening Post," to J. A. Hamilton, printed in the latter's "Reminiscences," pp. 126, 127.

fallen.<sup>75</sup> Again, in the latter part of 1824,—when the time that was to witness his completed change of opinion, was coming on apace,—he told the same diarist that agriculture had never been so depressed in the South.<sup>76</sup>

Bearing in mind then these indications of Calhoun's mental processes during this general period, what effect was the course of public affairs, such as has been detailed, likely to have upon him, a man born in the South, knowing slavery and the negro, and with all his ties of affection and interest wrapped up in that region? What could he think<sup>77</sup> when he went home for some months of every year and heard the universal conviction around him that grave dangers to the South were looming up in the development of federal affairs, that their system of slavery was becoming a subject of serious attack, that efforts were making to control their legislation on matters of vital State interest, and that the rapidly growing power of the North was aiming to exploit them by tariff laws passed entirely for the latter's benefit?

It is conceivable that some human beings would not have been greatly influenced and changed by all this, but nearly every man in South Carolina was so influenced, and it will be found that even those who in a few years absolutely rejected Nullification were careful to emphasize their general concurrence with the South's views as to the tariff and the other subjects in controversy, even while they spurned the remedy proposed.

It seems plain that the whole tendency of the general history of the period was to unite Calhoun more closely with his section of the Union and to drive him almost irresistibly to take up the position of a defender of his home and her interests. And it will soon be shown that the general course

<sup>75</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. V, pp. 410, 411.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 432.

<sup>77</sup> Perhaps a partial answer is furnished by a letter of August 12, 1827, from him to Micah Sterling, in which he apologizes for the delay in answering his correspondent, and then goes on: "The truth is, I had but little to say, *as the course of politics is so fixed to the South*" (*Italics mine*). Letter in the collection of John Gribbel, Esq., of Philadelphia.



of political events during the next few years did not fail to emphasize still more this tendency, while other causes,—applying especially to Calhoun,—led him on still further in the same direction.

## CHAPTER XIII

### ADAMS'S ADMINISTRATION

Further Causes Leading to Calhoun's Change — Randolph's Influence — A Solid South — Calhoun's New Political Faith — The Woolens Bill — Tariff Act of 1828 — Southern Outburst — South Carolina's Growing Isolation — Origin of Nullification — The "Exposition."

CALHOUN became Vice-President on March 4, 1825, and on the same day John Quincy Adams entered upon his ill-fated administration. From the very start it seemed destined to failure. A minority candidate,<sup>1</sup> and yet elected by the House, the people felt that Adams's choice had an element of unfairness in it, and to this serious handicap was shortly added his most unfortunate selection as Secretary of State of Henry Clay, who had never been a political friend and had yet very recently by his vote for Adams in the House been, in effect, the means of making the latter President.

If even it be admitted that there was no understanding<sup>2</sup> between the two men and that the never-dying charge of "bargain and corruption" was without actual basis to stand upon, yet a taint necessarily resulted from the bare facts. Intense opposition sprang up at once, founded at first on these charges; but Adams's policies soon furnished another and

<sup>1</sup> Adams received but 84 of the electoral votes, *i.e.*, less than a third.

<sup>2</sup> See Bassett's "Jackson," I, 368, 369, where the evidence from Adams's "Memoirs" is well summed up, and the conclusion reached that there was a "reasonable understanding." As early as January 8, 1825, even before the election in the House, it was suspected that Clay would cast his influence for Adams and then have a seat in the cabinet. Joel R. Poinsett wrote on that day from Washington to Joseph Hopkinson: "I cannot think that any such coalition can take place between Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay as will bring the latter into the cabinet, nor will I disguise to you that I hope not." Letter in Hopkinson collection in possession of Edward Hopkinson, Esq., of Philadelphia. Poinsett was then a member of the House.

more substantial cause to those who were united against him. What influence did all this have on Calhoun?

Public men do not often look on the characters of their competitors in the cold light of history, and are very prone to attribute dishonest or interested motives. Calhoun was clearly,—from the very start,—among those who thought there had been an understanding between Adams and Clay. He wrote in 1828 of their union as “a coalition forming a most dangerous precedent,”<sup>3</sup> and in his later “Autobiography”<sup>4</sup> refers to the excitement caused when, at the time of the election in the House, Clay gave his vote to Adams. This was, of course, before the appointment of Clay as Secretary of State, and Calhoun says that many even then wanted to organize an opposition. He discountenanced this, he adds, and advised awaiting the development of events in order to see whether Clay would “place his relations and conduct towards the administration of him whom he had elected above all suspicion . . . but when Mr. Clay afterward took office, and Mr. Adams adopted, in its full extent, Mr. Clay’s American System, opposition to the administration from himself [Calhoun] and his friends followed as a matter of course. . . . This opposition,” he goes on, “was greatly strengthened by the bold Federal and consolidation doctrines avowed by Mr. Adams in his inaugural address, and by the wild measures of policy which he recommended.”

Probably the latter words refer in part, at least, to the Panama Congress, which, despite a certain glamour attaching to it, was yet a measure of doubtful policy and soon promised to lead to the discussion of questions such as all Southerners felt could not,—with safety to them,—be debated at the proposed meeting. Thus, it was natural enough that Calhoun should soon find himself one of the leaders against an administration, which, while beyond doubt it advocated many of the general policies he had favored, yet carried them infinitely

<sup>3</sup> Letter of September 8, 1828, to Theodore Lyman, “Correspondence,” pp. 267–69, also printed in “Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society,” Vol. XIX, pp. 280, 281.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 29–31. On the early wish to form an opposition, see also J. Q. Adams’s “Memoirs,” Vol. VI, pp. 506, 507.

further than he had ever urged, and expanded them in directions almost certain to be opposed by a Southerner, who had observed the tendency of political forces during the preceding years.

Once in the opposition, Calhoun's tendency was necessarily to carp at and obstruct the policies advocated by his successful rival. Such is party government. His position as a political leader tended precisely as had the general growth of events in recent years and the consequent solidifying of the South in self-defense, to lead him on to recast the basis of his political and constitutional beliefs. He soon found himself associated with many who had in the past been his opponents. The contest of 1825, so he wrote in his answer of May 29, 1830, to Jackson, "ended in an entire change of the political elements of the country; and in the new state of things which followed, I found myself acting with many of the friends of Mr. Crawford, to whom I had been recently opposed, and opposed to many of my friends, with whom I had till then been associated." <sup>5</sup>

But his actual change had by no means yet come about, and in the spring of 1825, at a dinner given him at Augusta, he said in his speech, <sup>6</sup> "No one would reprobate more pointedly than myself, any concerted action between States, for interested or sectional objects. I would consider all such concert, as against the spirit of our constitution." There is nothing to show why he spoke in particular upon this point, but perhaps he had reference to some phase of the factional struggle between himself and William Smith or had in mind the heated denunciations of the Tariff Act of 1824. In a later speech, at Abbeville, on May 27th of the same year, he dwelt on his past course at some length, making no concealment of his general support of strong federal measures, and there seem to have been no consequent expressions of disapproval from his hearers, and we are told that the "day was spent in harmony and rational hilarity."

<sup>5</sup> "Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," p. 373.

<sup>6</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXVIII, p. 267.



In this speech,<sup>7</sup> after referring to the necessity of "an enlightened system of measures for the security of the country," he told his neighbors, "I gave my zealous efforts in favor of all such measures; the gradual increase of the navy, a moderate military establishment, properly organized and instructed, a system of fortification for the defence of the coast, the restoration of specie currency, a due protection of those manufactures of the country which had taken root during the period of war and restrictions; and finally a system of connecting the various portions of the country by a judicious system of internal improvement."

It is surprising to find him thus,—as late as 1825 and in South Carolina,—recalling attention to his vote in favor of the Tariff of 1816 and other actions of his that many had thought too much tinged with centralization. The incident seems to furnish positive proof that his change had not then come about. I cannot but think, however, that his letter of July 3, 1824, to Robert S. Garnett,<sup>8</sup> contains indications that his mind was by that date (a year earlier) somewhat drawn toward State Rights, and he was at least anxious to show that there was nothing in his record with which the advocates of that view could well find fault. Here we touch upon self-interest. There was no political future in South Carolina for the man who did not come to accept the views of that school. The State's unanimity was far too great for her long to tolerate a public servant who was a tariff man and in favor of those centralizing doctrines which recent years had led her to dread. Calhoun was human, and of course this influenced him.

He has himself thrown no little light upon the mode in which his change of opinion was brought about. When he became Vice-President, he reminds us that he was transferred from positions of great labor,—such as he had occupied for fifteen years,—to one of absolute ease. The duties of his new office were almost nothing, its labors for the day ending al-

<sup>7</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXVIII, pp. 265-67.

<sup>8</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," pp. 219, *et seq.* "Appendix A" to David F. Houston's "Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina," pp. 143-48.

ways with the adjournment, while between sessions he had absolute rest. A student by nature, he was thus led to observation and reflection upon public matters "from the time he first took his seat. Questions relating to the protective policy were constantly recurring in one form or another, and especially attracted his attention and excited reflection. He was not long in making himself master of that policy in all its bearings, economical and political, and in becoming thoroughly satisfied that it was unconstitutional, unjust, unequal, and oppressive in its character and tendency, and that it must, in the end, if it became the established and permanent policy, lead to the overthrow of our free and popular system of government."<sup>9</sup>

It would be necessary to exercise caution in accepting too closely this account, written in 1843, of events happening from fifteen to twenty years earlier, but there is other evidence that his change began about 1825 and that it was, moreover, not confined to the question of the tariff. Not only did he in more than one instance in subsequent years refer publicly and without apparent contradiction to that period as the time when the views of his later life were assuming shape<sup>10</sup> but in his contest of 1838 with Webster, that gentleman said in words:

"When did he announce himself a State Rights man? I have already said, Sir, that nobody knew of his claiming that character until after the commencement of 1825."<sup>11</sup>

At what date the change had gone so far as to lead him

<sup>9</sup> "Autobiography," p. 34. See, also, his speech in the Senate on March 10, 1838, printed in "Works," Vol. III, p. 278, and Jenkins's "Life," p. 160.

<sup>10</sup> In 1837, at the time when his support of Van Buren was leading to violent criticism, he wrote to a public paper: "I live but to carry out the great principles for which I have been contending since 1824." Niles's "Register," Vol. LIII, p. 33. Again, on June 4, 1840, in a letter declining an invitation to address the New York Democracy on July 4, he wrote, after outlining the political history of the country: "For sixteen years my efforts have been incessantly directed to counteract the policy of that school of politics to which I stand opposed, and advance that on which I solemnly believe, the salvation of our institutions depends." . . . "Works," Vol. VI, pp. 313-18. See almost the same statement in another public letter of his in 1843, Niles's "Register," Vol. LXIV, pp. 382, 383.

<sup>11</sup> Webster's "Works" (ed. 1851), Vol. IV, pp. 500 *et seq.*; 516; also see p. 511.

conclusively to the beliefs of his later life as to the nature of our government can, naturally enough, not be determined, but it will be shown to have certainly occurred before the summer of 1827. He himself tells us that Madison's Report of 1799 was a leading factor in bringing about his change. Speaking of Madison on February 18, 1837, he said in the Senate:

But there was another act, which would immortalize him in the eye of posterity — the profound and glorious views which he took of our Government in his celebrated Virginia report. In his opinion, that was by far the ablest document that issued from the pen of Mr. Madison — one from which Mr. Calhoun had derived more information and a profounder insight into our Government, than all the other documents he had penned.<sup>12</sup>

It should be remembered also that it was in December of this same year, 1825, that the Smith resolutions<sup>13</sup> were passed by the South Carolina Legislature. They spoke strongly for State Rights, but were chiefly induced by the rivalry of leaders, were opposed by Calhoun's friends, and at least portions of them must have been bitter medicine to him. It is not impossible, however, that the leisure of his new office had led him during that very same summer of 1825 to begin his new reading as to the nature of our Government, and that he was already secretly inclined to admit the truth of some of their assertions as to fundamental principles. However this may be, we shall find several hints of a tendency of his in that direction during the Congressional session of 1825-26.

Randolph was then a member of the Senate, and some writers have thought that the eccentric Virginian had a large share in leading Calhoun to the revision of his beliefs. Such changes are, however, probably in general gradual, and it seems to me far more likely that Calhoun had by that date in great part made his change, and that it was due to the growth since 1820, of that opposition to slavery, which has been already traced, and the consequent union of Southern men in defense of their rights. There is, too, the evidence of one compe-

<sup>12</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. XIII, Part I, 1836-37, p. 853.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, pp. 276, 277.

tent observer, whose language seems to imply that Calhoun held by 1826 the Southern view on most leading questions and that slavery was uppermost in his mind. During a long dissertation upon public affairs in 1826, writes Josiah Quincy,<sup>14</sup> Calhoun "never alluded to the subject of slavery, though it was easy to see that reference to this interest shaped his opinions about tariffs, state rights, internal improvements, and other questions, with which, on the surface, it had small connection."

Besides this, Randolph's methods were by no means conspicuous for that gentle suavity that makes converts.

"Sir," he had said on one occasion in the House at a recent session, with evident reference in part to Calhoun, "the blindness, as it appears to me,—I hope gentlemen will pardon the expression,—with which a certain portion of this Country,—I allude in particular to the seaboard of South Carolina and Georgia,—has lent its aid to increase the powers of the general government on points, to say the least, of doubtful construction fills me with astonishment and dismay."<sup>15</sup>

And again, referring to the power of internal improvements, of which Calhoun was a leading supporter, he had insisted that, if Congress possessed it, "they may emancipate every slave in the United States." This they might do, he said, "under the war power," or as the general result of all the powers rather than of any particular one.<sup>16</sup> And yet again he told his brethren of the South "we are the eel that is being flayed."<sup>17</sup>

There is nothing to show that Calhoun heard or read these rather acrid remarks concerning himself and his opinions; but at the session of 1825-26 Randolph occupied a seat in the Senate, of which Calhoun was then the presiding officer. The

<sup>14</sup> "Figures of the Past," p. 263. This was probably written many years afterward, and Quincy possibly may have injected into 1826 views in reality enounced much later.

<sup>15</sup> Henry Adams's "Randolph," p. 281. Calhoun was not strictly of the seaboard, but he had extensive connections in Charleston, and was doubtless too conspicuous not to be among those actually in Randolph's mind.

<sup>16</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Eighteenth Congress, First Session, 1823-24, Vol. I, p. 1308. Henry Adams's "Randolph," pp. 276, 277.

<sup>17</sup> *Annals of Congress*, Eighteenth Congress, First Session, 1823-24, Vol. II, p. 2379. Henry Adams's "Randolph," p. 279.



latter was very regular in attendance and beyond doubt heard many or most of the Roanoke member's harangues. It is quite evident that there was about this time a rapprochement<sup>18</sup> between the two men, who had hardly been friends theretofore. Thus, on February 1, 1826, Randolph wrote to a friend:<sup>19</sup>

Yesterday, we had a very interesting debate, in which I took part. . . . It drew upon me a great many handsome and flattering compliments; and from one quarter, my friend Benton (for I was on his side), I believe sincere. We differed from the presiding officer upon what Mr. J. would call a "speck" on the political horizon, but it turned out to be of vital importance as we probed it. It was laid over for mature consideration. After the debate, and while some Indian treaties were being read, Mr. C. sent for me, and said, that the question had assumed a new and important aspect — required solemn consideration and decision — my views were strong and important, &c. &c. He then sent for Mr. B. and told him much the same. He electioneers with great assiduity.

About a month later, after a debate in secret session on Friday, February 24th, on the question of sending Ministers to Panama, in which Randolph had evidently taken a leading part, he wrote<sup>20</sup> that he was probably as accessible to flattery as other men, and then went on:

The Vice-President has actually made love to me. . . . In short, Friday's affair has been praised on all hands in a style that might have gorged the appetite of Cicero himself.

Again on March 2, the rambling Virginian indulged in one of his long harangues, but scattered through it here and there

<sup>18</sup> In February 1827, toward the end of the session and shortly after Randolph's defeat for reelection to the Senate, Calhoun asked him to drive home in his (Calhoun's) carriage, and Randolph thought of accepting. Garland's "Randolph," Vol. II, p. 285.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 265. The debate concerned the nomination of Daniel Bissell to be a colonel of artillery, which was a long-standing controversy with the Executive, growing out of an earlier act for reducing the army. The nomination was laid upon the table on January 31, and an Indian treaty at once taken up. "Executive Journal of the Senate."

<sup>20</sup> Henry Adams's "Randolph," p. 288. Garland's "Randolph," pp. 267, 268,

true flashes of genius. Referring to emancipation and the opinion of some that slavery should never be brought into public notice, he said in the Senate: <sup>21</sup>

Sir . . . I differ from them *toto calo*. Sir, it is a thing which cannot be hid — it is not a dry rot which you can cover with the carpet, until the house tumbles about your ears — you might as well try to hide a volcano in full operation — it cannot be hid — it is a cancer in your face, and must be treated *secundum artem*. . . . A small danger menacing an inestimable object, is of more importance in the eyes of a wise man, than the greatest danger which can possibly threaten an object of minor consequence. The question before us is, is this an object of inestimable consequence? I do not put the question to you, sir. I know what your answer will be. I know what will be the answer of every husband, father, son and brother, throughout the Southern States; I know that on this depends the honor of every matron and maiden . . . between the Ohio and the Gulf of Mexico. [All my early feelings were against slavery and I was a member of the Colonization Society but never had much faith in it. They had two languages. Affecting to be only for abolition of the Slave Trade], they had another object — they had an object in view, which *now* they have the courage to declare, for which they have very lately united themselves into an anti-slavery society. . . . The Crusades . . . were incomparably more worthy, more desirable, in the object, more wise in the means taken to attain it, than this modern *black crusade*. . . . I may be told that the principles of these South American States are the principles that were of high authority on another question — the Missouri question — are the principles of the Declaration of Independence. . . . These principles, pushed to their extreme consequences — that all men are born free and equal — I can never assent to. . . . [Let slavery alone and] the disease will run its course — it has run its course in the Northern States; it is beginning to run its course in Maryland. The natural death of slavery is the unprofitableness of its most expensive labor. I am content to act the part of Cassandra, to lift up my voice, whether it be heeded, or heard only to be disregarded, until too late. . . .

Much of this was very striking and seems to-day to have

<sup>21</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. II, Part I, 1825-26 (Nineteenth Congress, First Session), pp. 117-132.

contained almost a note of prophecy, but would hardly have had much effect then except on a mind ripened for its acceptance by some cause. If uttered prior to the Missouri contest and the growing opposition to slavery, almost every one in the country would have regarded it as senseless braying and the author as a mere prophet of ill. I cannot but think that such would have been conspicuously its effect on the Calhoun of 1810-19, and that therefore we must suppose that a deep impression had been made on him between 1820 and 1825. But with his mind prepared by the events of that time, and feeling the evident struggle between the North and South looming up as a nightmare of danger to his waning section, the words of Randolph of course contributed their part to convince him of the necessity to his home of the new views that had already broken in upon him.

During the session of 1825-26, too, occurred the dispute as to whether Calhoun should not, as presiding officer, have called Randolph to order for some of his attacks upon Adams and Clay, and in the spring and summer of 1826 "Patrick Henry" and "Onslow" had their wordy duel. The dispute was very acrimonious and a subject much noticed by the public. At a dinner to Calhoun at Pendleton in the autumn, the toast to him compared "his protection of liberty's citadel, the freedom of debate" with his conduct during the War of 1812.<sup>22</sup>

Nothing seems to have survived to show Calhoun's occupation or special interests during the latter part of 1826, after the adjournment of Congress on May 22nd, but matters of vital moment to us here occurred during the session of 1826-27, and there is positive proof that during the year 1827 — at a date when his Presidential hopes must still have been high — he had entirely changed his views and had spoken in a way to show clearly that State Rights and the Southern views in general had come to be cardinal points of his political faith.

It was at this session of 1826-27 that the Woolens Bill, putting still higher duties on woolen goods, was introduced

<sup>22</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXI (October 7, 1826), pp. 94, 95.

and passed by the House. In the Senate it was known that the vote on a motion to lay on the table would be very close, and Van Buren is said to have cunningly devised the plan of bringing about a tie, so as to force Calhoun to give the casting vote and thus incur the odium of whichever course he might take. Van Buren was actually present when the vote was taken, but remained silent, and the vote was even.<sup>23</sup> Calhoun at once voted Aye, and thus the bill was shelved and lost for that session and Calhoun doubtless a marked and detested man in all tariff circles.

Probably he was quite as much an object of admiration throughout the South, where there was at once an outburst against the attempted increase. Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama all passed resolutions,<sup>24</sup> the general tenor of which was to recommend resistance, and in South Carolina numerous meetings of protest were called. The most conspicuous of these was held in Columbia on July 2nd, was presided over by the Governor; and here it was that Cooper made his well-known address,<sup>25</sup> in which he said that they would "ere-long, be forced to calculate the value of our Union." About the same time, too, was printed in the Charleston *Mercury* a series of articles called "The Crisis," by "Brutus," or Robert J. Turnbull,<sup>26</sup> in which State Rights doctrines of high flavor, but by no means the real Nullification of 1832-33, were advocated.

<sup>23</sup> Stanwood's "Tariff Controversies," Vol. I, p. 258.

<sup>24</sup> "State Documents on Federal Relations," by Herman V. Ames, pp. 146-151.

<sup>25</sup> Niles's "Register" of September 8, 1827, quoted in McMaster's "United States," Vol. V, pp. 248, 249; "South Carolina during Nullification," by Gaillard Hunt, in "Political Science Quarterly," Vol. VI (1891), p. 238.

<sup>26</sup> "The Crisis" is also to be found in pamphlet form. It was answered at great length by "Hamilton" in the Charleston "Courier," in a series of at least 28 letters, appearing from November 1, 1827, to February 12, 1828. It has been thought that Turnbull was the real originator of Nullification, but his papers did not get any nearer to it than is shown in the text, and one might with far greater truth say that Calhoun adopted the doctrine from Troup's Georgia contest or from the still earlier Massachusetts cases. All of these and several other instances contributed to the growth of Nullification, while Turnbull added nothing. Calhoun beyond question formulated and created the doctrine of 1832-33. The co-temporary "Book of Nullification" (Henry D. Capers's "Life



"I do not admit," wrote the author, with some of the essentials of both Secession and Nullification floating in his mind, as they had floated in many minds throughout the country at various times in the past, "the monstrous doctrine that a State can rebel." And he urged South Carolina to *will* that she would not submit to the tariff. How far he was from any real understanding of orthodox Nullification is shown, when he writes: "To talk of resistance to the tariff by all *constitutional* means, is to talk to no purpose. . . . It is to talk of *submission*, not *resistance*." And the following may serve as a sample of his heat "In all cases where slavery is proposed to be brought into discussion, let us say distinctly to Congress 'Hands off!—Mind your *own* business.' If this fails, let us separate. It is not a case for reasoning or for negotiation. It must be a *word* and a blow."<sup>27</sup>

Similar views were no doubt held at that time by many throughout the South, and Calhoun's letters during the summer show conclusively that, barring the violence, he was in pretty full unison with these wide-spread opinions. He wrote his intimates that our system had reached a vital point in its progress, the magnitude of which was realized by few. The policies advocated had greatly inflamed the public mind, he went on, and among them was "one, in particular, that, in my opinion, even threatens danger to the Union, I mean that of arraying the great geographical interests of the Union against one another . . . the South has commenced remonstrating against this unjust and oppressive attempt to sacrifice their interest [the Woolens Bill and the proposed Harrisburg Convention]; and, I do trust, that they will not be provoked to step beyond strict constitutional remedies. . . ." <sup>28</sup>

It would be interesting to know whether these last words indicate that State Interposition or Veto, as he called it a year later, had already found lodgment in his mind, under the influ-

of C. G. Memminger," "Appendix," p. 579) has it that Calhoun wrote letters to Turnbull and made him believe in Nullification.

<sup>27</sup> "Essays," No. 31, p. 151, and No. 27, p. 137.

<sup>28</sup> Letters of August 26, to his brother-in-law, James Edward Calhoun, and of July 23, 1827, to Christopher Van Deventer. "Correspondence," pp. 245, 246, 247-251.

ence of Madison's Report, but one can only draw one's own conclusions upon this point. To me, it seems difficult to attach any other actual meaning to them, when used, as they were, by a statesman, and presumably with some view to effective action. Remonstrance and resolution were already by that time about exhausted.

Again, there is nothing to show whether the South Carolina Legislative Resolutions<sup>29</sup> of that year reflect in part his mind; but they at least breathe in places those views as to the nature of our government, of which he was henceforth the greatest defender. "The Constitution of the United States," so ran the report of the Senate Committee, "is not a compact between the people of the United States at large with each other, but is the result of a compact originally formed between the people of thirteen separate and independent sovereignties, to produce and constitute a new form of government," and the first resolution embodied this idea, which is intensely Calhoun-like, though of far earlier origin, so far as its main idea is concerned.

The second resolution was to the effect that the tariff laws, "the object of which is not the raising of revenue or the regulation of foreign commerce but the promotion of domestic manufactures, are violations of the Constitution in its spirit and ought to be repealed," while the third, and only other one important to us here, put the same ban of unconstitutionality on laws for building roads and canals and was thus hardly likely to be altogether pleasing to Calhoun.

Whether or not he had a hand in drawing these resolutions, it is at least amply clear<sup>30</sup> that by their date he had made

<sup>29</sup> South Carolina Acts, &c., 1827, pp. 68, 69. John Ramsay, S. D. Miller, H. Deas, Alfred Huger, D. R. Evans, W. B. Seabrook, and Catlet Conner constituted the Senate Committee, and their report was presented by Ramsay. Mr. Hunt ("Calhoun," p. 80), says that the report was written by Turnbull. It and the resolutions smack far more of Nullification than did the earlier "Crisis."

<sup>30</sup> Mr. Hunt ("Calhoun," p. 68) thinks that Calhoun's letter of July 10, 1828, shows that even as late as its date he had not formulated Nullification. The letter is addressed to Monroe, and its material parts, after referring to the excitement in the South over the tariff and the unequal operation of the system in different parts of the country: are "I greatly fear, that the weak part of our system will be found to consist in the fact that in a country of such vast extent and diversity of interest,

his change and had become fully convinced of the truth of the State Rights theories. His quoted letters seem almost to prove this, and complete demonstration is added by a letter of his close political friend, Judge John McLean, dated September 25, 1831, to Samuel L. Gouverneur,<sup>31</sup> in regard to the then approaching Presidential contest of 1832-33. McLean reviews the whole field, including his own chances as the anti-Masonic candidate and says:

Our friend Calhoun is gone, I fear, forever. For four years past he has been infatuated, with his southern doctrines. In him they originated. He has shown a most extraordinary infatuation in the prosecution of this subject. I have no doubt, he believed, that he could consolidate the South, carry Pennsylvania, and bring over the West. He will not sustain himself any where, not even in his own state. In the west, the doctrine is as unpopular, and I believe more so, than the principles of the Hartford convention.

This language is, of course, not to be interpreted as meaning four years to a day or a month; and if Calhoun about four years preceding September 25, 1831, spoke of his new beliefs with sufficient clearness for McLean to be able to write those words, it is amply apparent that for a considerable number of

many of the laws will be found to act very unequally, and that some portions of the country may be enriched by legislation at the expense of others. It seems to me that we have no other check against abuses, but such as grow out of responsibility, or election, and while this is an effectual check, where the law acts equally on all, it is none in the case of the unequal action to which I refer." But I cannot think this one sentence in a single private letter can be held to have any such broad effect and to contradict what he says in the "Autobiography" of his course during that summer, later speeches of his own, the direct words of McLean, quoted *infra* in the text, and the many other indications I have cited. He probably had in mind the known and established checks, and the very next sentence refers clearly to some other remedy: "One thing seems to me certain, that the system is getting wrong and if a speedy and effective remedy be not applied a shock at no long interval may be expected." Did not these words mean Nullification, in his mind? But that doctrine had not yet been even promulgated, so that he would have had to write a treatise to put the high prerogative remedy before his far from sympathetic correspondent.

<sup>31</sup> Monroe Papers in Library of Congress. Dr. Schouler was, I think, the first to call attention to this letter. "History of United States," Vol. IV, p. 442. I have a copy of it.

months, and probably for one or more years, the new light had been breaking in upon him.

It is quite possible that the desire for a political career in South Carolina may have been one of the more or less conscious causes leading him to take up and develop the views popular at home, but how it is conceivable, as is often believed, that his burning ambition to be President led him to this fateful step is hard to conceive. If he really made the awful blunder of foresight that McLean attributes to him, it was probably the worst in his long career, and later pages will show, too, that in a few years there was quite a period during which those very flames of Presidential aspiration led him in the opposite direction, so that he hesitated to follow with his associates and take the cold plunge into sectionalism, which visibly meant the abandonment, for a time at least, of that fabric of hope that he had built up at such pains and that had such siren attraction for him.

Events of vast moment in the history of Calhoun, as well as of the United States, were now hurrying on apace. The tariff interests did not rest with the defeat of the Woolens Bill of 1827, and evidently thought the time of an approaching Presidential election opportune for renewed efforts. Accordingly, during the summer a Tariff Convention met at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. About one hundred delegates attended, representing the woolen and various other interests, and added their united voices to the agitation for higher rates on many articles. All this was of course watched with anxiety at the South<sup>32</sup> and contributed beyond doubt to the temper shown by Cooper and other hotheads in that quarter of the Union.

When Congress met in December of 1827, some have thought there was evident for a time a desire on the part of leaders to delay the subject and, at least, the taking of testimony on certain points was insisted upon by them, but on January 31, the fateful "Bill of Abominations,"—as it was dubbed<sup>33</sup> by Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland, a pro-tariff

<sup>32</sup> Calhoun wrote of the agitation to his brother-in-law on August 26, 1827, with marked anxiety. "Correspondence," pp. 250, 251.

<sup>33</sup> Webster in speech in "Works" (edition of 1851), Vol. II, pp. 237, 240. I do not think it is always borne in mind that this term originated



man,—was brought in. It was a strange medley, beyond question far more due to political manœuvering than to the public needs. The rates contained were in general very high, but the exact parentage of the measure is hard to ascertain. The latest writer on the subject, an advocate of protection, says that nothing could be more difficult than to free this law from the mystery surrounding it. A committee of the House, he goes on, a majority of which was against protection, reports a bill following most of the details of the Harrisburg Convention plan, but rejecting their proposal as to woollen goods, while iron, hemp, flax, molasses, spirits, and cotton prints were given perhaps more than ample protection.<sup>34</sup>

Both the Adams and Jackson following charged that the bill originated in the evil design of the other to win the election by driving its opponents into a position of great party difficulty. On the whole it is fairly clear that the plan of a new law containing still higher rates, urged by the Harrisburg Convention and the protectionists in general, had been originated by the supporters of Adams with the hope of defeating Jackson. The latter, whose support was very strong in some highly protective as well as in some free trade sections, could ill afford to let his friends vote against such a measure and thereby imperil his chances in Pennsylvania and other strong Tariff States. But Jackson's managers were not to be caught by any such trap. They had the upper hand in Congress; and accordingly not only did his friends in the end draw the bill but they controlled it as well and numbers of his staunch supporters voted in its favor. Perhaps honors were easy, and neither side was overly clean.<sup>35</sup>

with the friends of protection and had reference chiefly to some high rates very much opposed in the Eastern States. It was, however, fully adopted by the Southerners, but in their mouths referred to quite other provisions.

<sup>34</sup> Stanwood's "Tariff Controversies," Vol. I, pp. 270, 271. See also Taussig's "Tariff History," pp. 84-100, and Jenkins's "Silas Wright," pp. 53-60.

<sup>35</sup> Calhoun said in his speech to repeal the Force Bill ("Works," Vol. II, pp. 216, 396) that the Presidential election of 1828 soon ran off onto the tariff question, and those in power sought to take it up as theirs, while some of our allies were led to zeal in the same direction. Benton's opinion was much the same. Meigs's "Benton," pp. 251, 253.

Mallory, the chairman of the committee on Manufactures was opposed to the plan agreed upon by his associates, and Silas Wright drew the bill.<sup>36</sup> There can be no doubt that it was purposely framed with the view of being so distasteful to New England that her members would vote against it and thus insure defeat. This was, indeed, admitted on the floor both then and later.<sup>37</sup> Her manufactured goods were accordingly given little protection, while articles she bought for consumption or as raw materials for her mills, were taxed high.

As a further step towards the defeat of the bill, assurances were,—according to Calhoun's assertion in 1837,<sup>38</sup>—in effect given by Wright to members from the South that amendments would not be permitted, and hence the Southerners persistently voted even against reductions, in order to preserve a united front and keep the bill as unpalatable to New England as possible. One of the Southern members said<sup>39</sup> later that they "determined to put such ingredients in the chalice as would poison the monster. . . . This is what is sometimes called 'fighting the devil with fire.'" They evidently counted with absolute confidence on New England's voting solidly against the bill. Wright at a later day admitted having given the assurances, but said he had done "all he could to undeceive [the Southern members], but he could not succeed. He told them repeatedly that the New Englanders would end by voting for it and the bill pass."<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> John S. Jenkins's "Life of Silas Wright," pp. 57-62. R. H. Gillet's "Life and Times of Silas Wright," pp. 127, 130.

<sup>37</sup> Thos. R. Mitchell in Congressional Debates, Vol. IV, Part II, Twentieth Congress, First Session (1827-28), p. 2344. McDuffie, in "Congressional Globe," Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session (1843-44), "Appendix," p. 747, cited in Houston's "Nullification," pp. 34, 35.

<sup>38</sup> Speech in Senate on February 23, 1837, "Works," Vol. III, pp. 47-53, or Congressional Debates, Vol. IV, pp. 862, 870. See also "Autobiography," pp. 32, 33, and letters of October 23rd and December 4th, 1843, in "Correspondence," pp. 550, 552.

<sup>39</sup> McDuffie in speech of 1843, cited immediately above.

<sup>40</sup> Speech in Senate on February 23, 1837, in answer to Calhoun's charge of bad faith, Congressional Debates, Vol. XIII, Part I (1836-37), p. 921. See also Jenkins's "Wright," pp. 53-60. Van Buren and some few others did vote for the amendments wanted by New England, so that Calhoun had cause of complaint; but there seems to be no proof that Wright was implicated in the change.

The Southerners seem at first to have considered <sup>41</sup> whether their best course would be to unite with the New Englanders and amend the bill (presumably by reductions in the high rates obnoxious to her, and possibly by moderate raises on her manufactured goods), so as to make it more palatable; but this course would have fixed the system on the country more solidly than ever, so they concluded to rest on the assurances given. The risk then run was that the East might unite,—as, in the event, it did,—at a later stage with the Middle and Western States in favor of amendments acceptable to both and thus secure the passage of a law. Calhoun evidently had a large part in these not-inspiring manœuvres resorted to under the stress of great difficulties. Warren R. Davis of South Carolina, his close friend, was a member of the committee with Wright, and was evidently the actual intermediary for the South.<sup>42</sup>

The bill was, beyond all doubt, very largely,—or chiefly,—intended for protection and not for revenue, and at a late stage in the House, Drayton of South Carolina and others moved to insert in the title a declaration of this purpose, of course with the design of raising judicially the question of the constitutionality of protection; but the proposed amendments were all at once cut out by the previous question. The bill, then, passed in the House, April 22, by 105 Yeas to 94 Nays. Out of 58 votes from seven Southern States, there were 49 Nays, 3 Yeas from Virginia, and 6 members not voting.<sup>43</sup>

In the Senate, so Calhoun tells us in the already quoted speech of 1837, the New England members were so generally opposed to the bill that the Southerners

. . . Anticipated with confidence and joy that the bill would be defeated, and the whole system overthrown by the shock. Our hopes were soon blasted. A certain individual [Van Buren],

<sup>41</sup> Calhoun's "Works," Vol. III, pp. 47-53.

<sup>42</sup> Wright's Speech of February 23, 1837, referred to above.

<sup>43</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. IV, Part II, 1827-28, pp. 2471, 2472. See the Charleston "Courier" of April 30, 1828. Calhoun wrote in his posthumous "Discourse on the Constitution," etc. ("Works," Vol. I, pp. 364, 365) that the bill of 1828 was avowedly for protection, and was the first instance in which this purpose was avowed.

then a Senator but recently elected to the highest office in the Union, was observed to assume a mysterious air in relation to the bill, very little in accordance with what, there was every reason to believe, would have been his course. The mystery was explained when the bill came up to be acted upon. I will not give in detail his course. It is sufficient to say, that instead of resisting amendments, as we had a right to expect, he voted for all which were necessary to secure the votes of New England; particularly the amendments to raise the duties on woollens which were known to be essential for that purpose. All these amendments, with one or two exceptions, were carried by his votes, as appears from the journal, now on my table, which I have recently examined. If his name had been recorded on the opposite side, they would have been lost, and with them the bill itself. He held, at this critical juncture, the fate of the country in his hands.

At one time it was thought that the friends of the administration would arrange to make a tie in the Senate, so as to force Calhoun to vote against the measure, and thus probably defeat the Jackson ticket. Calhoun was then urged by his friends to absent himself and escape the difficulty for himself and Jackson; and he was reminded that, if he were absent and there was a tie, the bill would be equally defeated. But he promptly refused and added that his vote against the bill "should not hurt General Jackson's election, for in that event his name should be withdrawn from the ticket as Vice-President."<sup>44</sup>

Little share was taken by the South in the progress of the bill through either branch. In the House, McDuffie said<sup>45</sup> that their members had maintained "almost without exception, a profound but expressive silence," while in the Senate Hayne proclaimed that the measure could assume no shape to make it acceptable to him, and added that "with these views, he had determined to make no motion to amend the bill in any respect whatever."<sup>46</sup> Finally, when the contingency

<sup>44</sup> "Autobiography," p. 34.

<sup>45</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. IV, Part II, pp. 1827-28, p. 2382. McDuffie himself, however, and Hamilton and Martin did speak against the bill in the end,—shortly before the final vote.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 770.



feared by the South had occurred and the bill had been sufficiently amended, it passed the Senate on May 13 by 26 to 21, and Hayne entered "a solemn protest against it as a partial, unjust, and unconstitutional measure."<sup>47</sup> The Senators from the Southern States voted Nay by an overwhelming majority. The bill was signed by Adams on May 19.

There was at once among the Southerners an outburst against the "Bill of Abominations." A few days after its passage two meetings of the South Carolina members of Congress were held at Hayne's home in Washington. Anti-tariff men from other States had also been sounded, and some support found among them; but the difference of opinion was so great that they were not asked to attend.

One suggestion made at these meetings was to spread a protest on the records of Congress, and there was shown "a high degree of excitement at this new act of injustice against our constituents which had been marked by circumstances of unkindness, not to say bad faith, on the part of some of our political friends, which filled us with indignation and dismay. In the course of a very animated conversation," Hamilton said that, as soon as the bill was engrossed, he had decided to go home, resign his commission, and explain himself to his constituents. To this McDuffie added his opinion that persistence in the tariff must lead to disunion, but these ideas were strongly disapproved by Drayton and perhaps others. There was also some discussion of the possibility of coercion; but the answer was that the Federal army was a bare handful, and the sister States would not permit the marching of an army designed for that purpose. It was evidently an excited

<sup>47</sup> I do not think it has been generally observed that this turn of phrase, which is to be found with variations in many of the Southern resolutions of the time (See for example the "South Carolina Exposition and Protest"), was evidently adopted from the like earlier proceedings in New England. The Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature of 1809 declared the embargo "unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional and not legally binding on the citizens of this State," and the Faneuil Hall Resolutions of March 31, 1811, resolved that the Non-Intercourse Act of March 2nd was "unjust, oppressive and tyrannical." Schouler's "United States," Vol. II, pp. 192, 323, 324; McMaster's "United States," Vol. III, pp. 330, 422. Ames's "State Documents on Federal Relations," pp. 34, 35.

meeting of hot-headed and angry men, and probably some very ultra conversation came from the Hotspurs; but there was no unanimity, and the idea of action was abandoned.<sup>48</sup>

These meetings were probably,—especially after their outcome,—not designed for public knowledge; but one member of the delegation (Thomas R. Mitchell) wrote to the press about them, and they became a subject of controversy, chiefly between him and Hayne. There is no actual evidence that Calhoun had any part in the meetings, and it is clear he was not present, but it may probably be assumed that he knew of them and his course for a number of years indicates that he would have been in favor of mild counsels and opposed to the advocates of resigning in passion as well as to their hints at disunion.

In several Southern States, meetings were held to denounce the New Tariff Act, and the Legislatures of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia all adopted protests and memorials.<sup>49</sup> It will be enough, however, to follow here the course of events in South Carolina. So fast did the opposition grow and so ultra a shape did it assume that, as soon as June 5, a writer in the Charleston *Courier* said:

There was a time when the public sensibility on the question of disunion was such, that we could not even have tolerated the suggestion of its possibility. Little did any one imagine that the time was so nigh when it should be publicly proclaimed in our streets. . . . It is known that application has been made to the Governor to convene the Legislature. A memorial plainly indicating its object has been circulated for signatures, and if it has not succeeded, it is because it has been repelled by the sound sense of a virtuous community.

For what purpose convene the Legislature, if not to cloak and sanction the violent designs of individuals. . . . Revolutionary purposes alone were in contemplation.

<sup>48</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXV (1828-29), pp. 183, 184, 185, 195, 199-203, 230-34. I have summed up as fairly as I can what seems to have really occurred at these meetings. See also J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 83.

<sup>49</sup> Ames's "State Documents on Federal Relations," pp. 152-157.

<sup>50</sup> The Charleston "Courier" of June 19, 1828.

On June 12 at a meeting at Walterborough,<sup>50</sup> in the Colleton District, addresses to the People of South Carolina and to the Governor were adopted on motion of Robert Barnwell Smith (later Rhett), in which the people were reminded of their having, the past Summer, come together in Districts all over the State and declared to Congress (in reply to the Woolens Bill) that the protective tariff was contrary to their chartered rights. The Legislature also had repeated what it had said in 1824 and sent a protest to Congress, but all in vain. The address to the people advised "an attitude of open resistance to the laws of the Union," while that to the Governor urged that the Legislature be called together, and went on that the situation "requires national<sup>51</sup> consultation, either in Legislature or Convention." At a dinner given to McDuffie and Martin at Columbia, on their return from Washington, the former said: "It was insufferable. None but a coward could longer consent to bear such a state of things. . . . It would have been better for their representatives to have quit the capital and to have come home."

He proposed for a toast:

"Millions for defense, not a cent for tribute."

At a very large meeting at Edgefield on July 26, at which 3000 people, "all clothed in homespun," were said to be present,<sup>52</sup> non-intercourse with the tariff States was urged, and the same action was again called for on October 1 at Calhoun's old home, Abbeville, at a meeting that was thought to have been attended by as many as 5000 persons.<sup>53</sup> A large planter had earlier,—in the *Courier*,<sup>54</sup>—urged his brother planters "to come to a firm resolution not to purchase any Northern cloth for their domestics." "Leonidas" advocated<sup>55</sup> prohibitory duties on all Northern manufactures after they should become incorporated with the goods in general, and also that the Southerners should manufacture their own

<sup>51</sup> Perhaps some reader will hardly observe that this referred to action by South Carolina.

<sup>52</sup> The Charleston "Mercury" of August 2, 1828.

<sup>53</sup> "Mercury" of October 3, 1828.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, June, 9, 1828.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, July 18, 1828.

wearing apparel, raise their own animals, and cease buying from Kentucky.

Non-intercourse with the tariff States and non-consumption of protected articles were remedies often suggested, but the use of homespun seems to have been the favorite of these weapons drawn from the quiver of ancient days.<sup>56</sup> As late as the next December, at the meeting of Congress, McDuffie and some other Southern members appeared in homespun.<sup>57</sup> A tax to be levied in one way or another on Northern goods was also proposed,<sup>58</sup> and Calhoun seems, in preparing the "Exposition,"<sup>59</sup> to have favored an excise duty upon them.

The agitation spread widely over the State, and the people were practically unanimous against the tariff. Even the Unionists, while denouncing the policy of Nullification, were nearly always careful to express their opposition to protection, and some conspicuous instances to this effect will be cited later. During the years 1827-28, memorials, remonstrances, and petitions against the tariff were received in Congress and printed from the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, from a meeting of Agriculturists, from the Agricultural Society of St. John's and from that of St. Andrew's, from the citizens of Abbeville, Orangeburg, Edgefield, and Beaufort, and from fourteen meetings throughout the State describing themselves simply as "Citizens of South Carolina," as well as from the Legislature. And this list<sup>60</sup> is probably far from complete, for Hayne said in his Charleston speech<sup>61</sup> of July 4, 1831,

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, July 9, 12, 16, and 22; August 4; September 8 and 10; October 7, 1828.

<sup>57</sup> Charleston "Courier" of December 15, 1828.

<sup>58</sup> Charleston "Mercury" of July 7, 1828.

<sup>59</sup> "Works," Vol. VI, p. 57.

<sup>60</sup> My list is taken from Poole's "Descriptive Catalogue," nor have I thought it worth while to go farther. The Kershaw district apparently also remonstrated against the Woolens' Bill of 1827, the report speaking of "the undying cupidity" of the manufacturers, who had had so many bills in their favor in the past and now wanted more (Pamphlet in Gilpin Collection in The Historical Society of Pennsylvania). In two of the instances cited from Poole, the petitions merely call for a "revision of the tariff"; but it may probably be safely assumed that the revision they wanted was what modern days have called a "downward" one. In one instance, in 1824, a meeting of "citizens" favored the bill then before Congress.

<sup>61</sup> Pamphlet in Charleston Library Society.



after referring to the earlier proceedings, beginning in 1820:

There is not a district in the whole State, which has not, within the last ten years, over and over again forwarded similar memorials to Congress, until the very name of petitions against the Tariff became hateful to the ears of the majority, who would not consent to read them, nor hardly suffer them to be printed.

All these proceedings were of course closely watched by Calhoun, who had on May 4th, when the "Bill of Abominations" was still pending in the Senate, written to his absent brother-in-law of the deep business depression in the South, adding that the tariff system "must if persisted in reduce us to poverty, or compel us to an entire change of industry. You can form no idea how much it has alienated that part of the country." To Monroe, too, in a guarded letter of July 10, he wrote of the embarrassment and excitement caused by the tariff in the Southern States:

. . . Which they almost unanimously attribute to the high duties. It is not surprizing, that under this impression, they should exhibit some excess of feelings, but I feel confident, that the attachment to the Union remains unshaken with the great body of our citizens. Yet it cannot be disguised, that the system pushed to the present extreme, acts most unequally in its pressure on the several parts, which has of necessity a most pernicious tendency on the feelings of the oppressed portions. . . . One thing seems to me certain, that the system is getting wrong and if a speedy and effective remedy be not applied a shock at no long interval may be expected.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Calhoun wrote Monroe again on the same subject a few months later (December 29), but Monroe's answers were both far from sympathetic. He deeply regretted the Southern proceedings, thinking them fraught with great dangers to the Union and likely to lead to partial confederacies, conflicts and the overthrow of our system of government. The Southern States were, in his opinion, especially interested in the preservation of the Union, and would otherwise be certain to suffer frightful calamities from insurrections of the slaves. He at the same time urged Calhoun to visit him, supposing these differences had deterred him, but begged him to be assured that they had produced no effect on his mind, in relation to a visit. "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VII, pp. 175-77, 187-89. Calhoun's letter to Monroe of December 29, 1828, seems to be lost, but Monroe's answer to it is to be found in the latter's "Writings," as above; and a foot-note there refers shortly to the contents of Calhoun's letter.

On July 1, too, he had written, from Pendleton, to Duff Green, editor of the *U. S. Telegraph*<sup>63</sup> of Washington (his organ) that the country

. . . Is perfectly sound on the great question. I do not believe in this state there is one administration man in fifty. The unanimity is so great, as to allay all excitement on the presidential question. There is another of which I can say the same thing. I mean the tariff. The excitement is deep and universal, but I trust and believe will be restrained within the bounds of moderation. In its tendency I consider it by far the most dangerous question that has ever sprung up under our system, and mainly because its operation is so unequal among the parts. . . .

The great ground we have taken is—the great principle on which we stand is, that the tariff act is unconstitutional and must be repealed—that the rights of the Southern States have been destroyed and must be restored—that the Union is in danger and must be saved.

The statement often made that Calhoun was the sole originator and creator of Nullification is far from being strictly true, and the prior pages have shown that for some years he was, on the contrary merely one small atom in the slow growth of the forces that led thereto, and,—even more,—that for a period he resisted the swelling tide of dissatisfaction. By the date we have now reached, however, and for some little time before, he was, beyond doubt a chief leader in the matter, and by the summer of 1828 we shall find him advocating State Interposition or Veto and formulating the method by which that remedy,—pointed out in outline more than once in the past by others,—was to be carried out in practice in all its details.

It was easy enough to use the word “nullify,” and in several parts of the country particular laws had been denied obedience and their enforcement prevented in past years, but the tariff laws, carried out as they were in all particulars by

<sup>63</sup> This letter of Calhoun's is printed in Niles's “Register,” Vol. XXXV (September 20, 1828), p. 61. The “U. S. Telegraph” was the successor or continuation of the “City Gazette,” once Crawford's organ, and took its name in 1826. J. Q. Adams's “Memoirs,” Vol. VII, p. 180. That it was Calhoun's organ, at least in 1830, see *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 209.

Federal officers within the State, called for some new machinery, in order physically to accomplish their setting aside. In this particular, Calhoun was evidently the one man who in the main and almost entirely devised the *modus operandi*. He it was, too, who in the last stages,—from 1828 to the end, with the exception of a time when it will be seen that he did not go as fast as some of the hot-bloods wanted,—led South Carolina into and through the Nullification contest.

About the date of the Act of 1828 and for some time after it, he was evidently very active in the matter, and the public was freely allowed to know that such was the case. His recently quoted letter to Duff Green was of course not published,—as it was soon after it had been written—without his consent; and at a dinner given to him at Pendleton on July 4th, one of the regular toasts read:

The Congress of '76—they taught the world how oppression could be successfully resisted, may the lesson teach rulers that their only safety is in justice and moderation.<sup>64</sup>

He spent the summer of 1828 at his residence, Fort Hill in Pendleton, and it will be best to let him tell the story of what occurred there as well as give us his idea of the times. The famous Exposition took its origin at about this date. He writes in his "Autobiography":<sup>65</sup>

The entire South was justly indignant at the passage of so unjust and oppressive a measure, especially under the circumstances which attended it, and the question universally asked was, What is to be done? On his return home this question was often and emphatically asked him. He was not the man to evade it. He frankly replied that there was no hope from Congress; that in both houses there were fixed majorities in favour of the system, and that there was no hope of any speedy change for the better; but, on the contrary, things must grow worse, if no efficient remedy should be applied. He said that he could see but two possible remedies within the limits of the Constitution; one,

<sup>64</sup> Charleston "Courier" of July 18, 1828. Calhoun said in the Senate on February 15, 16, 1833: "The doctrine which I now sustain, under the present difficulties, I openly avowed and maintained immediately after the act of 1828." Speech on Force Bill, in "Works," Vol. II, p. 217.

<sup>65</sup> Pp. 35, 36.

the election of General Jackson, who, by bringing to bear systematically and steadily the patronage which the protective system placed in his hands, might reduce the duties down to the revenue standard; and the other, State interposition or Veto, the high remedy pointed out in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions as the proper one, after all others had failed, against oppressive and dangerous acts of the general government, in palpable violation of the Constitution. He gave it as his opinion that there was no hope from the judiciary, and, as the act stood, the constitutional question could not be brought before the courts, the majority having refused to amend the title of the bill so as to make it appear on the face of it that the duties were laid for protection and not for revenue, expressly with the view of preventing the courts from taking jurisdiction, and deciding on its constitutionality. He also stated that, although he regarded General Jackson's election as certain, yet he was constrained to say that the circumstances under which the act passed, and the part which many of his influential supporters took in its passage, made it doubtful whether the hopes entertained from his election would, as it regarded the protective system, be realized, and expressed his belief that South Carolina would in the end be obliged to resort to its ultimate constitutional remedy by state interposition, and the ruinous consequences which must inevitably result from the act to itself, to the South, and finally to the whole Union.

Many of the leading citizens of the state visited Mr. Calhoun at his residence, near the mountains in South Carolina, during the summer and autumn after his return from Washington, with all of whom he conversed freely, and expressed the same sentiments. But while he stated his conviction of the necessity of preparing in time for the worst, he always advised that there should be no precipitation, nor anything done to endanger the election of General Jackson, nor, indeed, afterward, till it was ascertained whether his administration would correct the evil before the public debt was finally discharged. He fixed on that as the period for invoking the high authority of the state, as one of the sovereign parties to the constitutional compact, to arrest the evil, not only because he thought that ample time ought to be allowed to see if anything would be done, but because he believed that so long as the money, however unjustly and unconstitutionally extorted from the people by the act of '28, was applied to the pay-



ment of the debt, it should be borne. But he thought, if the operation of the act should not then be arrested promptly, the vast surplus revenue which it would afterward pour into the treasury would be converted into the means of perpetuating it, and fixing the system on the country permanently and beyond the reach of any constitutional remedy.

He was the more deeply impressed with the danger from what had already occurred. A leading advocate of the measure in the Senate, Mr. Dickerson, of New Jersey, the chairman of the Committee on Manufactures, and since Secretary of the Navy, had already moved in anticipation of the payment of the debt, and with the view of strengthening the protective system, that five millions of dollars should annually be taken from the treasury and divided among the states. Such a proposition could not fail to arouse the attention and apprehension of one so sagacious and vigilant as Mr. Calhoun. He saw at once the full extent of the danger. No measure could be devised more insidious, corrupting, or better calculated to effect the object contemplated. . . .

So deep was his conviction of the danger, that when he was requested by one of the members elected to the Legislature of South Carolina, with whom he had conversed freely when on a visit to him, and who expected to be on the Committee of Federal Relations, to give him his views on the subject, he did not hesitate to draw them up in the shape of a report, in which he fully expressed himself as to the disease, the danger, and the remedy; and, regardless of popularity, he gave him authority to state who was its author, should he think it would be of any service. The paper was reported by the committee with some, though not material alterations. Five thousand copies were ordered by the Legislature to be printed, under the title of "The South Carolina Exposition and Protest on the subject of the Tariff."

It seems that William C. Preston<sup>66</sup> was the member of the Legislature, at whose instance,—either during a visit in the

<sup>66</sup> Preston is generally stated to be the person in question. See, *e.g.*, Hunt's "Calhoun," p. 71. Jenkins's "Life" does not name any one, and I have found no evidence on the point, unless that Preston's resolutions, offered at the coming session of the Legislature, and mentioned in the text shortly *infra*, perhaps bear evidence of the influence of Calhoun's views. They speak, *e.g.*, of the reserved rights of the States, and of the States having the right "acting in their high sovereign capacity to interpose and arrest the usurpation."

summer or at a later period,— Calhoun drafted the South Carolina Exposition. The Governor had not,—though more than once requested so to do,— called the Legislature together in special session; and when it met in November, while his message spoke of the tariff law of 1828 as a palpable violation of the Constitution which he wanted resisted by every means afforded by the Constitution and law of the land, yet his course was apparently not at all satisfactory to the would-be Nullifiers. He urged, for instance, that “no plan be adopted which will separate the interests of this State from those of the other suffering States.” This was by no means the programme or, in modern parlance, “slate,” of the leaders.

Early in the session, a number of resolutions<sup>67</sup> against the tariff and of various degrees of heat were submitted in the House by Preston and others. A special committee of seven,—consisting of James Gregg, D. L. Wardlaw, Hugh S. Legaré, Arthur P. Hayne, Wm. C. Preston, William Elliott, and R. Barnwell Smith,—was then appointed,<sup>68</sup> and from them on December 18 Gregg reported, with some minor changes, Calhoun’s “Exposition,” which had presumably been given to the Committee by Preston. A form of “Protest,” by the State was added, with eight reasons therefor; but it is not clear whether the “Protest” and reasons were Calhoun’s or the committee’s.<sup>69</sup>

In the Senate, also, resolutions upon the subject were presented by J. S. Deas, Black, and Wilson; and after their consideration in committee of the whole, a resolution was

<sup>67</sup> The resolutions are reproduced by Mr. A. S. Salley, Jr., in the “Publications of the Southern History Association,” Vol. III (1899), pp. 212-20. See also Niles’s “Register,” Vol. XXXV, pp. 304-10.

<sup>68</sup> “Calhoun’s Works,” Vol. VI, p. 1. Niles’s “Register,” Vol. XXXV, p. 307.

<sup>69</sup> “Calhoun’s Works,” Vol. VI, pp. 57-59. Niles’s “Register,” Vol. XXXV, p. 309, contains a letter of December 18, from Columbia, saying that the report had been presented that morning, and Niles adds that it was a very able paper but feared it was too long to be read. To the same effect is the comment of the Charleston “Mercury” of December 22, 1828, while the unfavorable “Courier” of the same date merely reproduces from the “Southern Patriot” the fact that on the 18th the special committee made “an elaborate report to the House,—the reading whereof took two hours.” Such was the obscure birth of the “Exposition.”

adopted by 34 to 6, to the effect that the protective tariff was "unconstitutional and should be resisted and the other States be invited to co-operate." This was then amended that it should be sent to the several States, and finally a Committee of 9 was appointed to draft such a declaration as should clearly elucidate the principles of South Carolina upon the subject. Perhaps we may suspect that here is an expression of the unwillingness of members to endorse Calhoun's Exposition. The Committee of 9 reported in a few days (December 19), and apparently <sup>70</sup> its report consisted of those resolutions of the Senate, which were in the end approved by both houses.

The two branches disagreed, however, at first, each adhering to its own measure and refusing to agree to that suggested by the other, and there seemed much likelihood of an adjournment without any action upon the subject. December 20 was a very busy day; a second session was held in the evening, and various messages were exchanged between the two houses. The Senate at one time voted by 21 to 10 to reject the House "Protest," and the subject was perhaps complicated by a disagreement on the "Bill for Supplies." This latter was first gotten out of the way, and then at a late hour <sup>71</sup> on Saturday night,—December 20,—a committee of conference upon the tariff matter was appointed by both houses. The Committee reported recommending the adoption of the "Protest,"—which had originated in the House and was probably Calhoun's,—and that the "Protest" should be entered on the Journals of Congress; and it also recommended the adoption of resolutions, which were probably those already referred to, which had been reported to the Senate on December 19, from the committee of 9. Both houses agreed to this report, and the session at length ended.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup> The report is not transcribed in the Journal, but it was ordered printed and made a part of the special orders upon the general subject, which came up at a very late hour of the session.

<sup>71</sup> At about 11:30, according to the "Courier" of December 23.

<sup>72</sup> The "Courier" of the 23rd says the adjournment was at about 1:30 a.m. Sunday. The MS. Journal of the House contains no statement that the report of the conference Committee was approved, but perhaps such omissions could be found in other instances and the printed laws and other records show the fact sufficiently. I have gone over the matter

The resolutions<sup>73</sup> of the Senate, thus approved by both branches, recited that the opinion of the Legislature, as expressed in the years 1825 and 1827, was unchanged and that it was "restrained from the assertion of the sovereign rights of the state by the hope that the magnanimity and justice of the good people of the Union will effect the abandonment of a system, partial in its nature, unjust in its operation and not within the powers delegated to Congress." Another clause directed that copies of this resolution, together with those of 1825 and 1827, be sent to the several States.

The "Protest,"—the other declaration upon the general subject approved by both Houses,—was presented in the U. S. Senate on February 10, 1829, by William Smith, the State's senior senator. It read: "The Senate and House of Representatives of South Carolina now met and sitting in General Assembly . . . do, in the name and on behalf of the good people of the said Commonwealth, solemnly protest against the system of protecting duties lately adopted by the Federal Government," giving eight reasons, which need not be quoted here; and the right was claimed, on behalf of the State, to enter upon the Journals of the Senate, "their protest against it as unconstitutional, oppressive, and unjust."<sup>74</sup>

Politics make strange bedfellows, and the changes of the complicated game are infinite. How interesting it would be and how curious to know the language that the pugnacious and bitter Smith indulged in among his intimates in regard to Calhoun, now that the kaleidoscope of human events found him offering State Rights papers drawn by his arch-enemy whom he knew to be the author of the "Exposition," which went much further than Smith had probably ever gone. Interesting indeed; but hardly edifying!

It has been said that the resolutions in regard to the tariff were sent to the several States, and we shall find that a few

in the MS. Journals of the House and Senate, and my account is based on them. See, also, Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXV, pp. 307-10; and the Charleston "Mercury" and "Courier," both of December 23.

<sup>73</sup> Laws of South Carolina, 1828, pp. 17-19.

<sup>74</sup> Congressional Debates, V. (1828-29), 52-58. "Calhoun's Works," Vol. VI, pp. 57-59.



favorable replies were at first received, though in a short time South Carolina was destined to stand quite alone and, as she doubtless thought, deserted. Indeed, Calhoun emphasized, in 1833, the fact that petitions, remonstrances, and protests against the protective system came in from Virginia and all the Southern States until 1828, "when Carolina, for the first time, changed the character of her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights as the shield of her defense against further encroachment."<sup>75</sup> And there, I think, we must find the real cause of the apparent desertion: The Southern States were all quite enough aroused to denounce the tariff and threaten State action against it, so long as the question remained somewhat doctrinaire and they were not led to the brink of a serious and possibly armed clash with the Federal Government, but they drew back at once at the perils of disunion plainly visible in the latter course.

This was much what had happened in the past as to some of the Fathers of events in 1798-99. Madison and his associates of that period surely meant<sup>76</sup> (if they had any definite meaning) that the individual States could rightfully prevent the enforcement within their respective limits of a Federal law they deemed clearly beyond the powers conferred, but the question remained then academic, and did not approach an

<sup>75</sup> Speech on Force Bill in "Works," Vol. II, p. 241. He also wrote in his "Autobiography," p. 38: "He [himself] and the state now stood alone. . . . They were deserted by all the Southern States, though most of them had adopted the strongest resolutions, declaring the tariff of '28 to be oppressive, unjust, unequal, and unconstitutional, and pledging themselves in the most positive manner to oppose it."

<sup>76</sup> It is impossible to argue here at any length the meaning of the famous resolutions of 1798-99, but to me it seems absolutely plain. There is no answer to the perfectly plain language used. Chancellor Harper, in his speech at Columbia on September 20, 1830 ("The Remedy by State Interposition, or Nullification, Explained," Pamphlet in Library of University of South Carolina and in Library Co. of Philadelphia, pp. 16-18), spoke of the absurdity of the efforts then making to explain the resolutions otherwise and went on to ask: "How did the Legislatures of Connecticut, Massachusetts and others, who made counter resolutions understand them? Was it then thought there was anything ambiguous in his words, or was the interpretation then put upon them, even disavowed?" See also F. M. Anderson's "Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions" ("American Historical Review," Vol. V (1898-1900), pp. 45-63, 225-52), and Ames's "State Documents on Federal Relations," pp. 16-26.

actual clash of authority. When, more than thirty years later, a concrete instance came to a head and the perils of revolutionary conflict presented themselves to Madison's declining years, the practical instance, the pregnant horrors of the actual condition, so different from the rather abstract theory and mere threats of 1799, appalled him, and he denied that he had ever intended to assert what his followers of 1832 found plainly written in his language of sturdy manhood. But he never did — he could not — give any satisfactory explanation of his writings of 1799 other than that which Calhoun and the Nullifiers drew from them.

All men are largely opportunists, and the truth is that in the earlier instance, swept on by the desire to attain a particular and highly important end, Madison and his associates had allowed their abstract ideas to run away with them a little and had developed a theory of our government which they would then have maintained, and probably did often say in conversation was meant literally; but, when the grievous wrongs, — at the time the chief issue in public affairs, — had later become mere history and their blood had cooled, they soon came then have maintained, and probably did often say in contention. It too plainly tended to annihilate all real government.

Precisely the same was the case about 1830 with the Southern States in general. In reply to the earlier South Carolina Resolutions of 1827, Georgia had answered in December, 1828, by expressing her concurrence "with the legislature of the State of South Carolina, in the Resolutions adopted at their December session in 1827, in relation to the powers of the General Government and state rights."<sup>77</sup> The Committee's report, which was adopted, was to the effect that protective

<sup>77</sup> I cite from the copy transmitted to South Carolina, printed in her Laws for 1829, pp. 79-81; but see, also, Georgia Laws, 1828, pp. 174-77. A remonstrance from Georgia addressed to the States in favor of the tariff, dated December 19, 1828, threatens nullification in some form, for it says: "if the unconstitutional measures are persevered in . . . We must as we did under British domination, seek an effectual remedy." South Carolina Laws, 1829, pp. 87-90. See, also, on this subject "Georgia and State Rights," by U. B. Phillips, in "Annual Reports of American Historical Association" (1901), Vol. II, pp. 117, 118, 120, 121.

tariff laws were unconstitutional and that the States had "the unquestionable right in case of any infraction of the general compact . . . to complain, remonstrate, and even to refuse obedience to any measure of the General Government manifestly against, and in violation of the constitution; and in short to seek redress of their wrongs by all the means rightfully exercised by a sovereign and independent Government."

Virginia was perhaps equally explicit at a slightly later date, and resolved in February, 1829:

That the Constitution of the United States, being a Federative Compact between sovereign States, in construing which no common arbiter is known, each State has the right to construe the compact for herself, but that each State, in so doing, "should be guided . . . by a sense of forbearance and respect for the opinion of the other States, and by community of attachment to the Union, so far as the same may be consistent with self-preservation. . . ."

The protective tariff laws were in her opinion unconstitutional.<sup>78</sup>

Alabama, too, in 1829 sent to Congress "a solemn protest against the tariff act of 1828 as unconstitutional, unequal, unjust and oppressive in its operation," but did not take up Nullification. These very resolutions, indeed, expressed the opinion that "open and unqualified resistance should be the last and desperate alternative between submission on the one hand and the liberty of the people on the other."<sup>79</sup>

Even Ohio concurred in part and answered the South Carolina resolutions of 1827 in February, 1828, by resolving that "to the general proposition contained in the first resolution [that the Constitution is 'a compact between the people of the different States with each other as separate independent sovereignties'] abstracted from definite questions of constitutional

<sup>78</sup> South Carolina Laws, 1829, pp. 71-79: see also Ames's "State Documents on Federal Relations," pp. 156, 157.

<sup>79</sup> Poole's "Descriptive Catalogue," etc., p. 210. Laws of Alabama, 1828, pp. 101, 102. The Alabama Legislature had also protested at the prior session against the Woolens Bill and the protective tariff in general, Laws 1827, pp. 169-72; Poole, p. 196, Ames's "State Documents," &c., pp. 150, 151. North Carolina, too, seems to have protested in 1827-28, Poole, p. 195, Ames's "State Documents," &c., pp. 148, 149. I have not been able to find this protest or remonstrance in the North Carolina Laws.

right or power this general assembly perceive no grounds of objection," but expressed their solemn dissent from the doctrines that protective tariff laws and internal improvements were unconstitutional.<sup>80</sup> But here the favorable answers ended and resolutions of an opposite tenor were passed in at least two Southern States,<sup>81</sup> and when South Carolina acted upon her theories in 1832, she was universally frowned upon.

Finally, in regard to the famous "Exposition" of Calhoun, as has been seen, it was not adopted by either branch of the South Carolina Legislature, but 5000 copies were ordered printed by the House.<sup>82</sup> On the title page, this publication was called: "Exposition and Protest reported by the Special Committee of the House of Representatives: read and ordered to be printed December 19, 1828." Printed thus by authority and widely circulated as it was, as well as offering, in Calhoun's crystal-like logic, by far the most complete argument to be found in favor of South Carolina's contentions, we need not wonder that it came ere long to be known as "The South Carolina Exposition." Calhoun himself so wrote of it,<sup>83</sup> and was perhaps not unwilling to magnify his own offspring. Many writers have even supposed that it was formally adopted by the Legislature. As a matter of fact, it was never formally approved by any agency of the State government having higher authority than a Special Committee of one branch of the Legislature, and it was said that members thought it contained tenets on which they ought not to be committed.<sup>84</sup>

The Exposition<sup>85</sup> had to cover a wide field of argument.

<sup>80</sup> Acts of Local Nature, First Session, Twenty-Sixth General Assembly (Ohio), Vol. XXVI, p. 187.

<sup>81</sup> Kentucky and Louisiana. Ames's "State Documents on Federal Relations," pp. 158-163. A Democratic State Convention of Mississippi also unanimously resolved against the existence of the alleged right of nullification and secession but this was apparently in 1834. John W. Garner's "The First Struggle over Secession in Mississippi" in "Publications of Mississippi Historical Society," Vol. IV, pp. 90, 91.

<sup>82</sup> MSS. Journal of the House, under date of December 19.

<sup>83</sup> "Autobiography," p. 36.

<sup>84</sup> Cooper so writes in his editorial notes to the "Statutes at Large," Vol. I, p. 273. He also writes there that the Exposition "is inserted as being a document of great historical interest. But although the report was read and ordered to be printed, it was not adopted by the two Houses."

<sup>85</sup> "Calhoun's Works," Vol. VI, pp. 2-57, contains the Exposition as



Taking up the tariff first, it began by admitting the general proposition that the consumers pay an impost, but contended that where a tariff exists and "furnishes the means [to some] of indemnifying themselves, . . . no proposition can be more fallacious than that the consumers pay." This was argued at length, and here may probably be found the mould in which was cast McDuffie's famous 40-bale theory.<sup>86</sup> The reader must decide for himself as to its validity.<sup>87</sup> Later pages went into the wide divergence of interests in the two sections of the country, the dangers of irresponsible power, and soon branched off to the question as to the nature of our system with its two governmental agencies. The distinction between government and sovereignty was carefully drawn,—the former divided by the Constitution in our case between the States and the Federal Government, while the latter was and always had been inherent in the people of the States respectively. No means had been provided in words, it said, to guard the reserved rights of the States, while the right of appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court, under the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, was provided to protect the rights vested in the General Government from violation by the State authorities.

But this judicial power had no application to the rights of the parties to the compact, and was confined to questions of the authority of different departments, as Madison had so well

Calhoun drew it. The printed pamphlet contains it, as reported to the Legislature. R. B. Rhett wrote Crallé in 1854 that it "was greatly altered by the committee, who reported it to the Legislature, of which I was one. Mr. Calhoun had nothing to do with these alterations and I know disapproved of them." R. B. Rhett on the "Biography of Calhoun," 1854, by Gaillard Hunt in "American Historical Review" (1907-08), Vol. XIII, pp. 310-312.

<sup>86</sup> See, also, the Report prepared by Calhoun for the Committee on Federal Relations of the Legislature, November Session, 1831; "Works," Vol. VI, p. 115.

<sup>87</sup> Few or none will doubt the soundness of one of their contentions, which probably contains the gist of their arguments upon this point. Calhoun wrote Micah Sterling on September 1, 1828, that he was not surprised at the views held in the North in regard to the excitement over the tariff in the South, and then explained that they could not recoup themselves from the consumer's pocket, as the North could do. Our market is a foreign one, and we can receive no protection in it. Letter in the collection of John Gribbel, Esq., of Philadelphia.

shown in his Report of 1799. To argue that the Federal authorities, judicial or any other, could finally decide on the extent of the powers conferred upon the Union, was not to divide the powers but to make our Federal Government one consolidated one. How, then, were the States to be protected? The answer is that their right of interposing to protect their powers from violation by the Federal authorities is an essential attribute of sovereignty, implied, it is true, but not for that reason wanting in certainty any more than is the equally implied power of the courts to hold laws unconstitutional. Hamilton and Madison were quoted to this point.

Finally, the question was discussed as to how to apply the proposed remedy of State veto. The Legislature probably had the power to act in the matter, but a Convention was best, because free from all doubt. It would, beyond question, represent the highest sovereignty in the State, and on it would rest the duty of deciding whether the tariff laws were so palpable a violation of the Constitution as to justify the interposition of the State. An amendment to the Federal Constitution affirming the disputed power could then, it was admitted, in turn overrule the action of the State and make the disputed exercise of power constitutional. That the facts justified interposition was clear; but delay was recommended in the hope that the obnoxious laws might be repealed. It was absurd to anticipate danger of armed conflict under a government of laws, where one of the sovereign parties should exercise a power she conscientiously believed to belong to her.

From this time on, the somewhat nebulous historical doctrine of Nullification, condensed at length into definite form, took a distinct place in the minds of many in the theory of our system. Millions disbelieved in it then, and more and more came in time to reject and ridicule it, but its equation and orbit, if the expression may be allowed, had now been calculated and were to be found, written out in plain terms, by any seeker. This elucidation and description were beyond doubt due to Calhoun. He it was, whose analytical mind had here brought order out of chaos.

It is true that James Hamilton, Jr., had antedated Calhoun

by some two months in proclaiming the doctrine publicly. He had set it forth quite fully and with remarkable accuracy in his Walterborough speech<sup>88</sup> of October 21, 1828, and seems to have been the very first to do so, but it can hardly be doubted that he had derived his knowledge from Calhoun, probably during a visit to Fort Hill. The later relations of the two men to the subject and to each other seem to demonstrate this.

It is worthy of note, too, that, probably at the very same time when Calhoun was writing the Exposition, the doctrine of Nullification was to some extent set forth by "Sidney" in a series of letters to the *Charleston Mercury*.<sup>89</sup> Who the author was is unknown, nor is there any actual knowledge as to where he derived his information. Possibly, as has been suggested,<sup>90</sup> he may have been another of those who visited Calhoun at Fort Hill during the time when Calhoun was at home between sessions. The latter had reached Pendleton on the 29th of May.<sup>91</sup>

"Sidney" did well enough in treating some phases of Nullification but broke down hopelessly on other points. He wanted their Legislature to declare the tariff laws void and that merchants should refuse to pay duties. They were then to sue in the State Courts, presumably to recover their goods, and on the trial of the case proof was apparently to be offered that the Acts were designed for protection. "For the purpose of discovering what were the objects the Bill intended accomplishing," wrote this would-be leader, distinctly referring to the method in which his proposed case was to be tried, "we must look to the petitioners whom it intended to benefit, and the speeches of those who passed it." If he had taken inspiration from Calhoun, he had learned his lesson badly, and he would have been a sadly unsafe leader. Calhoun was perhaps quite wrong in his chief contention, but there were no such flaws as this in the suit of armor he had forged.

<sup>88</sup> Pamphlet in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. O'Neill tells us that he had "often heard Chancellor Harper claim [Nullification] to be his own progeny." "Bench and Bar," etc., Vol. II, p. 286.

<sup>89</sup> Issues of July 3, 4, 8, 1828, and possibly of other dates.

<sup>90</sup> Prof. Houston in his "Study of Nullification," p. 76.

<sup>91</sup> *Charleston "Courier"* of June 9, 1828.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE WIDENING BREACH

Presidential Campaign of 1828-29 — Jackson-Calhoun Ticket Chosen — The President's Cabinet — Calhoun's Rivalry with Van Buren — The Eaton Affair — Growing Tension with Jackson — Crawford — Jackson's Quarrel with Calhoun.

THE events that have been under discussion in the last chapter, occurred at a time when another question, always of vital moment in American politics, was growing very acute. A Presidential election was near at hand, and the difficulties of the South, especially of the leaders in South Carolina, where greatly enhanced by the necessity of declaring for some one of the candidates. To them, other issues were of far more importance than was the question of who should be President, nor was there much to indicate who was the candidate most likely to advance their interests.

As early as December, 1826, however, before the tariff issue had come to dwarf all others, a caucus of the South Carolina Legislature had voted almost unanimously for Jackson,<sup>1</sup> and here was of course an indication. Possibly, this was partly the reason why, during the summer after the passage of the Tariff Act of 1828, when Calhoun was consulted as to the best course for the State to follow, he urged that they should support Jackson. It was a choice of evils, he added, for numbers of the general's supporters were tariff men, but he was a Southerner and slave-owner, not at all an out-spoken tariff man, and he had behind him a vast popularity. At the same time, Calhoun expressed great doubts, founded on the course taken by many of Jackson's supporters in the passage of the Act of 1828, whether he would bring them any

<sup>1</sup> Charleston "Mercury," December 26, 1828, cited in Houston's "Nullification," p. 67.



relief and inclined to the belief that they would in the end be compelled to resort to State interposition.<sup>2</sup>

South Carolina accordingly supported the ticket of Jackson and Calhoun, and on July 1st the latter wrote that "the unanimity is so great as to allay all excitement on the presidential question."<sup>3</sup> He was doubtless anxious to keep on good terms with the general and wrote him on July 10<sup>4</sup> about the effort (mentioned later) to embroil Monroe and himself with Jackson, saying in substance that the real difference between them had turned on the construction of orders and that it was enough that the orders had been honestly issued and honestly executed. Turning next to the excitement in the South over the tariff, he thought it was not surprising that some excess of feeling existed; but added that the hope that under Jackson "a better order of things will commence, in which an equal distribution of the burdens and benefits of government, economy, the payment of the public debt, and finally the removal of oppressive duties, will be primary objects of policy, is what mainly consoles this quarter of the Union."

In due time the South Carolina Legislature appointed electors in favor of the Jackson-Calhoun ticket and, as is well known, it was chosen by a large majority of the electoral vote, 178 to 83. A lull in politics doubtless at once then followed, while people were wondering what was in store for them under the new and quite untried powers about to assume the reins of office.

Calhoun wrote from Washington on January 10, 1829, to a Southern relative: "We have a dead calm in politics, which will continue till after the arrival of the President elect." And then went on that, despite much idle speculation as to the new cabinet, it was a subject on which Jackson had presumably not made up his mind, "nor will he, if he acts prudently, till he has had an opportunity of seeing the whole ground. . . .

<sup>2</sup> Speech on bill to reduce the duties, "Works," Vol. III, pp. 52, 53. Speech on Bill to repeal Force Act. "Works," Vol. II, pp. 394-396. "Autobiography," pp. 35-37, quoted *ante*, p. 388.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of July 1, 1828, to Duff Green, printed in Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXV, p. 61, and quoted *ante*, p. 372.

<sup>4</sup> Letter in Blair Collection of Jackson papers, Library of Congress.

I am not altogether without hope, if Genl. Jackson takes a correct general view of his position, and places an able sound man at the head of the Treasury Department, but that something like justice may be done to us."

Jackson arrived in Washington on February 11th,<sup>5</sup> and it was not long ere his cabinet was selected. Indeed, one member at least had probably been fixed upon (subject to his acceptance) before that date. J. A. Hamilton<sup>6</sup> evidently thought this was the case as to Van Buren, and for Secretary of War, also, the choice had apparently been already narrowed down to either Eaton or White, in order that the President might "have in his cabinet one old friend on whom he could always rely."

Some leading men were called to confer with Jackson upon the subject, but they found his mind already pretty well made up. James Hamilton, Jr., Hayne, Drayton, and McDuffie of South Carolina, and Archer of Virginia, all came by invitation on February 18th, and urged Langdon Cheves for the Treasury, but were told very positively that Ingham was to have that place, nor would Jackson listen to the suggestion they then made of Louis McLane of Delaware. They went off in a high state of wrath at finding that they had been asked more as a matter of form than with any real idea of conference.<sup>7</sup> It is noteworthy that these South Carolinians were

<sup>5</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 101. Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXV, pp. 401, 409. Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, p. 409. These authorities prove beyond doubt that the 11th was the actual day of his arrival. It was that on which the electoral vote was counted. J. A. Hamilton says in his "Reminiscences," p. 89, that the arrival was on the 12th, while Parton ("Jackson," Vol. III, p. 321) fixes it as about the 9th or 10th; but, they are evidently in error. In the end of January, a story of Jackson's death was circulating in Washington, and Webster wrote to Joseph Hopkinson on the 30th: "The rumour of General Jackson's death has subsided. My own private opinion, however, [word illegible] is, that he is very ill, and I have doubt whether he will ever reach this place." Letter in Hopkinson Collection in possession of Edward Hopkinson, Esq., of Philadelphia.

<sup>6</sup> "Reminiscences," p. 89. J. A. Hamilton wrote Van Buren, as early as February 21, of "the cabinet as determined," and of Calhoun's consequent disappointment. "Calendar of Van Buren Papers," 1910, Library of Congress, p. 101.

<sup>7</sup> The delightfully ebullient James Hamilton, Jr., in writing an account of the interview, said: "I assure you, in the words of Sir Anthony Absolute, 'I am perfectly cool—damn cool—never half so cool in my

evidently not yet in unison with Calhoun, and were opposing the very candidate whom he wanted for the Treasury. They expressed also to Jackson their approval of the selection of Van Buren for the State Department, though no man could have been fixed upon more distasteful to the great Southern leader, with whom they were destined soon to be so closely associated.<sup>8</sup>

Calhoun, too, probably had an interview by invitation with the President-elect shortly after the latter's arrival in Washington. According to J. A. Hamilton, on this occasion, Calhoun urged Tazewell of Virginia for the State Department, but Jackson intimated other intentions. Hamilton also expresses the belief that this was the last interview Calhoun had with Jackson in regard to the cabinet.<sup>9</sup> Hamilton's recollection and opinions were, however, not always accurate, and Calhoun wrote<sup>10</sup> publicly only some two or three years later: "Jackson never consulted me as to the formation of his cabinet. . . . As he did not consult me, I had too much self-respect . . . to intrude my advice." Doubtless, the meeting did take place, and possibly something of a general nature was said by Calhoun, which Jackson and Hamilton interpreted as advocacy of Tazewell, who was from Virginia. That important State was then for the first time left without a representative in the cabinet, and this was a doubtful party policy. There can be no doubt that Calhoun's friends were actively in favor of Tazewell.

The same partisan and not very reliable J. A. Hamilton writes further that "Calhoun and his friends made a desperate effort to induce the President to employ such men in his cabinet as would give them the control of the Government. The game was" Tazewell, State; Ingham, Treasury; Berrien, Attorney General, and John McLean of Ohio, War.<sup>11</sup> However much or little truth there may be in this statement of a life.'" Letter to Van Buren in Van Buren MSS., quoted in Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, p. 416.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 412, 415.

<sup>9</sup> "Reminiscences," pp. 100, 101.

<sup>10</sup> Reply to Eaton, printed in "Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," p. 443.

<sup>11</sup> "Reminiscences," p. 91.

supporter of Van Buren, there is no doubt that Calhoun was at heart strongly opposed to the selection of Van Buren and Eaton,<sup>12</sup> and that his friends tried hard to prevent them both. Van Buren was, in Calhoun's opinion, largely responsible for the Act of 1828, and Eaton had voted in its favor in the Senate. The opposition to Eaton, so Parton writes, "the President considered very unkind," as Eaton was his personal friend; he thought, too, that Calhoun could have stopped it, though he had no proof that the latter was personally concerned. In the process of cabinet-making, if not sooner, it is thus very evident that feeling had begun to crop up between Jackson and Calhoun.

Van Buren hesitated for a time to accept the office tendered him and was strongly advised against doing so by Louis McLane of Delaware. J. A. Hamilton, on the other hand, advised him to accept, writing that Calhoun was certainly disappointed and "now hopes that Jackson may be thrown into his arms by your refusal." In a few days Van Buren signified his acceptance, thus reaching a conclusion that was destined to have a vast influence on his career and that of Calhoun. It seems that his friends much feared the latter's influence, but the result of the struggle was that the cabinet was decidedly a Van Buren one, and Calhoun had but two friends in it — Ingham and John McLean. The latter of these, moreover, resigned almost at once to accept an appointment to the Supreme Bench and was replaced by W. T. Barry, who was not at all a Calhoun supporter.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For Calhoun's opinion as to the appointment of Van Buren, see his speech on the Force Bill in "Works," Vol. II, p. 216; and Eaton's vote for the tariff bill was quite enough, "Works," Vol. III, pp. 52, 53. Drayton was urged for the War Office, but it is not clear in whose interest. Letter of J. A. Hamilton to Van Buren, February 19, 1829, in *Calendar of Papers of Martin Van Buren*, 1910, Library of Congress, p. 101. Drayton, it seems, was later offered the War Office, at the time of the break-up of the cabinet, John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. IX, p. 182.

<sup>13</sup> Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 410, 411, 417, 418, 419. J. A. Hamilton ("Reminiscences," pp. 100, 101) thought the transfer of McLean to the Supreme Bench a stunning blow to Calhoun, and evidently was delighted at the move. On the selection of the cabinet in general, see J. A. Hamilton's "Reminiscences," pp. 89-101; Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 321-31; Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 408-19. The last named author has used very extensively the Jackson and Van Buren MSS. in the Library of Congress.



Thus Calhoun was far from likely to have much power under the new administration. With its leading member, Van Buren, his relations were already strained by prior contests, and the two men were now rivals not only in the struggle for influence with the new President but for the succession as well. Adams was told <sup>14</sup> on March 19, 1829, by a Senator that there was already great bitterness between their partisans, and Maxcy, while writing Calhoun in July that Jackson had satisfied him of his desire to be impartial between them, added that the fact of all the conspicuous appointments since that of Ingham going to Van Buren's friends made upon the public quite a different impression. A very bitter quarrel, too, had broken out at that time in regard to some printing patronage between Duff Green of the *Telegraph* and Ingham of the Treasury, which Maxcy had been trying without success to appease.<sup>15</sup>

The Southerners were inspired with some hope by Jackson's inaugural address, which favored "a strict and faithful economy" and on the burning issue of the tariff said that "the great interests of agriculture, commerce and manufactures should be equally favored and that perhaps the only exception to this rule should consist in the peculiar encouragement of any products of either of them that may be found essential to our national independence." The very first message, however, dashed these hopes. Vague and noncommittal on the tariff, it was distinctly in favor of distributing the surplus revenue,—after payment of the debt,—among the States. This was, to the Southerners, a fatal policy, as it promised to perpetuate the tariff system, by furnishing a means of employing the surplus. They had indeed, at Calhoun's advice, fixed on the extinction of the debt as the time until which they would wait, before deciding finally what course to pursue. The idea of distribution was not new, but had been advocated in the Senate at a prior session by Dickerson of New Jersey

<sup>14</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 116.

<sup>15</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," Maxcy's letters of June 1 and July 4, 1829, pp. 810, 814. A Washington correspondent of the Charleston "Courier" wrote, on December 20th, of the divergence between the Van Buren and Calhoun interests. "Courier" of December 29, 1829.

and had at once excited the apprehension of Calhoun.<sup>16</sup>

Once more, Southern hopes were aroused by the veto of the Maysville Road Bill, on May 27, 1830, during the first session of Congress under Jackson, for the South always felt that, if the expenditures were reduced, the temptation to maintain the tariff would be lessened. Hayne, in his speech at the Charleston Dinner on July 4, 1830, spoke of the veto as being "to the Southern States the first dawning of returning hope";<sup>17</sup> but the roseate hue did not last long. Within a few months, Jackson's second message (December, 1830) spoke again most distinctly in favor of distributing the surplus revenue among the States, while a vague mist still enveloped the sentences on the tariff. It should be changed, he wrote; some of the rates were too high, and duties had been placed on goods for the manufacture of which the country was not ripe. Here was probably poultice for injured Southern supporters, but the chalice was poisoned for others by the distinct opinion added,—that the tariff laws were constitutional.

Some efforts had been made at the prior session to change the tariff. After Mallary had reported on January 5, 1830, from the Committee on Manufactures that it was inexpedient to make any change,<sup>18</sup> McDuffie from the Ways and Means brought in a bill on February 5 to reduce the tariff.<sup>19</sup> He was unable, however, to get it considered, and it was almost at once laid on the table without discussion. All his proposals, moreover, to amend the bill, which was later reported from the Committee on Manufactures (mainly an administrative measure but containing some increases of rates), were re-

<sup>16</sup> "Autobiography," p. 35. Congressional Debates, Vol. III (1826-27), pp. 209-223.

<sup>17</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXVIII, p. 379. Prof. Bassett thinks ("Jackson," Vol. II, p. 490) that the veto was a hard blow to Calhoun, and quotes from Van Buren's MS. autobiography a sentence seeming to take the same view; but by this time Calhoun was probably no longer in favor of internal improvements, and his entirely private letter of Sept. 11, 1830, to Maxcy, when speaking of the Maysville Road Veto, seems to approve it and certainly does not suggest a regret at the defeat of internal improvements. See *infra*, pp. 417-419.

<sup>18</sup> House Journal, First Session, Twenty-First Congress, p. 130. Poole's "Descriptive Catalogue," &c., p. 214. Charleston "Courier," January 12, 1830.

<sup>19</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. VI, Part 1, 1829-30, pp. 555, 556.

jected. At this stage, and before the final vote, he and the South Carolina members generally withdrew from the House.<sup>20</sup> This is a petulant mode of indicating feeling, which has rarely had much success, and the Charleston *Courier* said in this instance again that its effect was less than expected. The bill passed finally and became a law.<sup>21</sup>

Not long after Jackson's inauguration there had broken out a public quarrel of a character, which has happily been rare in our short history. Questions of female virtue have broken more than one cabinet in some parts of the world, but I think Mrs. Eaton stands much alone among us. Peggy O'Neil, later Mrs. Timberlake, and then the wife of Jackson's Secretary of War, John H. Eaton, did not attain the standard of reputation laid down as necessary for Cæsar's wife, and the Washington dames of 1829-30 would have none of her. Jackson espoused the cause of his friend's wife with all the ardor of his Scotch-Irish nature and did his best to force her acceptance, but he met his match in the gentle sex, when he trespassed on a region they look upon as peculiarly their own. Mrs. Eaton was rarely received. The bachelor Van Buren was able to please the General in this particular to the top of his bent, but the married Calhoun was in another situation.

Mrs. Smith wrote,<sup>22</sup> early the next winter:

One woman has made sad havoc here; to be, or not to be, her friend is the test of Presidential favor. Mr. Van Buren sided with her and is consequently the right-hand man, the constant riding, walking and visiting companion [of the President]. . . . Mr. Calhoun, Ingham, his devoted friend, Branch and Berrien form one party, the President, Van Buren, General Eaton and Mr. Barry the other. . . . Meanwhile the lady who caused this division, is forced notwithstanding the support and favor of such high personages to withdraw from society. She is not re-

<sup>20</sup> The Charleston "Courier" of May 20, and the "Mercury" of June 2, 1830. I do not find this fact stated in the other newspapers of the period over which I have looked, nor does it seem to be mentioned in the histories of the time. Drayton and Tucker were the only South Carolinians to vote on the final vote. Congressional Debates, Vol. VI, Part II (1829-30), p. 987.

<sup>21</sup> Stanwood's "Tariff Controversies," Vol. I, p. 364.

<sup>22</sup> Letter of January 26, 1830, to her sister. "First Forty Years of Washington Society," p. 310.

ceived in any private parties, and since the 8th of January has withdrawn from public assemblies. At the ball given on that occasion, she was treated with such marked and universal neglect and indignity, that she will not expose herself again to such treatment.

Calhoun became very much involved in this battle royal. It seems that General and Mrs. Eaton called at his house once in his absence and were of course received by Mrs. Calhoun, and the latter and her husband had later that day some conversation about Mrs. Eaton and her relation to Washington society. The next morning, Mrs. Calhoun told her husband that she would not return the visit, as she considered herself a stranger in the capital, and that Mrs. Eaton should open her intercourse with ladies residing there. Calhoun approved her decision, though he foresaw the consequent difficulties to himself. In a later public statement<sup>23</sup> detailing these facts, he said that Mrs. Calhoun had never called on Mrs. Eaton, and wrote of "the great victory that has been achieved, in favor of the morals of the country, by the high-minded independence and virtue of the ladies of Washington." The next winter (1830-31) Mrs. Calhoun did not come to the capital at all, and John Quincy Adams says she was staying South so as to avoid the contamination of Mrs. Eaton.<sup>24</sup>

The divine wrath of Jackson over this matter had in it a tinge of opera bouffe; but his irascible nature was much impressed and the contest contributed largely to the dissolution of the cabinet a year later and beyond doubt helped to

<sup>23</sup> Reply of Calhoun to Eaton, printed in "Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," pp. 435-445, and also reprinted from the Pendleton "Messenger," in Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, pp. 178-80. The letter was due to an assertion by Eaton in the public papers that Calhoun was at the bottom of the troubles in the cabinet and that he and Mrs. Calhoun had at first called on Mrs. Eaton and later refused to do so, actuated by political motives. Calhoun's letter is followed in Niles by one from Rev. F. S. Evans, saying that four days after Eaton's marriage, Calhoun's carriage drove up to the door of Mr. O'Neil (Mrs. Eaton's father) and asked for Mr. and Mrs. Eaton and, they being absent, left the cards of Mr. & Mrs. Calhoun; but few will hesitate to accept Calhoun's word to the contrary, and his statement of the well known rule in Washington that Senators and their families always called on the Vice-President first seems conclusive.

<sup>24</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 159.



prepare his mind for that poison in regard to Calhoun's past actions which was even then in process of concoction by the latter's enemies.

Another highly important step in the political game of the day was the decision of Jackson, or rather of his friends, that he should run for a second term. His expressions had indicated that he would not do so; but before the end of December, 1829, it began to be rumored<sup>25</sup> that he would again be a candidate and in the following March, Van Buren and Major Lewis were working actively in this direction and some formal nominations of the General were obtained.

Lewis thought that he was the originator of this move and was apparently largely inspired thereto by dislike of Calhoun and the desire to defeat him. He wrote letters, about March, 1830, to members of the Pennsylvania Legislature, requesting them to sign a form of letter to Jackson (which he enclosed) asking him to stand again, and urged the absolute necessity of Jackson's endorsement<sup>26</sup>

. . . at the next meeting of their Legislature as the most effectual if not the only means of defeating the machinations of Mr. Calhoun and his friends, who were resolved on forcing General Jackson from the presidential chair after one term. The peculiar position of the Vice President, it was believed, made this necessary. He was then serving out his second term, and as none of his predecessors had ever served more than 8 years, his friends thought it might be objected to and perhaps would be injurious to him, to be presented to the nation for a third term. . . . It would not do for him to retire to the shades of private life for 4 long years. He could not run for a third term, and they dare not run him in opposition to General Jackson. . . . The scheme worked admirably, and in a few months the hopes of Mr. Calhoun and his partisans were completely withered, and the idea of driving General Jackson from the field abandoned altogether.

In such struggles as this, Calhoun was, in the writer's opinion, but a child in opposition to politicians of the mould of

<sup>25</sup> Charleston "Courier" of December 29, 1829.

<sup>26</sup> Letter to Parton, printed in "Life of Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 299-301.

Van Buren and Lewis. He could not play upon the mere passions of the multitude and had no comprehension of the burrowing schemes such men are forever indulging in to attain far-off as well as near-by designs. Despite his often marvelous power of forecasting the consequences of deep, underlying causes, there seem to be several instances in his career,—one conspicuous one now not far ahead,—in which he failed entirely to foresee results that were plain enough to them, and it may probably be added that he had no very full understanding of the nature of the ordinary man's mind in some of its workings. Nor must we forget that the little god of earth is after all the pawn by which the public man must attain his ends.

In the instance we are now concerned with, Calhoun still thought, as late as May, 1830, that it was "perfectly uncertain, whether Genl. Jackson will offer again or not. Some who regard their own interest more than his just fame are urging him to offer." <sup>27</sup> And on March 30, at the very time when the steps looking to his own defeat were being launched with such success, he wrote to Gouverneur that the latter understood fully

. . . The game, which is playing in a certain quarter. . . . It is, however, not calculated to do those engaged in it any service. I am surprised that one so artful as the author [doubtless meaning Van Buren] and who occupies so favorable a position for his operations, should so completely fail. His strength, which was never great, has been steadily declining all the session, and he may be now pronounced feeble. I see no cause to fear him, unless of enfeebling the administration by his devious course. . . . It is an object of ambition with us to carry the General through with glory.

The writer then went on to add, with reference to the nominations to office pending in the Senate, that the accusation that delay had been due to his friends was utterly false, and expressed his gratification at Swartwout's confirmation.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> "Correspondence," p. 273.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 271, 272, and Bulletin of the New York Public Library, Vol. III (1899), pp. 331, 332. This letter was dated March 30, the very

Probably these words reflect some still lingering effort to please Jackson, who was full of wrath at the slow confirmation of his many new appointments. It will ere long be seen how soon there was a rude awakening from the almost patronizing desire to bring the General through with glory.

The Hayne-Webster debate occurred during the latter half of January of this same year,—1830. Calhoun had, of course, no direct part in the discussion, but has often been said <sup>29</sup> to have followed it with interest and even to have shown approval repeatedly during Hayne's speeches and to have sent notes and suggestions to him. It is hard to find any evidence to this effect from an eyewitness, but approval may probably be assumed, and Benton tells us <sup>30</sup> that Hayne was "understood to be speaking the sentiments of the Vice-President."

Troubles were already fast thickening about Calhoun's great ambition, and the events of this debate added materially to them. Adams writes <sup>31</sup> that shortly after it was over, Calhoun was warned by White of Florida of "the injudiciousness of the violent attacks of his partisans against New England; and that Van Buren was taking advantage of it, and might have the whole Eastern influence thrown into his scale by it, which otherwise Calhoun might expect for himself. He said Calhoun seemed to be exceedingly at a loss what to do; said that he had been obliged by his position to take the lead in the opposition to Mrs. Eaton; that he did not know what

day on which Van Buren's organ announced that Jackson was again a candidate (Schouler's "United States," Vol. III, p. 497). Lewis's machinations had begun ten days earlier.

<sup>29</sup> See, *e.g.*, Curtiss's "Webster," Vol. I, p. 365. Sargent's "Public Men and Events" (the author of which does not write as if he had been present), Vol. I, p. 172.

<sup>30</sup> "Thirty Years' View," Vol. I, p. 138.

<sup>31</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 195. Others also saw at once this phase of the matter; and Judge Richard Peters wrote to Joseph Hopkinson, about January 24: "There has been going on in the Senate, and it will proceed to-morrow, a most angry contest in which Hayne and Benton are in array against Webster. . . . It grows out of the question of the Western lands. . . . There never was a course so ruinous as that which is now pursued by the Calhoun party in this violence towards Webster. All their hold in the East will be broken down by it, and Van Buren looks upon their conduct with the highest satisfaction. The whole East will support Webster." . . . The letter is dated "Sunday evening," and postmarked: "City of Washington, Jany. 24th." Hopkinson Collection, as above.

things were coming to," and so on. Possibly the advice given him was good; but the ultimate truth is that he was powerless, and the causes that were driving him away from all Northern support and to the inevitable loss of the Presidency were as resistless as fate. He and a hundred thousand others of the wisest of the sons of men were but autumn leaves in a gale to the long-grown trend of public events.

The Jefferson Birthday Dinner on April 13, 1830, furnished another similar portent. Designed of course by the South to add the strength of Jefferson's great name to their cause, and perhaps in the hope of enlisting Jackson, too, it was at once turned to ashes on their lips by the famous toast the latter gave. It is the fashion to-day to belittle Jackson because of his faults; but the man who could under the inspiration of the hour and by absolutely secret determination in advance so catch the best popular feeling by that toast as to carry with him the whole North and a good fraction of the South occupies far too high a place for most of us to pick at, and there is more than one like instance in Jackson's career.

"Our Federal Union: it must be preserved,"<sup>32</sup> rang like a clarion note from one end of the country to the other, and has ever since entirely dwarfed Calhoun's answering toast, admirably put from his viewpoint, but far too long, as well as too much hedged about, and necessarily quite lacking any note to stir the blood to patriotic fervor:

"The Union,—next to our Liberty most dear. May we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights of the States and distributing equally the benefit and the burthen of the Union."

<sup>32</sup> There is no doubt that this was the actual form of the toast. It did not contain in its last clause the words "and shall be." Prof. Bassett ("Jackson," Vol. II, p. 555) shows this conclusively from Van Buren's MS. autobiography in the Van Buren Papers in the Library of Congress, if even there could otherwise have been doubt. It was written down before the dinner, after consultation between Jackson and Van Buren. In proposing it, Jackson inadvertently omitted the word "federal," but added it at the suggestion of Hayne. The Charleston "Courier" of April 28, however, gives the toast with the addition of the words "and shall be," and adds that the Philadelphia "Sentinel," a warm and original Jackson paper, maintained that the "Telegraph" was in error in reporting it in the form given in the text.



Still another influence was tending to bring about the shipwreck of Calhoun's ambition. Crawford was an evil genius to him, and never forgave his young rival the rebuffs of 1816 and 1824. A man with all the bitter vindictiveness of a politician, Crawford is perhaps not unfairly described<sup>33</sup> as being "deadly as a viper," and he not only pursued Calhoun to the end but had at last a chief part in preventing the South Carolina leader from attaining the Presidency. A strong effort was also made by him in 1828 to secure his old enemy's defeat for the second office but he failed entirely to prevent the nomination, even in Georgia as well as in his own native State of Virginia. He did finally succeed in the electoral college of Georgia in inducing seven of the nine electors to cast their votes for William Smith instead of Calhoun for Vice-President; but this spiteful fling was the measure of his success at that time, and it had of course no influence on the general result. The object of these attacks was long fully aware of them.<sup>34</sup>

At about the date of these efforts and for some time earlier,

<sup>33</sup> Schouler's "United States," Vol. III, p. 427.

<sup>34</sup> Calhoun's "Correspondence," pp. 258, 259. John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VII, p. 427; Calhoun's "Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," pp. 384, 385, referring to Crawford's letter of October, 1828, to Major Barry, asking him to try and defeat Calhoun. Crawford's letter of October 21, 1828, to Van Buren calendared in the Library of Congress' "Calendar (1910) of the Papers of Martin Van Buren," and speaking of the impossibility of Georgia's voting for Calhoun for Vice-President as well as promising measures (evidently meaning the betrayal of Calhoun's alleged proposal in 1818 to arrest Jackson) to prevent Jackson from appointing him to the cabinet, in case of such defeat. In this letter Crawford shows that he was then striving to have Macon nominated instead of Calhoun; while at another time he was urging Clinton-Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 132, 133; Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, p. 405. Cobb's "Leisure Labors," pp. 238-47, says that Crawford began to write to this general effect to Jackson's friends as early as "in the fall and winter of 1827," and that the letters were shown to Jackson but produced no result: see *e.g.*, his letter of December 14, 1827, to Alfred Balch, in "Calhoun's Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," pp. 356-58, and the above-mentioned one of October to Barry; Parton's "Jackson," as above and "Jackson's Exposition," in "Benton's View," Vol. I, p. 174. In the Balch letter, Crawford also wrote: "Jackson ought to know, and, if he does not, he shall know, that, at the Calhoun caucus in Columbia, the term 'Military Chieftain' was bandied about more flippantly than by Henry Clay, and that the family friends of Mr. Calhoun were most active in giving it currency." Presumably, this refers to Calhoun's nomination for the Presidency on November 29, 1823, after the death of Lowndes, *ante*, p. 298.

Calhoun was engaged in correspondence with Monroe and others in the already mentioned effort to prevent enemies from embroiling Monroe with Jackson in regard to a question whether the former had fully supported the latter during his Mississippi campaign. This came later to touch upon Monroe's conduct in regard to Jackson during the Seminole campaign also. One letter of Monroe to Calhoun had been purloined from the latter's papers and shown to Jackson and was thought to evince hostility on the part of Monroe, but Calhoun traced the matter out with much difficulty and, by exhibiting the whole correspondence to Jackson's friends and Jackson himself, succeeded for the time in appeasing the latter's wrath and inducing him to see that Monroe had in reality been his friend.<sup>35</sup>

Little did Calhoun at first know that at the very time of this correspondence whisperings were flitting about between Crawford and other enemies of his which were ere long to lead to a far more deadly outburst against himself on the part of Jackson. This intrigue, like most, is involved in some obscurities; but is fairly clear in its main outlines. It is all originally traceable to Crawford, but probably began soon to be used by others for their own purposes. In January, 1828, while Calhoun was engaged in the just-mentioned efforts on Monroe's behalf, he had some suspicion that he was to be included in the attacks and wrote Monroe<sup>36</sup> that he hoped "to be able to trace the whole affair, but I am strongly inclined to think it was intended to fall on both of us." And in the spring of that year he was vaguely informed that efforts were making at Nashville to injure him, but paid little heed to the rumors.<sup>37</sup>

These early efforts of Crawford were quite unsuccessful, and Jackson refused to believe the charges when they were called to his attention. But the stories were far too rich a morsel to fail of sprouting some day. Jackson went with a party,

<sup>35</sup> Calhoun's "Correspondence," pp. 242, 243, 254-256, 260-263, 266; "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VII, pp. 137-43, 156-161, 173, 174, 175-177.

<sup>36</sup> Calhoun's "Correspondence," p. 256.

<sup>37</sup> "Calhoun's Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," p. 354.

of which Lewis and J. A. Hamilton were members, to attend at New Orleans the celebration of his famous battle, on January 8, 1828. On the way down the river, there was of course much talk among these friends in regard to the coming Presidential campaign, and Hamilton, who was, with Van Buren and the New York leaders in general, an old supporter of Crawford, offered to visit the latter and try to enlist his influence. Jackson was quite willing that this should be done, though he still thought that Crawford had been his chief opponent in Monroe's cabinet, during the Seminole campaign discussions. Whether any secret motive or special knowledge on the part of Hamilton led to this offer has never been disclosed, but a highly suggestive hint upon the point will appear shortly.

Hamilton, on his way North again, went as far as Sparta, Georgia, in the hope of seeing Crawford, but learned that he was probably absent from home, and accordingly wrote a letter<sup>38</sup> from Savannah to John Forsyth upon the matter he had in hand. The latter saw Crawford later, and wrote Hamilton on February 8, 1828, to say that Crawford stated that Calhoun and not he was the member of Monroe's cabinet, who had wished to arrest Jackson.<sup>39</sup> Some months later (April 1, 1828) Lewis visited New York and was shown this letter by Hamilton. There, however, in the unfathomable bosoms of these two adroit politicians lay hidden for a long time the secret of the existence of this political nugget of priceless value.

One other event, which occurred during Hamilton's return North, must be mentioned here. He stopped in Washington and made a friendly call on Calhoun, during the course of which he asked the latter in easy conversation,—of course, after consulting with a friend as to the propriety of his so doing,—whether “at any meeting of Mr. Monroe's cabinet,

<sup>38</sup> J. A. Hamilton's statement of February 22, 1831, published in the New York “Evening Post,” and reprinted in Niles's “Register,” Vol. XL, pp. 41, 42. His letter to Forsyth was dated January 25, 1828.

<sup>39</sup> Forsyth's letter to Hamilton of February 8, 1828, is printed in Niles's “Register,” Vol. XL, p. 45. See, also, letter of Crawford to a friend in Shipp's “Crawford,” pp. 208, 209.

the propriety of arresting General Jackson for anything done by him during the Seminole war had been discussed? To which he [Calhoun] replied: 'Never. Such a measure was not thought of, much less discussed.' " This was before Hamilton received the reply from Forsyth. At a later date (February 25), but still before Forsyth's answer came to hand on February 28, Hamilton wrote from New York for a written confirmation of Calhoun's verbal reply, but the latter was not again to be caught. He suspected by that time that the question had some connection with the matter of the letter purloined from him and the effort to embroil Monroe with Jackson, and declined either to answer or to be quoted.<sup>40</sup>

If Hamilton had no actual knowledge that Calhoun had been connected with the cabinet suggestion to punish Jackson, perhaps all this would have been unobjectionable, nor does he anywhere drop a hint that he already knew the truth pretty well. Lewis, too, tells the story as if Hamilton's offer on the river steamer to visit Crawford had been a sudden inspiration of that gentleman. Perhaps, moreover, Lewis thought this, for those engaged in such matters hardly allow their right hand to know what their left hand doeth, let alone tell others what they are up to.

But Hamilton did apparently know. Not only would he otherwise never have thought of asking Calhoun, *before Forsyth's answer came to hand*, in regard to the motion in the cabinet to arrest Jackson; but, more than this, the Jackson papers<sup>41</sup> have since furnished strong evidence that he knew well enough at that very time, that Crawford had already said

<sup>40</sup> Hamilton's "Evening Post" statement, *ut supra*. See, also, Calhoun's additional statement of February 24, 1831, in the "U. S. Telegraph," reprinted in Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, pp. 42-45, and his "Pamphlet." I give Hamilton's question and Calhoun's answer in Hamilton's words. Calhoun's account is much the same. He writes that the question was "whether any motion had been made in the cabinet to arrest him (Jackson). To which I replied in the negative. It may be proper to remark that no such motion or any other was made. The discussion in reference to the course that might be pursued towards him, took place on a suggestion of the propriety of an inquiry into his conduct, and my answer was therefore in strict conformity with the facts."

<sup>41</sup> Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 507, 508, citing letter of August 10, 1831, from R. G. Dunlap to Jackson, in Library of Congress, and printed in "American Historical Magazine" (Nashville), Vol. IX, p. 93.



to some one else, that Calhoun and not himself had been hostile to Jackson. Hamilton's offer to visit Crawford was merely an adroit method of securing evidence to that effect, and perhaps at the same time of screening some one higher up from being known in the matter.

We must now go back a year or so, and at least an indication will be found as to who may have been Hamilton's original informant and may have desired to be unknown. In April, 1827, Van Buren and Cambreleng paid a visit to Crawford at the latter's home.<sup>42</sup> They were both old supporters of Crawford, both politicians to the marrow, and their visit was not for the purpose of cheering the lonely hours of a much broken old man. Politics was the game they played and the outlook of the political field at that time was, beyond doubt, their frequent subject of conversation. Indeed, Crawford says as much in the letter referred to. A Presidential election was only a year and a half ahead, Jackson far in the lead as the candidate of the opposition to Adams, and Calhoun, hated of Crawford and feared by Van Buren, very prominent for the second office. Only a few months later, moreover, Crawford was actively engaged in correspondence far and wide in his effort to prevent the nomination of Calhoun.

It is almost inconceivable under these circumstances that Crawford should not have told those highly distinguished visitors his alleged true version of the events in Monroe's cabinet. It seems that in every probability here is the source whence, directly or by subterranean burrowings, the knowledge of this great secret came originally to Hamilton's ears. Van Buren's later denials of all knowledge of the intrigue will be mentioned hereafter.

The existence of Crawford's letter was long kept unknown, and few, if any, others were told of it, until not only Jackson's election but some eight months after he became President. In November, 1829, however, at a dinner given by him to Monroe, the matter advanced a step,—and a very important one. Lewis, Eaton, and Marshal Tench Ringgold were pres-

<sup>42</sup> Crawford's letter of December 14, 1827, to Alfred Balch, printed in Calhoun's "Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," pp. 356, 357.

ent, and the latter told Lewis that in the Seminole discussion Monroe had been Jackson's only friend. Lewis expressed great surprise, and with the feline innocence<sup>43</sup> of his class drew Ringgold on by saying that Calhoun was always understood to have favored Jackson. Later in the evening, when Eaton, Lewis and Jackson were left alone, the two former had some talk as to the earlier conversation with Ringgold. Jackson, interrupted in his reverie under the inspiration of a pipe and wreaths of smoke, asked ere long what they were talking about, and was told what Ringgold had said. He naturally expressed great surprise.

Evidently, the psychological moment had at length arrived. Lewis at once told Jackson of the Forsyth letter, and the consequence was that the very next day this equerry was dispatched to New York to secure the precious document and show it to Jackson. Hamilton had some conscientious scruples, however, and thought that he ought first to obtain Forsyth's permission. To this, Jackson assented, and as Hamilton and Forsyth were both soon to be in Washington at the opening of the session, the latter was spoken to there, but he in turn had scruples and said that Crawford should be asked about it. So this step also was taken, but it remains buried in mystery why all the months from early December, 1829, to April 16, 1830, were allowed to pass by before Forsyth's letter of inquiry was sent to Crawford. This was three days after the events of the Jefferson Anniversary Dinner, and perhaps here again we may find a psychological moment. Crawford's answer was written April 30 and was handed over to Jackson on May 12.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> "See you now;  
Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth;  
And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,  
With windlasses, and with assays of bias,  
By indirections find directions out."

<sup>44</sup> On all this subject in general, see "Major Lewis's Narrative," in Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 310-330, and Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 506, *et seq.* The latter author's use of the Jackson and Van Buren Papers has rendered his narrative very useful, and I owe much of my account to him. See, also, Calhoun's "Pamphlet" in his "Works," Vol. VI, "Appendix," pp. 349-445, or Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, pp. 11-24; his later statement and Hamilton's in *ibid.*, pp. 41-45; Van Buren's denial in *ibid.*, p. 45; and Forsyth's statement in *ibid.*, p. 88.

By that time, Calhoun and Jackson were already drifting far apart. Their relations had indeed at no time been close, and the former said, in 1837: "There never was any intimacy, at any time, between him and myself. Our relations were simply friendly, without being in any degree confidential." <sup>45</sup> Now numerous jealousies and distrusts had arisen. These had probably begun with the formation of the cabinet, while the very recent Jefferson Birthday incident had left a sting, and the refusal to call on Mrs. Eaton was rankling deep. Everything was ripe for an explosion. The very day (May 13) after receiving Crawford's letter to Forsyth, Jackson enclosed a copy to Calhoun with the name of Hamilton, Van Buren's close friend and supporter, suppressed, remarking in his accompanying letter upon the great surprise he felt at the statements and facts presented by Crawford, "so different from what I had heretofore understood to be correct," and desiring "to learn of you whether it be possible that the information given is correct; whether it can be, under all the circumstance of which you and I are both informed, that any attempt seriously to affect me was moved and sustained by you in the cabinet council."

Here was a portentous incident indeed for Calhoun, and perhaps he at once foresaw its probable effect on his great ambition. He answered shortly the same day, promising a full reply later. This was sent on May 29th and freely admitted that in the cabinet he had at first maintained that Jackson's conduct should be investigated, but added that cabinet councils were not for the object of bringing together "opinions already formed, but to form opinions on the course which the Government ought to pursue, after full and mature deliberation," and that it is accordingly the duty of members to present doubts and objections. He then went on to say that his arguments were met by others "growing out of a more enlarged view of the subject, as connected with the conduct of Spain and her officers. . . . After deliberately weighing every question, when the members of the cabinet came to form their final opinion, on a view of the whole ground, it was unani-

<sup>45</sup> Speech in Senate on February 23, 1837. "Works," Vol. III, p. 51.

mously determined, as I understood, in favor of the course adopted."

This was the gist of the whole matter, but of course the controversy ran on long over many other subjects as well as with other people. It is impossible, nor is it desirable, to go into all these details. Calhoun unearthed the story of the underground burrowings against his character with untiring energy and with much success, but was never able to trace the intrigue up to Van Buren. Monroe, the members of his cabinet at the time, and many others were appealed to for their evidence as to the matters involved, and the numerous points of the controversy put in the clear light that Calhoun was so markedly able to throw on everything. He even appealed, after Crawford had done the same, to John Quincy Adams, with whom,—owing to political differences,—he had long had no relations and there was a sort of rapprochement between the two men, though Adams once for a short time suspected that Calhoun was suppressing some of the important papers.<sup>46</sup>

The breach between the President and Vice-President was not known to the public at the time, but rumors of it were circulating by the next January (1831), and Calhoun's absence from the Executive Mansion on New Year's Day aided to confirm these. In February,<sup>47</sup> he published a pamphlet on the subject containing the correspondence and his evidence. That it was a very strong defense of himself and showed a long-

<sup>46</sup> John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, pp. 311, 323, 324, 325, 331, and see 332, 336, 340. These relations did not long continue, and I do not think the men were ever close together again. Adams said in 1843 with evident bitterness that he was entitled by precedent to a second term as president, and that it "was lost to him by the strenuous, bitter and persevering opposition of John C. Calhoun, who of course carried the entire South with him and such others as he could influence. His own eye was doubtless fixed upon the Presidency." Geo. P. Fisher's "Life of Benjamin Silliman," Vol. I, p. 367.

<sup>47</sup> Adams says the pamphlet was published late in the night of February 16 (*ibid.*, p. 319), and later publications in the matter were made by Calhoun in the "U. S. Telegraph" of February 22 and 25, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 324, 325, 327: these latter are to be found in Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, pp. 42-45; while Hamilton's Statement in the "Evening Post" is to be found in *ibid.*, pp. 41, 42, and Forsyth's publication in the Georgia "Constitutionalist" in *ibid.*, p. 88. Calhoun's pamphlet is also reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 11-24.



continued intrigue to bring about a breach between him and Jackson will hardly be doubted by any one. Long, it certainly was, and large parts treated of the hidden intrigue with which Jackson had had nothing to do, but this latter was vital to Calhoun, and his pamphlet was of course intended for the public far more than for Jackson. Doubtless, his answer of May 29th had equally been written with the expectation that it would some day be published.

Calhoun thought<sup>48</sup> that his pamphlet had a great influence on the public, and it is very remarkable that overtures looking to a reconciliation were made to him early in 1831, before the appearance of his pamphlet but at a time when much of the correspondence had been seen by many people.<sup>49</sup> He wrote his brother-in-law on January 13, 1831, that "every opening was made for me to renew my intercourse with the President, which I have declined, and will continue so to do, till he retracts what he has done. His friends are much alarmed."

It would, of course, not do to conclude from this evidence from one side alone that Jackson, or even his friends, for once sought to make peace in the heat of battle; but the statement is borne out by evidence of a conclusive character. Van Buren wrote<sup>50</sup> to precisely the same effect in his autobiography, adding that the efforts nearly succeeded and that, if they had done so, Calhoun would have reached the goal of his ambition; and J. A. Hamilton also knew of the matter and wrote Jackson on February 3, 1831, that Lewis had told him "you had from the solicitations of the friends of both parties promised to bury the affair in oblivion, provided the other party will act in good faith."<sup>51</sup> I know of no like instance in Jackson's career. He made up quarrels with several people, years after their occurrence, when his blood had cooled

<sup>48</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 290, 292. There is no little evidence to this same effect; but, on the other hand, Buchanan wrote from Washington ("Works," by Moore, Vol. II, pp. 166, 167) on February 18, that the pamphlet "has not produced the sensation here which was expected. I think it will not injure Jackson in the estimation of his friends in Pennsylvania."

<sup>49</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 279, 280.

<sup>50</sup> Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 516, 517.

<sup>51</sup> J. A. Hamilton's "Reminiscences," pp. 195, 196.

off, but there must have been serious alarm in his camp to lead to the proposals made to Calhoun in this case, when the *gaudium certaminis* was still on.

Probably, too, it was a lingering hope of reconciliation that had led Calhoun to submit his pamphlet before publication to a friend of Jackson, in order that anything offensive to the latter might be omitted. Grundy seems to have acted in this matter for Calhoun, and called on Eaton as a friend of Jackson to go over the manuscript with him. They did this together, and alterations were suggested by Eaton, which Calhoun apparently agreed to. The main object was to get the pamphlet in such shape that Jackson would not feel obliged to answer publicly, and Eaton was to have explained all this to the President, but did not, because he concluded it would be "improper." Perhaps he feared an explosion of temper.<sup>52</sup>

Despite his overtures for a reconciliation, Jackson was evidently still in high wrath, and, in the end of 1830, before the quarrel became publicly known, seems to have been writing of Calhoun as "an ambitious demagogue . . . [who] would sacrifice friends and country, and move heaven and earth to gratify his unholy ambition,"<sup>53</sup> and again he wrote of him to a friend,<sup>54</sup> at about the same time:

You know the confidence I once had in that gentleman. . . . I have a right to believe that most of the troubles, vexations and difficulties I have had to encounter, since my arrival in this city, have been caused by his friends. But for the present let this suffice. I find that Mr. Calhoun objects to the apportionment of the surplus revenues among the several States, after the public debt is paid. He is, also, silent on the bank question, and is believed to have encouraged the introduction and adoption of the resolutions in the South Carolina Legislature relative to the tariff. I wish you to have a few numbers written on the apportionment of the surplus revenue, after the debt is paid. It

<sup>52</sup> Eaton's statement in the "Globe" of March 26, 1831, reproduced in Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, p. 88.

<sup>53</sup> Letter in New York Public Library, quoted in Jervy's "Hayne," p. 280.

<sup>54</sup> Letter of December 31, 1830, to Judge Overton, in Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 294, 295.

is the only thing that can allay the jealousies arising between the different sections of the country.

This was mild enough, but with the public quarrel all bars were down, and in the latter half of 1831 Jackson was writing to Van Buren:

You may rest assured Duff Green, Calhoun & Co. are politically dead.

And again:

The fruitful mind of the great intriguer Calhoun with his aid Duff is upon the rack to find some plan to destroy me.

And still another time:

What must a moral world or community think of a man so perversely prone to secret lying as John C. Calhoun is proven to be?

William R. King, too, described Calhoun to Van Buren in 1833 as “(politically), a dead cock in the pit.”<sup>55</sup>

Mention should be made here of the fact that, during the heat of this contest, about a month before the publication of Calhoun’s pamphlet, there seems to have been a serious misunderstanding between Calhoun and Van Buren, and J. Q. Adams wrote on January 13, 1831, “there has been a very prevalent rumor that a challenge passed between them.”<sup>56</sup> The matter was amicably settled about that time, but I have not learned what was the origin of the dispute.

It seems to me perfectly clear that Calhoun proved conclusively the entire propriety of his course in the cabinet in 1819, nor had Jackson any right to feel that there was shown at that time the least hostility to him. To suggest at first blush that the general’s conduct should be made a matter of inquiry was not only justifiable but quite to be expected under the extraordinary circumstances. But there is another view of the matter to be considered, relating to subsequent events, and in this aspect Jackson’s amazement and wrath at Craw-

<sup>55</sup> Letters of July 11, September 5, and November 14, 1831, and of January 9, 1833, in the Van Buren Papers in Library of Congress.

<sup>56</sup> “Memoirs,” Vol. VIII, p. 274.

ford's information are not to be wondered at. He had always believed that Calhoun was his special defender in the Seminole discussion, and in 1819,—or 1821,<sup>57</sup>—offered his well-known toast to "John C. Calhoun,—an honest man, 'the noblest work of God,'" and wrote in 1825 that he was satisfied "Calhoun was the only friend I had in the cabinet." To be informed so circumstantially to the direct contrary would have surprised any one, let alone a person of Jackson's stamp.

The main question then is whether Calhoun was to blame for the existence of Jackson's belief that he had been the latter's special defender. There was certainly no duty to go to the general and tell him the details of one's course in the matter, but the silence followed had its unpleasant features, and here is the weak spot in Calhoun's conduct. It is probable that ✓ opinions in regard to the matter had been expressed in his presence by Jackson which were wide of the actual state of the case and showed an entire conviction that the Secretary of War had been his chief defender, and to let these impressions stand without correction was at least a painful necessity of the occasion.

It is not unlikely, moreover, that Calhoun did more than once, what we know he did in February, 1828, to J. A. Hamilton, shield himself under the verbal form of a question and give an answer, which, while strictly true, did yet produce an erroneous impression on his questioner. But what else could he do? What course can a man follow, when asked a question which there is no right to ask? On the whole, I should say that he was not to blame and that his conduct was necessary in the great affairs he was concerned in, but it was a painful situation to be placed in, and no one could expect the other

✓ <sup>57</sup> As both Lewis (see his statement in Parton's "Jackson," Vol. III, pp. 311-14) and Jackson himself ("Exposition" in "Benton's View" Vol. I, p. 177), say this toast was given at Winchester, Va., while Jackson was on the way to Washington (January, 1819) to defend himself against the Congressional attack in the Seminole matter, I hardly feel at liberty to contradict them. I have, however, been entirely unable to find any mention of it in the papers of that time, and do find that it was given by him at a dinner at Nashville, upon his return home from Pensacola, in 1821. "The National Intelligencer" of December 8, 1821. Lewis probably only repeated what Jackson had told him, and either Jackson's memory was at fault, or he gave the same toast twice.



side to look upon his actions otherwise than as deception.

Calhoun thought all through the controversy, and probably to the end of his life, that Van Buren was at the bottom of the attack upon him and so stated in more than one instance.<sup>58</sup> Van Buren denied having had anything to do with it, and said that Hamilton's applications to Forsyth in 1828 and 1830 were made without his advice or procurement, adding that "he has, at no period, taken any part" in the matter.<sup>59</sup> But this does not cover the question of his having learned of Crawford's charges, when visiting the latter with Cambreleng in April, 1827, nor deny that it was either through him or his friends that Hamilton acquired knowledge of the story at an early date. Probably, he could not have denied this, but, when once the luscious secret was thus started on its course, he was far too adroit to allow himself to be publicly caught in such an effort to ruin a rival. Nor was there the least necessity. His friends were quite enough. Perhaps Van Buren's relation to the matter has been fairly summed up by saying that he was "studiously ignorant" <sup>60</sup> of it.

At a later date, Jackson prepared an answer to Calhoun, which he at one time probably intended to print and issue. He sent it in April, 1832, to J. A. Hamilton for examination, but Hamilton "urgently advised him not to publish."<sup>61</sup> It was doubtless the same paper with which Calhoun thought in June of the same year that "Genl. Jackson is about to come before the publick,"<sup>62</sup> but it did not then nor for many years see the light of day. Benton says it was withheld, because Jackson decided it was unbecoming<sup>63</sup> for the President to engage in newspaper controversy, and he reproduces in his "View" <sup>64</sup>

<sup>58</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 289, 290. John Quincy Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 305.

<sup>59</sup> Van Buren's "Statement" of February 25, 1831, in the "U. S. Telegraph" of the 26th, and reprinted in Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, p. 45. See, also, Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, pp. 513-15.

<sup>60</sup> Hunt's "Calhoun," p. 112.

<sup>61</sup> J. A. Hamilton's "Reminiscences," pp. 244, 245.

<sup>62</sup> "Correspondence," p. 321.

<sup>63</sup> These words are written in June, 1912, when two would-be candidates of high Eastern culture have progressed far from such crude notions of a rough backwoodsman.

<sup>64</sup> Vol. I, pp. 167-180. Jackson's circumstantial story of the answer he received to the Rhea letter is of course referred to, and I, at least, cannot

portions — probably the greater part — of the answer, in which the curious reader may find absolutely insoluble differences between Jackson and his supporters on one side, and Monroe, Calhoun, and others on the opposite side.

solve that mystery without questioning the veracity of one side or the other. Like instances have occurred in very recent days.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE DRAMA OF NULLIFICATION

Defiance Discussed in South Carolina — Calhoun's Hesitations and Presidential Hopes — McDuffie's Speech of May 19, 1831 — Calhoun Declares Himself — The Tariff Act of 1832 — Letter to Governor Hamilton — The Nullification Convention — The Unionists — Elected to Senate — Death of Presidential Hopes.

MEANWHILE, lowering clouds were fast rolling up, far away to the South, and all signs indicated the breaking of a storm of tropical fury. Carolina, as her sons have ever loved to call her, was making ready, small and alone as she was, to defy the Federal power and the man of iron nerve who then occupied the Presidential office. It was a strange drama, and it turned out later to be but the prologue to a far greater and a terrible tragedy.

Probably all the leading men of South Carolina engaged in public affairs and the majority of those taking any interest in politics knew pretty well what Nullification was and had some idea of how it was to be applied, after the publication of the "Exposition" and "Protest," at the end of 1828; but, of course, the average citizen had not yet given much attention to the doctrine. Endless discussion was still necessary to bring about general acceptance and carry the State upon the issue. It was evidently agitated in every way for a long period, and earnest arguments, of which Calhoun's various papers are beyond doubt the most able,<sup>1</sup> addressed to the reason as well as to the feelings of the voters.

<sup>1</sup> Chancellor Harper, too, at Columbia, on September 20, 1830, delivered so closely reasoned an address upon the subject that the character of his audience is hard to realize. It was printed in 1832, and a copy exists in the Library of the University of South Carolina, and also in the Library Co. of Philadelphia.

Hamilton had an active hand in this agitation in general and was (as has been shown) the first to announce the doctrine from the stump. He wrote Calhoun<sup>2</sup> on May 10, 1829:

I have written to Hayne and Pinckney to keep up the fire on the tariff, and shall not be idle for the *Southern Review*<sup>3</sup> this summer at North Hampton.

On the other side was, *e. g.*, Judge Richardson's Address to the People,<sup>4</sup> in which he combatted most of the positions of the Nullifiers and warned the people that, if they voted to call a Convention, it must nullify and could not discuss, for that would be rebellion on its part. The body would only meet to declare the decision already made by the State. On the general doctrine, he objected that nothing was clear, and no one of their great statesmen had yet staked his reputation on the position that a State could nullify and yet remain in the Union. Is Nullification Secession? he asked. And again;

The advocates of this refined doctrine seem to forget that if the nullification be itself *nullified* by any foreign power or powers whatever [probably meaning by a Convention of the States], that the sovereign right of the State is subject to control from abroad, which denies every attribute and characteristic attached to the meaning of sovereign power. . . . My understanding cannot get over this stumbling block in the way. . . .

In the winter of 1829-30, the subject was freely discussed in the South Carolina newspapers. Some were outspoken in

<sup>2</sup> "Calhoun Correspondence," p. 808. B. F. Perry ("Reminiscences," p. 143) writes that Hamilton "was the gallant leader of the nullification party in South Carolina. He originated the nullification clubs, which were established in every district of the State, and which carried the election that fall [1831], in two-thirds of the election districts. Mr. Calhoun was the author of nullification in South Carolina, but Governor Hamilton made it a success throughout the State. But for him it would have fallen still-born, or been crushed in its swaddling clothes."

<sup>3</sup> Possibly two anonymous reviews of certain publications, which are in the "*Southern Review*" for August, 1830, pp. 206 *et seq.*, and for November, 1830, pp. 421 *et seq.*, are by Hamilton.

<sup>4</sup> "To the People, an Address in five numbers, originally published in the '*Camden Journal*' by 'Jefferson,' republished by permission of the author, Hon. J. S. Richardson, together with his speech delivered at the Statesborough Dinner, in Opposition to Disunion, Convention and Nullification." Charleston 1830. Pamphlet in Library of College of Charleston.



its favor, while others thought the whole doctrine absurd and were disgusted to hear it spoken of.<sup>5</sup> The idea, they would say, of nullifying and yet remaining a part of the Union; and so various writers under assumed names of ancient Rome threshed again over the same grain and chaff which had already several times before in our history been winnowed in other parts of the country. All this went to the education of the voting masses, but besides these there were some particular leaders whom both sides were anxious to gain as recruits.

William Drayton was one of these. Belonging to a family of power and wealth in a community where family counted for a great deal, and having shown marked ability in Congress, no wonder the nullifiers strove to bring him over entirely to their side. He was already one of their stoutest champions upon the main issue of the tariff, but refused entirely the remedy of Nullification. The first effort is said by one writer to have been to dragoon and drive him, and at some dinner McDuffie, famous among orators for the vehemence of his action, is said to have appealed pointedly to him "as one of those who had drawn the state into her then alternative of resistance . . . or tame submission. He quoted the speeches of Colonel Drayton delivered in Congress, full of invective and menace, committing the State to use force, if force were necessary."<sup>6</sup>

Later, gentle leading was tried at a dinner given at Charleston on July 4, 1830, to Hayne and Drayton. There was a vast crowd present, and Drayton was tremendously cheered as he rose to respond to the toast to him,—“with devoted firmness he has pursued the dictates of his conscience in opposition to the request of a respected portion of his constituents—we honor him for his independence.” He said, however, once more that he could not accept Nullification, and the toast he gave expressed the wish that the flag may “ever wave, with undiminished lustre, over free, sovereign,

<sup>5</sup> McMaster's "United States," Vol. VI, pp. 52, 53.

<sup>6</sup> "Memoirs of James Louis Petigru," by William J. Grayson, pp. 111, 112. I have found no other evidence of this meeting and it may well be apocryphal. Perhaps Grayson confounded it with the meeting of July 4, 1830; but he narrates it very clearly.

and 'United States.' " Nor could he be shaken by the gentle suasion and splendid eloquence of Hayne nor by James Hamilton, Jr.'s, insinuating prediction that, however much he might differ from them at that time on details, yet as the text of his opinions affirmed the right of resistance, when South Carolina did act, he would be found in the van.<sup>7</sup>

Drayton remained an Unionist to the end, even voted in 1833 for the Force Bill, and was finally one of those to leave the State. Others, and there were far more of them, took the opposite course and from opponents became outspoken and earnest advocates of the doctrine of Nullification. Conspicuous among these was Chancellor Harper, who was a Nationalist in 1826 but became a leading nullifier and one of the chief supporters of the doctrine with his pen, though apparently always disliking Calhoun.<sup>8</sup> Wm. C. Preston, too, had formerly held other views, but was early won over by Calhoun.<sup>9</sup> And David R. Williams, who had strongly opposed the earlier New England State Rights movements, became in time a staunch nullifier.<sup>10</sup> Much the same might be said of Hamilton, McDuffie, Hayne and others; nor was the record of Calhoun himself very different.

All these events were of course well known and closely observed by Calhoun, and he was certainly by this time a leader in the whole movement, though it will soon appear that there were even yet times when he was not fast enough for the hot bloods and hesitated to take the awful plunge in full view of the whole country. Evidently, some others, too, hesitated at times on the brink. Thomas Ritchie, of the Richmond *Enquirer* thought in June, 1830, that the Southern troubles were far less menacing, and wrote <sup>11</sup> his brother on the 8th of the month:

I had this day long conversations with Stevenson and with

<sup>7</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 375-92.

<sup>8</sup> Hunt's "Calhoun," p. 61. Letter of Thomas Cooper in "American Historical Review," (1900-01), p. 728.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Pendleton's "Alexander H. Stephens," p. 32. Hunt's "Calhoun," p. 237.

<sup>11</sup> "The John Branch Historical Papers," of Randolph Macon College, Vol. III, pp. 207-209.

McDuffie. I infer from the remarks and tone of the latter that the storm in South Carolina is blowing over, that the proceedings of Congress<sup>12</sup> for the last few days previous to adjournment will have the effect of tranquillizing her excited politicians. . . . I told him very plainly that in my opinion Virginia would not co-operate in such a measure. He said the most the politicians of S. C. had thought of doing was to declare the Tariff null and void by a Convention, and then leaving it to her Juries to refuse giving Judgments on the Revenue Bonds. He seemed to think that even this course would now be abandoned. . . . I confess upon the whole his tone is much softened down, and that I have almost lost all fear of a *storm from the South*.

To just what extent Ritchie's understanding of McDuffie was correct must remain uncertain. He may have been guided to some extent by his feelings, but Hayne also wrote Van Buren on October 28, 1830, that the Nullification plans were much exaggerated;<sup>13</sup> and there is, moreover, evidence that Calhoun, too, was at about that time hesitating to cross the fateful Rubicon. Thus, on September 11, 1830, he wrote a long letter<sup>14</sup> from Fort Hill to his friend Maxcy, who had evidently urged him to certain steps in some important matter as to himself — presumably in regard to the presidency. This private letter can hardly be supposed to do otherwise than represent its writer's genuine opinions and shows him full of earnest devotion to the Union but feeling compelled by the sacred interests of home to the course he and South Carolina were advocating, and absolutely convinced that they were guarding real liberty. It shows him, too, convinced by that time,—and it is, so far as I have found, his earliest expression of this belief,—that slavery was the fundamental cause of the differences between the sections, and the tariff but the occasion. The letter reads in part:

Your opinion has been made up too much, as it relates to me individually, and my future prospects. The partiality of a long and ardent friendship may be well excused in taking so re-

<sup>12</sup> Referring doubtless to the veto of the Maysville Road bill.

<sup>13</sup> Letter in Van Buren Papers, cited in Bassett's "Jackson," Vol. II, p. 558.

<sup>14</sup> The Maxcy-Markoe Collection in Library of Congress.

stricted a view; but, I fear, the world and my own judgment, would not be so lenient toward me, were I to act on it. In this, as well as in all the other trying situations, in which I have been placed, I must merge my interest, in the higher sense of duty; and to do that, which with the best lights I have, may seem right, regardless of consequences. Not that I am indifferent to what concerns myself, or my future advancement. It would be mere affectation to pretend to such indifference, but, I trust, however strong may be my ambition, my sense of duty is still stronger. . . .

From a sense of propriety connected with my relations to the General Government, I have not intermingled with the great contest between it and the State, except so far as might seem advisable to direct the eye of the state to the constitution, instead of looking beyond it, for the redress of its wrongs. My friends, out of the State, seem to think, at least many of them, that another duty is imposed on me, to step forward in order to arrest the current of events. They appear to take it for granted, that it is in my power. In this they make a great mistake. In my opinion there is but one man in this Union, who can quiet the State, I mean the President of the United States. If he were to come out decidedly in his message to Congress recognizing the justice of the complaints of the South, and throwing his weight without equivocation on the side of equalizing the burdens and benefits of the Union, the State would undoubtedly pause, in the hope of redress by the General Government, but for me, who have so little control over its movements, to attempt to stay the present current, were I so inclined, would, under my impression, be almost an act of madness. In fact, I thought the Maysville veto, would dispose the State to make another effort through the General Government for relief, and so expressed myself freely to my friends before I left Washington, but I found on my return, that so far from that being the case, the question of Convention or no Convention already made all over the State. Nor am I surprised, when I come to reflect, that the veto had so little effect, on the publick mind here. The message was drawn up, at least in appearance, with too much art, and looked too much like courting all sides, to satisfy those, who were contending for principles, which they believed were essential to the preservation of their liberty. . . .

If, I really believed, that civil discord, revolution, or disunion



would follow from the measure contemplated, I would not hesitate, devoted to our system of government, as I am, to throw myself in the current with the view to arrest it at every hazard, but believing that the State, while she is struggling to preserve her reserved powers, is acting with devoted loyalty to the Union, no earthly consideration would induce me to do an act, or utter a sentiment, which would cast an imputation on her motives. Should the State ever look beyond her present object, to prevent a consolidation of all power in the General Government, and thereby the loss of our liberty and Union, I trust no good citizen would better understand his duty to the Union or be more prompt to perform it, than myself; but of this there is not the least fear, unless the Genl. Government should undertake to oppose force to Constitutional and peaceful remedies.

I consider the Tariff, but as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick institution of the Southern States, and the consequent direction, which that and her soil and climate have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriations in opposite relations to the majority of the Union; against the danger of which, if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the States, they must in the end be forced to rebel, or submit to have their permanent interests sacrificed, their domestick institutions subverted by Colonization and other schemes, and themselves & children reduced to wretchedness. Thus situated, the denial of the right of the State to interfere constitutionally in the last resort, more alarms the thinking, than all other causes. . . .

Again, on November 3, when the Legislature was soon to meet and the question of calling a convention to be decided, he wrote Maxcy:

I see a great crisis. I pray God that our beloved country may pass it in safety. I did hope that the election of General Jackson would have carried us through by his firmness and patriotism, with safety. May he yet do it; but my hope is faint indeed.

As is well known, this first effort to call a Convention failed at the session of the State Legislature in the end of 1830.

<sup>15</sup> Maxcy-Markoe Collection, *ibidem*.

Its success would certainly have meant Nullification. Preston had made the motion to call a Convention after the ensuing session of Congress, but D. E. Huger then moved a vastly milder measure, and Preston's motion, which required a two-thirds vote, barely secured an actual majority in the House of 60 Ayes to 56 Noes. A correspondent of the *Courier* wrote that "never has there, in my knowledge, been such intense and bitter excitement in the Legislature," while far-off Niles indulged in an altogether premature pæan of triumph as to the complete defeat the nullifiers would suffer at the next election.<sup>16</sup>

Other steps, which these latter doubtless regarded with more satisfaction, had better success in the Legislature, and it is likely that Calhoun, who was usually very punctual in attending Congress but did not this year reach Washington until December 27,<sup>17</sup> had remained South in consequence of these matters. Not only was William Smith defeated for the U. S. Senatorship, but the Legislature once more passed a series of resolutions,<sup>18</sup> which had evidently been drawn in close accord with the famous Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. They asserted the general doctrines of State Rights, and added that the tariff acts were "deliberate and highly dangerous and oppressive violations of the constitutional compact, and that whenever any State, which is suffering under this oppression, shall lose all reasonable hope of redress from the wisdom and justice of the Federal Government, it will be its right and duty to interpose, in its sovereign capacity, for the purpose of arresting the progress of the evil occasioned by the said unconstitutional acts."

At the session of Congress of 1830-31, another effort was made by the Southerners, which must be referred to. The right to have a decree of the highest court of a State revised

<sup>16</sup> Jervcy's "Hayne," 284, 285; Charleston "Courier" of December 3, 1830; Niles's Register, Vol. XXXIX, p. 330.

<sup>17</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXIX, p. 333.

<sup>18</sup> South Carolina Laws, &c., 1830, p. 59. See, also, Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXIX, pp. 304, 305. Jackson thought Calhoun had encouraged the introduction of these resolutions; letter of December 31, 1830, to Judge Overton quoted *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 408, 409.

by the United States Supreme Court had been inserted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 by the fathers fresh from the Constitutional Convention, but had always been a subject of attack by the ultra State-Rights School, and the intention to authorize it denied. The provision might well come to be very inconvenient to South Carolina in her Nullification struggle, and on December 21 Warren R. Davis introduced a bill into the House to repeal it. This was favorably reported from committee, but was lost in the House on January 29.

Calhoun had not yet reached Washington, at the time of the introduction of the measure, and there is nothing definite to connect him with it, but Davis was his close friend, and Calhoun wrote Hammond on the subject on January 15th, remarking that the discussion "will doubtless strengthen our doctrines, as the occurrence in Georgia has done." He seems to have thought the repeal would pass the House, and added: "however strange it may seem, there are many zealously in favour of the repeal, who are violently opposed to what they call Nullification,<sup>19</sup> as if the appeal did not comprehend and go beyond Nullification."

In this same letter of January 15, 1831, events were given another push forward. Calhoun wrote that, as an united effort of the South seemed hopeless of attainment during Jackson's time: "we must next look to the action of our own State, as she is the only one, that can possibly put herself on her sovereignty." In other words, the answers of the sister States had been so unfavorable, that it was plain they would not join in the movement. South Carolina alone must nullify.

Historians have differed in regard to how far Calhoun was known at the time as the author of the "Exposition" and as a leader in general in directing the course of his State.

<sup>19</sup> Calhoun did not like the word Nullification,—perhaps because it implied more than he meant. His purpose was to force the calling of a convention of the States. "Nullification," so he is reported as saying, "is not my word. I never use it. I always say State Interposition. My purpose is a suspensive veto to compel the installing of the highest tribunal provided in the Constitution, to decide on the point in dispute. I do not wish to destroy the Union, I only wish to make it honest." Charles Coterworth Pinckney's "John C. Calhoun, from a Southern Standpoint," "Lippincott's Magazine," Vol. LXII, pp. 81-90.

What has been quoted, however, from his Autobiography in regard to the authorization he gave Preston to name him as the writer, and again what he said to many visitors at Fort Hill in the summer of 1828 as to his ideas of the proper course to pursue, can hardly leave much doubt that the public men of South Carolina generally knew his beliefs and his actions. This receives confirmation, too, from what Poinsett told Adams<sup>20</sup> in August of 1830 that Calhoun was at the bottom of the whole agitation and was "the instigator of the most violent measures."

It does not at all follow from this, however, that the general public of South Carolina or leading men in other parts of the country knew his relations to the matter, and the evidence seems to show that they did not. Adams's note of Poinsett's remark indicates surprise, and Benton, writing of January, 1830, says: "Mr. Calhoun had not then uncovered his position in regard to Nullification."<sup>21</sup>

A few indications, too, reach us from South Carolina. Thus, the *Charleston Courier*,<sup>22</sup> in announcing the appearance of Calhoun's letter of July 26, 1831,<sup>23</sup> in the *Pendleton Messenger*, spoke of it as an ingenious defense of the doctrines of the "Exposition," "which is understood to have been written by Mr. Calhoun." And "Civis" in the same paper of August 15, while equally saying that Calhoun had written the "Exposition," yet added that he had only now at length announced himself and had theretofore been in a most pitiable situation. Then the writer goes on:

It is believed that Mr. Calhoun was anxious he should be concealed. It has been frequently denied that he was the author, and both he and his friends indulged a hope that it could not be fastened upon him.

But longer concealment became impossible, added Civis, and

<sup>20</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 237. Poinsett added, it may be said as a picture of the time, that he had come away from South Carolina, "because it was in every respect too hot for him."

<sup>21</sup> "Thirty Years' View," Vol. I, p. 142, referring to the Hayne-Webster debate.

<sup>22</sup> Issue of August 11, 1831.

<sup>23</sup> See *infra*, pp. 435, 436.



therefore he has come out and is now ruined, a laughing stock.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Judge Richardson, in his address of 1830, argued strongly against Nullification, and then wrote:

Not one of our great statesmen has said that the constitutional right to nullify a federal law is clear; and that this is the time for the people to practise it. Whatever obscure rumor there may be on the subject, we cannot trace the principle up to any direct sanction of our esteemed Vice-President.

It will soon appear, too, that the Unionists took the ground in 1831 that he had not declared himself and sought to drive him to do so.

It is true that he had been connected at times with some toasts, which seemed to indicate his opinions clearly enough. Thus, as has been seen, at a dinner on July 4, 1828, he had proposed "The Congress of '76—they taught the world how oppression could be successfully resisted, may the lesson teach rulers that their only safety is in justice and moderation."<sup>25</sup> And again, at a public dinner given him at Pendleton in the end of March, 1831, one of the regular toasts was "The Union—May the period be indefinitely postponed when we may be compelled to choose between its dissolution, and submission to a government of unlimited powers."<sup>26</sup>

Still there was nothing to connect him directly with nullification, in the minds of the multitude. The fact of his connection was evidently denied,<sup>27</sup> as well as asserted. Nor is it likely that he wanted his beliefs to be widely known. He was still burning with passion to be President and had lingering hopes of success, while his open siding with the Nullifiers would evidently extinguish for the time that dream of his ambition. It too plainly meant the loss of the North, and

<sup>24</sup> The reader will bear in mind that the "Courier" was strongly Unionist.

<sup>25</sup> *Ante*, Vol. II, p. 373.

<sup>26</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XL, p. 171.

<sup>27</sup> On August 21, 1831, shortly after Calhoun had fully announced his views on nullification to the public in his letter of July 26 to the Pendleton "Messenger" (*infra*, pp. 435, 436), Duff Green wrote to Crallé that Calhoun's "friends had been taught to believe that he was not a nullifier." "Calhoun As Seen by his Political Friends," etc., in "Publications of Southern History Association," Vol. VII, p. 167.

we shall soon see that he fully appreciated this at the time. Ambition and mere self-interest may well have kept him back from hurrying on into the contest, but they cannot have impelled him to it, as the world has thought they did. No wonder, indeed, that he stood on the brink, hesitating, and no wonder that this course of his lasted so long that the hot bloods of South Carolina became a little distrustful and even sought to dragoon him.

At some time during this winter of 1830-31, he had said to M. L. Davis, a well-known writer interested in public affairs, that he was the strong man of the South for the Presidency and would receive the votes of all those States except Georgia, and Davis understood him to intend to be a candidate against Jackson at the approaching election.<sup>28</sup> In the latter part of that month, too, it was perfectly apparent (as will very shortly be shown) to Hamilton and Hammond<sup>29</sup> of South Carolina that he was still under the obsession of presidential hopes. As late as May, after those two leading men had shown very plainly their entire want of sympathy with him in this, though he wrote to Hammond on the 16th:

As to myself, I feel but little solicitude. In the present state of things, I have but little ambition to administer the Government.

Yet his real feelings were evidently much more clearly expressed in a letter of the 25th to his friend Van Deventer, to whom he wrote:

I am at perfect liberty to determine the position I may assume, unrestricted by any other obligation, except those of patriotism and duty. It is time enough to take my stand. An early development would do mischief, instead of good. Moderation becomes, in my situation, alike a dictate of duty and prudence; but you may rest assured of one thing, that I will in the coming contest act second to no one. I feel that it would degrade me. I will stand on my own ground, which I know to be strong in principle and the publick support. I do not fear to carry the

<sup>28</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 333.

<sup>29</sup> James H. Hammond, then editor of the "Southern Times," of Columbia.

whole South with me, acting as it becomes my duty, which I will take care to do. I never stood stronger. I have the strongest assurance of a decided and successful support in Virginia which in the present state of things is all important; but whatever strength I may have, I will deem it to be my duty, in the present critical state of our affairs, to direct to the publick good exclusively.

Even in December, he was not absolutely without hope and in speaking of Jackson, said of himself that he "had it in his power to annihilate him—but would act on the defensive."<sup>30</sup>

It will shortly be shown, however, that long ere December he had cast the die, which he had so long been balancing in his hand, and declared his views to the public in the fullest manner. It had indeed, in May, if not earlier, grown apparent that he must do so. He was in Columbia in the middle of March, after the session of Congress, and had a long conversation with Hammond on public affairs, of which the latter made extensive notes. These fully bear out all that has been said of his hopes and hesitations, as well as of the doubts of him entertained by Hammond and at least one other South Carolina leader. As Hammond writes in his Memorandum:<sup>31</sup>

COLUMBIA, 18th March, 1831.

I called at 7 o'clock this morning at Judge DeSaussure's to see Mr. Calhoun, the Vice President of the United States. He is on his way from Washington to his residence in Pendleton. On receiving notice of his arrival in town, yesterday morning, I paid him a visit of civility, and my call this morning was in consequence of a wish wh. he expressed to have some private conversation with me. He was alone, and immediately entered freely into the discussion of the affairs of the Nation. He said that great changes had taken and were taking place now in the political elements and that the course of a few months would exhibit a situation of parties in the country as extraordinary, as it had been unexpected. Genl. Jackson he said was losing the confidence of the Republican party every where, and even Tennessee had to a man sustained him (Mr. C) in the late rupture wh.

<sup>30</sup> "Correspondence," p. 305.

<sup>31</sup> "Nullification in South Carolina, 1830-34," "American Historical Review," Vol. VI (1900-01), pp. 741-745.

had taken place between himself and the General. Kentucky was with him,—so was Pennsylvania, and Virginia with the exception of Stevenson and Archer. In fact three fourths of the members of Congress were with him agt. the President. That he (Gen. J) had deserted all his political positions; he had first intimated he would not be a candidate for re-election, and now was; that he would not appoint members of Congress to office and had done so continually, and in short was as jealous of his military fame, as ever was Othello of his wife and easily played upon with it, by the cunning men by whom he is surrounded. For these reasons he thought confidence of the Republican party in General Jackson very much diminished; and for himself, he had dissolved all ties, political or otherwise, with him and forever. He did not think him as sincere a man, as he once did. With regard to the opposition, Mr. Calhoun thought he could discern a crack in that party also. The Tariff-men were beginning to believe that to push their policy any further would be a desperate movement, that would in all probability destroy the whole of it, and therefore the most reflecting among them were not disposed to support Henry Clay, for fear of his going too far with the system. Mr. Webster he thought the only very prominent man thoroughly in favor of Mr. Clay. The members from Kentucky had gone home resolved to push the election against Clay, tho' not in favor of Jackson. Should they succeed Mr. Clay was gone, and his partizans hating Genl. Jackson and Mr. Van Buren as they did, would unite upon any man to put him out. They would even take him (Mr. C) with nullification on his head. (Judge Martin<sup>32</sup> was in the room and heard this expression also.) In this state of affairs he thought best for the South to stand uncommitted on the Presidential question and to rally and concentrate her strength in pushing the principles for which she had been of late contending. He then spoke of the three great interests of the Nation, The North, The South and the West. They had been struggling in a fierce war with each other and he thought the period was approaching that was to determine whether they could be reconciled or not so as to perpetuate the Union. He was of opinion that they could. The interest of the North was a manufacturing and protecting one, that of the South Free Trade, and that of the West was involved in the distribution of the lands and Internal Improvements. How were they to be

<sup>32</sup> William D. Martin, whose term as M. C. had just expired.



reconciled? The West must have some visible appropriations to counter-balance those for the improvement of the Harbours, fortifications &c of the Atlantic States, of which they were exceedingly jealous. And in the distribution of every acre of the public land they felt a deep solicitude. He would therefore gratify them with a system of internal improvements. And here he spoke fully and freely of his opinions on this subject. He said he had always doubted of the Constitutionality of Internal Improvements and that in all his Reports and Speeches on the subject, he had never once committed himself on the Constitutional ground. . . . Mr. Clay, he said, had seized upon In. Im. as a hobby and ridden it to death. Carried it much further than he ever intended to do and made it odious. In fact for the last five years, he said, he had seen that it would not do and had told his friends in Congress that the system, as carried on, must be arrested. Mr. Calhoun proposed to amend the Constitution for the purpose of making these In. Im. and to make the public lands the great fund to be set apart for that purpose. He did not agree with Mr. Hayne, in his project of giving these lands away, wh. would at once unsettle the whole landed property of the U. S. Nor did he think as well of Mr. Webster's plan of doling them away by littles to the people, thus constituting them a great gambling fund, for corrupt speculations. The advantages to the South from this system would be very great. By connecting the channels of the West with those to the Atlantic it would bring the trade at once to its point [port?] thro' the Southern States. He spoke of the Union of the Ohio and the Kenhawa wh. would make Virginia one state. Of the trade that would come to Charleston through the Saluda Gap wh. together with a rail-road from that city to Florence on the Tennessee River, and a canal thro' the cape of Florida would make it the great City of the South. The Free Trade System was that of the South and thus would she reap the advantages. He did not dwell upon this latter proposition, but showed that in this manner the interests of the West and South might readily be reconciled. But how was the North to be prevailed on to give up the protecting system?

Mr. Calhoun said that he was for direct taxation ultimately, but at present he aimed only at reducing the Tariff down to the Revenue point — about Eleven or Twelve millions per annum, wh. would enable the government to pay the civil list handsomely.

He said he was no radical in this and thought the government should be liberal in its constitutional expenditures. The Tariff at this point might be so adjusted as to suit the Northern people better than it did now. The general increase of duty on every article had diminished the profits of each individually by adding to the cost of every thing necessary to the production of each manufacturer. He would propose to single out some of the most important articles and giving them a liberal protection, enhance their profits still further by lowering the duties upon all (or) nearly all the other articles of necessary consumption. He said that the Northern manufacturers, if they took an extended view of things, must look to a foreign market and with that object it would be their desire and their most urgent interest, to cheapen everything in the country but their own peculiar manufactures. Taking this view of it, he thought the Northern people might easily be induced to lower the Tariff to the revenue point and thus reconcile the interests of the North and South. This is a pretty full view of Mr. Calhoun's plan of reconciliation. He thought it practicable—at all events worth trying. If it failed or matters continued going forward as they now did he looked upon disunion as inevitable. And he thought it best, for the system of plunder such as it was now was the most despicable of all possible forms of government. For his part he would not administer the government as it was now operating. He regarded it as a despicable ambition. It would be administering an insolvent estate,—and one, said Judge Martin who had entered the room during our conversation, that would soon have to plead *plene administravit*. If things could be fixed upon the basis he proposed the government would be strengthened, and regain the confidence of the people. It would prevent the traffic of interests now carried on. In this game the North could beat us. We being the payer and they the receiver they could outbid us with the West and always wd. do it.

When I started to come away Mr. Calhoun took his hat, and we walked together for some distance. He then hinted pretty strongly that if things went right, he might be placed in nomination for the Presidency next fall. I told him candidly that such a step would be imprudent at this moment both at home and abroad, and should not be thought of at this time. He agreed with me. He said his object was to throw himself entirely upon the South and if

possible to be more Southern if possible [*sic*]. In advancing our principles therefore, we should advance him in the only way in wh. he desired to be advanced.

This I believe is a correct outline of the long interesting interview wh. I had with Mr. Calhoun. To many of his projects I could not yield my assent, and his fine theory — if sound and republican — I fear will be found impracticable.

I dined with Mr. Calhoun to-day at Judge D's and took tea with him at Major Taylor's. He is much less disposed to harangue than usual. There is a listlessness about him wh. shows that his mind is deeply engaged and no doubt that it is on the subject of the Presidency. He is unquestionably quite feverish under the present excitement and his hopes.

Nearly three months later, on June 11, Hamilton in turn wrote as follows to Hammond from Charleston,— and his letter<sup>33</sup> shows clearly the same general tendencies on his part and the same inclination to be a little mistrustful of Calhoun's course:

. . . I have seen with great regret the course which Green<sup>34</sup> is pursuing towards us and Mr. Calhoun. He will ruin the latter if he is not checked. Green has certainly got into his head, I hope without Mr. Calhoun's sanction, that by compromising with the Manufacturers that he can be elected. Indeed Green has written me a long Epistle on the subject, holding out the most alluring probabilities of Mr. Calhoun's success and of the willingness of the Manufacturers to compromise with us on the principle of his speech in 1816. I have replied very explicitly to him that in no shape lot or scot would we be included in the arrangement, that we would take no part in the presidential election and that I was quite sure that Mr. Calhoun's prospects were as hopeless as his ruin would be certain, if he was brought to give his countenance to such a compact. He also civilly asked if we were all crazy at McDuffie's dinner [shortly to be mentioned], if we intended to start into open rebellion and insure the empire of the wh—e of Washington (Mrs. E., I suppose). To these civil things my reply was brief and explicit. That . . . we should go on and abate not one jot of our zeal in the support of our principles, which we would sacrifice to the elevation of no man

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 746, 747.

<sup>34</sup> Editor of the "U. S. Telegraph."

on earth. That as for surrendering Nullification, which he kindly recommended, that this was as impossible as his proposed league between the Nullifiers and the Manufacturers which in itself was as practicable as a confederation between the Poles and the Cossacks. I have no doubt he moves in this matter with Calhoun's sanction. Mr. Calhoun has too much sense not to see the essential weakness of his occupying a double position, Janus faced, with one expression of countenance for one side of the Potomac and another expression for the other. . . . P. S. I enclosed Mr. Calhoun copies of Green's letter to me and my letter in reply, in order that he might see the whole ground. If G. continues this course we shall have to be even more explicit than we have been in the short editorial which Pinckney [of the *Charleston Mercury*] put forth a few Days since.<sup>35</sup>

Events were now moving fast. While McDuffie was in Charleston in May a dinner was given him on the 19th, and the toasts, even more than his speech, were most outspoken for nullification. One of them read:

"Nullification — The only rightful remedy of an injured State. In itself, peaceful and constitutional. It can never lead to *Disunion* or *Civil War*, unless an unjust Government should grow so bold in usurpation as to seal its tyranny with blood."<sup>36</sup>

It will have been observed that Green was inclined to think that everybody had been crazy on this occasion. On the other hand, some correspondent wrote a Philadelphia newspaper as follows in regard to McDuffie's speech:

Never have I listened to anything half so magnificent in eloquence or half so powerful in argument. I have heard most of the great speakers of the United States, but could form no conception from their efforts, of such a display of "might of mind" and splendor of oratory as I listened to on this occasion. Indeed no words can convey to you an adequate idea of the electric power

<sup>35</sup> Probably referring to an editorial in the issue of June 9, which is, however, not very short but is aimed mainly against Green and the "U. S. Telegraph." It says that any compromise of Southern rights with the manufacturers is absolutely impossible. I could not find any later and more explicit warning. For many months later Green was still trying to secure the nomination of Calhoun: see *infra*, Vol. II, pp. 222-226.

<sup>36</sup> The *Charleston "Mercury,"* May 21, 1831.



with which his occasional bursts of indignation at our oppression swept with them the entranced feelings of his hearers. Yet the main current, and almost the entire stream of his argument, flowed on in a calm, clear, and dignified course of the most rigid and powerful logic to which I have ever listened.<sup>37</sup>

To this may be added that Hamilton wrote to Hammond:

In the excellence of the *tact* which he displayed in adapting his speech to the crisis and the community in which it was delivered, he was almost seemingly inspired.<sup>38</sup>

The Speech of McDuffie<sup>39</sup> was in great part an elaboration of the theory that our tariff laws operated "to impose a burthen upon the planters, as such, independent of the burthens they bear in common with all other classes, as the consumers of taxed articles." Various cases were put to illustrate his meaning, such as free tea on which a heavy tax is then laid, with the result that the consumer by no means pays such tax but buys less tea, so that the producer must either accept a lower price or at once greatly curtail production. Again, to show that the tariff was in effect an excise duty on exportation, he supposes two ships laden with cotton, and in all respects identical, bound for Liverpool. One is, however, compelled to pay an export duty before sailing and can buy much less of a return cargo; but the other ship starting home with a larger cargo (but subject to import duties) finds upon arrival that she is mulcted largely and is finally left in precisely the same condition as the first vessel. An illustration of essentially local flavor was that of three bakers in Charleston,— "one north of Broad Street." A tax is put on him alone and he assured the consumer will pay it, but sad experience soon demonstrates the contrary.

Finally, coming down to Nullification, McDuffie said he was perfectly ready to concede that a State could not nullify an Act of Congress by virtue of any power derived from the Constitution (as some have strangely enough thought that

<sup>37</sup> Quoted in the "National Intelligencer" of June 7, 1831.

<sup>38</sup> "Nullification in South Carolina, 1830-34," "American Historical Review," Vol. VI (1900-01), p. 746.

<sup>39</sup> Reprinted in the "National Intelligencer" of June 7, 1831, probably from the Charleston "Mercury" of May 25.

Calhoun argued): "it would be a perfect solecism to suppose any such power was conferred by the Constitution. The right flows from a higher source."<sup>40</sup> And in answer to the talk of treason and threats of consequent war and tumult, he burst out:

"Shall we be terrified by mere phantoms of blood, when our ancestors, for less cause, encountered the dreadful reality? Great God! are we the descendants of those ancestors? Are we freemen — are we men — grown men — to be frightened from the discharge of our most sacred duty, and the vindication of our most sacred rights, by the mere nursery story of raw head and bloody bones, which even the women of our country laugh to scorn? The idea of bloodshed and civil war, in a contest of this kind, is utterly ridiculous" . . . One can to some extent imagine the scene when told that McDuffie's gesticulation was at times so violent that a hearer once asked her neighbor whether his fists would not "fly off and hit somebody."<sup>41</sup>

It may be surmised that this dinner to McDuffie was arranged by Hamilton and Hammond and their friends for the very purpose of precipitating Nullification. It was given at the same time when, as has been seen, they thought Calhoun quite too slow, and Hamilton's already quoted admiration of the speech is quite consistent with his having had a part in arranging for its delivery. Beyond doubt, the mine for Nullification was fired on that 19th day of May.

Calhoun was very much displeased at the whole occurrence

<sup>40</sup> It has been maintained from these words that McDuffie was not at heart a nullifier, but I can attribute no such meaning to them. The last short sentence quoted seems on the contrary, to establish conclusively that in his opinion the right did exist. His words as to a perfect solecism are probably what has led to the conclusion on the part of some, but the expression only states what every nullifier would have admitted and even have insisted on. They all maintained that the right arose from the surrounding circumstances and not at all from the constitution. It is plain, however, that McDuffie was, at least at an early date, not enamored of the remedy and doubted its efficacy. O'Neill writes ("Bench and Bar," Vol. II, p. 466) that he knew from a conversation with McDuffie in December, 1830, that he had no faith in "Nullification as a peaceable and Constitutional measure. He believed in revolution as the only measure of redress."

<sup>41</sup> Josiah Quincy's "Figures of the Past," p. 283, as cited in Houston's "Nullification," p. 37.

Washington

18<sup>th</sup> June, 1822

My dear Sir,

The mail of this  
morning has spread joy over  
our city. Mr Duffie is not  
any sicker, but is believed to  
be safe. He so considers him-  
self, in a letter written by  
him from hours after the  
meeting. The loss entered  
the small of his back obliquely  
never having feelings undergone  
so great a change in so short  
a time

Yours friend  
J. C. Calhoun

FAC-SIMILE OF LETTER OF JOHN C. CALHOUN





and at the crisis in South Carolina's course which it precipitated. Small wonder, too, in view of the presidential hopes he expressed at nearly the same time in the letter of May 25 to Van Deventer, already quoted. Green, too (so Calhoun adds), was in "embarrassment and distress" at the matter, and Ingham wrote Calhoun, evidently to the same effect. To the latter Calhoun replied on June 16 that "the occurrence in Charleston to me was wholly unexpected. . . . I think it every way imprudent, and have so written to Hamilton. I see clearly it brings matters to a crisis; and that I must meet it, promptly and manfully. I intended to wait for Mr. Crawford's move [?] on me, so as to have the great advantage of acting on the defensive"; and then he sketches his plan of a letter to a near-by home newspaper, very much as it appeared in July.

During all this time the political struggle in South Carolina between the Nullifiers and Unionists was seething. On July 4, 1831, monster meetings were held in Charleston by both parties, and there was no little danger of violence. Hayne, possibly called upon for the purpose<sup>42</sup> with Calhoun's consent, now that the contest was evidently unavoidable, put Nullification forth definitely as his party's policy. His address<sup>43</sup> seems to bear evidence that he was not highly enamored of the remedy, and perhaps not thoroughly conversant with all the refinements of the doctrine, and he more than once emphasizes the fact that it was chosen because it was short of disunion. No one can, I think, read the address without feeling, what every known utterance of Hayne bears out, that he was deeply devoted to the Union and most anxious for some means of preserving it, at the same time that he was,—*pro aris et focis*,—engaged in the excentric Nullification contest. The sacred fanes of home and their defense were, in his associates' eyes, their very highest duty on earth.

"What then, my countrymen," he said, after reviewing the history of the matter, "remains to be done? Are you for submission? No! That is impossible. What then? Shall we dissolve the Union? God forbid. . . . [Retreat is impos-

<sup>42</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," p. 287.

<sup>43</sup> Pamphlet in Charleston Library Society.

sible. You must advance. Should all arguments fail and only the alternative be left of submission or] the interposition of the sovereign authority of the State, I say with Mr. Jefferson 'there ought to be no hesitation.' But this we are told will be Nullification. Be it so. When nullification shall be our only means of deliverance from this oppression, who is there that would not be a *nullifier*? . . . We will take any remedy that may be proposed to us, short of disunion, . . . call it Nullification or call it what you will. . . . By Nullification, then, we understand nothing more than such an interposition of State sovereignty, as may be effectual for the preservation of State Rights. . . . I consider Nullification by a State, therefore, simply as a high act of sovereignty, by which she makes known to her sister States that she deems her constitutional rights violated in so essential a particular that she cannot consent to submit to the violation . . . it brings about a crisis, but it is no dissolution of the Union. . . . Nullification, as I understand it, consists in no particular act. It is . . . the rendering *an act*, which she deems unconstitutional, null, void, and of no force within her limits, . . . We have been charged with being enemies to the Union. In the indignant spirit of insulted patriotism, you have, in the face of the world, and with one voice, hurled back the slander on the heads of its propagators. For *myself* (and I know I may say the same for *you*), I speak in the perfect sincerity of my heart when I declare my entire devotion to the Union. To preserve it I would do all that may become a patriot, who would do more is none." <sup>44</sup> He closed with the well-known words of the X Y Z episode, which were inscribed on a flag then presented, "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."

The Union meeting of the same date was perhaps chiefly

<sup>44</sup> In his speech at the Charleston Dinner of July 4, 1830, to himself and Drayton, Hayne had said, what not every Charlestonian of that day could have said: "For my single self, I am free to declare that I cherish a sincere and ardent devotion to the Union, and that to preserve it inviolate, I would willingly lay down my life." He closed with a splendid and moving flight of eloquence as to all his ties being with South Carolina and that by her he would stand. Niles's "Register," Vol. XXXVIII, p. 380.

noteworthy for the letter of Jackson, in which the President came out distinctly against the Nullifiers, and aimed to soothe the Unionists' well-known opposition to the tariff by the honeyed words that their "patriotic efforts . . . cannot be forwarded more effectually than by inculcating a reliance on the justice of the National Councils, and pointing to the fast approaching extinction of the public debt as an event which must necessarily produce modification in the revenue system, by which all interests, under a spirit of mutual accommodation and concession, will be probably <sup>45</sup> protected." More important to us here, however, was one of the toasts aimed directly at Calhoun and evidently designed to force a complete announcement of his position. It read:

"The Vice-President of the United States: His political intimates have declared their sentiments on Nullification,—will he *shrink* from an *open* exposition of his own?" <sup>46</sup>

Whatever may have been Calhoun's secret wishes and hesitations, the hint of Judge Richardson's pamphlet of 1830, this sharp jibe of the Unionists, McDuffie's speech and the seething caldron of the political struggle, made silence impossible any longer. It was announced in the *Pendleton Messenger* <sup>47</sup> of July 27, 1831, that he would soon "place his sentiments before the public without reserve" in reference to Nullification, and his well-known letter <sup>48</sup> of July 26 was printed in that paper's next issue (August 3). It was outspoken enough for any one and put him absolutely with the Nullifiers, on the basis of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the Report of Madison in Virginia and the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Cobbett's case. Thus he formulated the primordial principle of our system:

The great and fundamental distinction is that the General Gov-

<sup>45</sup> This word ought presumably to be "properly," but the reading in the text is given both in Capers's "Memminger" and in the contemporary Niles (Vol. XL, p. 351).

<sup>46</sup> H. D. Capers's "Life and Times of C. G. Memminger," pp. 37-105, 43. Jervay's "Hayne," pp. 290, 291.

<sup>47</sup> The Charleston "Courier," August 4 and 11, 1831. See also 40 Niles's "Register" (July 23, 1831), p. 361.

<sup>48</sup> "Works," Vol. VI, pp. 59-94. Niles's "Register" (August 20, 1831), Vol. XL, pp. 437-45.

ernment emanated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community. . . . This right of [State] interposition . . . I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability and safety of our political institutions. . . . I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the union of these States. I never breathed an opposite sentiment. . . .

Later on in the letter, the subject of the tariff was argued again, without material change from what he had written in the "Exposition," but with the more pronounced conclusion that "were there no exports, there would be no tariff." And the curious reader, fond of tracing the evolution of thought, or rather of expression, will find here a further development of that principle which Calhoun came soon to call the doctrine of the "concurrent majorities," and which had been touched upon in the Exposition. The exact name<sup>49</sup> is still wanting, but the whole idea is there, as it had indeed been in numbers of governments of modern days as well as of antiquity. Calhoun only analyzed and explained the matter, giving it a name and showing clearly enough its existence in our system. He usually led up to the subject by arguing the tyranny of a mere numerical majority.

Calhoun evidently appreciated the importance to himself of this step, and in sending copies of the letter to Van Deventer and Gouverneur wrote of the great doubt in regard to how it would be received at the North. "I can scarcely hope for the concurrence of my northern friends," so he wrote the latter and added in a second letter, "I know I am right. I have

<sup>49</sup> In the Address to the People of South Carolina, which he prepared for the legislative session of November-December, 1831, he uses the term "compounded majority," "Works," Vol. VI, p. 136. "Concurring majorities" first appears in the letter to Governor Hamilton of August 28, 1832, "Works," Vol. VI, pp. 152, 181. In his later writings, "concurrent" is always used. See his "Disquisition on Government," *passim*, "Works," Vol. I, pp. 1-107.



gone over the whole subject, with more care, than I ever did any other; and feel that I cannot be mistaken.”<sup>50</sup>

Can the sincerity of this man be doubted? He was human and perhaps mistaken, but struggling to find a remedy for what he and every South Carolinian to a man believed to be great wrongs to his home and his neighbors, he took up and greatly elaborated a theory of our Government as old as our birth and never quite abandoned, and then is charged with having done so because of political disappointment. It has already been shown that his new views were formed by him and that many knew of them, long before there was cause for disappointment, and recent pages have shown that he several times hesitated and held back from the final plunge, well knowing its serious effects on his ambition.

The South Carolina Legislature met again in November, 1831. Many subjects of importance were to come before it. Calhoun had, presumably at the request of some members, prepared for the session two papers,<sup>51</sup>—a Report and an Address,—but neither was used, and one of them at least was said to have been “suppressed, greatly to his mortification and indignation.” Perhaps, as with the “Exposition,” portions of them were thought too ultra, or injudicious under the circumstances.

In regard to the tariff, the Legislature resolved shortly that

<sup>50</sup> “Correspondence,” pp. 296–300; and see p. 302.

<sup>51</sup> Report prepared for the Committee on Federal Relations of the Legislature of South Carolina, at its session in November, 1831 (“Works,” Vol. VI, pp. 94–123), and Address to the People of South Carolina prepared for the members of the Legislature at the close of the session of 1831 (*ibid.*, pp. 124–144). R. B. Rhett wrote Crallé in 1854, saying that Crallé ought to include in the Works he was editing Calhoun’s “Addresses to the People of the United States and of South Carolina. He wished to have them put forth. They were read to the South Carolina delegation in Congress to obtain their judgment upon them. They were suppressed, and greatly to his mortification and indignation.” “R. B. Rhett on the Biography of Calhoun, 1854”; by Gaillard Hunt in “American Historical Review,” 1907–8, Vol. XIII, pp. 310–12. Rhett’s words doubtless refer in part to the above cited “Address to the People of South Carolina,” but perhaps not to the Report for the Committee on Federal Relations, which (though it was equally not used) is not at all in the form of an address. His letter is dated some 22 years after the event, and it may be that by the “Address to the People of the United States” he meant the paper that Calhoun wrote for the Nullification Convention a year later. “Works,” Vol. VI, pp. 193–209, and see *infra*, pp. 448, 449.

"their opinion is unchanged," while Jackson's letter to the July 4 meeting of the Union party, was attacked as "an unauthorized interference in the affairs of this State"; "Is this Legislature to be schooled and rated by the President of the United States?" they asked. But they also found reason to resolve "we regard with high gratification the sentiment expressed in his late message that the tariff ought to be reduced to the wants of Government."<sup>52</sup> These words refer of course to the presidential message of December, 1831, which omitted for the first time all reference to the distribution of the surplus and did recommend, as soon as the debt should be paid, a reduction of the tariff "to the wants of Government and an adjustment of the duties on imports with a view to equal justice in relation to all our national interests."

Jackson was much pleased with this move on his part and wrote Van Buren, on November 14,<sup>53</sup> in regard to the draft of his intended message and particularly this clause, which, he said, "will annihilate the nullifiers as they will be left without any pretext of complaint." The South Carolinians seem to have been more sincere and not to have been playing politics, for we are told that for a time after this utterance they once more had hopes of relief, without Nullification.<sup>54</sup>

The administration and not a few of the leaders were evidently in favor of real reductions, and we are told on good authority<sup>55</sup> that "the anxious wish of the administration is to make a compromise in relation to the tariff," or again, as Livingston expressed it,<sup>56</sup> that a measure to compromise the tariff would "win Jackson's heart." Adams, too, who had just re-entered the political field in that sphere where his real reputation was destined to be made and who was chairman of the House Committee on Manufactures, told his associates that

<sup>52</sup> South Carolina Laws, 1831, pp. 28 and 57.

<sup>53</sup> Van Buren Collection, in Library of Congress.

<sup>54</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography," p. 41.

<sup>55</sup> James A. Hamilton's "Reminiscences," p. 243.

<sup>56</sup> "Life of Charles J. Ingersoll," by William M. Meigs, p. 175. Ingersoll was in Washington in February and March of 1832, and had several conferences with Livingston, chiefly in regard to the bank. They talked of a plan to introduce as administration measures, bills to re-charter the bank with modifications (which latter seem to have been both shown to Jackson and agreed to by him) and to compromise the tariff.

he "became from day to day more fully convinced that this system of minimums must be abandoned, or there would be an insurrection in the South." He sounded Webster on this point, but found no encouragement.<sup>57</sup>

South Carolinians, both Unionists and Nullifiers, were present in Washington and active in this late struggle of the long contest. Poinsett was there, and wrote his friend Judge Hopkinson on February 9: <sup>58</sup>

I am here begging that something may be done to pacify the south, but doubt if I shall succeed. Both parties are obstinate. I think it probable that Congress will not act definitely upon either of the great questions before them but postpone both Bank and Tariff bills. Van Buren's rejection has thrown the camp into great confusion. His friends now wish to have him nominated for the Vice Presidency.

A bill making reductions was ere long brought in by McDuffie from the Ways and Means Committee, which seems almost to have been an answer to a memorial from the members of the South Carolina Legislature opposed to Nullification. Drayton had presented this memorial early in the session. In it the Unionists said they

. . . Are exceedingly aggrieved by the laws of the United States, imposing high duties on foreign merchandise for the protection of manufactures; the evils under which South Carolina is suffering are obvious and alarming; the great depreciation of cotton, the chief staple of her soil has reduced the profits to which the planters have long been accustomed, to such a degree, that the culture, yielding no longer an adequate compensation for their labor, is continued merely from necessity; at the same time her citizens are exorbitantly taxed on all the articles of foreign growth or production that enter into their consumption. If other causes conspire to reduce the income of her citizens, it is the tariff alone which denies them the right of converting that reduced income into such an amount of the necessities or conveniences of life as would certainly be at their command under the revenue system of moderate duties. These difficulties,

<sup>57</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, pp. 494, 499.

<sup>58</sup> Hopkinson Letters, in possession of Edward Hopkinson, Esq., of Philadelphia.

though great, might be tolerated, if the burden was equal; but they are greatly aggravated by the consideration that the benefits of the tariff are confined to the manufacturing States, and that South Carolina feels with severity the weight of the protecting system, but receives no part of the compensation. . . . Your memorialists, who fully concur with their fellow-citizens in their opposition to the tariff are of that party who regard nullification as utterly unconstitutional.<sup>59</sup>

Besides these efforts, J. A. Hamilton writes<sup>60</sup> that Louis McLane, Secretary of the Treasury, said he would "furnish a bill in that spirit which ought to be passed," and Baldwin's proposal is well known. Roughly speaking, the latter reduced the duties on all importations to 20 per cent. It was shown to Hayne and McDuffie who wanted it brought forward but did not say they would be satisfied.<sup>61</sup>

All these efforts came to nought. The protected interests had the power and could not be forced to let go their grasp on the system they had enacted. Further pressure and a more vivid sense of the serious nature of the impending conflict were necessary. The *National Intelligencer* soon saw more clearly, and wrote in the summer of 1832 with special reference to the closing words of Calhoun's letter to Governor Hamilton,<sup>62</sup>

Our readers East, West and North may judge from this language . . . to what extent the views of the prevailing party in South Carolina go. But they cannot be made to comprehend the deep excitement, and the spirit of self-devotion, which urge them towards a practical application of their doctrine.<sup>63</sup>

Calhoun foresaw from early in the session that little would

<sup>59</sup> Congressional Debates, Vol. VIII, Part 2, 1831-32, pp. 1610, 1620. Not enough praise has been awarded the Unionists of South Carolina for their brave and high-minded course. Agreeing absolutely with the Nullifiers as to the main issue of the tariff, they yet persistently, and despite being a very decided minority, struggled to the end against the only remedy which was proposed, because of their devotion to the Union. And they suffered for their course in almost every way in which a minority can be made to suffer.

<sup>60</sup> "Reminiscences," p. 243.

<sup>61</sup> J. Q. Adams's "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 482.

<sup>62</sup> Quoted *infra*, p. 446.

<sup>63</sup> Quoted in Niles's "Register," Vol. XLII, p. 373.



be done with the tariff and wrote more than one correspondent to about the following effect:

As far as I can judge from indications, the result will be the repeal of the taxes and the retention of the bounties; that is the duties will be retained on all articles the North can manufacture, and be repealed on all others. The burden will it is true be diminished, but the inequality be increased; it will be taken off the North and left on the South; off the rich and left on the poor.<sup>64</sup>

This was not an unfair description of the tariff law of that session, which received the President's approval on July 14. Its chief advantage to the South was that it did away with the minimums. The new statute was soon pronounced by responsible leaders,—Clay of the opposition, as well as the Secretary of the Treasury,—to be a final adjustment of the tariff and the permanent system of revenue, after payment of the debt.<sup>65</sup>

Hayne and numbers of the South Carolina leaders looked upon the law in one sense in the same light, and it was clearly the means which finally drove them to the conclusion that it was impossible to delay further the action they had so long been threatening. Eight of their delegation united in a letter, bearing date the day (July 13) preceding the act's approval and addressed to the People of South Carolina, in which they reviewed the history of our tariff system and added that they would not pretend to suggest the remedy. But their opinion was made clear enough at the end, when, after expressing a solemn conviction "that all hope of relief from Congress is irrevocably gone, they leave it with you, the sovereign power of the State, to determine whether the rights and liberties which you received as a precious inheritance from an illustrious ancestry, shall be tamely surrendered without a struggle, or transmitted undiminished to your posterity."<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Letter of December 27, 1831, to Armistead Burt, "Correspondence," p. 307; see, also, pp. 306, 313, 317, 319.

<sup>65</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography," pp. 41, 42. Taussig's "Tariff History," pp. 103-105, 109, 110.

<sup>66</sup> "The National Intelligencer" of July 31, 1832, reprints this letter "from the Charleston papers." It was signed by Hayne, Stephen D.

A few other events of about this period must be mentioned. Sporadic efforts looking to some other course than Nullification were still apparently making in South Carolina. Calhoun's brother-in-law conceived a plan for some application to Congress which should lead to a convention of the States. This was in December, 1831, and Calhoun wrote in reply that, at the proper stage of action, the design might have been the best, but he thought the period had "passed to make application in any form to Congress." Nothing further seems to have been done in the matter than to write about it to Calhoun and James Hamilton, Jr.

On January 25, 1832, the nomination of Van Buren as Minister to England was rejected in the Senate by Calhoun's casting vote. The Vice-President seems to have thought this would end Van Buren's career, and the story told by Benton<sup>67</sup> is well known, how he heard Calhoun say to a friend "It will kill him, sir, kill him dead. He will never kick, sir, never kick." Very different was the actual result, and in two days Jackson was writing<sup>68</sup> that the feeling was universal to nominate Van Buren by acclamation for Vice-President. In less than two weeks, Calhoun himself wrote that "the partisans of Mr. Van Buren will make the most desperate effort to force him into the V. Presidency but judging from indications, I am of the impression, they will fail."<sup>69</sup> As is well known, they by no means failed, and the rejection seems to have been a serious error on the part of Calhoun and others, and to show a lack of appreciation of the generally sound sense of the public, which at once felt that the step was but a move of rival politicians. Hayne disapproved of the action, thinking it would help to advance Van Buren,<sup>70</sup> and it has been seen that Poin-

Miller, McDuffie, Warren R. Davis, John M. Felder, John R. Griffin, W. T. Nickolls, and Robert W. Barnwell. Drayton, Blair, and Mitchell, the remaining members, were strong Unionists and would, of course, not sign, but it is not clear why the Unionist Felder joined.

<sup>67</sup> "View," Vol. I, p. 219. Benton says (*ibid.*, p. 215) that, when the vote was declared, he, on the other hand, said to a member near him: "You have broken a minister, and elected a Vice-President."

<sup>68</sup> J. A. Hamilton's "Reminiscences," p. 237.

<sup>69</sup> "Correspondence," p. 310.

<sup>70</sup> Jervey's "Hayne," pp. 494-496. The unbridled pen of Randolph wrote that the part which "the thrice double ass," Calhoun, had played in the

sett thought it had a disorganizing influence and contributed to the impossibility of securing a real reduction of the tariff.

Most great movements are to some extent met by satire, and Nullification was no exception. Early in 1832 "The Book of Nullification" was published anonymously in Charleston,—a work that contained some account of the events of the day in biblical form and language. In its ten chapters, Nullification was a graven image which John the Conjuror had promised to cast for the people, telling them that it should be set up in Convention; but in a rash moment Robert the Nullifier (Hayne) exposed it to view at an earlier date in Congress, whereupon Daniel (Webster) smote it and hurled it to earth. The idol was put together again with much difficulty by John the Conjuror (who was of course Calhoun), and hidden away carefully, with the intention of bringing it out to view in Convention. But Convention was lost in 1830 and the satire was published not long before its success two years later.

Of the characters, John the King and Andrew the King are at once easily identified, while McDuffie figures as George the Prophet; Hayne, as Robert the Nullifier, and James Hamilton, Jr., becomes James the Deluded. Robert the Englishman was Robert J. Turnbull or "Brutus," while Thersites was, of course, the loose-tongued and ultra Thomas Cooper. The sarcasm of the paper is said to have excited much attention, nor was it long before the author was known to be C. G. Memminger,<sup>71</sup> then but a modest young lawyer, but destined later in life to play a part on the Southern side in the tragedy of the Civil War.

Meanwhile, the bitter feeling against the Federal Government had grown rapidly in South Carolina. A "Disunion Drama" had been performed at Beaufort, and early in 1831 a State Rights Ball was held in Charleston, at which the

matter had made it "as easy for Benedict Arnold to get the vote of Virginia as for him" (Calhoun). Letter to Jackson quoted in Ambler's "Ritchie," p. 145, or Randolph, March 16, 1832, to Jackson in the Jackson papers in Library of Congress.

<sup>71</sup>"The Life and Times of C. G. Memminger," by Henry D. Capers, p. 107, and "Appendix," pp. 569-599.

United States flag formed no part of the decoration.<sup>72</sup> Disunion dinners, too, are said to have been eaten in almost every hamlet in the State.<sup>73</sup> And it must always be remembered that, except as to such separatist outbursts as these and as to the remedy proposed of Nullification, the State was practically a unit. Every South Carolinian, almost to a man,<sup>74</sup> believed that his section was grievously injured by the tariff laws. The Unionists, as has been seen, in numerous instances emphasized their agreement with the opposite party as to this point, even while denouncing and bitterly opposing Nullification. Doubtless, the leaders had to do this in order to hold their following together.

The agitation went on, too, in other ways quite as serious

<sup>72</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLV, p. 107. Some account of such a ball in 1833 may be found in Jervay's "Hayne," pp. 357-61.

<sup>73</sup> "South Carolina during the Nullification Struggle," by Gaillard Hunt, in "Political Science Quarterly," Vol. VI (1891), pp. 236, 241.

<sup>74</sup> Even the strong Unionist Petigru was of this opinion, in spite of his intense opposition to the Nullifiers, as the earlier sentences of the following from one of his speeches amply show: "That the tariff of protective duties ought never to have been passed; that it is contrary to the spirit of amity and concession in which the Constitution was conceived, and in which the government ought to be exercised, I freely admit; that it is injurious to the South I firmly believe, but that it is unconstitutional I wholly deny; and that it is ruinous in its operations, is no more than a rhetorical flourish." Quoted in Houston's "Nullification," p. 101, from Capers's "Memminger," p. 61. The following incident shows, the same unanimity. In 1831, two Charleston lawyers, Holmes and Mazyck, imported goods and gave bond but refused to pay, in order to lead to suit. The U. S. District Attorney at the time refused to proceed, however, on the ground that the tariff law was unconstitutional; whereupon Jackson removed him, and suit was brought by his successor. On the trial, the Court declined to receive any evidence other than of the execution of the bond, so the question of unconstitutionality could not be raised. Judgment accordingly went against the defendants, but upon a levy on a house of one of them and an offer of it at public sale, it was bought in by a State Rights man, and he refused to comply with his bid "on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the laws." When it was then put up again on account of and at the risk of this purchaser, "not a single bid could be obtained." It does not appear that further proceedings were at any time taken against the bidder ("The National Intelligencer" of November 17, 1832, quoting the Charleston "Mercury"; Hunt's "South Carolina," etc., *ut supra*, pp. 242, 243; The Charleston "Courier" of July 30, 1831). I made inquiries with the view of tracing the history of this case, but found that the records of the U. S. District Court previous to the Civil War have been destroyed or removed. The judgment-roll book remains, however, and contains an entry of "Satisfied" on the judgment against Holmes and Mazyck, without showing the date of satisfaction. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not, I think, very certain.



as the drama or social gatherings. On February 22, 1832, a Convention of Delegates of the State Rights and Free Trade Associations of South Carolina met in pursuance of notice at the Circus in Charleston. Several largely-attended meetings were held by them and an address issued, which distinctly advocated resistance and urged that their doctrines should be taught by tract and otherwise.<sup>75</sup> One other event of nearly the same period must be mentioned.

The Nullifiers had persistently maintained that Jefferson was the author of the Kentucky Resolutions, both of 1798 and 1799, in which latter occur the words: "A nullification by these sovereignties [the several States] of all unauthorized acts, done under colour of that instrument [the constitution], is the rightful remedy." This assertion had been as stoutly denied on the other side, for Jefferson's name at that date still carried great weight. Among others, Ritchie<sup>76</sup> of the *Richmond Enquirer*, whose paper was a leading organ of the Democracy, had maintained that Jefferson could not be associated with the doctrine. Madison, too, had at about this time appeared in the public prints to deny that his language in the Virginia proceedings furnished any precedent for the South Carolina doctrine of the day.<sup>77</sup>

The question as to Madison's early views had to be solved from the language he had used, with the help of his more recent explanations, while every effort was made by Ritchie and doubtless others to ferret out the truth as to Jefferson. Finally, Ritchie was shown by Jefferson's grandson a small man-

<sup>75</sup> The Charleston "Mercury," February 20 and 27, 1832; Houston's "Nullification," p. 105.

<sup>76</sup> Ritchie, as appears in other parts of this book, was altogether an opponent of Nullification. He wrote Wm. C. Rives on December 6, 1832, of Jackson's then recent message that "his tone about South Carolina is precisely what it should be." The John Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, Vol. III, p. 211.

<sup>77</sup> Madison's chief letter on the subject was to Edward Everett (Madison's "Works," 1851, Vol. IV, pp. 95-107), as dated August, 1830, and was shortly published in the "North American Review." Numerous other like letters are to be found in his works *passim*, extending over several years. Benton ("View," Vol. I, pp. 354-60) reproduces parts of these which he says, had been "recently put into print" by the liberality of a citizen of Washington. On the question of Madison's real opinions in 1789-99, see *ante*, p. 379, foot-note.

uscript book in which were found in Jefferson's own handwriting two drafts (one very greatly altered and the other a fair copy), the latter of which was evidently the original of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, with the clause using the word "nullification." Ritchie at once recognized that he had been in error and published his discovery in the *Enquirer* of March 13, 1832.<sup>78</sup> And, when we recall how recent Jefferson then was and what a weight his name still carried, no one need hesitate to believe Calhoun's statement<sup>79</sup> that "supported by this high and explicit authority, the State Rights party moved forward with renovated energy and confidence in preparing for the great issue."

During the following summer, when the time for the election was coming on apace, Calhoun contributed another paper to the discussion, in his letter of August 26, 1832, to Governor Hamilton,<sup>80</sup> which perhaps presents the Nullifiers' reasons in their strongest light. Parts are indeed of terrible force, but it is impossible to reproduce here it and the hundred other instances in which Calhoun's mind wrought out his thoughts on this subject with perhaps too clear a pure logic. The concluding sentences, however, must be quoted, for they show the sincerity of the author, and show, too, with pathetic plainness, the mistaken view which he held as to the future of the doctrines he was advocating. He wrote:

I believe the cause to be the cause of truth and justice, of union, liberty, and the Constitution, before which the ordinary party struggles of the day sink into perfect insignificance; and that it will be so regarded by the most distant posterity, I have not the slightest doubt.

This letter to Hamilton and the thousand other arguments

<sup>78</sup> These facts are all set forth in Calhoun's "Autobiography," pp. 42, 43; and the discovery of Jefferson's draft referred to in a letter of Duff Green to R. K. Crallé, dated March 12, 1832. Green Papers in Library of Congress. Mr. Warfield ("The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798," pp. 135, 136, 151, 152) objects that Jefferson's draft is not absolutely identical with the Resolutions adopted, but why should it be? Some alterations by Breckenridge in Kentucky are highly likely, but the use of the word *nullification* in both, with the other facts, seems proof enough.

<sup>79</sup> Calhoun's "Autobiography," p. 43.

<sup>80</sup> "Works," Vol. VI, pp. 144-193.

that had been and still were advanced had their effect upon the mind of a public eager for any mode of escape from the ills they were suffering, and when the election<sup>81</sup> came to be held on October 8, 1832, the Nullifiers had a majority of about 6,000 in a total poll of but 40,000<sup>82</sup> and it was well known that they had secured the necessary two-thirds vote in the Legislature. On the day of the election Calhoun wrote to Maxcy: <sup>83</sup>

Our election takes place to-day. The State Rights party will triumph by a large majority. A convention of the state will certainly be called and the act nullified; but every movement will be made with the view of preserving the Union. The end aimed at will be a General Convention of all the States, in order to adjust all constitutional differences and thus restore general harmony.

It seems<sup>84</sup> that the popular vote in favor of Nullification was about evenly divided between the up-country and the lower.

A special session of the Legislature was called by Governor Hamilton<sup>85</sup> to meet on October 22nd, and on the 26th an act was passed by more than the necessary two-thirds majority to call a Convention of the people of the State.<sup>86</sup> At the election held for this purpose, the Unionists, already badly defeated in the election for the Legislature, made but little effort,

<sup>81</sup> It was said that there was on this occasion some violence and kidnapping of voters, etc., Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, p. 205. Petigru wrote Legaré that he and his friends had to arm themselves, and that blows were aimed at him and Drayton and Poinsett struck. Letter of October 29, 1832, printed in Joseph Blyth Allston's "Life and Times of James L. Petigru" in the Charleston "Sunday News," January 21 to June 17, 1900; see issue of May 27.

<sup>82</sup> Houston's "Nullification," p. 107, citing DeBow's "Political Annals of South Carolina," 1845, p. 39. The Charleston "Mercury's" partly estimated returns indicated a majority of 8,000, in a poll of about 45,000. Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, p. 149.

<sup>83</sup> Maxcy-Markoe Collection in Library of Congress.

<sup>84</sup> Wm. A. Schaper's "Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina," printed in "Annual Report of American Historical Association" (1900) Vol. I, pp. 443, 444. Other writers have thought differently, but Mr. Schaper's conclusion is based on a very careful investigation.

<sup>85</sup> Petigru wrote Legaré on December 21, 1832: "The election was hardly declared before Jack Irvine got upon a table at the door of the State House and read the Governor's proclamation calling the Legislature." Allston's "Life" in the Charleston "Sunday News," issue of May 27, 1832.

<sup>86</sup> "Laws of South Carolina, 1834." The news of the passage of this law was followed by a discharge of cannon at the doors of the State Hall, Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, p. 175.

and of the 162 members chosen they secured but 26.<sup>87</sup> The body so elected,—the famous Nullification Convention,—met at Columbia on November 19th, 1832, and at once appointed a Select Committee of 21 to consider and report upon the matters before them. The majority party was evidently full of triumph and the *Mercury* of November 22 contained a letter from an enthusiastic correspondent, announcing that “the knell of *submission* is rung.”

The Select Committee, in its report, reviewed shortly the history of the tariff laws, and of the constant efforts made in the State against them since 1820, and then announced the “solemn truth” that “after more than ten years patient endurance of a system” believed by our people to be fatal to their prosperity and plainly unconstitutional, a crisis had come at which it must be determined whether it is in the power of the State to do anything to redress the evil. They reported two Addresses,—one to the People of South Carolina, written by Turnbull, and the other to the People of Massachusetts, etc., etc., taken in part, though not very largely, from a draft prepared by Calhoun. It was in the main written by McDuffie.<sup>88</sup>

The purpose of these papers was of course to explain and justify the action of the State. The South Carolina address asserted that “the idea of using force on an occasion of this kind is utterly at variance with the genius and spirit of the

<sup>87</sup> Houston’s “Nullification,” pp. 108, 109. Petigru also wrote to much the same effect, and said the Unionists did not even support a ticket for the Convention except in districts where they had the upper hand. Letters of October 29 and December 21, 1832, to Legaré, *ut supra*.

<sup>88</sup> P. M. Butler wrote Hammond from the Convention Hall on November 22, 1832, specifying the authors of the various papers as stated in the text here and below, except that he says generally that the address to the other States was written by McDuffie (Hammond Papers, in Library of Congress), but parts of Calhoun’s draft (“Works,” Vol. VI, pp. 193–209) are plainly to be found in it. They were doubtless adopted by McDuffie. See also Mr. Hunt’s “Calhoun,” pp. 154–156, and Jervey’s “Hayne,” p. 219. The “Address” is not to the “co-States,” but to Massachusetts, etc., etc., by name. The term “co-States” was doubtless used afterwards for brevity. Both “Addresses” are to be found in the “Proceedings of the Conventions of the People of South Carolina held in 1832, 1833 and 1852,” Columbia, South Carolina, 1860, pp. 53–77, and also in Cooper’s “Statutes at Large,” Vol. I, pp. 334–54. It has already been said, (*ante*, p. 437) that perhaps this draft of Calhoun is one of those which R. B. Rhett wrote in 1854 as having been “suppressed, . . . greatly to his [Calhoun’s] mortification and indignation.”



American people"; while that to the other States ran in part:

Having formed this resolution, we *will* throw off this oppression *at every hazard* [and in the event of a resort to military force, we] will, forthwith, provide for the organization of a new and separate Government.

Perhaps more important than these threats and forebodings of trouble, was an offer of compromise (not contained in Calhoun's draft) in the following words:

But we are willing to make a large sacrifice to preserve the Union; and with a distinct declaration that it is a concession on our part, we will consent that the same rate of duty may be imposed upon the protected articles that shall be imposed upon the unprotected, provided that no more revenue be raised than is necessary to meet the demands of the Government for constitutional purposes; and provided also that a duty, substantially uniform be imposed upon all foreign imports.<sup>89</sup>

The great document of the Convention, however, was of course the Ordinance of Nullification, written by Harper. This now so strange monument of our past enacted that the Tariff Acts of May 19, 1828, and of July 14, 1832,<sup>90</sup> "are unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning thereof, and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens." It was passed on November 24 by a vote of 136 to 26 and was to go into effect on February 1, 1833. After then directing that the Legislature should pass the laws necessary to carry the ordinance into effect, the convention adjourned to meet on the call of the President.

The task left to the Legislature was not an easy one, but a very complete system was enacted. A replevin was allowed for goods held for payment of duties and the sheriff might distrain on the personal property of the offender, in case any one should refuse to deliver under the replevin or the goods should be later seized from him. A *habeas corpus* was directed to

<sup>89</sup> "The Journals of the Conventions," etc., p. 76.

<sup>90</sup> The Act of 1828 was then in force, and that of 1832 was to go into effect on March 4, 1833.

issue on behalf of any one arrested by a federal court in the matter, nor was a sale under a federal decree to vest title. Copies of court records were not to be issued, and penalties were placed on clerks of the courts violating this provision in any case where the authority of the ordinance was drawn in question.

Heavy penalties were also imposed on such as should resist process under the act or should re-seize goods, which had been replevied, and on a jailer detaining any one in jail for disobeying the annulled law, or private persons so doing, or leasing or permitting to be used for such purpose any place, house, or building. An oath to obey the ordinance was required to be taken by all officers, various militia laws were enacted, the purchase of ten thousand stand of arms and necessary accoutrements authorized, and the Governor empowered to call the men out in case the Government of the United States should try to enforce the nullified acts. A resolution in favor of a convention of the States was also passed as had been directed by the Nullifying Convention.<sup>91</sup> Calhoun was present at Columbia during at least part of this session.<sup>92</sup>

These steps of the Nullifiers did not by any means escape opposition. The Unionists denounced them, and the test-oath became a subject of litigation and was in the end adjudged by a divided court to be unconstitutional.<sup>93</sup> Meetings were, moreover, held at various times during the agitation to oppose the course of the majority. At one of these, which met in Charleston as early as June of 1832, the Unionists suggested the calling of a Southern Convention.<sup>94</sup> Another meeting in opposition to Nullification had been held at Chester, South Caro-

<sup>91</sup> "Cooper's Statutes at Large," Vol. I, pp. 371-376. "Laws of South Carolina, 1832," pp. 15-20, 22-27, 28, 29, 42, 51, 52, 58, 65, 66. Calhoun's "Works," Vol. VI, p. 207.

<sup>92</sup> "Correspondence," p. 322. His resignation of the Vice-Presidency, on December 28, is dated at Columbia. "The National Intelligencer" of January 7, 1833.

<sup>93</sup> State vs. Hunt, 2, Hill, p. 1, decided in 1834. Of the three members of the court, Johnson and O'Neill agreed in the judgment, for different reasons, while Harper dissented.

<sup>94</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLII, p. 300. So far as I know this was the first suggestion ever made of a Southern Convention. It is curious that the idea should have originated with the Unionists, of all people.

lina, probably in the preceding March.<sup>95</sup> It seems, too, that in December, 1832, Hamilton and Calhoun were hung in effigy at Spartanburg.<sup>96</sup>

The Unionists were once more in session in September, at Columbia, when the Legislature was about to meet and issue the call for the Nullification Convention. On this occasion, they again took up the idea of a Southern Convention, and resolved "with great unanimity" that, in case of the concurrence of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, they "recommend to the citizens of this state to meet in their several districts and elect delegates to attend a general meeting of the citizens of the said states in convention, to take into consideration the grievances under which we labor, and the means and measure of redress. "And they pledged themselves to abide by such measures as said convention should recommend."<sup>97</sup>

The address they issued emphasized once more their opposition to the tariff, while of the remedy proposed by the majority it said: "Regarded as a peaceful remedy, Nullification resolves itself into a mere law-suit, and may be shortly dismissed as a feeble, inefficient measure. . . . Regarded as a forcible interposition of the sovereign power of the State, the objects to it lie far deeper," in that it is utterly unconstitutional.<sup>98</sup>

Again, after the passage of the law calling the convention, the Unionists held a meeting in Columbia on October 25 and issued an address against the call and recommending their

<sup>95</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLII, p. 92.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, XLIII, p. 301, quoting the Raleigh "Register" of December 28.

<sup>97</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, p. 66. The doings of this convention were perhaps those which Calhoun referred to in a letter of November 8, 1832, to a relative as "of an extraordinary character, indeed, and [they] certainly indicate a factious spirit, as well as a very selfish one. They have been well answered by our Committee." The proposal of a Southern Convention was evidently to some extent a move for position on the political chess-board. Petigru wrote Legaré on October 29, 1832, "We had our Union Convention in September, and put forth our Southern Convention prospectus, but all would not do. Nothing could supplant nullification but something that would go ahead of it." Allston's "Life," *ut supra*, in Charleston "Sunday News" of May 27, 1900.

<sup>98</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, pp. 87-89.

party to send delegates to the convention:<sup>99</sup> and finally after the passage of the Ordinance of Nullification they met in Columbia on December 10, according to adjournment. The number of delegates present was estimated at 150,<sup>100</sup> and resolutions were received from the people of Greenville, Spartanburg, Pendleton, Chester, and apparently other districts. A long "solemn protest" against Nullification was issued, and Randell Hunt offered resolutions to the effect that they acknowledged no allegiance to any government but that of the United States, that the general committee be directed to inquire "whether it is not expedient to give a military organization to the Union Party throughout the State," and whether it will be necessary to call in the assistance of the General Government.<sup>101</sup>

These resolutions were referred with only one dissenting vote, but it seems that no report was made on them. At a later date Hunt said that they had been substantially approved "by the citizens of Greenville, Spartanburg and other portions of our own State," as well as outside the State.<sup>102</sup>

The Legislature of South Carolina had had one other question to meet at its session in the late fall of 1832. The time had then arrived when, if ever, a position must be taken as to the presidency. Little interest had been shown in it in the State, and Hamilton had written that "they would take no part in the presidential election."<sup>103</sup> Calhoun, too, wrote Crallé

<sup>99</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, p. 175. It has already been said that, in the actual election, little effort was, however, made by the Unionists.

<sup>100</sup> Petigru wrote: "We mustered very strong," Letter to Legaré dated December 21, 1832: Allston's "Life," in "Sunday News" of May 27, 1900.

<sup>101</sup> Niles's "Register," Vol. XLIII, pp. 279, 291-93; "The National Intelligencer" of November 17 and 22, and December 25, 1832. The Unionists seem not to have been united on the question of opposing by arms the course of the controlling party in the State. James S. Rhett said in a public speech in 1844 that, when nullification was about to be enforced, he was sent by the Union party to Jackson on a secret mission and was directed to tell him that, "whilst we were anxious to do our duty as good citizens of the Union, no union man would commit treason against his State." Niles's "Register," Vol. LXVII, pp. 43, 44.

<sup>102</sup> Randell Hunt's Address of January 21 to the Union Party of South Carolina, Pamphlet in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. The Address bears date January 21, but no year is given. It was evidently first printed in some newspaper and internal evidence shows that it was of 1833.

<sup>103</sup> Letter to Hammond of June 11, 1832, quoted *ante* pp. 429, 430.



in May,—doubtless with a view to the course to be followed by Crallé's Richmond newspaper:

. . . The question of the V. Pres<sup>r</sup> ought to be entered into by you just to the extent, and no farther, than may be necessary to strengthen the state rights doctrine in your State. . . . Let us place the Presidential question under our foot; and make it the criterion of patriotism not to take office under the Gen<sup>l</sup> Gov<sup>t</sup> till the Constitution be restored, and the South liberated from her burdens.<sup>104</sup>

In South Carolina at that date, the Legislature always chose the Presidential electors, but it was manifestly not to be expected of the State to cast her vote for Jackson, who was hotly denouncing her course and threatening co-ercion, nor was the natural alternative easier, for Clay typified the so-called American System, which was anathema to them. The position they had taken left apparently no choice but that, which usually seems a lame and impotent conclusion, of throwing their vote away. Accordingly, resolutions were passed by the Legislature on December 3, to the effect that it was inexpedient for South Carolina to vote for either one of the candidates for President or Vice-President and that therefore "in testimony of our high esteem and consideration for the patriotic devotion of John Floyd of Virginia and Henry Lee of Massachusetts to the principles of State Rights, and the great cause of Free Trade, we will give to them the vote of this State for President and Vice-President."<sup>105</sup>

Congress came together in regular session on December 3, 1832, at a time when Nullification had been enacted in South Carolina and most of the events above narrated had taken place. The whole country was in a condition of great excitement and anxiety, and the arrest of Calhoun was expected upon his arrival in Washington early in January of 1833. People all felt that we were face to face with a most serious

<sup>104</sup> "Correspondence," pp. 320, 321. The candidates of the leading parties for Vice-President were Van Buren and John Sergeant.

<sup>105</sup> The Charleston "Mercury" of December 6, 1832. John Floyd, long a State Rights Democrat, was then Governor of Virginia. He had strongly criticized Jackson's Proclamation. Henry Lee of Massachusetts had written in support of free trade.

emergency growing out of the tariff. Jackson, it has been seen, had advocated reductions in his more recent utterances and his message at the opening of this session again contained the same recommendation, in spite of the fact that the Act of 1832 had been widely and authoritatively proclaimed to be our definitive Tariff.

Indeed, the Message went much further, for, omitting all reference to distribution, it recommended economy in expenditures and then added that the approaching extinction of the public debt

. . . affords the means of further provision for all the objects of general welfare and public defence which the constitution authorizes, and presents the occasion for such further reduction in the revenue as may not be required for them. From the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, it will be seen that after the present year, such a reduction may be made to a considerable extent. [Long and patient reflection had strengthened the opinions which the President had theretofore expressed to Congress on this subject and he then goes on that the soundest maxims of public policy and our principles recommend] a proper adaptation of the revenue to the expenditures, and they also require that the expenditure shall be limited to what, by an economical administration, shall be consistent with the simplicity of the Government and necessary to an efficient public service. . . . I recommend that it [the legislative protection] be gradually diminished and that, as far as may be consistent with these objects [to counteract foreign regulations and secure a supply of articles essential to national independence and safety in time of war], the whole scheme of duties be reduced to the revenue standard as soon as a just regard to the faith of the government and to the preservation of the large capital invested in establishments of domestic industry, will permit.

This language was certainly highly conciliatory and presumably to no little extent intended by Jackson as a carrying out of his indications to the Unionists. It may probably also be accepted as proof that he was sincere in his desire for real reductions and far from satisfied with the Act of 1832. John Quincy Adams wrote <sup>106</sup> however, that the message threw away

<sup>106</sup> "Memoirs," Vol. VIII, p. 503.

all neutrality "and surrenders the whole Union to the nullifiers of the South and the land-robbers of the West." With these "land-robbers" we are not here concerned, but the historian may perhaps find a high patriotism in Jackson's course and will at least conclude that the carping diarist would not have shown nearly as firm a front under the appalling difficulties of the day as did Jackson. He certainly had not done so in the contest of his time with Georgia.

A few days after the meeting of Congress, Jackson issued his famous Proclamation of December 10, 1832,<sup>107</sup> against the Nullifiers, which was in turn answered by Hayne, the new Governor of South Carolina, on December 20th, in pursuance of the request of the Legislature.<sup>108</sup> Hayne having been elected to the Governorship on December 10th,<sup>109</sup> had resigned the Senatorship,<sup>110</sup> and on the 12th of the same month, Calhoun was elected to the U. S. Senate to fill the unexpired term of Hayne. He then in turn resigned the Vice-Presidency on December 28.<sup>111</sup> His election had been foreseen by at least one politician during the preceding summer,<sup>112</sup> and of course the exchange was made in pursuance of an arrangement among

<sup>107</sup> The proclamation was reviewed at great length by "A Virginian" (L. W. Tazewell), in thirteen numbers, originally printed in the "Norfolk and Portsmouth Herald." The review was later published in pamphlet form and contains 112 pages. A copy is preserved in the Library of the University of South Carolina.

<sup>108</sup> "Laws of South Carolina," 1832, p. 37.

<sup>109</sup> Charleston "Mercury" of November 30, and December 13, 1832. He was elected by the Legislature by 123 votes to 26 blank.

<sup>110</sup> Mr. Hunt ("Life of Calhoun," pp. 159, 160) writes that Hayne by no means wanted to give up the senatorship. See also Jervey's "Hayne," p. 322.

<sup>111</sup> "Life of Calhoun," by Gaillard Hunt, pp. 159, 160. The exact form of the resignation is given by Mr. Hunt. It was addressed to the Secretary of State, and was sent by that officer on January 4, 1833, with a letter of his own, to the President of the Senate, in pursuance of the directions of Jackson. Nothing further was then done. Hugh L. White had already on the opening day of the session (December 3rd) been elected President *Pro tem.*, "the Vice-President of the United States being absent," and he remained in the office until March 4, 1833. Journal of the Senate; and see "The National Intelligencer" for January 7, 1833.

<sup>112</sup> Duff Green wrote to Crallé on July 28: "Mr. Calhoun will come into the Senate and be at the head of that party, who rallies for the Constitution and Liberty. *Of this, however, say nothing.* I see this must be the result. His master spirit will place him there." "Calhoun as seen by his Friends," in "Publications of Southern History Association," Vol. VII, pp. 276, 277.

the leaders. It may be safely surmised that the object in view was to have Calhoun present the South Carolina views on the floor of the Senate. He was now known far and wide as their great defender.

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